The People of the State of New York v. Nicademus Garner, Defendant. (2026)

The defendant is charged by indictment with one count of Criminal Possession of a Weapon in the Third Degree, in violation of Penal Law ("PL") § 220.16(1). These charges stem from the defendant's arrest on September 5, 2025. On June 4, 2026, and June 9, 2026, this Court presided over a Huntley/Mapp/Boodle/Dunaway hearing. For the reasons set forth below, the defendant's motion to suppress is GRANTED.

Findings of Fact

The People called one witness at the hearing: Police Officer Melissa Munoz, Shield #12610 of the Police Service Area 5 ("PSA 5") precinct. The People also admitted into evidence six exhibits: (1) a probable cause I-card for an individual named Shaliek Hill; (2) an arrest photo of the defendant from September 5, 2025; (3) Officer Munoz's body worn camera recording from September 5, 2025; (4) two pages from the NYPD Patrol Guide; (5 & 6) vouchers created in connection with the arrest. The defendant also admitted into evidence one exhibit, defense exhibit A, Police Officer Agramonte's body worn camera recording from September 5, 2025. The Court credits the testimony of the People's witness.

Police Officer Munoz

Police Officer Melissa Munoz testified that, at the time of the hearing, she had been a member of the New York City Police Department for approximately one year and eight months and was assigned to Police Service Area 5. During her career, she had made approximately 24 arrests and assisted in approximately 45 others. Officer Munoz testified that she received training at the Police Academy concerning police procedures and that NYPD procedures are set forth in the Patrol Guide and Administrative Guide.

On September 5, 2025, Officer Munoz was assigned to a uniformed foot post in the Washington Houses with her partner, Police Officer Agramonte. At approximately 10:37 p.m., the officers were outside 1875 Third Avenue, having just completed a response to a domestic incident inside that building pursuant to a 911 application she received on her department issued device.

Officer Munoz testified that when an officer accepts a job through the 911 application on a department-issued device, the application displays warnings associated with the address, including information concerning wanted individuals associated with that location. According to Officer Munoz, the information available through such an alert may include a photograph, date of birth, the underlying offense, and whether the individual is the subject of a probable-cause I-card.

Before entering 1875 Third Avenue, Officer Munoz reviewed alerts for more than one wanted individual associated with that address. One of those alerts, dated November 9, 2023, admitted as People's Exhibit 1, concerned Shaliek Hill and contained a photograph of Hill and indicated that he was the subject of a probable-cause I-card. Neither Officer Munoz nor Agramonte, ever personally interacted with Hill, did not issue the I-card, did not speak to the person who issued it, and had no personal knowledge of the investigation that resulted in its issuance.

After completing the domestic incident and exiting the building, Officer Munoz observed the defendant, Nicademus Garner, approximately five feet away. She testified that the area was brightly illuminated by artificial light and was not very busy. Officer Munoz believed the defendant was consistent with the photograph contained in the I-card alert and notified her partner. She testified that the defendant and the individual depicted in the photograph had similar hair texture and haircut, a similar mustache, skin complexion, and nose.

Officer Munoz testified that the protocol when officers encounter someone whom they believe to be the subject of an active probable-cause I-card is to have that person identify himself. If the person does not provide a name or identification after being given several opportunities to do so, the officers detain the person and bring him to the precinct to determine his identity. According to Officer Munoz, Officer Agramonte asked the defendant to identify himself multiple times, and she did not hear the defendant provide his name.

The People introduced into evidence People's Exhibit 3, Munoz's body-worn-camera footage, which captured the encounter. Because of the camera's buffer period, however, the beginning of the recording did not contain audio. The footage therefore depicted the initial interaction—including Agramonte speaking to the defendant, the defendant appearing to respond, and the defendant gesturing toward his pocket—but did not capture the substance of that initial conversation.

However, on cross examination, the defendant introduced into evidence Defense Exhibit A, Agramonte's body-worn-camera footage, which contained audio of the initial interaction. The footage established that the first question Agramonte asked the defendant was, "What's your name?". The defendant responded that his name was Nicademus Garner. Munoz was approximately a few feet from the defendant when the exchange occurred, but testified that she did not recall hearing him provide his name at the time. When shown the body-worn-camera footage during cross-examination, Munoz acknowledged hearing the defendant state his name on the recording.

At the beginning of the encounter, the defendant was seated on a bicycle. After asking his name, Agramonte directed the defendant to get off the bicycle, and the defendant complied. Munoz took the bicycle and moved it toward a nearby fence for safekeeping. The defendant was not handcuffed at that time.

Munoz then asked the defendant whether he had identification, and the defendant responded that he did not. Munoz asked the defendant his name, to which the defendant responded that he had just told the officers his name and repeated it. On cross-examination Munoz testified that she recalled the defendant saying he just told them his name but did not recall the defendant stating his actual name. Munoz then leaned toward the defendant and again asked for his name, the defendant replied "Nicademus". The defendant then gestured toward his front pocket and stated that he could show Munoz a photograph of his identification. Munoz responded "that's alright" and raised her hand with her palm facing the defendant, which she testified was intended to signal that he should not remove anything from his pocket. The defendant complied and did not reach into his pocket.

Agramonte then asked the defendant if he had identification and asked him again for his name. The defendant asked why and stated, "Am I being detained?". Agramonte replied "yeah, you're under arrest for matching a description."

Munoz testified that, pursuant to her training, when officers encounter an individual whom they believe may be the subject of an I-card, they attempt to verify the person's identity. She was trained to do so by, among other things, running the person's name through a department-issued wireless device. Munoz acknowledged that members of the public are not required to carry identification and cannot be arrested for further investigation merely because they fail to produce identification. Munoz did not conduct a name check for Nicademus Garner on her department-issued device before the defendant was taken to the precinct.

The defendant was thereafter placed in handcuffs. Munoz testified that the officers did so because they believed the defendant was the individual depicted in the I-card and because, in her view, he had failed to identify himself despite being given multiple opportunities to do so. While the defendant was handcuffed, he told Munoz and Agramonte multiple times that he had a photograph of his identification on his phone and offered to show it them. Munoz did not permit him to do so and told him that once the defendant was in handcuffs, "that's it," and that he would be brought to the precinct to be identified. The defendant continued to implore the officers to allow him to show them his identification and Agramonte responded "now it's too late."

Additionally, during that period of time, a civilian female approached the officers and without specifically stating the defendant's name, she indicated to them that she knew the defendant and they had the wrong person in custody. The officers informed her that they had to arrest the defendant to verify his identity but did not ask her any additional questions.

After the defendant was handcuffed, Munoz reviewed additional information concerning Shaliek Hill on her department-issued device. Munoz testified that the expanded profile provided demographic information concerning the subject of the I-card. While Munoz was reviewing the information, the defendant looked over her shoulder at the device and stated, "That's not me." The information associated with Hill listed him as approximately five feet five inches tall and 140 pounds. The defendant was subsequently recorded in the arrest paperwork as approximately five feet nine inches tall and 155 pounds. Munoz testified that the defendant's height and weight were obtained at the precinct rather than at the scene. She further testified that she is also approximately five feet nine inches tall.

Munoz further testified that, after the defendant was handcuffed, she notified a supervisor. According to Munoz, the supervisor was required to respond to the scene and determine whether the officers had taken the appropriate measures and whether the defendant should be transported to the precinct. The supervisor had not yet arrived when the events described below occurred.

Agramonte conducted a search or pat-down of the defendant after he was handcuffed and recovered a knife, cash, and a cellular telephone from the defendant's front right pants pocket. Those items were placed into the defendant's backpack. With regard to the knife, Agramonte asked the defendant "what is this" "what do you use it for", and the defendant replied "to cut food." During this time, the defendant was moved a short distance toward the entrance of the building, adjacent to a grassy area located behind a gate.

Munoz testified that she was watching the defendant's hands for officer-safety reasons. According to Munoz, the defendant moved his hands toward his right waistband and shoved an item toward the grassy area behind the gate. Munoz testified that she continuously observed the item until it landed in the grass. After Agramonte secured the defendant, Munoz went behind the gate and recovered a clear bag containing multiple yellow capsules of alleged cocaine. The defendant stated, "That's not mine." Munoz placed the bag into the front pocket of the defendant's backpack.

The defendant was thereafter transported to the precinct. Munoz testified that, pursuant to NYPD procedure, she inventoried the contents of the defendant's backpack. She emptied the backpack, counted and accounted for its contents, and recorded the process on her body-worn camera in the presence of a desk supervisor. In addition to the items that had been recovered from the defendant and placed into the backpack at the scene, Munoz recovered multiple packages of marijuana from inside the backpack. The property was thereafter vouchered.

Conclusions of Law

At a suppression hearing, the People bear the initial burden of establishing the legality of the police conduct, after which the defendant bears the ultimate burden of proving that the evidence should be suppressed (People v Berrios, 28 NY2d 361, 367-368 [1971]). Probable cause exists where it "appear[s] to be at least more probable than not that a crime has taken place and that the one arrested is its perpetrator, for conduct equally compatible with guilt or innocence will not suffice" (People v Carrasquillo, 54 NY2d 248, 254 [1981]). Whether probable cause exists is determined by considering the totality of the facts and circumstances known to the arresting officer (People v Shulman, 6 NY3d 1, 26 [2005]).

People v De Bour sets forth a four-level framework governing police encounters. At level one, police may approach an individual and request basic information when they have an objective, credible reason for doing so. At level two, police may exercise the common-law right of inquiry by asking more pointed questions based upon a founded suspicion that criminal activity is afoot, but may not forcibly detain the individual. At level three, police may forcibly stop and detain an individual when they have reasonable suspicion that the individual has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a crime. At level four, police may arrest an individual when they have probable cause (People v De Bour, 40 NY2d 210, 223 [1976]).

The officers' initial approach and request for the defendant's name and identification were permissible as a level-two request for information based upon the defendant's perceived resemblance to the I-card photograph and his presence at the address associated with Hill. Police officers have broad authority to approach an individual and ask basic questions concerning identity, provided they have an articulable reason for doing so and are not acting on mere whim or caprice (People v Hollman, 79 NY2d 181, 190 [1992]).

The encounter escalated to a level-three seizure, however, when Officer Agramonte directed the defendant to get off his bicycle and Officer Munoz took the bicycle and moved it away. At that point, the defendant was surrounded by two uniformed officers who had now taken possession of his bicycle. Thus, a reasonable person in the defendant's position would not have felt free to leave (see De Bour, 40 NY2d at 223; People v Banks, 85 NY2d 558, 562 [1995]). That seizure required reasonable suspicion. The encounter escalated further when Officer Agramonte told the defendant he was under arrest and the officers placed him in handcuffs, which, under these circumstances, constituted an arrest requiring probable cause.

The Court need not determine whether the People sufficiently established the probable-cause basis underlying the I-card. Even assuming that the I-card was supported by probable cause to arrest Hill, the People were still required to establish that the officers had reasonable grounds to believe the defendant was the individual named in the I-card.

Here, the officers' perceived resemblance between the defendant and the I-card photograph, together with the defendant's presence at the address associated with Hill, provided an objective, credible reason to approach the defendant and request information. Those circumstances did not, however, supply reasonable suspicion to forcibly detain him. Before Officer Agramonte directed the defendant to get off his bicycle, the defendant had provided his name, which bore no similarity to the name Shaliek Hill. The officers nevertheless removed the defendant from his bicycle and took the bicycle away without attempting to verify the name he provided. Under the totality of the circumstances, the officers lacked reasonable grounds to believe the defendant was Hill and therefore lacked reasonable suspicion to seize him.

Even if the initial seizure was supported by reasonable suspicion, the officers lacked probable cause to arrest the defendant as Hill. A mistaken-identity arrest is lawful only where the police possess probable cause to arrest the person sought and reasonably believe that the person arrested is that individual (People v Jones, 2026 NY Slip Op 01447, *2-3 [Ct App Mar. 17, 2026]; People v Porter, 109 AD3d 737, 737 [1st Dept 2013]). Here, the record does not justify the officers' reasonable belief that the defendant was Hill.¹ The Court was able to compare the photograph of Hill contained in the I-card notification (People's Exhibit 1) with the defendant's appearance in the body-worn camera recordings (People's Exhibit 3 and Defense Exhibit A), as well as his arrest photograph (People's Exhibit 2). Although the defendant bore some resemblance to the individual depicted in the I-card, there were notable differences between the two. The defendant stood four inches taller than Hill, wore a different hairstyle, and had different facial hair. Moreover, neither officer had ever personally interacted with Hill and thus had no independent basis upon which to identify the defendant as him. The I-card notification, although associated with the same address, was dated November 9, 2023, nearly two years before the incident at issue.

More significantly, the defendant repeatedly told the officers that he was not Hill, provided them with a different name, and implored both Officers multiple times to look at a photograph of his identification on his phone. Thus, the officers were presented with readily available information that could have confirmed or dispelled their belief that the defendant was Hill. Rather than attempt to verify his identity, however, the officers told the defendant it was "too late", placed the defendant in handcuffs and arrested him. Considering the discrepancies between the defendant and the I-card description, the age of the I-card, the officers' lack of any prior familiarity with Hill, and the defendant's repeated efforts to identify himself, the Court finds that, under the totality of the circumstances, the officers' belief that the defendant was Hill was not reasonable (see Jones at *3-4).

Accordingly, the tangible evidence recovered from defendant's person and backpack, together with the statements he made during the encounter, are suppressed as fruit of the defendant's unlawful seizure and arrest.  ² Moreover, as to the bag of alleged cocaine, the defendant discarded the bag during the same continuous encounter in response to the police officers unlawful conduct. In determining whether property discarded by a defendant following unlawful police conduct constitutes abandonment, the relevant inquiry is whether the defendant's act was a spontaneous reaction precipitated by the unlawful police conduct or, instead, a calculated act sufficiently attenuated from the illegality to dissipate the taint (People v Wilkerson, 64 NY2d 749, 750 [1984]; People v Boodle, 47 NY2d 398, 404 [1979]).

Applying this standard to the facts here, the Court finds that the defendant's act of discarding the bag of alleged cocaine was a spontaneous reaction to the officers' unlawful conduct, rather than an independent, calculated act of abandonment. The defendant discarded the bag during the same continuous encounter with the police, and the circumstances establish a direct causal connection between the unlawful police conduct and the defendant's actions. Accordingly, the defendant's act of discarding the bag was not sufficiently attenuated from the unlawful police conduct to constitute abandonment under Boodle.

This opinion constitutes the Decision and Order of the Court.

Dated: October 13, 2026

New York, NY

Cori Weston, A.J.S.C.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Although Officer Agramonte initially interacted with the defendant he was not called as a witness at the suppression hearing.

2.   In light of this determination, the Court need not reach defendant's remaining arguments under Huntley or determine whether the subsequent search of his backpack otherwise complied with the requirements governing inventory searches.

Cori Weston, J.