The People of the State of New York v. Sandra Brown, Defendant. (2026)

The allegations in this case arose from the defendant allegedly stabbing her intimate partner (JH) twice, once in front and once in the back. Official court proceedings, motions, Grand Jury testimony and the defendant's statements provide the following context. Preceding the assault, the defendant, her teenage daughter and JH had been drinking and playing Karaoke. As the night wore on, JH became intoxicated and aggressive towards the defendant and her daughter. The defendant and her daughter tried to get JH to leave. Notably, the defendant lacked full mobility at the time and relied on a walker for assistance. When JH refused to leave, the defendant pulled out a large kitchen knife and stabbed him. When the police arrived, the defendant volunteered her own explanation of the occurrence, presenting the situation as a form of justification. She similarly testified before the Grand Jury and continues to maintain that she acted in self-defense. The complainant sustained serious, life-threatening injuries. He was revived twice, underwent multiple surgeries and continues to experience pain in his abdomen. Soon after the assault, he testified via video from Jacobi Hospital for the Grand Jury. A true bill was voted with a top charge of Assault in the First Degree.

As the case proceeded, JH grew increasingly reluctant to cooperate with the prosecution and finally refused to further communicate with the District Attorney's Office. Given the complainant's initial cooperation with the prosecution, the People investigated the reasons for his change in attitude. They learned that approximately a week after the filing of the indictment, the defendant began calling the complainant. As the calls continued, the People maintain that it is the defendant's actions that caused the complainant to become unavailable. The People then requested a combined Sirois hearing to determine whether the complainant's Grand Jury testimony can be introduced as evidence in the People's case in chief and a CPL § 530.12(11) to determine if the defendant willfully violated the Court's orders of protection.

The Court presided over a combined CPL § 530.12(11)/Sirois hearing. The Court heard testimony and received evidence over the course of several appearances commencing on June 12, 2026, and concluding on August 27, 2026. The People submitted call logs and a flash drive of calls placed from Rikers Island, a letter from the complainant JH attached to a pre-pleading investigation dated March 19, 2026, and T-Mobile records for a number that received calls from Rikers Island. The People also called two witnesses, Investigator Jeffry Rios who works as a liaison with Rikers Island, and Assistant District Attorney Megan Leo. The defense played portions of 22 calls that had been admitted into evidence and submitted a letter from Steps to End Family Violence. At various times, the defense represented that the complainant could be called to testify. The Court assigned the complainant independent counsel to consult with and represent him if he was called by either party as a witness. On the final day of proceedings, counsel for the complainant stated that JH did not want to appear in court and he was not called as witness.

Findings of Fact

The Court makes the following findings of fact. Investigator Rios testified to how inmates held at Rikers Island receive pin numbers for placing calls, and how inmates use their booking and case number with this pin to place calls. He explained how inmates are advised as to the regulations for placing calls and how each call commences with an audio warning that the call is recorded and may be used for law enforcement purposes. According to Investigator Rios, Securus technology is used to maintain phone logs from calls placed by inmates at Rikers Island. Through his investigation, Investigator Rios identified 3,450 calls from the defendant to the complainant over a period of seven months. In 1,450 of the phone calls, conversations ensued.

The People's second witness was Assistant District Attorney Megan Leo who works as a major case assistant in the domestic violence bureau and was assigned to prosecute this matter. The defendant was arrested on November 4th and ADA Leo first met the complainant at Jacobi Hospital on November 7th. She returned to Jacobi Hospital on November 10th and via court order took video testimony of JH for the Grand Jury proceedings. On November 13th, ADA Leo texted and called JH to advise him of the Grand Jury's vote, and on December 8th, she contacted him concerning the defendant's Supreme Court arraignment and to discuss the defendant's planned bail application. At this time, JH cooperated with the prosecution and appeared interested in remaining appraised of the case status.

In March, the complainant's attitude suddenly shifted. JH yelled at ADA Leo on the phone. As part of a defense pre-pleading report provided to the Court and People on March 19th, the complainant provided a letter on behalf of the defendant. In this letter, JH characterized the defendant as his future wife who he had known for eighteen months. He described her as a caring person. His letter did not recant or contradict his prior testimony.

Through the Riker's calls collected by Investigator Rios, the People identified a call to JH on November 25th, 2025. ADA Leo identified the recipient of the call as JH. The caller identified herself as "Mila Tursunova" but in fact was the defendant. The Court notes here that throughout the hearing, the defense never asserted that the person calling the complainant was anyone other than the defendant. Rather, the defense conceded the defendant's identity as the caller by playing several of the calls during the defense case and relying on the defendant's identity as the caller as part of the defense's hearing arguments. On the November 25th call, the following conversation ensued once the complainant answered and asked who the caller was.

Defendant: "Please just listen. This is Sandra. I'm on a recorded line. So, please just listen really quickly before you talk, because you know, I — I'm so happy to hear your voice. I'm so --- I heard everything is going on right now. I don't know what the fuck is going on. I'm happy you are okay. I'm so sorry for every fucking thing that is going on. I would never want any of this. I'm so fucking upset to the point that I would even tell you to do what you got to do, but I really, really can't, if you understand what I mean. I don't know what else to say."

JH: " You dead violated me."

Defendant: "I'm not even in control of anything right now."

JH: "You dead violating me."

Defendant: "I know. I know."

JH: "You killed me twice. I died twice. You dead violated me Sandra."

Defendant: "You know I would never — yo come on."

Eight minutes later the defendant called back the complainant once again identifying herself as "Mila Tursonova."

Defendant: "Please don't say that again. "

JH: "What you want, bro?"

Defendant: "You know me. You fucking know me. You know I — you —"

JH: "That's not it."

Defendant: "You really think that's where my heart—"

JH: "You dead — you dead to me twice."

Defendant: "You really think—"

JH: "They had to bring me back to life, Sandra, twice."

Defendant: "Listen — listen, I'm on a recorded line."

JH: "I don't give a fuck. You killed me twice, bro. And I really loved you. I was going to marry you. Why you did that to me?"

Defendant: "And you think I don't? And you think I don't?"

JH: "I mean I don't even want to talk, bro, I got nothing to say."

Approximately fifty minutes later, the defendant once again called JH, identifying herself with the name Mila. She stated: "Hello. Please say something. Hello. Hello." The call ended with no response from JH.

Later that week on Thanksgiving, the defendant called the complainant and they exchanged Thanksgiving greetings. Following this, the defendant stated: "I love you. I just want you to know that I'm hurting too. I can't eat. I can't sleep. I'm crying every fucking night. You forced my hand as well. You know I would never do anything to hurt you." A few minutes later, the defendant placed another call. JH asked her why she kept calling him, why she is saying she loves him, and how she had a smile on her face when she stabbed him. He repeated to her how he died twice. The defendant responded with a sense of incredulity at his questions.

The calls continued. In December, the calls became more intimate. The subjects ranged from the defendant sharing how she suffered a miscarriage; how she wants to care for JH; and her asking if she can call him. JH expresses forgiveness for the defendant's actions. By January, the defendant became explicit in directing JH's interactions with the prosecution. On a January 29th call, she tells JH, "So, do you know what you're going to say if they call?" JH tells her he will say he wants to drop the charges. The conversation continued. Aware that the call is recorded, the defendant hesitates in explaining herself and JH reassures her that they only listen for a couple of seconds. She then tells JH that she has been told that he needs to tell them how he has moved on with his life, and that she has learned that he cannot ignore them or it will drag the case out.

On March 31st , the Court learned that the defendant had placed 1,153 calls to the complainant. In court JH appeared along with various members of the defendant's family. Following the court appearance, the defendant called JH in the evening. She discusses how she cannot use her account to call the complainant and explains how JH can change his number. The prosecution learns of the new number and the calls continue.

In May, the Court scheduled the case for the Sirois hearing and trial. When ADA Leo contacted JH, he told her that he would not be testifying for anyone. ADA Leo also attempted to subpoena him. Despite the commencement of the Sirois hearing, the calls continued through June and the beginning of July. From the winter through the summer, the recorded calls became increasingly loving with both the defendant and complainant sharing plans to marry, have children and set up a household together.

The Court takes note that neither the defendant nor JH allege prior acts of violence before the charged assault. While the defendant maintains that she experienced childhood trauma and previous domestic violence, she does not allege any acts of violence perpetrated by JH before her arrest. Through its pre-pleading memorandums, the defense presented a history of sexual exploitation (though not at the hands of JH). At the time of this case, the defendant had open warrants relating to out-of-state crimes that may have evolved from this exploitation. There were no facts adduced at the hearing supporting the conclusion that JH exercised power and control in his relationship with the defendant. Rather, in the lengthy calls played in court, JH acts increasingly smitten and under the emotional sway of the defendant. Through the calls, JH expresses his continued trauma and pain from the assault and seems to progressively rely on the defendant for emotional support. Her promises to care for him, how he will need a wedding ring worthy of her, and the number of children they will have, coercively undermine his independence and willingness to testify.

Conclusions of Law

CPL § 530.12(11)

CPL § 530.12(11)(a) provides that where a defendant is brought before the Court for willfully failing to abide by an order of protection, the Court may revoke an order of recognizance or release under non-monetary conditions (CPL § 530.12[11][a]). The Criminal Procedure Law does not set forth a burden of proof for a willful violation finding. However, CPL § 530.12 concerns family offense orders of protection, and its violation provisions are similarly worded to those contained within the Family Court Act concerning violations of court orders (compare CPL § 530.12[11] ["[I]f, after hearing, the court is satisfied by competent proof that the defendant has willfully failed to obey any such order, the court may . . ." with Family Court § Act 846-a ["[I]f, after hearing, the court is satisfied by competent proof that the respondent has willfully failed to obey any such order, the court may . . ."]; see also Family Court Act § 1072 ["[I]f, after hearing, the court is satisfied by competent proof that the parent or other person violated the order of supervision willfully and without just cause, the court may . . ."]). Appellate precedent provides that where a Family Court intends to address a violation of a court order by imposing a definite period of incarceration, the alleged violation must be found beyond a reasonable doubt (see Matter of Cori XX. [Michael XX.-Katherine XX.], 155 AD3d 113, 115-16 [3d Dept 2017]; Matter of Rubackin v Rubackin, 62 AD3d 11, 21 [2d Dept 2009]; see also Matter of Dyandira D., 22 AD3d 354, 354 [1st Dept 2005], lv denied 6 NY3d 704 [2006]). Precedent so holds, because the imposition of jailtime as a punitive remedy that cannot be purged constitutes a finding of criminal contempt (Cori XX, 155 AD3d at 116; Rubackin, 155 AD3d at 115-116). Judiciary Law § 751(1) provides that a court may punish a violation of an order issued under CPL § 530.12 with a finding of criminal contempt and a sentence of up to three months. The Court has not been asked to sentence the defendant for the violations addressed at the hearing. The People, instead, have sought an order revoking the defendant's bail and imposing remand under CPL § 530.12(11)(a). Therefore, a burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt is inapplicable.

Clear and convincing evidence is the burden that applies to the relief sought. Appellate precedent has applied this burden to Family Court violation hearings at which a remedy other than incarceration is imposed (see Matter of Omelime v Odudukudu, 221 AD3d 1012, 1013 [2d Dept 2023], lv denied 41 NY3d 907 [2024]; Cori XX., 155 AD3d at 115-116). In addition, the Criminal Procedure Law sets forth a burden of clear and convincing evidence for other evidentiary hearings at which a defendant's bail may be revoked (see CPL § 530.60[2][b]). Since hearsay may not be used in a Family Court violation hearing (see Matter of Nicholas L. [Melissa L.], 198 AD3d 1113, 1118 [3d Dept 2021]), and the Criminal Procedure Law disallows hearsay at other hearings that may lead to a revocation of bail (see CPL 530.60[2][b], hearsay should not be considered in meeting this burden.

Here, the proof is overwhelming that the defendant willfully disobeyed the Court's orders. Repeatedly, the defendant flaunted the Court's order by calling JH. DOC business records established that these voluminous calls occurred. The defense has not disputed that the defendant was the caller heard in the recordings and has conceded the defendant's identity during argument. ADA Leo recognized JH's voice from their various interactions. Even after a court record of the defendant's hundreds of violations, the defendant deliberately continued to disregard the Court's explicit and express warnings. The proof satisfied the clear and convincing burden applied by the Court and would also satisfy a burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Pursuant to CPL § 530.12(11)(a), the Court orders the defendant's bail revoked and imposes remand as the new securing order.

Sirois Hearing

The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment provides: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against him." The right to confront witnesses, however, is not absolute, and one who obtains the absence of a witness by wrongdoing forfeits the constitutional right to confront that witness (Davis v Washington, 547 US 813 [2006]; People v Encarnacion, 87 AD3d 81 [1st Dept 2011], lv denied 17 NY3d 952). "Any other result would mock the very system of justice the confrontation clause was designed to protect" (Matter of Holtzman v Hellenbrand, 92 AD2d 405, 413 [2d Dept 2013] [internal citations omitted]).

Whenever the People allege specific facts which demonstrate a "distinct possibility" that a criminal defendant's misconduct has induced a witness' unlawful refusal to testify at trial, the People shall be given the opportunity to prove that misconduct at an evidentiary Sirois hearing (Hellenbrand, 92 AD2d at 415). At a Sirois hearing, the burden is on the People to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant intentionally procured the complainant's unavailability through "violence, threats or chicanery" (People v Geraci, 85 NY2d 359, 366 [1995]][internal citations omitted]). The People need not demonstrate that the defendant's sole motivation is to procure the witness' unavailability. It is enough that the defendant was motivated "in part" by a "desire to silence the witness" (People v Byrd, 51 AD3d 267, 273 [1st Dept 2008], citing People v Maher, 89 NY2d 456 [1997]). Since "witness tampering is a surreptitious activity rarely admitted by the defendant or the witness," the Court of Appeals has instructed that "the court may infer the requisite causation from the evidence of the defendant's coercive behavior and the actions taken by the witness in direct response to or within a close temporal proximity to that misconduct (People v Smart, 23 NY3d 213, 220-21 [2014]). Upon an affirmative finding by the Court on the issue of the defendant's misconduct, the defendant "may not assert either the constitutional right of confrontation or the evidentiary rules against the admission of hearsay in order to prevent the admission of the witness's out-of-court declarations" (Geraci, 85 NY2d 359, 366 [1995]).

Courts have found the People's burden satisfied where evidence adduced at a Sirois hearing showed that the defendant procured a witness's unavailability by relying on guilt, sympathy, and emotion. In People v Roby (58 Misc 3d 1227[A] [Sup Ct, NY Co 2018]), the court found that the People met their burden where the defendant repeatedly called, but did not threaten, the complainant from jail in violation of an order of protection. In one instance, the defendant conveyed how upsetting it was to face a potential life sentence and reminded the complainant how she had previously said she "was never gonna be the one to do it to [him]." The defendant then made sexual promises to the complainant that she rejected. In a subsequent call, the defendant referred to how the complainant would have to tell their child that "mommy" caused "daddy" to serve a life sentence. The defendant later professed his love to the complainant, and in a subsequent call offered to marry her. The First Department, in concluding that the trial court correctly resolved the Sirois hearing, stated, "the People proved by clear and convincing evidence that defendant wrongfully procured the victim's unavailability" (People v Roby, 217 AD3d 505, 506 [1st Dept 2023]), lv denied 40 NY3d 952 [2023]).

In People v Major (251 AD2d 999, 999 [4th Dept 1998], lv denied 92 NY2d 927 [1998]), the Fourth Department held that the People met their burden at a Sirois hearing where, inter alia, the defendant called his mother on Christmas Day, swore at her, and said, "How can you testify against me and put me away the rest of my life. I wish I wasn't your son and I don't want to talk to you anymore." The Fourth Department stated that "those comments implicitly pressured defendant's mother not to testify at trial" (id.).

Here, the defendant with clear intention pressured JH not to testify and to assist in seeking the case's dismissal. During their initial phone calls, JH informed the defendant that he did not want to speak to her. He emphasized that he had to be revived twice because of the serious injuries he suffered. He expressed his hurt that someone he loved, and believed he would marry, would have caused him to "die twice." Despite this request, the defendant's campaign of calls continued. Her emotional pleas combined with her sympathy for his pain and expressions of love and marriage slowly entangled JH. Her actions directly caused JH to disavow himself from testifying in court (Smart, 23 NY3d at 220-21). Here, the defendant "wrongfully made use of [the] relationship" by pivoting on JH's lingering affection to secure his unavailability (People v Jurnigan (41 AD3d 331, 332 [1st Dept 2007], lv denied 9 NY3d 923 [2007]),

Throughout the proceedings, the defense maintained that the defendant's actions were attributable to JH's abusive conduct. To support this inference, the defense played several sections of calls where JH used a raised tone and referenced a firearm. The Court views this evidence as unpersuasive. JH's expressed frustration on one call was directed at another individual, not the defendant. Similarly, his mention of a firearm had no association with any threats. While the defense maintains that the defendant was justified in her actions during the alleged assault, the Grand Jury rejected her defense after she testified.

Inferring that a male complainant must be the female defendant's abuser, where the evidence gives no basis to draw that inference, would also require the Court to base its reasoning on false assumptions about intimate partner violence. As observed by one legal scholar, "The statistic most frequently cited in the domestic violence movement is that more than seventy-five percent of domestic abuse is committed by men, but implicit in this statistic is that some of these acts are committed by women." (Jamie R. Abrams, The Collateral Consequences of Masculinizing Violence, 16 Wm & Mary J Women & L 703, 731-32 [2010] [internal quotation marks omitted]).

The People have met their burden by clear and convincing evidence to show that JH is unavailable, and his unavailability is the product of the defendant's misconduct. As a result, the defendant has forfeited her right of confrontation, and the People will be permitted to introduce JH's sworn Grand Jury testimony at trial.

This constitutes the decision and order of the Court.

Dated: September 22, 2026

Bronx, New York

Audrey E. Stone, A.J.S.C.

Audrey E. Stone, J.