V.Q., Plaintiff, v. N.Q., Defendant. (2026)

I. Statement Pursuant to CPLR 2219 [a]

The following e-filed papers were read on the three motion sequences determined herein, which are consolidated for disposition because they arise from the same course of events and present overlapping questions of law.

On motion sequence number 002, by defendant N.Q., brought on by order to show cause, to quash plaintiff's Notice of Deposition Non-party dated February 19, 2026, directed to non-party E.L., and for a stay, sanctions, counsel fees, and related relief: the order to show cause signed March 20, 2026 (NYSCEF Doc No. 114); the affirmation of Elizabeth Kuiken, Esq., dated March 19, 2026, with the exhibits referenced therein (NYSCEF Doc No. 106); counsel's word count and Part 130 certifications (NYSCEF Doc Nos. 112, 113); the stipulation of counsel dated April 21, 2026 (NYSCEF Doc Nos. 123, 124); the affidavit of plaintiff V.Q. in opposition (NYSCEF Doc No. 126); the affirmation of Yonatan S. Levoritz, Esq., dated May 5, 2026, in opposition (NYSCEF Doc No. 127); the attorney certification dated May 5, 2026 (NYSCEF Doc No. 128); and the affidavit of service sworn to May 6, 2026 (NYSCEF Doc No. 149).

On motion sequence number 003, by defendant, brought on by order to show cause, to quash plaintiff's Judicial Subpoena to Witness to Appear for Deposition Upon Oral Examination and Judicial Subpoena Duces Tecum dated March 19, 2026, directed to E.L., for a protective order, sanctions, and counsel fees, together with plaintiff's cross-motion for sanctions and costs: the order to show cause signed March 30, 2026 (NYSCEF Doc No. 122); the affirmation of Val Kleyman, Esq., dated March 23, 2026, with the exhibits referenced therein (NYSCEF Doc No. 116); counsel's Part 130 certification (NYSCEF Doc No. 119); the stipulation of counsel dated April 21, 2026 (NYSCEF Doc Nos. 123, 124); plaintiff's notice of cross-motion dated May 5, 2026 (NYSCEF Doc No. 150); plaintiff's affidavit in opposition and in support of the cross-motion (NYSCEF Doc No. 151); the affirmation of Yonatan S. Levoritz, Esq., dated May 5, 2026 (NYSCEF Doc No. 152); the attorney certification (NYSCEF Doc No. 153); and the affidavit of service sworn to May 6, 2026 (NYSCEF Doc No. 177).

On motion sequence number 004, by plaintiff, brought on by order to show cause, for pendente lite maintenance, child-related expenses, counsel fees, and an order that motion sequence number 004 supersede motion sequence number 001, together with defendant's cross-motion for sanctions and costs: the order to show cause signed May 29, 2026 (NYSCEF Doc No. 243); the affirmation of emergency circumstances of Yonatan S. Levoritz, Esq., dated May 28, 2026 (NYSCEF Doc No. 196); plaintiff's affidavit in support (NYSCEF Doc Nos. 197, 246); the affirmation of Yonatan S. Levoritz, Esq., dated May 28, 2026 (NYSCEF Doc No. 198); the attorney certification (NYSCEF Doc No. 199); defendant's notice of cross-motion dated July 29, 2026 (NYSCEF Doc No. 250); the affirmation of Elizabeth M. Kuiken, Esq., in opposition and in support of the cross-motion (NYSCEF Doc No. 251); defendant's affirmation in opposition and in support of the cross-motion (NYSCEF Doc No. 252); counsel's Part 130 certification (NYSCEF Doc No. 258); the affirmation of Julio E. Portilla, Esq., dated August 25, 2026, in opposition to the cross-motion and in further support (NYSCEF Doc No. 264); plaintiff's affirmation dated August 25, 2026 (NYSCEF Doc No. 265); the supplemental and amended supplemental affirmations of Julio E. Portilla, Esq., dated August 25 and August 27, 2026 (NYSCEF Doc Nos. 266, 267); the reply affirmation of Elizabeth M. Kuiken, Esq., dated August 28, 2026 (NYSCEF Doc No. 270); and defendant's reply affirmation dated August 28, 2026 (NYSCEF Doc No. 271).

The court has also considered its decision and order dated August 11, 2026, determining motion sequence number 001 (NYSCEF Doc No. 261), insofar as it bears upon the relief sought on motion sequence number 004 and upon the scheduling of disclosure. No reply papers were submitted on motion sequence numbers 002 and 003. Plaintiff's affidavit in support of motion sequence number 004 appears in the record in more than one filed version, one of which repeats a page. Plaintiff's counsel has characterized the irregularity as clerical and has asked that it be disregarded (NYSCEF Doc Nos. 266, 267), and defendant has not claimed any prejudice from it. Pursuant to CPLR 2001, which both sides invoke (NYSCEF Doc No. 264 ¶ 3; NYSCEF Doc No. 270 ¶ 21), the court disregards the irregularity and has considered the complete version of the affidavit (NYSCEF Doc No. 246).

Upon the foregoing papers, and for the reasons that follow, motion sequence number 002 is granted to the extent of quashing the Notice of Deposition Non-party and is otherwise denied; motion sequence number 003 is granted to the extent of quashing the Judicial Subpoena dated March 19, 2026, without prejudice to service of a subpoena that complies with the CPLR, and is otherwise denied; plaintiff's cross-motion under motion sequence number 003 is denied; motion sequence number 004 is granted solely to the extent of allocating the summer camp expense as set forth below and is otherwise denied or denied as academic; and defendant's cross-motion under motion sequence number 004 is denied.

II. Findings of Fact

A. The Parties and the Nature of the Action

Plaintiff V.Q. and defendant N.Q. were married in 2011, in New York County (NYSCEF Doc No. 106 ¶ 3; NYSCEF Doc No. 126 ¶ 4). They are the parents of two children: an older daughter, born in 2007, who attends college, and a younger daughter, born in 2016, who attends a private school (NYSCEF Doc No. 246 ¶¶ 4, 103). Plaintiff commenced this action for divorce in October 2024. The papers variously place the commencement on October 24, October 25, and October 31, 2024 (NYSCEF Doc No. 106 ¶ 4; NYSCEF Doc No. 126 ¶ 20; NYSCEF Doc No. 251 ¶

7; NYSCEF Doc No. 252 ¶ 10), a variance that has no bearing on the questions presented.

Plaintiff describes defendant as a real estate developer who works through his family's business and who, for years, spent as much as half of each year in a French overseas territory in the Caribbean, managing projects associated with his family (NYSCEF Doc No. 126 ¶¶ 6-10). She states that she left her own career in 2014 and has since been a stay-at-home parent (id. ¶ 15). Defendant, for his part, attests that he does not earn a standard salary, that his income has historically depended upon the completion of individual development projects, that he completed a project in Queens in 2019 and deposited more than $1 million into the parties' joint account, that the family's elevated lifestyle after 2019 was funded by that sale, and that his parents are now lending him the money he pays toward the family's support (NYSCEF Doc No. 252 ¶¶ 7, 15-17).

B. The Parties' Finances and Defendant's Business Interests

The parties exchanged sworn statements of net worth on May 9, 2025 (NYSCEF Doc No. 126 ¶ 23). Defendant's statement reports annual income of $161,760 (NYSCEF Doc No. 127 ¶ 82). Plaintiff's statement dated December 3, 2025 reports annual gross income of approximately $8,000 and monthly expenses of $33,231 (NYSCEF Doc No. 198 ¶ 16), and her statement dated March 2, 2026 reports annual gross income of $16,106 (NYSCEF Doc No. 127 ¶ 83). Since March 2026, plaintiff has worked part-time on a temporary basis and earns approximately $854 net every two weeks (NYSCEF Doc No. 265 ¶ 7).

Defendant acknowledges that he holds a one-third interest in a closely held French company (the Entity) that owns land in a French overseas territory in the Caribbean, and a minority interest in a second French company (NYSCEF Doc No. 106 ¶¶ 9, 31; NYSCEF Doc No. 252 ¶ 18). He describes the Entity's project as undeveloped, "only a foundation in the ground," without contracts, leases, or income (NYSCEF Doc No. 251 ¶ 17; NYSCEF Doc No. 252 ¶ 18). Plaintiff paints a very different picture. She avers that defendant's statement of net worth omits his interest in the Entity; that the Entity's articles of association dated April 26, 2024 reflect at least €3,000,000invested and an allotment to defendant of up to 10,000 shares for his contribution; that land owned by the Entity is under construction and is expected to generate rental income of €2,000,000 or more each year; and that defendant told her before the action was commenced that the Entity had received, or would receive, €12,000,000 in key money (NYSCEF Doc No. 126 ¶¶ 26, 93-94; NYSCEF Doc No. 246 ¶¶ 37-38, 100). Defendant denies that any such sum has come to him or to the entity (NYSCEF Doc No. 252 ¶ 18).

Discovery has been contentious. Plaintiff served a Notice of Discovery and Inspection on June 13, 2025; a preliminary conference stipulation and order issued on July 10, 2025; and, according to plaintiff, the court directed defendant on September 30, 2025 to comply within two weeks (NYSCEF Doc No. 126 ¶¶ 22, 27-28, 31). Defense counsel states that defendant responded on September 24, 2025 and that additional documents followed, including a responsive letter and a supplemental letter describing defendant's business interests, both sent on February 20, 2026 in answer to a deficiency letter from plaintiff's then counsel, Helene Carvallo, Esq., dated January 16, 2026 (NYSCEF Doc No. 106 ¶¶ 7-9). The February 20, 2026 letter objected to plaintiff's demands concerning the Entity on the ground that responsive documents, to the extent they exist, "have been created in the regular course of business on behalf of a corporate legal entity [the Entity] not subject to this litigation and not in his individual capacity constituting confidential and proprietary business information of such entity" (NYSCEF Doc No. 127 ¶ 11). In his most recent submission, defendant attests that he either lacks access to, or cannot provide, the Entity's financial statements, bank records, loan and financing information, contracts, and communications with a real estate broker (NYSCEF Doc No. 271 ¶ 20).

In late September 2025, plaintiff moved by order to show cause, designated motion sequence number 001, for custody, maintenance, child support, counsel fees, an order compelling discovery, and other relief (NYSCEF Doc No. 126 ¶ 33; NYSCEF Doc No. 251 ¶ 9). That motion was fully submitted in December 2025 (NYSCEF Doc No. 251 ¶ 10; NYSCEF Doc No. 264 ¶ 10). Meanwhile, defendant made voluntary monthly support payments to plaintiff of between $12,000 and $13,480 from the commencement of the action until January 2026, when he reduced them to 10,000 per month (NYSCEF Doc No. 251 ¶ 11; NYSCEF Doc No. 265 ¶ 6). Plaintiff avers that in April 2025 defendant also stopped paying the family's credit cards and stopped providing the additional sums he had previously provided (NYSCEF Doc No. 246 ¶¶ 25-29). Defendant pays the children's tuition, which for the spring 2026 semester amounted to $43,363.74 for the older child and $31,370 for the younger child, together with the children's medical expenses and most of their extracurricular expenses (NYSCEF Doc No. 252 ¶¶ 7, 35).

C. Notice of Deposition Non-party

Plaintiff's counsel issued a document entitled "Notice of Deposition Non-party," dated February 19, 2026, directing E.L. to appear for a deposition and to produce documents on March 23, 2026 (NYSCEF Doc No. 106 ¶¶ 2, 10). Defense counsel received it on or about February 25, 2026 (id. ¶ 10; NYSCEF Doc No. 126 ¶ 51). According to defense counsel, the document does not call itself a subpoena, is not captioned as a subpoena duces tecum, and nowhere uses the word subpoena; it was sent to E.L. by FedEx and to defense counsel by regular mail (NYSCEF Doc No. 106 ¶¶ 18, 22-23). Plaintiff does not dispute any of these descriptions.

The rider to the Notice demands employment agreements between E.L. and defendant from January 1, 2018 to the present; partnership and contractual agreements between them for the same period; documents concerning conversations among E.L., defendant, and other non-parties; documents reflecting future agreements, including agreements not yet executed; leases for properties owned by E.L. and defendant, including leases not yet executed; all indicia of payments by E.L. to defendant, including commissions, partnership distributions, finders fees, participation fees, rents, and other profits; documents reflecting the retention of architects, contractors, or subcontractors for any property owned, managed, leased, or rented by defendant in any jurisdiction; and loan documents, promissory notes, mortgages, and debts involving E.L. and defendant (NYSCEF Doc No. 106 ¶ 15; see NYSCEF Doc No. 127 ¶ 50). Plaintiff quotes the following statement from the face of the Notice: "the documents listed on the annexed Rider will berequired to be produced and are relevant to the prosecution of the within matter based upon the deponent's business relationship with Defendant" (NYSCEF Doc No. 127 ¶ 49).

Defense counsel describes E.L. as a broker retained by the Entity to gauge the interest of prospective tenants in undeveloped land owned by that entity, and asserts that he has no personal connection or relationship with defendant (NYSCEF Doc No. 106 ¶ 40). Plaintiff avers that E.L. has done business with defendant, that defendant was his principal contact on all of the Entity's projects abroad, including the leasing of retail space, and that defendant has authority to make decisions and sign contracts on the Entity's behalf (NYSCEF Doc No. 126 ¶¶ 85, 92).

D. Defense Counsel's Correspondence and Motion Sequence Number 002

On March 12, 2026, defense counsel wrote to plaintiff's counsel that the Notice was defective because a subpoena must be served on any nonparty witness whose testimony and documents are sought and because the requirements for service of a nonparty subpoena had not been met, and advised that defendant would disregard the Notice "until such time that a proper protocol regarding seeking discovery information and deposition of a non-party has been followed per the CPLR" (NYSCEF Doc No. 106 ¶¶ 11, 54). On March 17, 2026, defense counsel wrote again, reminding plaintiff's counsel that "[b]oth sides have an obligation to confer and attempt to try to resolve all discovery related issues prior to court intervention" (id. ¶¶ 12, 55). Defense counsel states that neither letter drew a response (id. ¶¶ 11-12, 55-56).

Defendant then moved by order to show cause. The Honorable Jeffrey H. Pearlman signed the order on March 20, 2026, made it returnable on May 29, 2026, and directed oral argument (NYSCEF Doc No. 114). The order to show cause seeks to quash the Notice pursuant to CPLR 3106 [b], because E.L. was not served with a subpoena; pursuant to CPLR 2303 [a], for improper service and failure to notice defendant; pursuant to CPLR 3120 [3] and 2103, for failure to notice defendant; pursuant to CPLR 3101 [a] [4], for want of an adequate statement of the reasons for the disclosure; and pursuant to CPLR 2304, as improperly served, unduly burdensome, lacking in specificity, and unlikely to yield relevant information (id.). It further seeks a stay of the deposition, sanctions against plaintiff's counsel pursuant to 22 NYCRR 130-1.2, counsel fees and costs, and further relief (id.). The supporting affirmation requests counsel fees of $10,000 under Domestic Relations Law § 237 and, in several places, a protective order (NYSCEF Doc No. 106 ¶¶ 16, 25, 41-43). Justice Pearlman declined to grant interim relief, striking the proposed paragraphs that would have granted the motion pending the hearing and stayed the deposition (NYSCEF Doc No. 114).

E. The Judicial Subpoena and Motion Sequence Number 003

Plaintiff avers that on March 20, 2026, her then counsel informed defense counsel that she had served E.L. and defense counsel with a Judicial Subpoena to Witness to Appear for Deposition Upon Oral Examination and Judicial Subpoena Duces Tecum dated March 19, 2026, requiring E.L. to appear on March 23, 2026 (NYSCEF Doc No. 126 ¶ 52). According to defense counsel, plaintiff's counsel represented that the new instrument had "cured" the Notice, stated that the deposition would likely move to March 25, 2026, and later confirmed a deposition on that date at her office, without first consulting defense counsel about the date (NYSCEF Doc No. 116 ¶¶ 15, 17, 46). Defense counsel replied the same day that CPLR 3106 [b] requires that a nonparty subpoena be served at least twenty days before the examination, and offered a joint call to address the outstanding discovery issues; plaintiff's counsel agreed that a call was needed but indicated that she still intended to proceed with the deposition (id. ¶¶ 16, 58-59). Defense counsel further states that, despite his requests, plaintiff's counsel did not provide any affidavit of service reflecting the manner in which the Subpoena was served upon E.L. (id. ¶¶ 15, 25). The demands in the Subpoena, as described by defense counsel, track those in the Notice (compare NYSCEF Doc No. 106 ¶ 15 with NYSCEF Doc No. 116 ¶ 20).

Defendant then moved by a second order to show cause, which Justice Pearlman signed on March 30, 2026, designated motion sequence number 003, and made returnable on May 29, 2026 (NYSCEF Doc No. 122). That motion seeks to quash the Subpoena pursuant to CPLR 2304 as improperly served, unduly burdensome, overly broad, intended to harass, and unlikely to yield relevant information; a protective order pursuant to CPLR 3103 [a] denying the Subpoena and "limiting any future discovery devices"; sanctions against plaintiff's counsel pursuant to 22 NYCRR 130-1.2; and counsel fees and costs (id.), which the supporting affirmation quantifies at

$5,000 (NYSCEF Doc No. 116 ¶ 62). By stipulation dated April 21, 2026, counsel agreed that plaintiff's opposition to both motion sequences would be due on May 15, 2026 (NYSCEF Doc Nos.123, 124).

F. Plaintiff's Opposition to Motion Sequence Numbers 002 and 003 and Her Cross-Motion

Plaintiff, then represented by The Levoritz Law Firm, timely opposed both motions and cross-moved under motion sequence number 003 (NYSCEF Doc Nos. 126, 127, 150-152). She contends that defendant lacks standing because he has shown no proprietary interest in, or privilege over, the materials sought (NYSCEF Doc No. 127 ¶¶ 5-14; NYSCEF Doc No. 152 ¶¶ 6-15); that the motions are academic because E.L. did not object in writing within twenty days and, by email dated April 14, 2026, agreed to appear for a deposition on May 11, 2026 and accepted service (NYSCEF Doc No. 127 ¶¶ 15-24; NYSCEF Doc No. 152 ¶¶ 16-22; NYSCEF Doc No. 126 ¶¶ 30, 53, 106);that the information sought is material and necessary to equitable distribution, maintenance, and child support (NYSCEF Doc No. 127 ¶¶ 25-47; NYSCEF Doc No. 152 ¶¶ 23-46); that the demands are not unduly burdensome (NYSCEF Doc No. 152 ¶¶ 47-53); and that nothing required her to await defendant's deposition before seeking nonparty disclosure (id. ¶¶ 54-59). She further argues that defendant's requests for counsel fees fail because his moving papers lack a statement of net worth and because she is the less monied spouse (id. ¶¶ 60-70). Plaintiff states that she was unaware that her former counsel had not answered defense counsel's letters and that she retained new counsel because she was dissatisfied with her prior representation (NYSCEF Doc No. 126 ¶ 99 & n 20).Plaintiff's cross-motion seeks an order denying motion sequence number 003, imposing financial sanctions of $10,000 each upon defendant and his counsel, Val Kleyman, Esq., and awarding plaintiff costs and counsel fees incurred in responding to motion sequence numbers 002and 003 (NYSCEF Doc No. 150). Plaintiff's counsel reports charges of $14,100 through May 4, 2026 in connection with those motions (NYSCEF Doc No. 152 ¶¶ 100-103).

G. Motion Sequence Number 004

On May 28, 2026, the evening before the return date of motion sequence numbers 002 and 003, plaintiff filed an emergency order to show cause, designated motion sequence number 004 (NYSCEF Doc Nos. 196-199). Justice Pearlman signed it on May 29, 2026 and made it returnable on August 11, 2026, striking the proposed interim directives for maintenance, the older child's allowance, educational expenses, and the camp expense (NYSCEF Doc No. 243). The application seeks needs-based pendente lite maintenance of $17,559 per month; an order directing defendant to continue paying all of the children's educational expenses; an order directing defendant to pay the older child a $125 weekly allowance by automatic payment; an order directing defendant to pay the $916.70 cost of the younger child's attendance at a sleepaway summer camp; $100,000 in interim counsel fees payable to plaintiff's then counsel; and an order that motion sequence number 004 supersede motion sequence number 001 (id.)

In support, plaintiff describes the family's standard of living during the marriage, including travel and private schooling (NYSCEF Doc No. 246 ¶¶ 13-20); the reduction in defendant's voluntary support (id. ¶¶ 24-29, 70); her minimum credit card payments of $3,600 per month (id. ¶ 70); her own expenses of $17,559 per month, exclusive of the children's expenses and school costs (id. ¶ 102 & n 37); and her belief that defendant's actual income exceeds what he reports (id. ¶¶ 35-47, 97-101). Her counsel argued that where "the court is otherwise presented with insufficient evidence to determine income, the court shall order the temporary maintenance award based upon the needs of the payee or the standard of living of the parties prior to commencement of the divorce action, whichever is greater" (NYSCEF Doc No. 198 ¶ 12, quoting Domestic Relations Law § 236 [B] [5-a] [j]). As to the older child's allowance, plaintiff acknowledges that defendant pays $125 per week, but states that the older child must ask for it each week (NYSCEF Doc No. 246 ¶ 104). As to the camp, plaintiff avers that defendant knew of and encouraged the enrollment, that shereserved the place with a friend's credit card when registration opened, and that defendant later declined to contribute (id. ¶¶ 106-109; NYSCEF Doc No. 265 ¶¶ 23-24). Plaintiff's affidavit also states that E.L. "[i]nitially" agreed to appear for a deposition and accepted service, but "subsequently refused to sit for a deposition" after being advised by defense counsel not to appear, and references an email from E.L. dated March 24, 2026 (NYSCEF Doc No. 246 ¶ 51).

Plaintiff's counsel at the time reported charges of $28,382.50 through May 28, 2026, against which plaintiff had paid a $10,000 retainer (NYSCEF Doc No. 198 ¶¶ 57-60). Plaintiff's statement of net worth dated December 3, 2025 was annexed to the application (id. ¶ 16).

H. Defendant's Opposition and Cross-Motion

Defendant opposes motion sequence number 004 as duplicative of motion sequence number 001 (NYSCEF Doc No. 251 ¶¶ 25-35). He attests that he already pays all of the children's educational expenses and the older child's $125 weekly allowance, that he cannot afford to continue paying the children's expenses in full, and that plaintiff should contribute on a pro rata basis (NYSCEF Doc No. 252 ¶¶ 34-35). As to the camp, defendant attests that plaintiff enrolled the younger child and paid the fee without consulting him, that he did not refuse to pay but wished to discuss his contribution, and that he has always paid for the children's recreational and extracurricular activities and "likely would have paid for it" had he been asked in advance (id. ¶ 36; NYSCEF Doc No. 271 ¶ 15). His counsel's affirmation, by contrast, states that "Defendant already paid for the camp fees for [the younger child]" (NYSCEF Doc No. 251 ¶ 40).

Defendant cross-moves for sanctions and costs against plaintiff and her former counsel under Part 130, seeking $11,800 in counsel fees (NYSCEF Doc Nos. 250-252). He contends that motion sequence number 004 is duplicative, that its emergency designation was a tactic to have it heard with motion sequence numbers 002 and 003, that plaintiff's papers contain false statements concerning the allowance, discovery, and the camp, and that plaintiff's repeated changes of counsel have prolonged the litigation (NYSCEF Doc No. 251 ¶¶ 44-61; NYSCEF Doc No. 252 ¶¶ 5-6, 20-27, 31). Plaintiff responds that the cross-motion is procedurally defective because the notice ofcross-motion leaves the return date and Part blank and does not identify the former attorney against whom sanctions are sought, that no statement in her papers has been shown to be false, and that the requested fees are not segregated (NYSCEF Doc No. 264 ¶¶ 17-41).

I. Subsequent Proceedings

Oral argument on motion sequence numbers 002 and 003 was held before Justice Pearlman on May 29, 2026 (NYSCEF Doc No. 251 ¶ 31; NYSCEF Doc No. 252 ¶ 12). According to defendant, Justice Pearlman declined to hear motion sequence number 004 that day because it was not returnable (NYSCEF Doc No. 252 ¶ 12). The undersigned was thereafter recently assigned to the Supreme Court, New York County, by administrative order of the Chief Administrative Judge of the Courts (AO/150/2026), and this matter is now before the undersigned.

Motion sequence number 004 and defendant's cross-motion were argued before the undersigned on August 11, 2026 (NYSCEF Doc No. 270 ¶ 7; NYSCEF Doc No. 271 ¶ 6). By decision and order dated August 11, 2026 and entered August 14, 2026, the court determined motion sequence number 001 (NYSCEF Doc No. 261). For purposes of that pendente lite determination only, the court imputed income of $357,000 per year to defendant and $15,000 per year to plaintiff (id. at 23). It awarded plaintiff temporary maintenance of $6,704.17 per month, consisting of a guideline sum of $3,704.17 and an additional $3,000 on income above the statutory cap, and basic temporary child support of $2,989.14 per month, each commencing September 1, 2026, for a combined monthly obligation of $9,693.31 (id.). Both awards are retroactive to September 26, 2025, subject to dollar-for-dollar credits for qualifying payments, and the order prescribes a procedure under which the parties exchange proof of claimed credits within twenty days and, absent agreement, either party may restore the matter to the calendar by letter application for a determination of arrears (id. at 23-24). The order directs that, except for private-school tuition, defendant bear 74.34 percent and plaintiff 25.66 percent of the children's reasonable unreimbursed medical expenses, qualifying childcare expenses, tutoring, and "agreed-upon or previously established extracurricular activities," with reimbursement within thirty days afterpresentation of documentary proof (id. at 24-25). It directs defendant to pay, or cause to be paid, one hundred percent of the children's private-school tuition, and not to cause or permit the discontinuance of the younger child's tutoring or the older child's therapy (id. at 25). It treats both children as unemancipated for purposes of the interim determination (id. at 3). It awards plaintiff$25,000 in interim counsel fees of the $50,000 requested, payable directly to her counsel, without prejudice to further application, explaining that the reduction reflected, among other things, plaintiff's retention of three successive sets of counsel and fees attributable to letters rogatory and nonparty discovery abroad whose necessity and proportionality had not yet been demonstrated (id. at 21, 25). It records that plaintiff's counsel withdrew on the record the branches of that motion seeking temporary custody and an order compelling defendant to respond to plaintiff's June 13, 2025 discovery demand, which were not reached, without prejudice to any future application (id. at 2-3, 22). Finally, it directs a conference at which the court will establish a schedule for the completion of disclosure, including depositions (id. at 25). Plaintiff now asserts that the withdrawal of the discovery branch was made without her authorization (NYSCEF Doc No. 265 ¶¶ 32-33).

At the August 11, 2026 appearance, the parties agreed to work toward a stipulation resolving custody and parenting time by August 25, 2026, later extended to September 1, 2026 (NYSCEF Doc No. 270 ¶¶ 7-12). No stipulation has been executed (NYSCEF Doc No. 271 ¶ 24). Plaintiff has changed counsel several times during the pendency of these motions. She was represented by Robert Marc Wallack, Esq. of The Wallack Law Firm, P.C. at the August 11, 2026 argument, and thereafter by Julio E. Portilla, Esq., who on August 27, 2026 moved to be relieved (NYSCEF Doc No. 270 ¶¶ 7, 13; NYSCEF Doc No. 271 ¶ 6). That application is not before the court on these motions. In reply, plaintiff also asks the court to clarify the allocation of an August 20, 2026 support transfer under the decision and order on motion sequence number 001 and to preserve discovery issues she regards as unresolved (NYSCEF Doc No. 264 ¶ 3; NYSCEF Doc No. 265 ¶¶ 14-18, 25-33).Nothing in the record indicates that E.L.'s deposition has taken place.

III. Conclusions of Law

A. The Governing Disclosure Framework

The disclosure provisions of the CPLR begin from the premise that "[t]here shall be full disclosure of all matter material and necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action, regardless of the burden of proof," and that premise reaches nonparties, from whom disclosure may be obtained "upon notice stating the circumstances or reasons such disclosure is sought or required" (CPLR 3101 [a] [4]). The words material and necessary must "be interpreted liberally to require disclosure, upon request, of any facts bearing on the controversy which will assist preparation for trial by sharpening the issues and reducing delay and prolixity" (Matter of Kapon v Koch, 23 NY3d 32, 38 [2014], quoting Allen v Crowell-Collier Publ. Co., 21 NY2d 403, 406 [1968]). In a matrimonial action that liberality carries particular force, because "[t]he entire financial history of the marriage must be open for inspection by both parties" (Jaffe v Jaffe, 91 AD3d 551, 554 [1st Dept 2012], quoting Kaye v Kaye, 102 AD2d 682, 686 [2d Dept 1984]).

Breadth of scope, however, has never meant informality of method. Where "the person to be examined is not a party or a person who at the time of taking the deposition is an officer, director, member or employee of a party, he shall be served with a subpoena," and, "[u]nless the court orders otherwise, on motion or without notice, such subpoena shall be served at least twenty days before such examination" (CPLR 3106 [b]). For documents, the statute draws the same line between parties and strangers to the action: "[a]fter commencement of an action, any party may serve on any other party a notice or on any other person a subpoena duces tecum" (CPLR 3120 [1]). A subpoena requiring attendance or a subpoena duces tecum "shall be served in the same manner as a summons," with a copy served "on each party who has appeared in the civil judicial proceeding" (CPLR 2303 [a]), and the party issuing a subpoena duces tecum "shall at the same time serve a copy of the subpoena upon all other parties" (CPLR 3120 [3]).

These requirements are not empty formalities. " For disclosure purposes, a party is distinguished from a non-party and where disclosure is sought against a non-party, more stringent requirements are imposed on the party seeking disclosure" (Velez v Hunts Point Multi-Serv. Ctr., Inc., 29 AD3d 104, 108 [1st Dept 2006]). Those requirements exist in part to give a nonparty, who may know nothing of the parties' dispute, an opportunity to decide how to respond (id. at 110). A motion to quash, fix conditions, or modify "shall be made promptly in the court in which the subpoena is returnable" (CPLR 2304), and the court may "make a protective order denying, limiting, conditioning or regulating the use of any disclosure device" to prevent "unreasonable annoyance, expense, embarrassment, disadvantage, or other prejudice to any person or the courts" (CPLR 3103 [a]). Defendant moved promptly on each occasion

B. Motion Sequence Number 002: The Notice of Deposition Non-party

1. Standing. Plaintiff's threshold argument is that defendant lacks standing because he has not shown a proprietary interest in, or a privilege over, the materials sought. Her authorities hold that "[a] person other than one to whom a subpoena is directed has standing to move to quash the subpoena where he or she has a proprietary interest in the subject documents or where they involve privileged communications" (Hyatt v State of Cal. Franchise Tax Bd., 105 AD3d 186, 194-195 [2d Dept 2013]), that a "subpoena may only be challenged by the person to whom it is directed or by a person whose property rights or privileges may be violated" (Matter of Selesnick, 115 Misc 2d 993, 995 [Sup Ct, Westchester County 1982]), and that a party lacks standing to quash portions of a nonparty subpoena, or to obtain a protective order, where "none of the information sought" is "proprietary or privileged" (Matter of Radio Drama Network, Inc., 214 AD3d 461, 463 [1st Dept 2023]).

Those authorities address challenges to the substantive reach of a subpoena, that is, efforts by someone other than the recipient to keep particular information from being disclosed. Defendant's principal objection to the Notice is of a different character. He contends that the instrument is not a subpoena at all and therefore could not lawfully summon a nonparty to adeposition in this action. The very provisions that govern nonparty process entitle each appearing party to be served with it (CPLR 2303 [a]; CPLR 3120 [3]). A party whose right to proper notice of nonparty process is written into the statute has a direct interest in whether that process conforms to the statute, and that interest does not depend upon ownership of the documents sought. That conclusion is consistent with the text of CPLR 2304, which provides for a motion to quash without limiting who may bring it. Defendant therefore has standing to challenge the Notice on the ground that it fails to satisfy the statutory prerequisites for compelling a nonparty's deposition. The court need not decide whether defendant may also contest the substantive scope of the demands, because, as explained below in connection with motion sequence number 003, the result would be the same even assuming that he may.

2. The motion is not academic. Plaintiff relies on CPLR 3122 [a] [1], which requires "the party or person to whom the notice or subpoena duces tecum is directed" to serve any objection within twenty days, and on the observation that "a nonparty served with a CPLR 3120 subpoena is required to object in writing within 20 days" (Velez, 29 AD3d at 110), and that where nonparties "do not object and the disclosure goes forward," the notice requirement of CPLR 3101 [a] [4] is, "in effect, waived" (id. at 111-112). The argument fails for several reasons. The twenty-day period runs from service of "a notice or subpoena duces tecum under rule 3120" (CPLR 3122 [a] [1]), and CPLR 3120 [1] authorizes a notice only as between parties; as to "any other person," the authorized instrument is a subpoena duces tecum. An instrument that the statute does not authorize to be directed to a nonparty does not start the running of a period for the nonparty's objections. The waiver discussed in Velez belongs to the nonparty and concerns the particular notice requirement of CPLR 3101 [a] [4]; nothing in that decision suggests that a nonparty's silence extinguishes a party's own objection that nonparty process was never properly issued. And the waiver described in Velez attaches where the disclosure "goes forward" (29 AD3d at 111-112), which has not happened here.

Nor has the controversy been extinguished by events. The Notice was never re-served, the deposition has not occurred, and the asserted consent of E.L. rests on an April 14, 2026 email that the court knows only through plaintiff's description, while plaintiff's own later sworn statement is that E.L. "subsequently refused to sit for a deposition" (NYSCEF Doc No. 246 ¶ 51). Those accounts cannot be fully reconciled, and on this record the court cannot find a present and unqualified consent that would dissolve the controversy. Nor did the controversy end when the Subpoena followed the Notice. Plaintiff has not withdrawn the Notice; she defends it on the merits (NYSCEF Doc No. 127 ¶¶ 48-64) and describes E.L. as having accepted service of the "deposition notices" (NYSCEF Doc No. 126 ¶¶ 30, 53).

3. The Notice does not satisfy CPLR 3106 [b]. The CPLR directs that a nonparty deponent "shall be served with a subpoena" (CPLR 3106 [b]). The instrument at issue is, by its own title, a notice of deposition, and defense counsel's uncontroverted description establishes that it nowhere identifies itself as a subpoena (NYSCEF Doc No. 106 ¶ 18). Plaintiff does not contend otherwise. Her papers identify the Subpoena dated March 19, 2026 as a separate and later instrument (NYSCEF Doc No. 126 ¶¶ 51-52), and her former counsel described that later instrument, as related by defense counsel, as having "cured" the Notice (NYSCEF Doc No. 116 ¶ 15). A cure presupposes a defect.

The distinction between a notice and a subpoena is not a matter of labels. A notice of deposition is the device by which one party calls upon another party to appear. It carries no compulsion as to a stranger to the litigation. A subpoena is process that commands attendance and, when properly served, binds the recipient to obey. That is why CPLR 3106 [b] requires a subpoena for a nonparty deponent, why CPLR 3120 [1] confines the use of a notice to "any other party," and why CPLR 2303 [a] requires that nonparty process be served "in the same manner as a summons." The more stringent requirements that apply to nonparty disclosure (Velez, 29 AD3d at 108) would mean little if a party could compel a nonparty's testimony with an instrument that the statute reserves for use between parties. The Notice must therefore be quashed. In light of thatdetermination, the alternative grounds for quashing the Notice under CPLR 2303 [a], CPLR 3120 [3], CPLR 2103, CPLR 3101 [a] [4], and CPLR 2304 are academic, as is the request for a stay, which the court declined to grant when it signed the order to show cause and which the passage of the Notice's return date and its quashing have overtaken.

C. Motion Sequence Number 003: The Judicial Subpoena Dated March 19, 2026

1. Standing and timeliness. For the reasons stated in connection with motion sequence number 002, defendant has standing to challenge the Subpoena on the ground that it was not served within the time the statute requires. He moved promptly: the Subpoena was dated March 19, 2026, defense counsel raised the timing defect the next day, and his supporting affirmation is dated March 23, 2026 (NYSCEF Doc No. 116 ¶¶ 15-16).

2. The Subpoena did not comply with the twenty-day requirement. Unless the court orders otherwise, a subpoena for the deposition of a nonparty "shall be served at least twenty days before such examination" (CPLR 3106 [b]). The Subpoena was dated March 19, 2026, could not have been served before that date, and commanded E.L. to appear on March 23, 2026, at most four days later (NYSCEF Doc No. 126 ¶ 52; NYSCEF Doc No. 116 ¶¶ 26, 46). Plaintiff does not contend that the court shortened the period, and she does not dispute the timing. The later rescheduling to March 25, 2026, which defense counsel states was fixed without consulting him (NYSCEF Doc No. 116¶¶ 17, 46), did not cure the defect, since the examination would still have taken place less than twenty days after service. That defect appears on the face of the record and is dispositive. The court therefore does not reach defendant's separate contention that the Subpoena was not served in the manner required by CPLR 2303 [a], and it draws no inference on that question from the absence of an affidavit of service in these motion papers.

Plaintiff's reliance on E.L.'s asserted agreement to appear on May 11, 2026 does not change the result. A private arrangement to appear on a date the Subpoena never commanded is a voluntary undertaking, not compliance with process, and the record casts doubt on whether even that arrangement survived (NYSCEF Doc No. 246 ¶ 51). In any event, defendant's motion for aprotective order was pending by that date, and, as defendant points out, service of a motion for a protective order suspends disclosure of the matter in dispute (CPLR 3103 [b]; see NYSCEF Doc No. 116 ¶ 37). The Subpoena, which commanded an appearance on less than twenty days' notice and on a date long past, is accordingly quashed under CPLR 3106 [b]. For the reasons already given, the twenty-day objection rule of CPLR 3122 [a] [1] and the waiver principle discussed in Velez do not rescue it.

3. No protective order barring the deposition is warranted. Quashing the Subpoena on procedural grounds does not end the inquiry, because defendant also asks for a protective order denying the disclosure outright and "limiting any future discovery devices" (NYSCEF Doc No. 122). Plaintiff argues that defendant lacks standing to seek that relief because he has no proprietary or privileged interest in the materials sought (NYSCEF Doc No. 152 ¶¶ 6-15, citing Matter of Radio Drama Network, Inc., 214 AD3d at 463). The court need not resolve that question. Even assuming defendant may seek a protective order under CPLR 3103 [a], the requested order barring any future disclosure from E.L. is not warranted. The proposed disclosure bears directly on the identification and valuation of defendant's asserted interest in the Entity and on income relevant to maintenance and support. Defendant has not shown that the disclosure is utterly irrelevant or that its futility is inevitable or obvious. Any renewed subpoena remains subject to objections or a motion by E.L., and to further application by either party upon a concrete showing of undue burden, privilege, confidentiality, or other prejudice.

The disclosure is plainly material and necessary. Defendant concedes that he holds a one-third interest in the Entity and that E.L. was retained by that entity (NYSCEF Doc No. 106 ¶¶ 31, 40). Plaintiff contends that the interest in the Entity was acquired during the marriage, was omitted from defendant's statement of net worth, and bears on both the value of the marital estate and defendant's income (NYSCEF Doc No. 127 ¶¶ 37-42; NYSCEF Doc No. 246 ¶¶ 37-38, 100). The nature and extent of defendant's role in the Entity is sharply disputed, and defendant's own counsel has described defendant's documents concerning an Entity project as created "by Defendant in hiscapacity solely on behalf of" the Entity (NYSCEF Doc No. 127 ¶ 45). Matrimonial litigants are entitled to "a searching exploration of each other's assets and dealings at the time of and during the marriage," so as to "uncover hidden assets of marital property" and "gain any information which may bear on the issue of equitable distribution, as well as maintenance and child support" (Kaye v Kaye, 102 AD2d at 686). That exploration "is more than justified in the case of close corporations, the ownership of which is in the hands of a small number of stockholders and for which there is little objective evidence of fair market value" (Reich v Reich, 36 AD3d 506, 507 [1st Dept 2007], quoting Briger v Briger, 110 AD2d 526, 527 [1st Dept 1985]), and it extends to family-held close corporations "regardless of the extent of that interest" (Sanford v Sanford, 170 AD2d 1047, 1048 [4th Dept 1991]). In Reich, the Appellate Division affirmed the denial of a motion to quash subpoenas concerning an entity in which the husband held a 2.5 percent interest (36 AD3d at 507). Defendant's one-third interest is a far stronger predicate. And because CPLR 3101 [a] [4] "imposes no requirement that the subpoenaing party demonstrate that it cannot obtain the requested disclosure from any other source" (Matter of Kapon v Koch, 23 NY3d at 38), defendant's representation that he has produced everything available to him is no answer. If anything, his statement that he cannot obtain the Entity's records or its broker communications underscores why a nonparty source is needed.

Defendant's contrary authorities do not compel a different result. They reflect the reluctance of courts to enforce nonparty process that is lengthy, burdensome, or the cause of unreasonable annoyance (Reuters Ltd. v Dow Jones Telerate, Inc., 231 AD2d 337, 344 [1st Dept 1997]; Riverside Capital Advisors, Inc. v First Secured Capital Corp., 28 AD3d 457, 460 [2d Dept 2006]), the treatment of broadly framed "any and all" demands (Grotallio v Soft Drink Leasing Corp., 97 AD2d 383 [1st Dept 1983]). Those concerns are real, and certain of the demands described in the record, such as those reaching agreements "not yet executed" and relationships that "are anticipated to be established" (NYSCEF Doc No. 106 ¶ 38), may well invite objection. But they are properly addressed to particular demands in a particular subpoena, upon a concrete showing, and not by an order barring in advance a deposition that bears directly on the marital estate and on defendant's income. The recipient may serve written objections stating "with reasonable particularity the reasons for each objection" (CPLR 3122 [a] [1]) or may move to quash, fix conditions, or modify (CPLR 2304), and either party may seek further relief upon a showing directed to a renewed subpoena.

Nor was plaintiff required to await defendant's deposition or interrogatory answers before seeking nonparty disclosure (see NYSCEF Doc No. 116 ¶¶ 60, 68). The statute authorizes a subpoena duces tecum upon a nonparty "[a]fter commencement of an action" (CPLR 3120 [1]), and defendant cites no authority for the sequencing he proposes. The request that the court limit "any future discovery devices" is likewise denied; defendant has identified no future device, and a generalized restriction of that kind would be inconsistent with the liberal disclosure the statute contemplates.

4. Terms of any renewed subpoena. Plaintiff may serve a new subpoena upon E.L., but it must comply with the requirements that the Notice and the Subpoena did not meet. Pursuant to the court's authority to fix conditions and to regulate the use of disclosure devices (CPLR 2304; CPLR 3103 [a]), any such subpoena shall be served in the same manner as a summons at least twenty days before the examination (CPLR 2303 [a]; CPLR 3106 [b]); shall be served at the same time upon defendant's counsel (CPLR 2303 [a]; CPLR 3120 [3]); and shall state on its face, or in an accompanying notice, the circumstances or reasons the disclosure is sought (CPLR 3101 [a] [4]). In addition, because the date of the March 25, 2026 examination was fixed without consultation, the court, in the exercise of its discretion under CPLR 3103 [a] and CPLR 2304, directs that counsel confer in good faith regarding the date, time, and place of the examination before any renewed subpoena is served, and that the examination be scheduled consistently with any disclosure schedule the court fixes pursuant to its decision and order on motion sequence number 001 (NYSCEF Doc No. 261 at 25). Nothing herein limits E.L.'s right to object to, or move with respect to, any such subpoena.

D. Motion Sequence Number 004: Plaintiff's Application for Pendente Lite Relief

1. Supersession of motion sequence number 001. Plaintiff asked that motion sequence number 004 supersede motion sequence number 001 and serve as the operative application. Motion sequence number 001 has since been determined by decision and order dated August 11, 2026 (NYSCEF Doc No. 261). There is nothing left for motion sequence number 004 to supersede, and this branch is denied as academic. Defendant's arguments concerning withdrawal of a submitted motion (NYSCEF Doc No. 251 ¶¶ 25-28) are academic for the same reason.

2. Temporary maintenance. Plaintiff sought needs-based temporary maintenance of$17,559 per month, invoking the rule that where "the court is otherwise presented with insufficient evidence to determine income, the court shall order the temporary maintenance award based upon the needs of the payee or the standard of living of the parties prior to commencement of the divorce action, whichever is greater" (Domestic Relations Law § 236 [B] [5-a] [j]; see Gaetano D. v Antoinette D., 37 Misc 3d 990, 999 [Sup Ct, Westchester County 2012]). The court has now fixed temporary maintenance and temporary child support in its decision and order on motion sequence number 001, upon imputed incomes of $357,000 for defendant and $15,000 for plaintiff (NYSCEF Doc No. 261 at 23), and both parties acknowledge that the combined award of $9,693.31 per month governs going forward (NYSCEF Doc No. 265 ¶¶ 12, 17; NYSCEF Doc No. 270 ¶ 5). Motion sequence number 004 presents the same question on overlapping papers, and a second determination of the same pendente lite obligation would serve only to invite inconsistency. This branch is therefore denied as academic. To the extent plaintiff contends that newly discovered evidence bears on defendant's income, nothing herein precludes an appropriate application directed to the award on motion sequence number 001.

3. Educational expenses. Plaintiff asked that defendant be directed to continue paying all of the children's educational expenses. The decision and order on motion sequence number 001 directs defendant to pay, or cause to be paid, one hundred percent of the children's private-school tuition, allocates the cost of tutoring between the parties, and bars defendant from causing or permitting the discontinuance of the younger child's tutoring (NYSCEF Doc No. 261 at 24-25). To that extent this branch is academic. To the extent it reaches any educational expense not addressed by that decision and order, the record shows that defendant has paid, and continues to pay, the tuition of both children, including $43,363.74 for the older child and $31,370 for the younger child for the spring 2026 semester (NYSCEF Doc No. 252 ¶ 35), and plaintiff identifies no nonpayment. No present need for a directive has been shown, and the branch is denied without prejudice. Defendant's request that plaintiff be directed to contribute to these expenses on a pro rata basis (NYSCEF Doc No. 251 ¶¶ 35, 43) is not before the court, because his cross-motion seeks only denial of the application and sanctions (NYSCEF Doc No. 250).

4. The older child's allowance. The parties agree that defendant pays the older child $125 per week (NYSCEF Doc No. 246 ¶ 104; NYSCEF Doc No. 252 ¶ 34). Plaintiff's concern is not the amount but the manner of payment, since the older child must ask for it each week (NYSCEF Doc No. 265 ¶¶ 20-22). The older child is nineteen years old and receives the allowance directly from her father. The court has now fixed basic temporary child support computed for two children, treating the older child as unemancipated for that purpose (NYSCEF Doc No. 261 at 3, 16-17), and that award provides for the children's needs during the pendency of the action. On this record, the court declines to convert a voluntary payment from a father to his adult daughter into a court-ordered automatic transfer. This branch is denied. Defendant's counsel's accusation that plaintiff falsely claimed that no allowance was paid (NYSCEF Doc No. 251 ¶ 49) is unfounded; plaintiff's affidavit expressly acknowledged the weekly payment (NYSCEF Doc No. 246 ¶ 104).

5. The younger child's camp expense. The $916.70 expense for the younger child's attendance at a sleepaway summer camp is undisputed in amount. Its circumstances are disputed. Plaintiff avers that defendant knew of and encouraged the enrollment (NYSCEF Doc No. 265 ¶ 23); defendant attests that plaintiff enrolled the younger child and paid the fee without consulting him (NYSCEF Doc No. 271 ¶ 15). The court need not resolve that dispute. Defendant's own sworn statements are that he has "always contributed 100%" to the children's recreational and extracurricular activities, that he "did not refuse to pay for [the younger child's] camp but rather wanted to discuss this, and my contribution amount," and that he "likely would have paid for it" had plaintiff raised it in advance (NYSCEF Doc No. 252 ¶ 36). His objection, in substance, is to the absence of consultation and to bearing the entire cost, not to contributing at all. His counsel's statement that defendant "already paid for the camp fees" (NYSCEF Doc No. 251 ¶ 40) is contradicted by defendant's own sworn account and is not supported by any proof of payment.

The decision and order on motion sequence number 001 allocates "agreed-upon or previously established extracurricular activities" 74.34 percent to defendant and 25.66 percent to plaintiff (NYSCEF Doc No. 261 at 24-25). Summer camp is a previously established extracurricular activity for the younger child. Plaintiff attests without contradiction that the younger child attended a one-week summer camp in July 2024 at a cost of $1,050 (NYSCEF Doc No. 246 ¶ 19), and defendant's counsel lists "camps" among the extracurricular expenses that defendant has paid since the children's birth (NYSCEF Doc No. 251 ¶ 21). The camp expense therefore falls within that allocation. Applying it, defendant's share of the $916.70 expense is$681.47 and plaintiff's share is $235.23, with credit to defendant for any portion he proves he has already paid. This branch is granted to that extent. The court also notes that disputes of this size are best resolved between the parties before a child is enrolled; a brief communication in advance would have avoided the need for judicial intervention.

6. Interim counsel fees. "[T]here shall be a rebuttable presumption that counsel fees shall be awarded to the less monied spouse" (Domestic Relations Law § 237 [a]). Such awards are designed "to create parity in divorce litigation by preventing a monied spouse from wearing down a non-monied spouse on the basis of sheer financial strength" (Rosenbaum v Rosenbaum, 55 AD3d 713, 714 [2d Dept 2008]) and "to redress the economic disparity between the monied spouse and the non-monied spouse" (Kaplan v Kaplan, 28 AD3d 523, 523 [2d Dept 2006]). In fixing an award, the court should "take into account the parties' ability to pay, the nature and extent of the services rendered, the complexity of the issues involved, and the reasonableness of the fees under all of the circumstances" (Grumet v Grumet, 37 AD3d 534, 536-537 [2d Dept 2007]). Plaintiff annexed her statement of net worth, and there is no dispute that she is the less monied spouse; defendant himself acknowledges that he may be so regarded (NYSCEF Doc No. 252 ¶ 46; NYSCEF Doc No. 271 ¶ 25).

The difficulty lies not in plaintiff's entitlement but in the record on which the court is asked to act. The court has already awarded interim counsel fees of $25,000 on motion sequence number 001, without prejudice to further application, and in doing so noted plaintiff's retention of successive counsel and the absence of any showing of the necessity and proportionality of fees attributable to letters rogatory and nonparty discovery abroad (NYSCEF Doc No. 261 at 21, 25). Plaintiff now asks for $100,000 more, "without duplication" of that award (NYSCEF Doc No. 264¶ 44). The only billing proof submitted, however, is the invoice of counsel who no longer represents her, reflecting $28,382.50 in charges through May 28, 2026 against a $10,000 retainer (NYSCEF Doc No. 198 ¶¶ 57-60). Plaintiff has since retained, and parted with, at least two further firms, and her most recent counsel has moved to be relieved. The record does not show which fees were incurred for which services, which have been paid and from what source, or whether any portion is already encompassed by the award on motion sequence number 001. On that record the court cannot evaluate "the nature and extent of the services rendered" or "the reasonableness of the fees" (Grumet, 37 AD3d at 536-537), and it cannot ensure that a second award does not duplicate the first. This branch is therefore denied without prejudice to renewal upon an updated sworn statement of net worth, the retainer agreements of each firm that has represented plaintiff since the submission of motion sequence number 001, contemporaneous invoices, proof of payment, and an explanation of why the fees sought are not encompassed by the award on motion sequence number 001.

7. Matters raised for the first time in reply. In her reply papers, plaintiff asks the court to clarify the allocation of the August 20, 2026 transfer under the decision and order on motion sequence number 001 and to preserve discovery issues she regards as unresolved (NYSCEF Doc No. 264 ¶ 3; NYSCEF Doc No. 265 ¶¶ 14-18, 25-33). Neither request appears in the order to show cause (NYSCEF Doc No. 243), and defendant objects to both (NYSCEF Doc No. 270 ¶¶ 5, 18). The first concerns compliance with the decision and order on motion sequence number 001, which itself prescribes the procedure for exchanging proof of claimed credits and for restoring the matter by letter application if the parties cannot agree on arrears (NYSCEF Doc No. 261 at 24); the allocation of the August 20, 2026 transfer should be raised through that procedure. The second concerns disclosure from defendant, which motion sequence number 004 did not seek. The decision and order on motion sequence number 001 left the withdrawn discovery branch undetermined and without prejudice to any future application, and directed a conference to establish a disclosure schedule (id. at 22, 25); that conference is the appropriate forum for plaintiff's concerns. The court declines to reach either request on this motion, and nothing herein determines whether any discovery request has been waived or withdrawn.

E. Sanctions and Counsel Fees Sought on All Three Motion Sequences

1. Defendant's requests for counsel fees under Domestic Relations Law § 237. On motion sequence numbers 002 and 003, defendant seeks counsel fees of $10,000 and $5,000, respectively, under Domestic Relations Law § 237 (NYSCEF Doc No. 106 ¶¶ 42-43; NYSCEF Doc No. 116 ¶¶ 62-63). Both requests must be denied. "A party in a matrimonial action seeking an award of interim counsel fees must include, in his or her moving papers, a sworn statement of net worth" (Daich v Daich, 153 AD3d 900, 901 [2d Dept 2017]; see 22 NYCRR 202.16 [k] [2]), and defendant's moving papers include none. Independently, defendant is the more monied spouse. His reported income of $161,760 exceeds plaintiff's reported income of $16,106 or less (NYSCEF Doc No. 127¶¶ 82-83), and the court has since imputed income of $357,000 to defendant and $15,000 to plaintiff for pendente lite purposes, denying defendant's own request for counsel fees on motion sequence number 001 on the ground, among others, that he is the monied spouse (NYSCEF Doc No. 261 at 22-23, 25). Moreover, "it is improper to direct the nonmonied spouse to pay a portion of the other's fees under Domestic Relations Law § 237," an award of a punitive character being"permissible, not under section 237, but only under 22 NYCRR 130-1.1" (Silverman v Silverman, 304 AD2d 41, 49 [1st Dept 2003]). Defendant's fee requests rest explicitly on the asserted impropriety of plaintiff's litigation conduct, which is the punitive rationale that Silverman confines to Part 130. The partial success defendant obtains on these motions does not alter that analysis.

2. The governing Part 130 standard. The court, in its discretion, may award costs or impose financial sanctions upon a party or attorney who engages in frivolous conduct (22 NYCRR 130-1.1 [a]). Conduct is frivolous if it is completely without merit in law and cannot be supported by a reasonable argument for an extension, modification, or reversal of existing law; if it is undertaken primarily to delay or prolong the resolution of the litigation, or to harass or maliciously injure another; or if it asserts material factual statements that are false (22 NYCRR 130-1.1 [c]; see Weissman v Weissman, 116 AD3d 848 [2014]). The court considers, among other things, the circumstances under which the conduct took place and whether it was continued when its lack of legal or factual basis was apparent, should have been apparent, or was brought to the attention of counsel or the party (22 NYCRR 130-1.1 [c]).

3. Defendant's requests for sanctions against plaintiff's former counsel on motion sequence numbers 002 and 003. This is the closest question presented. Plaintiff's then counsel did not answer defense counsel's letters of March 12 and March 17, 2026, and "prior to contacting the court regarding a disclosure dispute, counsel must first consult with one another" (Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC v Evanson, 230 AD3d 1091, 1092 [2d Dept 2024]). After defense counsel had identified the service requirements of CPLR 3106 [b] and CPLR 2303, counsel issued a subpoena that gave the witness a few days' notice, and after defense counsel pointed out the twenty-day requirement on March 20, 2026, she nonetheless confirmed a deposition for March 25, 2026 without consulting him (NYSCEF Doc No. 116 ¶¶ 16-17, 58-59). That course of conduct fell short of what the CPLR and professional courtesy require.

Nevertheless, the court declines, in its discretion, to impose sanctions. The object of the disclosure was legitimate, as the analysis above demonstrates, and plaintiff's pursuit of it rested ona colorable legal basis. Counsel's response to the first motion was to attempt a correction rather than to insist on the Notice, even though the correction was itself defective. The deposition never took place, so the defective process caused no disclosure to occur. Counsel no longer represents plaintiff, and plaintiff has sworn that she was unaware of the unanswered correspondence (NYSCEF Doc No. 126 ¶ 99). Under all the circumstances, the costs of the procedural missteps are adequately addressed by quashing the defective process and conditioning any renewed subpoena on strict compliance with the CPLR.

4. Plaintiff's cross-motion under motion sequence number 003. Plaintiff seeks sanctions of$10,000 each against defendant and his counsel, and her costs and counsel fees, on the theory that motion sequence numbers 002 and 003 were frivolous because defendant lacked standing and E.L. was cooperating (NYSCEF Doc No. 152 ¶¶ 71-79). The premise is mistaken. Defendant had standing to challenge the procedural validity of the Notice and the Subpoena, and both motions succeed on that ground. A motion that is granted in substantial part cannot be "completely without merit in law" (22 NYCRR 130-1.1 [c]). The cross-motion is denied.

5. Defendant's cross-motion under motion sequence number 004. Plaintiff first objects that the notice of cross-motion leaves the Part, room, return date, and time blank (NYSCEF Doc No. 264 ¶¶ 17-18). The cross-motion was on the calendar with motion sequence number 004 on August 11, 2026, and plaintiff has responded to it fully (NYSCEF Doc Nos. 264, 265). No substantial right of plaintiff was prejudiced, and the omission is disregarded (CPLR 2001). The request for sanctions against plaintiff's "former counsel," however, stands differently. The cross-motion does not identify the attorney against whom sanctions are sought or the conduct attributed to that attorney, and it was not directed to that attorney (NYSCEF Doc No. 250). The court will not impose sanctions upon an unnamed attorney who has not been given notice of the claim. That branch is denied.

As against plaintiff, the cross-motion is also denied. Motion sequence number 004 was filed eight months after motion sequence number 001 and roughly five months after that motion was fully submitted, while it remained undecided, and after defendant had reduced his voluntary support (NYSCEF Doc No. 251 ¶¶ 10-11). Plaintiff disclosed the earlier motion and asked that the new one take its place (NYSCEF Doc No. 198 ¶ 62), and she added requests concerning the camp and the allowance that the earlier motion had not raised. An application of that kind is not "completely without merit in law," and the result on motion sequence number 001 confirms that plaintiff's claim to interim support was substantial. The cases on which defendant relies involved repeated applications for the same relief (see Trajkovic v Trajkovic, 98 AD3d 575 [2d Dept 2012]; Ofman v Campos, 12 AD3d 581 [2d Dept 2004]), which is not what occurred here. The emergency designation and the timing of the filing on the eve of the May 29, 2026 argument were ill-advised, but the application was not heard that day and did not prejudice the determination of motion sequence numbers 002 and 003.

Defendant's charge that plaintiff made false statements of material fact fares no better. As already noted, plaintiff did not claim that defendant paid no allowance. The competing accounts of the camp enrollment present an ordinary credibility dispute, not demonstrable falsity. And the parties' dispute over the completeness of defendant's disclosure, including the Revolut account that defendant acknowledges was opened in his name and at his address (NYSCEF Doc No. 252 ¶ 27) and the Entity's records he states he cannot obtain (NYSCEF Doc No. 271 ¶ 20), is a genuine one. Plaintiff's changes of counsel, however frequent, are not frivolous conduct within the definitions of Part 130.

The court does not minimize the cost of this litigation to both parties. The record reflects repeated substitutions of plaintiff's counsel, a missed deadline for a custody and parenting time stipulation that the parties had agreed to pursue, and accusations of dishonesty traded in nearly every submission. Each side has also charged the other's counsel with mischaracterizing authority (see NYSCEF Doc No. 270 ¶¶ 32-33). The court has relied only on authorities as quoted and described in the record, and it reminds all counsel of their obligation to present authorityaccurately. Both parties are urged to complete the custody and parenting time stipulation promptly and to confer in good faith before bringing further disclosure disputes to the court.

IV. Conclusion and Decretal Paragraphs

The Notice of Deposition Non-party dated February 19, 2026 was not a subpoena and could not compel a nonparty to appear, and the Judicial Subpoena dated March 19, 2026 commanded a deposition at most four days after it could have been served, in violation of CPLR 3106 [b]. Both are quashed. The information plaintiff seeks from E.L. bears directly on the financial issues in this action, and defendant has not shown that it is utterly irrelevant or that its futility is inevitable or obvious, so no protective order barring the deposition will issue; plaintiff may serve a subpoena that complies with the CPLR on the terms stated above. The court's decision and order on motion sequence number 001 has resolved the core pendente lite issues raised by motion sequence number 004, and the remaining branches of that motion are resolved as set forth above. No party has demonstrated entitlement to sanctions or to a shifting of counsel fees on these motions.

Accordingly, it is hereby

ORDEREDthat the branch of defendant's motion (motion sequence number 002) seeking an order quashing plaintiff's Notice of Deposition Non-party dated February 19, 2026, directed to non-party E.L., is GRANTED upon the ground that the Notice does not satisfy CPLR 3106 [b], and the Notice of Deposition Non-party dated February 19, 2026 is quashed and shall be of no force or effect; and it is further

ORDEREDthat the branches of motion sequence number 002 seeking to quash the Notice on the alternative grounds asserted pursuant to CPLR 2303 [a], CPLR 3120 [3], CPLR 2103, CPLR 3101 [a] [4], and CPLR 2304, and seeking a stay of the deposition of non-party E.L., are DENIED as academic; and it is further

ORDEREDthat the branch of defendant's motion (motion sequence number 003) seeking an order quashing plaintiff's Judicial Subpoena to Witness to Appear for Deposition Upon OralExamination and Judicial Subpoena Duces Tecum dated March 19, 2026, directed to non-party E.L., is GRANTED upon the ground that the Subpoena was not served at least twenty days before the examination it commanded, as CPLR 3106 [b] requires, and the Subpoena is quashed and shall be of no force or effect; and it is further

ORDEREDthat the branches of motion sequence numbers 002 and 003 seeking a protective order pursuant to CPLR 3103 [a] denying disclosure from non-party E.L. and limiting future disclosure devices are DENIED; and it is further

ORDEREDthat plaintiff may serve upon non-party E.L. a subpoena for his deposition and for the production of documents, provided that (i) counsel for the parties first confer in good faith regarding the date, time, and place of the examination; (ii) the subpoena is served in the same manner as a summons at least twenty days before the examination, pursuant to CPLR 2303 [a] and CPLR 3106 [b]; (iii) a copy of the subpoena is served upon defendant's counsel at the same time, pursuant to CPLR 2303 [a] and CPLR 3120 [3]; (iv) the subpoena or an accompanying notice states the circumstances or reasons the disclosure is sought, pursuant to CPLR 3101 [a] [4]; and (v) the examination is scheduled consistently with any disclosure schedule fixed pursuant to the decision and order on motion sequence number 001; and nothing herein shall limit the right of non-party E.L. to object to, or move with respect to, any such subpoena; and it is further

ORDEREDthat the branches of motion sequence numbers 002 and 003 seeking sanctions pursuant to 22 NYCRR 130-1.2 are DENIED; and it is further

ORDEREDthat the branches of motion sequence numbers 002 and 003 seeking counsel fees and costs are DENIED; and it is further

ORDEREDthat plaintiff's cross-motion under motion sequence number 003 seeking sanctions and costs pursuant to 22 NYCRR 130-1.1 is DENIED in its entirety; and it is further

ORDEREDthat the branch of plaintiff's motion (motion sequence number 004) seeking an order that motion sequence number 004 supersede motion sequence number 001 is DENIED as academic; and it is further

ORDEREDthat the branch of motion sequence number 004 seeking needs-based pendente lite maintenance of $17,559 per month is DENIED as academic in light of the court's decision and order on motion sequence number 001 (NYSCEF Doc No. 261); and it is further

ORDEREDthat the branch of motion sequence number 004 seeking an order directing defendant to continue paying all of the children's educational expenses is DENIED as academic to the extent such expenses are addressed by the decision and order on motion sequence number 001, and is otherwise DENIED without prejudice; and it is further

ORDEREDthat the branch of motion sequence number 004 seeking an order directing defendant to pay the parties' older child an allowance of $125 per week by automatic payment is DENIED; and it is further

ORDEREDthat the branch of motion sequence number 004 seeking an order directing defendant to pay the cost of the younger child's attendance at a sleepaway summer camp is GRANTED to the extent that the $916.70 expense shall be borne 74.34 percent by defendant and25.66 percent by plaintiff, consistent with the allocation of extracurricular expenses in the decision and order on motion sequence number 001 (NYSCEF Doc No. 261), and defendant shall pay plaintiff $681.47, representing his share, within thirty days after plaintiff serves proof of payment, less a credit for any portion defendant documents that he has already paid, and is otherwise DENIED; and it is further

ORDEREDthat the branch of motion sequence number 004 seeking an award of $100,000 in interim counsel fees is DENIED without prejudice to renewal upon an updated sworn statement of net worth, the retainer agreements of each firm that has represented plaintiff since the submission of motion sequence number 001, contemporaneous invoices, proof of payment, and a showing that the fees sought are not encompassed by the interim counsel fee award on motion sequence number 001; and it is further

ORDEREDthat plaintiff's requests, raised for the first time in reply, for clarification of the allocation of the August 20, 2026 support transfer and for the preservation of discovery issues arenot determined herein, without prejudice to the procedures and conference directed in the decision and order on motion sequence number 001 and to any properly noticed application, and nothing herein shall be construed as a determination that any discovery request has been waived or withdrawn; and it is further

ORDEREDthat the pagination irregularity in plaintiff's affidavit in support of motion sequence number 004 is disregarded pursuant to CPLR 2001; and it is further

ORDEREDthat defendant's cross-motion under motion sequence number 004 seeking sanctions and costs pursuant to 22 NYCRR 130-1.1 against plaintiff and her former counsel is DENIED in its entirety; and it is further

ORDEREDthat any relief requested on these motions and cross-motions and not expressly addressed herein is DENIED; and it is furtherORDERED that defendant shall serve a copy of this decision and order with notice of entry upon plaintiff or her counsel of record by NYSCEF, and upon non-party E.L. by overnight courier with tracking and by email at the street and email addresses designated in the orders to show cause, within ten days of entry.This constitutes the decision and order of the court.

Dated: October 5, 2026

New York, New York

ENTER: Hon. Ronald Castorina Jr., J.S.C.

Ronald Castorina, Jr., J.