Menachem Lichter, Plaintiff, v. Shulim Leifer, Defendant. (2026)

Before the Court is the motion of Defendant Shulim Leifer seeking to dismiss the Verified Complaint of Plaintiff Menachem Lichter pursuant to CPLR § 3211(g) and CPLR § 3211(a)(7); for summary judgment per CPLR § 3212(h); and for attorneys' fees and punitive damages per NY Civil Rights Law § 70-a.¹ The documents filed on NYSCEF as Docs Nos. 11-40 were considered in deciding this motion.

Background

Plaintiff was accused of sexual abuse by his adult daughter, Goldy, in 2023. Goldy alleged that Plaintiff had abused her when she was a child. Defendant, who is a victim's advocate, assisted Goldy in filing a police report with the Ramapo Police Department on November 29, 2023.

On December 18, 2023, Freida Lichter (Plaintiff's wife and Goldy's mother) filed a petition in Rockland County Supreme Court to have Goldy involuntarily committed pursuant to MHL § 9.43. Defendant attended the court appearance with Goldy on January 2, 2024. After testimony, the petition was denied and dismissed.

On February 6, 2024, Defendant was a guest on a podcast called "The Franciska Show" on an episode named "A Gaslighting Case in the Literal Sense — with Shulim Leifer (The Lichter Case)." During the podcast, Defendant and the host discussed childhood sexual abuse claims in the Chasidic community, including Goldy Lichter's accusations and her parents' reactions to the claims of abuse. Defendant and the host specifically discussed the January 2, 2024 court appearance and the Lichters' efforts to have Goldy involuntarily committed.

Procedural Posture

Plaintiff Menachem Lichter commenced this action for defamation, defamation per se, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and prima facie tort against Defendant Shulim Leifer on February 3, 2025 by summons and notice. Plaintiff filed his verified complaint on June 23, 2025 in response to a demand from Defendant. Defendant filed the instant motion to dismiss on August 25, 2025. After various stipulated adjournments, the matter was marked fully submitted on June 12, 2026.

Arguments

In the complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant made numerous false statements during the podcast, including the claim that Plaintiff committed the crime of obstruction of justice (Compt. ¶ 82). Plaintiff alleges that Defendant referred to Goldy's allegation of sexual abuse and said "I think everyone is pretty certain now who the guilty party is" (id. ¶ 83). Plaintiff alleges that Defendant accused him of bullying and beating up people who were speaking about Goldy's allegations (id. ¶ 84). Plaintiff alleges that Defendant stated that Plaintiff was "accused of horrible, really cruel and depraved things, and so we should understand that [he] will continue to do really horrible, cruel and depraved things to, to stay free or to clear [his] name" (id. ¶ 85). Plaintiff alleges that Defendant referred to Plaintiff's behavior as "the desperate flailings [sic] of guilty people" (id. ¶ 86). Plaintiff alleges that Defendant spoke on the podcast to personally exact revenge against those who tried to come forward on Plaintiff's behalf (id. ¶ 88). Plaintiff alleges that Defendant falsely accused Plaintiff of "sexually abusing [Goldy] growing up and also of trafficking her" (id. ¶ 89). Plaintiff alleges that Defendant falsely claimed to have gone public with Goldy's case in response to the petition filed by her parents to have her committed (id. ¶ 93). Plaintiff alleges that at the time of the podcast, Defendant was aware that both the Spring Valley and Ramapo Police Departments had closed their investigations into Goldy's claims (id. ¶ 94).

In the motion to dismiss, Defendant argues that this is a classic strategic lawsuit against public participation, or SLAPP. Defendant argues this lawsuit should be dismissed per the anti-SLAPP law, as the lawsuit was brought to chill protected speech. Specifically, Defendant argues that his statements during the podcast were communications in a public forum about an issue of public interest, as defined by New York Civil Rights Law § 76-a. Defendant argues that a podcast is a public forum. He argues that allegations of criminal conduct are inherently matters of public interest. Defendant argues that because the anti-SLAPP statute protects his speech, the burden shifts to Plaintiff to demonstrate that the defamation claims have a substantial basis. Defendant argues that Plaintiff cannot establish by clear and convincing evidence that the communication was made with actual malice toward Plaintiff.

Defendant argues that Plaintiff failed to adequately plead the cause of action for defamation because Plaintiff does not include the entire statement made by Defendant on the podcast. Defendant argues that Plaintiff only quoted certain comments to take them out of context. Defendant further argues that one of the statements identified by Plaintiff as defamatory was not even about Plaintiff specifically. Defendant argues that some of the statements were forward-looking predictions or opinion. Defendant argues that other statements were true or substantially true. Defendant argues that the claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress and prima facie tort must be dismissed as duplicative of the defamation claim. Finally, Defendant argues that pursuant to the anti-SLAPP statute, he is entitled to his costs and fees, and he requests that the matter be set down for a hearing on punitive damages.

Prior to the filing of Plaintiff's opposition to the instant motion, Defendant submitted a notice of supplemental authority (Doc. 24). Defendant pointed this Court to a decision in the matter Menachem Lichter and Frieda Lichter v. Mirel Ginsberg and Nosson Ginsberg, (Index No. 031042/2024 [Sup Ct Rockland Co Dec 2025]). In that case, in which the Lichters had made, inter alia, allegations of defamation against the Ginsbergs, the Court specifically found that allegations of sexual assault are an issue of public interest within the meaning of the anti-SLAPP law (see id. at 11).

In opposition to Defendant's motion, Plaintiff first argues that the branch of the motion seeking summary judgment per CPLR § 3212(h) is procedurally improper because issue is not joined. Plaintiff argues that the anti-SLAPP laws do not change this fundamental rule. Next, Plaintiff argues that the complaint is sufficiently pleaded. Plaintiff argues that it was not necessary for him to provide a transcript of the podcast because he identified the objectionable statements and provided the podcast episode and date of publication. Plaintiff argues that Defendant's statements are clearly about Plaintiff, his family, and his daughter's allegations of sexual abuse. Plaintiff argues that Defendant's statements are actionable "mixed opinions" rather than protected opinion or forward-looking statements.

Plaintiff argues that his lawsuit is not a "SLAPP" lawsuit and therefore, the anti-SLAPP statutes do not apply. Plaintiff acknowledges that the podcast is a public forum, but argues that the topic is not one of public interest. Plaintiff argues that the statements concern a purely private family dispute and are therefore outside the scope of the anti-SLAPP statute. Plaintiff argues that allegations of sexual abuse or criminal misconduct are not necessarily matters of public interest. Plaintiff argues that Defendant was not discussing child sexual abuse as a social issue, but was instead amplifying Goldy's accusations of rape, assault, and trafficking. Plaintiff argues that the fact that the statements were made on a podcast does not automatically make them of public interest.

Plaintiff argues that even if the anti-SLAPP law applies, Plaintiff has a substantial basis in law and fact for his claims. Further, he argues that his defamation claims allege actionable factual accusations causing reputational and economic harm. Plaintiff argues that he is not required to prove actual malice by Defendant, but even if he were, he has adequately alleged it. Plaintiff argues that he has adequately pled intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED). Plaintiff argues that Defendant is not entitled to attorneys' fees. Finally, Plaintiff argues that Lichter v. Ginsberg is neither binding nor correctly decided.

In reply, Defendant first argues that collateral estoppel requires that this Court dismiss this action per the anti-SLAPP statutes on the basis of the decision in Lichter v. Ginsberg. Defendant argues that Plaintiff failed to meaningfully contest the essential facts. Defendant argues that a sworn denial by Plaintiff does not provide a substantial basis in fact per CPRL §§ 3211(g) and/or 3212(h). Defendant argues that Plaintiff failed to deny that Defendant subjectively believed every statement made on the podcast. Defendant argues that establishing actual malice requires more than a showing of a lack of a reasonable basis for belief that something is true. Defendant argues that he repeatedly stated that he was commenting on an allegation by Goldy that Plaintiff raped her as a child. He argues that his use of the words "allegation" or "allegedly" is sufficient to shield Defendant from Plaintiff's defamation claims.

Defendant again argues that Plaintiff was required to quote the allegedly defamatory words verbatim in the complaint. Defendant argues that Plaintiff failed to specifically identify which statements in the podcast were mixed fact and opinion. Defendant argues that "everyone thinks" type statements are not independently actionable. Defendant reiterates that the anti-SLAPP law applies to this matter. Defendant argues that Plaintiff's "substantial basis" argument appears to flip the burden of proof. Defendant argues that Plaintiff provides no proof of actual malice.

Additional filings

The day after Defendant filed his reply, Plaintiff sought permission to file a sur-reply, for which permission was denied. On June 1, 2026, Defendant filed a second notice of supplemental authority, which annexed the Decision and Order dated May 27, 2026, on motions 4 and 5 in Lichter v. Ginsberg. (Doc. 39). The decision denied the Lichter plaintiffs' motion to reargue the Decision and Order of December 15, 2025, which granted summary judgment to the Ginsberg defendants per CPLR § 3212(h). The May 2026 decision and order also set a date for a hearing on an award of counsel fees and punitive damages to the Ginsberg defendants. Plaintiff filed opposition to the notice on June 4, 2026, arguing that the Lichter v. Ginsberg decision is irrelevant to this matter.

On August 14, 2026, Defendant filed a third notice of supplemental authority, which annexed the Amended Decision and Order on motions 4 and 5 in Lichter v. Ginsberg, dated August 4, 2026. (Doc. 41). The amended decision and order held that the Ginsberg defendants were not entitled to compensatory or punitive damages, as no such claim had been properly asserted by them. The court set a date for a hearing on an award of reasonable counsel fees for the Ginsberg defendants. Plaintiff filed opposition to the notice on August 19, 2026, arguing that the amended Lichter v. Ginsberg decision contained changes that are irrelevant to this matter.

DISCUSSION

Motion to Dismiss for Insufficient Pleading per CPLR § 3016(a)

Defamation is defined as "the making of a false statement which tends to expose the plaintiff to public contempt, ridicule, aversion or disgrace, or induce an evil opinion of him in the minds of right-thinking persons, and to deprive him of their friendly intercourse in society" (Foster v Churchill, 87 NY2d 744, 751 [1996] [internal quotations omitted]; see Hogan v Herald, 84 AD2d 470 [4th Dept] aff'd 58 NY2d 630 [1982] ["Defamation, consisting of the twin torts of libel and slander, is the invasion of the interest in a reputation and good name"]).

Per CPLR § 3016(a), a cause of action for defamation requires particularity in pleading. The complaint "must set forth the particular words allegedly constituting defamation . . . as well as the time when, place where, and manner in which the false statement was made, and specify to whom it was made" (Sternberg v Wiederman, 225 AD3d 820, 821 [2d Dept 2024] [internal quotations omitted]). The "requirement that the defamatory words must be quoted verbatim is strictly enforced" (Varela v Invs. Ins. Holding Corp., 185 AD2d 309, 310 [2d Dept 1992]). As such, "failing to include the entire statement or publication requires dismissal of that cause of action." (Massa Constr., Inc. v George M. Bunk, P.E., P.C., 68 AD3d 1725, 1725 [4th Dept 2009]).

As a threshold matter, Defendant argues that Plaintiff did not properly plead defamation because the complaint contains only select quotes from the podcast, rather than a copy of the transcript of the whole episode. In response to this argument, Plaintiff argues that in the complaint he identified the particular podcast with specificity, identified the websites and social media sites where it could be accessed, and identified the particular statements that he found offensive (see Compt ¶ 73-75, 82-93). Plaintiff argues that the pleadings satisfy CPLR § 3016(a) because the information provided Defendant with sufficient notice of the precise statements at issue. In the opposition to this motion, Plaintiff included a download of the podcast as an exhibit (Doc. 29).

When the potentially defamatory statements are written down, the annexation of an offending article will satisfy the defamation specificity mandate, (see Pappalardo v Westchester Rockland Newspapers, Inc., 101 AD2d 830, 830 [2d Dept 1984]), as long as the allegedly defamatory material is clearly revealed by the writing (see Hausch v Clarke, 298 AD2d 429 [2d Dept 2002]). Here, although the alleged defamation was spoken, it was contained in a podcast, which is amenable to being transcribed and being included with the complaint. While it may be true that the complaint insufficiently plead defamation because it did not include a full copy of the allegedly defamatory podcast in the body of the complaint or annexed as an exhibit (see Doe v Eliyas, 241 AD3d 1271, 1276 [2d Dept 2025] [dismissing complaint that failed to comply with CPLR 3016(a) because alleged defamatory statements consisted of images and videos, which were neither embedded in the second amended complaint or in an accompanying exhibit]), Plaintiff did remedy the deficiency by including a copy of the full podcast as an exhibit to his opposition. This, combined with his identification of particular statements in the complaint, is sufficient to satisfy the heightened pleading requirements of CPLR § 3016(a) and avoid dismissal on this ground.

Dismissal per the Anti-SLAPP law per CPLR § 3211(g)

In 1992, New York enacted a statute designed to protect those who face targeted litigation for their participation in public affairs. Those lawsuits, which typically alleged defamation, are known as Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation or "SLAPP" suits (see Reeves v Associated Newspapers, Ltd., 232 AD3d 10, 12 [1st Dept 2024] ["A SLAPP suit . . . is brought to intimidate or silence a person who has spoken out about a matter of public interest"]). The 1992 law, colloquially known as the "anti-SLAPP" statute, is codified in Civil Rights Law § 76-a and § 70-a and CPLR § 3211(g) and § 3212(h) (see L 1992, ch 767; Gottwald v Sebert, 40 NY3d 240, 250 [2023]).

In 2020, that legislature amended New York's anti-SLAPP statute to, among other changes, "expand the definition of an action involving public petition and participation to include claims based upon any communication in a place open to the public or a public forum in connection with an issue of public interest" (Aristocrat Plastic S P.C. v. Silva, 206 AD3d 26, 29 [lst Dept 2022]). Civil Rights Law § 76-a (l)(a) now defines an "action involving public petition and participation" as a claim based upon:

(1) any communication in a place open to the public or a public forum in connection with an issue of public interest; or (2) any other lawful conduct in furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right of free speech in connection with an issue of public interest . . . .

The amended anti-SLAPP statute further states that " 'public interest' shall be construed broadly, and shall mean any subject other than a purely private matter" (Civ RL § 76-a [1][d]). In analyzing the breadth of the anti-SLAPP statute, courts have noted that "[m]atters of public concern include matters of political, social, or other concern to the community, even those that do not affect the general population" (Aristocrat Plastic Surgery, P.C., 206 AD3d at 29). Given the "extremely broad" interpretation of the term "public interest," cases in which the subject matter at issue was not a matter of public interest are "extremely rare" (Lindberg v Dow Jones & Co., 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 151397, Index No 20-cv-8231 [SDNY 2021] quoting Albert v. Loksen, 239 F3d 256, 269 [2d Cir 2001]).

As part of the effort to discourage and disincentivize the filing of SLAPP lawsuits, the anti-SLAPP law creates an accelerated dismissal procedure at CPLR § 3211(g), which applies when a defendant in a SLAPP suit moves pursuant to CPLR § 3211(a)(7) to dismiss the complaint (see VIP Pet Grooming Studio, Inc. v Sproule, 224 AD3d 78, 83 [2d Dept 2024] [noting that motion to dismiss SLAPP suit alleging defamation is more readily granted than motion to dismiss other claims]). Upon such a motion, the defendant bears the initial burden of showing that the action or claim is a SLAPP suit.

Here, Defendant has established that Plaintiff brought a SLAPP suit against him. It is uncontested that the podcast was a "communication in a place open to the public or a public forum" (Civ RL § 76-a[l][a][2]). Defendant has also established that the statements on the podcast were made "in connection with an issue of public interest" (Civ RL § 76-a[l][a][2]). Although Plaintiff tries to frame the issue as a private family matter, the podcast clearly discusses both the broader issues of childhood sexual abuse in the Chasidic community and the responses of people accused of such activity. The conversation focuses specifically on the lawsuit brought by Goldy's mother to have her involuntarily committed as an example of a particularly aggressive response to the accusation. There is no doubt that childhood sexual abuse and the backlash that survivors may experience upon disclosure are "issues of public interest" (see Grace v Sabal, 2026 LX 418435, at *4 [Sup Ct, NY County July 10, 2026, No. 952265/2023] [holding that discussion of alleged sexual abuse on a public forum is "in connection with an issue of public interest" Civ RL § 76-a]).

Plaintiff's attempt to argue that the Second Department has held otherwise is misguided. In Nelson v. Ardley, (231 AD3d 179 [2d Dept 2024]), which Plaintiff argues requires a finding that the discussion on the podcast was not an issue of public interest, the Second Department found that a Facebook post on a private page accusing a parent of sexual abuse was not a statement within the sphere of public interest. The Court specifically noted that the statements were made "on what was a limited personal Facebook post concerning the birthday of the plaintiff's daughter and not on a forum of broader scope" (id. at 185). Nowhere does the Second Department suggest in Nelson that issues of sexual abuse are not issues of public interest generally, nor that such discussions could not be matters of public interest as a matter of law. Such a holding would directly contradict longstanding understanding that "a 'human interest' portrayal of events in the lives of persons who are not themselves public figures [may be a matter of public interest], so long as some theme of legitimate public concern can reasonably be drawn from their experience" (Huggins v. Moore, 94 NY2d 296, 303 [1999]).

Therefore, this Court finds that the topics discussed on the podcast, that is, childhood sexual abuse and actions taken by an accused person after such accusations, are matters of public interest (see Gillespie v Kling, 217 AD3d 566, 567 [1st Dept 2023] [holding that discussion on podcast regarding domestic violence that woman experienced during her marriage is "an issue of public interest"]; Shuman v New York Mag., 72 Misc 3d 1211[A] at 3 [Sup Ct NY County 2021] [finding that "evolving gender power dynamics in sexual relationships" are a matter of public concern under New York Civil Rights Law § 76-a).²

Once a defendant establishes that a SLAPP suit was brought against him, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate that the claim has a "substantial basis in law" (CPLR § 3211[g][1]). The "substantial basis in law" standard under CPLR § 3211(g) is more demanding than the standard applicable to an ordinary CPLR § 3211(a)(7) motion to dismiss and has been equated to the "substantial evidence" standard under the anti-SLAPP summary judgment statute at CPLR § 3211(h), which in turn has been equated to the standard of a typical summary judgment motion. A motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(g) is therefore "analogous to an accelerated summary judgment motion" (Reeves v. Associated Newspapers, Ltd., supra, at 24; see Glen Harbor Holdings, LLC v Wiener, NYLJ, Feb. 5, 2025 at p.17, col.2, 2025 NYLJ LEXIS 396 [Sup Ct Suffolk Co 2025] [dismissing complaint per CPLR § 3211(g)]). Said another way, the substantial basis standard is intended to mean "such relevant proof as a reasonable mind may accept as adequate to support a conclusion or ultimate fact" (Vitagliano v Weiner, 237 AD3d 1548, 1550 [4th Dept 2025]; Matter of Ridge Rd. Fire Dist. v Schiano, 16 NY3d 494, 499 [2011] ["The standard demands only that a given inference is reasonable and plausible, not necessarily the most probable"] [internal quotation marks omitted]).

Because plaintiff has a burden to at least raise an issue of fact, in contrast to an ordinary CPLR § 3211(a)(7) motion to dismiss, under CPLR § 3211(g)(2), "the court shall consider the pleadings, and supporting and opposing affidavits stating the facts upon which the action or defense is based" (Greenwich Bldg. Co. v Hoots, 2026 NY Slip Op 26127, *7 [Sup Ct Kings Co 2026]; see Reeves v. Associated Newspapers, Ltd., supra, at 23-24; see also Black v. Ganieva, 236 AD3d 427, 428 [1st Dept 2025]). Therefore, to survive a CPLR § 3211(g) motion, a plaintiff must offer admissible evidence that tends to establish all of the elements of the claim. In this case, that means proving all the elements of the claim for defamation: "[1] the defendant published a false statement, [2] without privilege or authorization, to a third party, [3] constituting fault as judged by, at a minimum, a negligence standard, [4] and it must either cause special harm or constitute defamation per se." (Rosner v Amazon.com, 132 AD3d 835, 836-37 [2d Dept 2015]). A statement is defamatory per se if, inter alia, it charges the plaintiff with a serious crime (see Kasavana v Vela, 172 AD3d 1042, 1044 [2d Dept 2019]).

The first threshold that a plaintiff must cross to establish that a statement is potentially defamatory is prove that the statement is a fact or a mix of fact and opinion, because only facts can be false (see Moonbeam Gateway Mar., LLC v Tai Chan, 239 AD3d 965, 967 [2d Dept 2025] ["Since falsity is a necessary element of a defamation cause of action and only facts are capable of being proven false, it follows that only statements alleging facts can properly be the subject of a defamation action"] [internal quotations and citations omitted]). Pure expressions of opinion are "deemed privileged and, no matter how offensive, cannot be the subject of an action for defamation" (Mann v Abel, 10 NY3d 271, 276 [2008]). When a statement is a mix of opinion and fact, it will be actionable if it implies that there exist underlying, unrevealed facts known to the speaker to justify the opinion (see Stega v NY Downtown Hosp., 31 NY3d 661, 675 [2018]).

"Whether a particular statement constitutes an opinion or an objective fact is a question of law" (Mann v Abel, 10 NY3d at 276). "In distinguishing between facts and opinion, the court must consider (1) whether the specific language has a precise meaning that is readily understood, (2) whether the statements are capable of being proven true or false, and (3) whether the context in which the statement appears signals to readers that the statement is likely to be opinion, not fact" (Stiloski v Wingate, 241 AD3d 958, 962 [2d Dept 2025]). The third factor has the distinction of lending "both depth and difficulty to the analysis and requires that the court consider the content of the communication as a whole, its tone and apparent purpose" (Davis v Boeheim, 24 NY3d 262, 270 [2014] [internal citation omitted]). The Court of Appeals has adopted a "holistic approach" to the third factor:

Rather than sifting through a communication for the purpose of isolating and identifying assertions of fact, the court should look to the over-all context in which the assertions were made and determine on that basis 'whether the reasonable [listener] would have believed that the challenged statements were conveying facts about the . . . plaintiff'

(Davis, 24 NY3d at 270, quoting Brian v. Richardson, 87 NY2d 46, 51 [1995]; see Thomas H. v Paul B., 18 NY3d 580, 585 [2012] ["Context, therefore, is often the key consideration in categorizing a statement as fact or opinion"]).

Finally, in the context of anti-SLAPP motion for dismissal, even if a plaintiff can establish that a defendant made false statements, in order to state a claim for damages, the plaintiff must establish "by clear and convincing evidence that any communication which gives rise to the action was made with knowledge of its falsity or with reckless disregard of whether it was false, where the truth or falsity of such communication is material to the cause of action at issue" (Civ RL § 76-a[2]). In other words, the plaintiff must establish that any false statements were made with actual malice (see Huggins v Moore, 94 NY2d 296, 301 [1999] [adopting the New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 US 254, 280 [1964] definition of "actual malice"]).

Application

Guided by these principles, the Court now turns to the statements identified by Plaintiff and to evaluate first, whether they are facts, opinions, or mixed opinions; second, for the facts and mixed opinions, whether Plaintiff has provided substantial evidence that the statements were false, and; finally, for the false statements, whether Plaintiff has provided clear and convincing evidence that Defendant made such false statement with actual malice.

A. Evaluation of whether statements were fact, opinion, or mixed opinion

Statement 1 — "obstruction of justice"

At 15:25, in discussing the mental hygiene petition brought by Goldy's mother to have Goldy involuntarily committed after she publicly accused her father of sexual abuse, Defendant said, "but even Mr. Lichter, I don't think had the guts to bring this petition himself; it would be obstruction of justice so he had his wife do it."

Statement 1 is an opinion about a hypothetical. The statement is literally drawing a legal conclusion, which is a form of opinion (see Titan Capital Group II, LLC v Raghavan, 19 Misc 3d 1115[A] *6 [Sup Ct NY Co 2008] [statements were one party's opinion as to the legal implications of other party's behavior]). Further, this statement says that if Plaintiff had done something, which he did not do, the result would have been a criminal act. However, as it is not a statement of a fact, it is not an actionable statement.

Statement 2 - "I think everyone is pretty certain now who the guilty party is"

At 19:22, Defendant said, referring to the mental hygiene petition, "I really hope that nobody thinks that this is a way to handle this moving forward because I doubt there's anybody, anybody, especially in Monsey, who doubted beforehand whether or not this Lichter - where this, if there's any fire where there's smoke in regards to the Lichter story - I mean seeing how her family handled this, I think everyone's pretty certain now who the guilty party is and yeah I, I hope nobody else tries this that's all."

Statement 2 is inactionable opinion. Defendant says "I think everyone's pretty certain," which is language that clearly indicates that his statement is an opinion about what "everyone" thinks about this case (see Kerns, 208 AD3d at 1103). This type of statement is "simply too broad and undefined to be provable" (Maines Food & Party Warehouse, Inc. v Hurlburt, 2025 NY Slip Op 30781[U], *9 [Sup Ct Broome Co 2024]).

Statement 3 — "bullying and beating up"

At 20:13, in explaining how he came to be connected with Goldy, Defendant said, "I was contacted by people in Monsey during the summer who knew about this and asked me to see what I can do to help because her father was allegedly bullying and beating, literally beating up people who were talking about this, and I refused to because I did not I can't just reach out to people randomly and say 'hey it's so and so and did this happen to you and can I help you?' "

While the statement alleging that Plaintiff is a "bully" is opinion, the statement that Plaintiff was "literally beating up people" who were talking about the sexual assault allegations is an actionable statement of fact.³

Statement 4 "horrible, really cruel and depraved things"

At 27:17, Defendant explains why he is doing this podcast: "I'm explaining I want to I want the listeners and I want people to understand that when people come forward when people, the ones who are being accused, in the first instance they're being accused of horrible, really cruel and depraved things, and so we should understand that they will continue to do really horrible, cruel, and depraved things to to stay free or to or to clear their name and and if this is happening people should hear about because this is how it stops happening."

This is a statement of mixed opinion because it implies that people accused of horrible things, like sexual assault, are guilty. Defendants says that such people will "continue" to do horrible things, suggesting that he has access to additional facts about the underlying guilt of the accused. However, this is not a statement about Plaintiff specifically. It is a generalization about people accused of sexual abuse, and therefore is not an actionable defamatory statement.

Statement 5- "the desperate flailings [sic] of guilty people"

At 27:26, in continuing to discuss why this issue was the topic of a podcast, Defendant said, "And if it happens to be happening to somebody in some form or fashion, you can scale it up or scale it down, this is certainly not the worst case of intimidation I've ever seen and it's not the easiest, but they should understand that this is all the desperate flailings [sic] of guilty people and they're not alone and there's people who can handle these things for them and help them."

Like Statement 4, this is not a statement about Plaintiff specifically. It is a generalization about people accused of sexual abuse, and therefore is not an actionable defamatory statement. Further, the "desperate flailing of guilty people" is simply too broad and undefined to be provably true or false.

Statement 6 - "I am I guess, destroying this man's reputation or whatever"

At 23:16, Defendant says that a panel of Rabbis in Monsey contacted him because "they're convinced that Mr. Lichter is a victim, not an abuser, but they invite me to come bring whatever evidence I have to change their mind because they believe a grave mistake is made here and that I'm I, I guess, I'm destroying this man's reputation." This is a statement detailing the alleged fact that people reached out to Defendant on Plaintiff's behalf. Defendant is not claiming that he actually is or was destroying Lichter's reputation, and this is non-actionable statement.

Statement 7 — Defendant went public to personally extract revenge

At 26:44, Defendant said, "Nobody's choosing to have this interactions, right? Had her parents not pulled her into court and and tried to claim she's crazy this this would not be a public story, right now. Nobody would be talking about it, right." The host said, "like most cases" and Defendant continued, "exactly and had and had they not bothered me or tried to run after me to to 'clear his name' quote unquote, right after that, we would have been having a discussion about a much more abstract discussion about this story." This statement simply does not say what Plaintiff claims, that is, that Defendant went public to extract revenge. It is a further discussion about why this is an issue of public interest. It is non-actionable.

Statement 8 - Defendant accused Plaintiff of "sexually abusing [Goldy] growing up and also of trafficking her"

At 8:20, while introducing the story, Defendant said, "this is a story about a young woman in the Lichter family in in Rockland County - I'm allowed to say the name because she came forward publicly - who accused her father of sexually abusing her growing up and also of trafficking her. Her father's name is Menachem Lichter."

Generally, "the fact that a particular accusation originated with a different source does not automatically furnish a license for others to repeat or publish it without regard to its accuracy or defamatory character" (Thomas H. v Paul B., 18 NY3d 580, 586 [2012] [denying summary judgment to defendants who allegedly made "[u]nqualified statements . . . that plaintiff sexually assaulted their underage daughter on two occasions in Vermont"]). However, Defendant did not state that Plaintiff actually abused Goldy. Instead, Defendant reported a true factual statement, that is, that Goldy accused her father of abuse. Because a factual statement must be false to be actionable, this is not an actionable statement.

Statement 9 - Defendant referred to Plaintiff as a "rapist," a "child rapist," and a "trafficker"

At 28:17, Defendant in speaking again about the phone calls he received on behalf of Mr. Lichter, said that it takes "chutzpah" to ask people to make phone calls on your behalf to marshal sympathy "on behalf of an alleged rapist, child rapist, trafficker." As with the statement that Plaintiff was accused by Goldy of sexual assault and trafficking, when Defendant referred to Plaintiff as an alleged rapist, child rapist, trafficker, it was a factual statement. It is uncontested that Goldy accused her father of childhood sexual assault and trafficking. Because a factual statement must be false to be actionable, this is not an actionable statement.

Statement 10 — Plaintiff was "sued as [a] co-conspirator in a fraud scheme"

At 23:41, while discussing the people who called Defendant on Plaintiff's behalf, Defendant said, "and then also that this Pachman guy and Lichter are in business like they do business together like I they're being sued as Co-conspirators in a in a in a fraud scheme." This is a factual statement and is actionable.

Statement 11 & 12 — Not a matter of public interest

At 20:43, in discussing how he came to work with Goldy, Defendant said that when he was first contacted by people in Monsey, "this was not any kind of public allegations or anything, you know, nothing public about this. And my understanding is that [Goldy] made very private allegations to certain people that she trusted." At 26:44, Defendant said, "had [Goldy's] parents not pulled her into court and tried to claim she is crazy this would not be a public story right now." Neither of these statement are about Plaintiff. The first statement is true and the second is opinion. Neither is an actionable statement.

B. Evaluation of whether Plaintiff provided substantial evidence that the fact and mixed opinion statements were false

For the two potentially actionable statements to survive the motion to dismiss, Plaintiff is required to provide a substantial basis to establish that they are false statements. Here, as to the two fact statements, that Plaintiff was "literally beating up people" (at 20:25) and that Plaintiff was "sued as a co-conspirator in a fraud scheme" (at 23:41), Plaintiff does not meet his burden. In his affirmation in opposition, Plaintiff does not even mention either statement. Having offered no proof that these statements are not true, these claims do not survive dismissal.

Intentional Infliction of Emotional District and Prima Facie Tort

Finally, Plaintiff's intentional infliction of emotional distress and prima facie tort claim are duplicative of the defamation claims as a matter of law and are therefore dismissed (see Freihofer v Hearst Corp., 65 NY2d 135, 142 [1985]; Reeves v Associated Newspapers, supra, 210 NYS3d at 25; Fernandez v Fernandez, 216 AD3d 743, 746 [2d Dept 2023]).

Fees, Costs, and Damages

Having found that all of Plaintiff's claims must be dismissed per CPLR § 3211(g), the Court now turns to Defendant's claim for attorney's fees and costs and punitive damages. Pursuant to Civil Rights Law § 70-a, a defendant in SLAPP action "may maintain an action, claim, cross claim or counterclaim to recover damages, including costs and attorney's fees, from any person who commenced or continued such action" when such action is dismissed per CPLR § 3211(g) because the plaintiff failed to establish his claims had a substantial basis in fact or law (Civ RL § 70-a[1][a]). To recover punitive damages, the defendant must make the additional demonstration that the SLAPP action "was commenced or continued for the sole purpose of harassing, intimidating, punishing or otherwise maliciously inhibiting the free exercise of speech, petition or association rights" (Civ RL § 70-a[1][c]).

Defendant properly asserted these claims in the motion to dismiss the petition. Therefore, this matter will be set down for a hearing on attorneys' fees, costs, and punitive damages. And it is

ORDERED that Defendant Shulim Leifer's motion to dismiss is GRANTED in its entirety; and it is further

ORDERED that this matter shall be set down for a hearing on attorney's fees, costs, and punitive damages on a date to be set after a conference.

This constitutes the Court's decision on Motion Seq. #1. The parties shall appear for a conference on a date to be assigned by the Clerk by separate court notice.

Dated: October 2, 2026

New City, New York

ENTER

HON. KEITH J. CORNELL, A.J.S.C.

TO: All Parties via NYSCEF

FOOTNOTES

1.   Although the Notice of Motion includes a request for dismissal per CPLR § 3211(a)(1) based on documentary evidence, no argument is advanced on this point by Defendant. As such, this ground is deemed abandoned.

2.   In the reply, Defendant argued that this issue could be decided as a matter collateral estoppel based on the December 2025 decision in Lichter v. Ginsburg, which also found childhood sexual abuse to be a matter of public interest. While that argument may be sound, because it was first raised in the reply, the Court declined to consider it.

3.   The Court notes that "literally" is often used in a hyperbolic sense, especially in oral communication. However, as Defendant did not raise this as a defense, the Court treats this use of "literally" to refer to something that actually occurred.

Keith J. Cornell, J.