PEOPLE v. GOULDBOURNE (2026)

This Court presided over a combined Huntley/Dunaway/Payton hearing. The People called as witnesses Detectives Joseph Rivera and Kyle Keiser. The defense called Cynthia Rodriguez, an investigator from counsel's office. The Court also reviewed the court file, and exhibits, including a photograph of the hallway outside the apartment where the defendant was arrested and a video recording of her Mirandized statement. The Court finds all witnesses to be credible and makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of law.

Findings of Fact

The defendant faces charges of manslaughter in the second degree and criminally negligent homicide for the death of her newborn daughter. Detective Keiser learned through interviews of the defendant's mother, Karetha Brown, and a friend of the defendant, Gary Taylor, the circumstances that surrounded the infant's birth and death by asphyxiation. On August 31, 2023, the defendant, who was pregnant with twins, came to her mother's home complaining of pain and Ms. Brown took her to Metropolitan Hospital. Before receiving any care, however, the defendant left. The Court record suggests (and the parties agree) that it is likely the defendant feared the removal of her babies if she stayed at the hospital since she had previously had twins removed from her care based on positive drug screenings at birth. After the defendant left the hospital, she returned to her mother's home where her mother begged her to get medical care. The defendant refused, used the bathroom and left her mother's home.

Detective Keiser learned that sometime later, the defendant arrived at Gary Taylor's residence located at 2854 Bronx Park East, Apartment S32. Mr. Taylor knew the defendant from the neighborhood, that she was homeless and he would let her stay at times as a guest and cook meals for her. Mr. Taylor related that after arriving at his apartment the defendant went to use the bathroom. He then heard a baby crying and realized the defendant had given birth. When she emerged, he saw her holding the newborn baby. Mr. Taylor called 911 for an ambulance. Before help arrived, the defendant left holding a bag. Mr. Taylor went to look in the bathroom and could not find the baby. Ring camera footage from Mr. Taylor's apartment showed the defendant walking down the stairs with a bag at around 3:30 a.m.

The following morning at around 6:30 a.m., the defendant returned to her mother's home and handed her mother the bag telling her, “Don't look too quick.” Inside the bag, Ms. Brown found the newborn baby girl, who did not appear to be breathing. The defendant's mother called 911 and again before help arrived the defendant left. Ultimately, patrol officers found the defendant five or six blocks from her mother's home and transported her to Metropolitan Hospital. At the hospital, the defendant gave birth to the second child. She was also placed on a psychiatric hold. The medical examiner ruled the cause of death as suffocation and the manner of death as a homicide and communicated this information in a meeting that Detective Keiser attended.

On January 28, 2024, NYPD activated a probable cause I-Card, and the following day Detective Joseph Rivera, a member of the United States Marshals Fugitive Task Force, was assigned to execute the defendant's arrest. The United States Marshals Fugitive Taskforce is a joint operation between the New York City Police Department and the United States Department of Justice. Detective Rivera's work involves making arrests, including for fugitives wanted for homicide, violent cases, and “worst of the worst” or “WOW” cases. Detective Keiser informed Detective Rivera about details of the case and his bases for probable cause. He also gave the addresses of Ms. Brown and Mr. Taylor as possible places the defendant was known to frequent. When searching the defendant in various databases, Detective Rivera learned that she did not have a prior criminal record.

Detective Rivera decided to look for the defendant at Mr. Taylor's address, 2854 Bronx Park East, Apartment S32, since this was the address where the alleged offense had occurred. At around 8:45 AM, on January 30, 2024, Detective Rivera and seven other United States Marshals responded to the apartment. All eight marshals stood outside of apartment S32. The defense introduced a photograph of the hallway into evidence and their investigator testified to the hallway's measurements. Its dimensions are roughly a width of 82.5 inches, a length of 87.5 inches, and 117 inches in diameter diagonally.

Detective Rivera knocked twice on the door and announced that law enforcement was present. He and the other United States Marshals were wearing bullet proof vests that stated “police” or “US Marshals.” The marshals did not draw their weapons, but each possessed a gun, taser, and handcuffs. Mr. Taylor answered the door, and after the group of marshals identified themselves, Mr. Taylor stated that it was his home and that he had two friends in the apartment. Detective Rivera asked whether the defendant was present, and Mr. Taylor replied that she was. Detective Rivera could see into the apartment and saw a man and a woman. He believed that the woman was the defendant. With the door open, Detective Rivera announced that the United States Marshals were present, and Mr. Taylor said he would get the defendant. Detective Rivera also called out the defendant's name. He announced once again the presence of the United States Marshals. At this point, the defendant came out of the apartment, Detective Rivera told her that she was wanted by the 49th Precinct Detective Squad and placed her under arrest. The defendant was cooperative, nonviolent, and did not resist. The People introduced a photograph of the defendant from the time of her arrest that depicted her as appearing wan and frail.

Detective Rivera transported the defendant to the 49th Precinct. At around 11:40 a.m., Detective Keiser and Detective Soler began to interview the defendant in a designated interview room. The interrogation was video-recorded and played for the Court. At the beginning of the recording, the detectives gave the defendant a coat because she was cold. When asked where she was staying, the defendant explained that she was staying with her friend Gary, although she did not know his address. After explaining to the defendant that she was under arrest, Detective Keiser read the defendant her Miranda rights from a card. The detective read each right at a measured pace. When the defendant answered, “I do,” to one warning and “Mhm” to another, Detective Keiser followed up to ensure the defendant's answer was “Yes.” When the defendant paused after being asked whether she would answer questions, Detective Keiser posed the question again and ensured that the defendant's answer was, again, “Yes.” From there, the detectives questioned the defendant about the birth of her daughter and the child's demise. The detectives' demeanors were appropriate and mindful of the difficult subject matter discussed. At times, the defendant said things that did not make sense, such as that her brother had hidden her daughter's body. She also mistakenly believed that the deceased baby was a boy. Detective Keiser learned that the defendant took medication for schizophrenia and bipolar disorder. After the interview, the defendant stated that she did not feel well and believed that she was pregnant again. Detective Keiser requested medical attention for the defendant, and she was transported to the hospital from the precinct.

Conclusions of Law

1. Dunaway

The People bear the burden of going forward to show the legality of the defendant's arrest in the first instance, after which the defendant carries the ultimate burden of demonstrating an illegality (People v. Berrios, 28 N.Y.2d 361, 367-68, 321 N.Y.S.2d 884, 270 N.E.2d 709 [1971]). “Probable cause does not require proof sufficient to warrant a conviction beyond a reasonable doubt but merely information sufficient to support a reasonable belief that an offense has been or is being committed” (People v. Bigelow, 66 N.Y.2d 417, 423, 497 N.Y.S.2d 630, 488 N.E.2d 451 [1985]). New York employs the Aguilar-Spinelli test, which requires that when probable cause is based on hearsay statements, the informant's basis of knowledge and reliability be established (id.). A witness's “personal observation of the events she described” can satisfy the Aguilar-Spinelli test's basis of knowledge requirement (People v. Hetrick, 80 N.Y.2d 344, 348, 590 N.Y.S.2d 183, 604 N.E.2d 732 [1992]). An “identified citizen informant” has a “built-in basis for crediting [their] reliability” (id. at 349, 590 N.Y.S.2d 183, 604 N.E.2d 732 [internal quotation marks omitted]). “Under the fellow officer rule, a police officer can make a lawful arrest even without personal knowledge sufficient to establish probable cause, so long as the officer is acting upon the direction of ․ a fellow officer ․ in possession of information sufficient to constitute probable cause” (People v. Ketcham, 93 N.Y.2d 416, 419, 690 N.Y.S.2d 874, 712 N.E.2d 1238 [1999]).

Here, Detective Keiser investigated the death of the defendant's newborn daughter by speaking with Ms. Brown and Mr. Taylor. Ms. Brown and Mr. Taylor were identified citizen informants who spoke about events that they had each personally observed (Hetrick, 80 N.Y.2d at 348-349, 590 N.Y.S.2d 183, 604 N.E.2d 732). From these witnesses, Detective Keiser learned that the defendant was pregnant, gave birth in Mr. Taylor's home, left with the baby, and then appeared at Ms. Brown's home with a bag containing the deceased child wrapped in clothing. Detective Keiser joined a meeting where the medical examiner ruled the child's death a homicide by asphyxiation. The investigation was sufficient to provide Detective Keiser with a “reasonable belief” that the defendant had recklessly and negligently caused her newborn daughter's death (Bigelow, 66 N.Y.2d at 423, 497 N.Y.S.2d 630, 488 N.E.2d 451). When Detective Rivera went out into the field to arrest the defendant, he relied upon the probable cause developed and communicated by Detective Keiser (Ketcham, 93 N.Y.2d at 419, 690 N.Y.S.2d 874, 712 N.E.2d 1238 ).

Since the defendant's arrest was supported by probable cause, the Court denies suppression of her statement as the fruit of an unlawful arrest.

2. Payton

Payton v New York, 445 U.S. 573, 576, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980) proscribes, absent exigent circumstances, the warrantless arrest entry into a suspect's home for the purpose of making a routine felony arrest. Although the defendant did not live at Mr. Taylor's home, her frequency as a guest establishes standing (see People v. Williams, 181 A.D.2d 474, 475, 581 N.Y.S.2d 21 [1st Dept. 1992], lv denied 79 N.Y.2d 1055, 584 N.Y.S.2d 1023, 596 N.E.2d 421 [1992]; People v. Crippen, 156 A.D.3d 946, 947-48, 67 N.Y.S.3d 320 [3d Dept. 2017]). She was known to reside there at times and have meals. She was present at around 3:00 AM on the date of the charged crime and 8:45 AM on the date of her arrest. The question before the Court turns on whether the defendant was “arrested” within the home when summoned outside by eight United States Marshals standing outside apartment S32. Under the circumstances herein, the Court finds that the defendant's Fourth Amendment and New York State Constitutional rights were violated.

In People v. Shaw, the Court of Appeals held that Payton proscribes not only warrantless entry into the home to effectuate a felony arrest, but also “constructive entry” (––– N.Y.3d ––––, ––– N.Y.S.3d ––––, ––– N.E.3d ––––, 2026 WL 466797, 2026 NY Slip Op 00961 [February 19, 2026]). As explained by the Court of Appeals, “[w]hen officers subject someone to a display of authority that induces them to exit the home under coercion, the sanctity of the home has been invaded to the same extent as if the officers had physically entered” (id.). “Such a show of force violates Payton and renders an arrest unlawful under both the Fourth Amendment and the New York Constitution, just as it would be if the arrest occurred within the confines of the home itself” (id.). In specifically noting that the “State Constitution encompasses a theory of constructive entry,” the Court of Appeals emphasized the State Constitution's provision of “even more robust protections against Payton violations than the Fourth Amendment” (id.) The Court of Appeals also highlighted People v. Harris, 77 N.Y.2d 434, 568 N.Y.S.2d 702, 570 N.E.2d 1051 (1991), where the Court of Appeals held under the State Constitution that, because New York law attaches the right to counsel at the time that an arrest warrant is issued, statements obtained following a Payton violation must be suppressed unless they are sufficiently attenuated.

The Court of Appeals distinguished between the use of “coercive tactics to force a defendant out of the home,” and “simply knock[ing] on a defendant's door and ask[ing] them to come outside” (id. at ––––, ––– N.Y.S.3d ––––, ––– N.E.3d ––––, 2026 WL 466797, at *4; see also United States v. Thomas, 430 F.3d 274, 277-78 [6th Cir. 2005] [noting that the difference between a “permissible consensual encounter and an impermissible constructive entry ․ turns on the show of force exhibited by police”]; United States v. Von Marschner, 849 F.2d 1477, at *2 [9th Cir. 1988] [No constructive entry where agents “knocked on [the defendant's] door, identified themselves, and invited [him] to step outside]).

Shaw involved the apprehension of a defendant who had been identified as the shooter in an incident that killed two people and paralyzed another. To effectuate the defendant's arrest, fifteen SWAT team members and additional uniformed officers arrived at the defendant's home. They came in an armored vehicle clothed in body armor and camouflage tactical attire bearing assault rifles. Seeing the defendant in a window, an investigator shouted that he should come out with his hands raised. By arresting the defendant in this manner, rather than an arrest warrant, the police hoped to interview him before the right to counsel attached. Under these facts, the Court of Appeals held that the trial court record supported a finding that “no reasonable person would have felt free to ignore the officer's command to exit the home” (Shaw, ––– N.Y.3d at ––––, ––– N.Y.S.3d ––––, ––– N.E.3d ––––, 2026 N.Y. Slip Op. 00961 *5) and affirmed the order of the Fourth Department.

Undoubtedly, there is nothing about the police encounter with the defendant herein that raises the same specter of coercion by the police. However, a determination as to whether a constructive entry has occurred requires a court to consider whether a reasonable person would have seen themselves as under arrest or felt free to ignore the command to leave the home (id.; see also Thomas, 430 F.3d at 278; United States v. Al-Azzawy, 784 F.2d 890, 893 (9th Cir. 1985)). In directing how lower courts should determine in a seizure analysis “whether a reasonable person would have believed, under the circumstances, that the officer's conduct was a significant limitation on his or her freedom”, the Court of Appeals has instructed, “[t]ypically the inquiry involves a consideration of all the facts and a weighing of their individual significance” (People v. Bora, 83 N.Y.2d 531, 535-535, 611 N.Y.S.2d 796, 634 N.E.2d 168 [1994]; see also United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 64 L.Ed.2d 497 [1980] [Seizure occurs under the United States Constitution when “in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave”]). Determination of whether a constructive entry occurred here similarly requires the Court to consider the full panoply of facts and circumstances surrounding the encounter at apartment S32.

At the time of the defendant's arrest, the defendant presented as frail, unkempt and depressed. Detective Rivera consulted with Detective Keiser and presumably knew that the defendant had been hospitalized for psychiatric reasons after giving birth and had other children removed from her care. Record searches and interviews revealed that the defendant lived an itinerant lifestyle with no fixed residence or employment. While the charges involved homicide, the allegations had been described to Detective Rivera as an aborted baby. No weapons had been used, and no adults had been physically harmed.

While there is no indication the police acted in a physically forceful or disrespectful manner towards the defendant, the plan for her apprehension displayed an extraordinary use of force unwarranted for the situation at hand. Eight United States Marshals wearing bulletproof vests responded to the apartment. Given the tight space outside the apartment, the presence of so many officers necessarily filled the hallway and likely blocked the nearby staircase. The defendant could not leave the apartment without entering a sea of armed United States Marshals. Detective Rivera testified to seeing the defendant inside the apartment from the doorway suggesting she may have also seen him and the other Marshals. The defendant's photograph, taken contemporaneously with her arrest, corroborates that she was a frail individual. The detective did not limit the encounter to knocking on the door and asking Mr. Taylor whether he could get the defendant and bring her to the doorway. Rather, Detective Rivera called out the defendant's name effectively ordering her to exit. In its totality and considering New York State's heightened protection against Payton violations emphasized in Shaw, a constructive entry occurred (id. at ––––, ––– N.Y.S.3d ––––, ––– N.E.3d ––––, 2026 WL 466797, at *3).

The Court does not suggest that the response here would never be appropriate. Had this case involved a violent, intentional homicide or other offense carried out by someone whose arrest raised concerns of safety and danger, the exigency calculus may have differed (see Al-Azzawy, 784 F.2d at 894 [exigent circumstances justified constructive entry where law enforcement reliably believed the defendant possessed explosives and was in an agitated and violent state]). Under the facts of this case, the degree and manner of the response by law enforcement responded exceeded the bounds set by the Court of Appeals in Shaw.

The defendant's arrest occurred at around 8:45 a.m. and her statement was taken at the 49th Precinct at around 11:40 a.m. The defendant's prompt transportation from the scene of arrest to the precinct and interview, with no intervening change in circumstances, demonstrates that her statement was not attenuated from the Payton violation (see Harris, 77 N.Y.2d at 441, 568 N.Y.S.2d 702, 570 N.E.2d 1051; see also People v. Chen Ren Jie, 280 A.D.2d 301, 301, 720 N.Y.S.2d 135 [1st Dept. 2001], lv denied 96 N.Y.2d 798, 726 N.Y.S.2d 376, 750 N.E.2d 78 [2001] [initial statement at precinct was suppressed as fruit of Payton violation but statement at District Attorney's Office attenuated based on seven-hour break]; People v. Harris, 63 A.D.3d 480, 480, 880 N.Y.S.2d 640 [1st Dept. 2009], lv denied 13 N.Y.3d 796, 887 N.Y.S.2d 546, 916 N.E.2d 441 [2000] [sufficient attenuation with seven-hour break between warrantless arrest and statement]). Accordingly, the defendant's statement must be suppressed.

3. Huntley

“The relevant issue on a Huntley suppression hearing is whether if the statement was made, it was made either involuntarily or without appropriate Miranda procedures” (People v. Williams, 73 A.D.2d 584, 423 N.Y.S.2d 54 [1st Dept. 1979]). The People bear the burden of proving a statement voluntary beyond a reasonable doubt (People v. Witherspoon, 66 N.Y.2d 973, 974, 498 N.Y.S.2d 789, 489 N.E.2d 758 [1985]).

“An individual may validly waive Miranda rights so long as the immediate import of those warnings is comprehended, regardless of his or her ignorance of the mechanics by which the fruits of that waiver may be used later in the criminal process” (People v. Williams, 62 N.Y.2d 285, 289, 476 N.Y.S.2d 788, 465 N.E.2d 327 [1984]). Consistent with this principle, New York appellate courts have upheld Miranda waivers where a person with mental illness or intellectual impairment understood the import of the Miranda warnings (see Williams, 62 N.Y.2d at 290, 476 N.Y.S.2d 788, 465 N.E.2d 327 ; People v. Ram, 127 A.D.3d 512, 512, 4 N.Y.S.3d 888 [1st Dept. 2015], lv denied 25 N.Y.3d 1206, 16 N.Y.S.3d 528, 37 N.E.3d 1171 [2015]; People v. Abreu-Guzman, 39 A.D.3d 413, 413, 835 N.Y.S.2d 90 [1st Dept. 2007], lv denied 9 N.Y.3d 872, 842 N.Y.S.2d 784, 874 N.E.2d 751 [2007]; People v. Capela, 97 A.D.3d 760, 761, 948 N.Y.S.2d 423 [2d Dept. 2012], lv denied 19 N.Y.3d 1024, 953 N.Y.S.2d 557, 978 N.E.2d 109 [2012]; People v. Guinyard, 72 A.D.3d 1545, 1546, 899 N.Y.S.2d 505 [4th Dept. 2010], lv denied 15 N.Y.3d 805, 908 N.Y.S.2d 165, 934 N.E.2d 899 [2010]).

Here, the video played at the hearing showed that the defendant understood the warnings as they were conveyed to her. Detective Keiser read the warnings from a Miranda card at a reasonable pace. When Detective Keiser informed the defendant that she needed to give a clear “Yes,” answer, the defendant did so. While the defendant was somewhat sullen during the interview, she did not appear preoccupied or unable to focus on what was being asked of her. She engaged with Detective Keiser during the Miranda colloquy, and the Court finds her waiver knowing and intelligent.

As to voluntariness itself, the “[d]efendant's mental condition did not cast doubt on the voluntariness of [her] statement” (People v. Sussman, 298 A.D.2d 205, 205, 748 N.Y.S.2d 552 [1st Dept. 2002], lv denied 99 N.Y.2d 585, 755 N.Y.S.2d 721, 785 N.E.2d 743 [2003]). While “conduct that does not constitute impermissible coercion when employed with nondisabled persons may impair the voluntariness of the statements of persons who are mentally ill” (People v. Knapp, 124 A.D.3d 36, 46, 995 N.Y.S.2d 869 [4th Dept. 2014], appeal withdrawn 24 N.Y.3d 1220, 4 N.Y.S.3d 608, 28 N.E.3d 44 [2015] [internal quotation marks omitted]), Detectives Keiser and Soler behaved appropriately and calmly with the defendant. Detective Keiser was aware that the defendant had been on a psychiatric hold after giving birth to her surviving child. Nothing suggested that he or Detective Soler exploited the defendant's mental health to overbear her will. She was offered a coat early in the interview because she was cold. She was allowed to pause and the detectives repeated questions where the defendant seemed unsure of what she was being asked. The interview did not extract an involuntary statement.

For all these reasons, the Court suppresses the defendant's statement as the fruit of an unattenuated Payton violation (Shaw, ––– N.Y.3d at ––––, ––– N.Y.S.3d ––––, ––– N.E.3d ––––, 2026 N.Y. Slip Op. 00961, *3; Harris, 77 N.Y.2d at 440-441, 568 N.Y.S.2d 702, 570 N.E.2d 1051). Since the statement was not involuntary, it may be reserved by the People for impeachment purposes (see People v. Maerling, 64 N.Y.2d 134, 140, 485 N.Y.S.2d 23, 474 N.E.2d 231 [1984]).

This constitutes the decision and order of the Court.

Audrey E. Stone, J.