1600 MARILYN SCHWARTZ HELEN FROMEN AND HELEN SANTOS v. TOWN OF RAMAPO MOUNT IVY LLC LINDIFRIM POMONA LIMITED PARTNERSHIP (2026)

Before the Court is the combined Article 78 Proceeding and declaratory judgment action of the Petitioners against the Town of Ramapo Planning Board and the Town of Ramapo (the "Planning Board"). Respondents oppose the petition. The following documents have been read and considered: NYSCEF Doc Nos. 2-12, 17, 55, 69-125, 128-136.

This matter was commenced by Petitioners pursuant to Article 78 and Section 3001 of the Civil Practice Law and Rules seeking, among other things, that the Court annul and set aside the Planning Board resolutions of June 24, 2025 and August 12, 2025 related to the Miller's Pond PUD Phase 1 Site Plan for failure to follow the procedural and substantive requirements of the State Environmental Quality Review Act pursuant to 6 NYCRR 617 ("SEQRA"), the requirements of Town Law § 274-a, Town Law § 280-a, NY State Open Meetings Law, Town of Ramapo laws and regulations, and a finding that its decisions were arbitrary and capricious. The petition was amended (NYSCEF #16). The petition alleges eight causes of action. The Applicants and the Town each submit a Verified Answer with Objections in Point of Law as well as Memorandums of Law in opposition to the amended petition, with the Town generally adopting the arguments of the Applicants.

The Applicants correctly point out that this is the fourth proceeding brought by the petitioners seeking to challenge the Miller's Pond project approvals, with much of the litigation resulting in determinations finding that various Town approvals were proper. The Court notes that much of the history of the Project was detailed in its prior decision under Index No. 034124/2024 (reproduced at NYSCEF # 28 under this Index # 036922/2025) and will not restate the parties' protracted history here.

As an initial matter, the Applicants argue that Petitioners' declaratory judgment action must be dismissed as jurisdictionally defective as no summons was served and further, that the claims are merely a restatement of the relief requested in Petitioners' Art. 78 claim.

Pursuant to CPLR § 304(a), "[a]n action is commenced by filing of a summons and complaint or summons with notice" and "[a] special proceeding is commenced by filing a petition." A petitioner commencing a hybrid action is required "to serve a summons in addition to the notice of petition, and a combined petition/complaint" (Matter of New York Times Co. v City of NY Police Dept., 103 AD3d 405, 407 [1st Dept 2013]; see 301 East 66th Street Condominium Corp v City of New York, 224 AD3d 423, 426 [1st Dept 2024]). The necessity of filing both documents to commence a hybrid Article 78/Declaratory Judgment is because separate procedural rules apply to each type of action (see Lake Street Granite Quarry, Inc v Town/Village of Harrison, 106 AD3d 918, 920 [2d Dept 2013]). "The summons invokes jurisdiction for the declaratory-judgment-action component while the notice of petition performs the same function for the Article 78 aspect of the case" (Vincent C. Alexander, Practice Commentaries, C7804:5 Pleadings, In General; Joinder of Claims; "Hybrid" Declaratory Judgment Action-Article 78 Proceeding).

Here, the Petitioners failed to file and serve a summons in addition to the notice petition. Therefore, the action for declaratory judgment is jurisdictionally defective and must be dismissed.

SEQRA Violations

In their first, second, third, fifth and sixth causes of action, Petitioners assert SEQRA claims alleging, inter alia, that the Planning Board engaged in unlawful segmentation under SEQRA and failed to take a "hard look" at relevant environmental concerns prior to approving the site plan. This Court has already determined that the Applicants and the Town followed the procedures expressly set forth in Town Law § 272-a (8) and no further environmental review was required (NYSCEF Doc.#94 p.15) (the "Main Approval Challenge"). The Court's determination was "predicated upon the Town having engaged in extensive and intensive analysis of the impacts of the project and necessary mitigation requirements. While the Petitioner and even a court, might find fault with certain determinations, it is not for courts to second-guess the sound discretion of a town, so long as there has been a reasoned analysis" (id.).

Where, as here, the lead agency (Town of Ramapo) exercises due diligence in identifying all other involved agencies and provides written notice to them of its determination as to the significance of any environmental impacts, the review procedure comes to an end (see Matter of Cathedral Church of St. John the Divine v Dormitory Auth. Of State of NY, 224 AD2d 85, 99 [3d Dept 1996]) and no involved agency may later require a second determination in connection with the action, such as the completion of a new environmental assessment form, the issuance of a second negative declaration or the preparation of a full environmental impact statement (see 6 NYCRR 617.6[b][iii]; Matter of Gordon v Rush, 299 AD2d 20, 29 [2d Dept 2002]). Here, the Town adopted its Draft Generic Environmental Impact Statement (DGEIS) in 2022 and later determined that the Miller's Pond project, which was studied in the 2022 DGEIS, was within the scope of that DGEIS. The Planning Board, as an agency issuing subsequent approvals, must rely on that SEQRA process and cannot conduct its own SEQRA review (see Village of Pelham v City of Mount Vernon Indus. Development Agency, 302 AD2d 399 [2d Dept 2003]).

In light of the dismissal of the Main Approval Challenge, the Petitioners do not have the basis upon which to challenge the Phase 1 Site Development Plan approval. This Court has already determined that the Town Board, as SEQRA lead agency, took the requisite "hard look" at the impact of the Miller's Pond Project under SEQRA, thus, the Planning Board's responsibility as an involved agency is only to determined that its approval is within the scope of the Town Board's SEQRA findings. The Petitioners' argument that there has been an illegal segmentation of the environmental approval process is unpersuasive.

Open Meetings Law Violation

Petitioners claim that there was an Open Meetings Law violation is also unconvincing. "The purpose of the Open Meetings Law is to prevent municipal governments from debating and deciding in private what they are required to debate and decide in public" (Matter of Gernatt Asphalt Prods., Inc. v Town of Sardinia, 87 NY2d 668, 686 [1996] [citations omitted]; see Matter of Lynch v New York City Civilian Complaint Review Bd., 206 AD3d 558, 561 [1st Dept 2022], lv denied 39 NY3d 902 [2022]). A violation of the Open Meetings Law renders an ensuing determination "not void but, rather, voidable upon good cause shown" (Matter of Harvey v Zoning Bd. of Appeals of the City of Kingston, 166 AD3d 1149, 1151 [3d Dept 2018] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; see Matter of Cutler v Town of Mamakating, 137 AD3d 1373, 1375 [3d Dept 2016]).

Here, Petitioners complain that the Planning Board failed to satisfy the requirements of Public Officers Law § 106(1) and (3) for its June 24, 2025 and August 12, 2025 meetings. Assuming arguendo there was a violation, Petitioners failed to demonstrate good cause requiring nullification given the extensive public input at the meetings, the posting of supporting documents relating to the site plan approvals on the Planning Board's website, and the parties' extensive documentary submissions. As such, there was no effort to thwart public scrutiny on the part of the Town so as to warrant vacatur of any action taken at the meetings (Matter of Oakwood Prop. Mgt., LLC v Town of Brunswick, 103 AD3d 1067 [3d Dept 2013]).

Municipal Law § 239-m

Petitioners contend that the Planning Board failed to comply with General Municipal Law § 239-m by failing to refer the revised Phase 1 Site Plan dated May 30, 2025, to the County. Petitioner points to the County's July 23, 2025 letter and argues that the County never stated it received or reviewed the revised May 30, 2025 plan set and narrative. Such argument is wholly contradicted by the record. The County's letters of March 20, 2025 and July 23, 2025 specify two distinct referral items with the latter indicating a revised Phase 1 Site Plan. The County explicitly stated that "[a] revised Phasing Plan dated May 30, 2025, was furnished by the applicant" (NYSCEF Doc.# 95 at TOR 5650). The record clearly reflects that the County received two GML referrals of the Project in compliance with GML § 239-m.

Arbitrary, Capricious and Unsupported by Substantial Evidence

A local planning board has broad discretion in deciding applications for site plan approval, and judicial review is limited to determining whether the board's action was illegal, arbitrary, or an abuse of discretion (see Matter of Ifrah v Utschig, 98 NY2d 304, 308 [2002]; Matter of Valentine v McLaughlin, 87 AD3d 1155 [2d Dept 2011]; Matter of Fairway Manor, Inc. v Bertinelli, 81 AD3d 821, 822—823 [2d Dept 2011]). The planning board's determination must be upheld on judicial review if it was not illegal, has a rational basis, and is not arbitrary and capricious (see Matter of Fairway Manor, Inc. v Bertinelli, 81 AD3d at 823; Matter of Kearney v Kita, 62 AD3d 1000, 1001 [2d Dept 2009]). "When reviewing the determinations of a local planning board, courts consider substantial evidence only to determine whether the record contains sufficient evidence to support the rationality of the Board's determination" (id. at 1001 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Matter of In—Towne Shopping Ctrs. Co. v Planning Bd. of the Town of Brookhaven, 73 AD3d 925, 926 [2d Dept 2010]).

Most of Petitioners' allegations that the Planning Board acted arbitrarily and capriciously are conclusory, unsupported by the administrative record, and not meaningfully developed in Petitioners' brief. To the extent the allegations relate to claimed deficiencies on the SEQRA process — such as assertions of "conditional approval" or an absence of an independent environmental review — they merely repeat issues already addressed earlier in this decision. Town Law § 7-725-a(4) authorizes a planning board to impose "reasonable conditions" on a site plan approval. The ability of a planning board or other reviewing agency to impose conditions of site plan approval enables the board to ameliorate the undesirable consequences of a particular site plan. Conditions imposed as an incident of approval in a development permit control system allow flexibility and fairness in land use and development control decisions, and provide the ability to deal with problems such as traffic congestion (see Holmes v Planning Board of the Town of New Castle, 78 AD2d 1, 14 [2d Dept 1980]). In fact, " '[i]n conducting ... site plan review, the Planning Board is required to set appropriate conditions and safeguards which are in harmony with the general purpose and intent of the Town's zoning code, and which give particular regard to, inter alia, achieving conformance of the final site development' with any town development plan" (Valentine v. McLaughlin, 87 AD3d 1155, 1157 [2d Dept 2011]), lv. denied, 18 NY3d 804 [2012], quoting Commerce Bank, N.A. v Planning Board of the Town of Bedford, 47 AD3d 810, 810 [2d Dept 2008]). Here, the record demonstrates that the Planning Board conducted and adopted its own SEQRA Statement of Findings at its regularly scheduled meeting on June 24, 2025, thereby satisfying its obligations under SEQRA and has set appropriate conditions and safeguards.

Turning to Petitioners' various local law claims, they are equally unavailing. Petitioners allege that the Planning Board failed to comply with Town Code § 96-7(B) by failing to obtain a report from the Department of Public Works and Building Inspector as to "their review of the regulated activities" (Town of Ramapo Code § 96-7[B]). Such regulated activities are listed in § 96-6, none of which are activities proposed in the subject site plan application and Petitioners do not allege otherwise. Petitioners' argument is based on a misreading of the statute. Given that there are no such "regulated activities," this provision is incontrovertibly inapplicable.

Petitioners also allege that the Planning Board failed to comply with Town Code § 215-4(A)(1) and (3) in failing to find that the important scenic and natural features of the site will be substantially preserved. Such contention is directly contrary to the record. The Planning Board specifically stated that it examined the Scenic Road District law and determined that "the proposal Final Phase 1 MP-PUD development is consistent with the Scenic Road District regulations" (see NYSCEF Doc. No. 95, TOR-5633). Petitioners' have not met their burden of demonstrating that the Board's action was "arbitrary and capricious" or otherwise contrary to law or procedure. Petitioners have not pointed to anything in the record to show that the Board either ignored the requirements of Town Code § 215-4(1) and (3) or interpreted them contrary to law. The only thing before the Court is the Board's assertion that they complied and the Petitioners' assertion to the contrary. While the Court is mindful of Petitioners' concern for preserving the natural scenery of the area, judicial restraint ensures that municipal boards, not courts, make land-use decisions unless those decisions clearly overstep legal or procedural boundaries. The record has revealed none.

Petitioners assert that the Planning Board granted site plan approval unlawfully in violation of Town of Ramapo Code § 376-24(B)(5) which requires a subdivision approval by the Planning Board. It appears that Petitioners base such argument on the fact that the applicants initially submitted a subdivision application and then later withdrew it. The fact of the matter is that the Phase 1 Site Plan application did not propose any subdivision, thus § 376-24(b)(5) was never triggered. Again, Petitioners' argument is based on a misreading of the Town's code as well as inaccurate assumptions.

Lastly, Petitioners assert that the Board neglected to require performance bonds or other financial security as mandated by Town Law § 274-a(7) and Town of Ramapo Code § 376-24(b)(3)(i). A reading of both statues makes clear that a performance bond shall be required if the necessary infrastructure cannot be provided. Here, Petitioners have not established that the applicant had not provided the necessary infrastructure. Conversely, the Board's notice of decision specifically identifies Phase 1 of the Project to be an area of 62 acres that includes a renovated clubhouse, portions of a mix-use Village Center, parks and open space. There is no evidence indicating the requirement of performance bonds or other financial security.

Here, the Court finds that the actions of the Planning Board in approving the Miller's Pond project application had a rational basis, were not arbitrary or capricious, and were not illegal. Contrary to the Petitioners' contention, the record contains sufficient evidence to support the rationality of its determination.

The parties' remaining contentions, to the extent not rendered academic by our determination or explicitly addressed herein, have been considered and found to be unavailing.

Now therefore, it is

ORDERED, that the petition is denied in its entirety.

The foregoing constitutes the Decision and Order of the Court on Motion Seq. 1.

Dated: October 9, 2026

New City, New York

ENTER

The Honorable Keith J. Cornell

Acting Supreme Court Judge

To: All Counsel via NYSCEF

Keith J. Cornell, J.