Freedom Mortgage Corporation, Plaintiff, v. SUSTAINABLE NEIGHBORHOODS LLC PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ON BEHALF OF THE IRS UNKNOWN HEIRS OF ELISHA LANGLEY IF LIVING AND IF HE SHE BE DEAD ANY AND ALL PERSONS UNKNOWN TO PLAINTIFF CLAIMING OR WHO MAY CLAIM TO HAVE AN INTEREST IN OR GENERAL OR SPECIFIC LIEN UPON THE REAL PROPERTY DESCRIBED IN THIS ACTION SUCH UNKNOWN PERSONS BEING HEREIN GENERALLY DESCRIBED AND INTENDED TO BE INCLUDED IN WIFE WIDOW HUSBAND WIDOWER HEIRS AT LAW NEXT OF KIN DESCENDANTS EXECUTORS ADMINISTRATORS DEVISEES LEGATEES CREDITORS TRUSTEES COMMITTEES LIENORS AND ASSIGNEES OF SUCH DECEASED ANY AND ALL PERSONS DERIVING INTEREST IN OR LIEN UPON OR TITLE TO SAID REAL PROPERTY BY THROUGH OR UNDER THEM OR EITHER OF THEM AND THEIR RESPECTIVE WIVES WIDOWS HUSBANDS WIDOWERS HEIRS AT LAW NEXT OF KIN DESCENDANTS EXECUTORS ADMINISTRATORS DEVISEES LEGATEES CREDITORS TRUSTEES COMMITTEES LIENORS AND ASSIGNS ALL OF WHOM AND WHOSE NAMES EXCEPT AS STATED ARE UNKNOWN TO PLAINTIFF CITY REGISTER OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK COUNTY OF KINGS JOHN DOE (2026)

Plaintiff Freedom Mortgage Corporation moves for summary judgment and related relief on its claim seeking to foreclose a mortgage securing a promissory note in the original amount of $654,500.00 against property located at 144 Shepherd Avenue, Brooklyn, NY 11208-1227 (the Property).

Specifically, Freedom moves for summary judgment pursuant to CPLR 3212 to: (i) dismiss defendant Victoria Morgan's defenses raised in her answer pursuant to CPLR 3211(b); (ii) appoint a referee to compute the amount due and examine whether the Property can be sold in parcels pursuant to RPAPL 1321; (iii) amend the caption to remove John Doe and the Unknown Heirs of Elisha Langley as defendants pursuant to CPLR 1024; and (iv) grant default judgment against any non-appearing parties pursuant to CPLR 3215 (MS004). Defendant Morgan, pro se, opposes and cross-moves for summary judgment and to dismiss the amended complaint with prejudice (MS005).¹ For the reasons below, Freedom's motion is granted in its entirety and Morgan's cross-motion is denied.

BACKGROUND

As best this Court can glean from the papers, Victoria Morgan executed a mortgage and promissory note on January 17, 2020, with non-party Quicken Loans Inc. (Quicken) for the purchase of the Property. NYSCEF No. 56 at Exhibit 2. The mortgage also contained a rider pursuant to which any reference to a requirement that Morgan occupy the property within a year was deleted. See id. at pdf pgs. 20, 32-34. Quicken then transferred that mortgage to non-party RoundPoint Mortgage Servicing Corp. (RoundPoint). Id. at pdf pg. 50 (Welcome Letter from RoundPoint); see also NYSCEF No. 118 (Quicken predecessor recounting transfer to RoundPoint). RoundPoint sent Morgan a letter verifying this transfer on February 4, 2021. NYSCE No. 56 at pdf pg. 50. Then on May 6, 2022, RoundPoint transferred the mortgage to Freedom Freedom Mortgage Corp. (Freedom), each alerting Morgan about this transfer by letter. Id. at pdf pg. 45, 58.

In the background of these transfers, Morgan was dealing with very real problems concerning her new Property. According to her initial loan application, Morgan took out the mortgage in order to purchase the Property with the goal of using it as her primary residence. NYSCEF No. 78. However, Morgan alleges that the seller, non-party Cheryl McLeod, fraudulently hid the fact that the Property had multiple outstanding violations issued by the Department of Buildings (DOB) and the Department of Housing Preservation and Development that prevented DOB from issuing a certificate of occupancy. NYSCEF No. 72 at ¶ 2; NYSCEF No. 116 at § 3.1(A)(iii). Morgan claims without citation that these violations would have cost over $250,000 to remediate. NYSCEF No. 84 at pdf pg. 33. Morgan also argues that her attorney for the purchase and multiple others forced her to proceed with the sale against her will in the weeks leading up to the closing despite their knowledge of these issues to varying degrees. See NYSCEF No. 116. Morgan claims she is unable to move into the Property to this day, undermining her alleged objective in purchasing it.

In a separate action, Morgan sued McLeod and several others for the alleged fraud. See Morgan v. McLeod, Index No. 00042/2023 (paper filing only). That case was dismissed for Morgan's failure to serve, and the Second Department recently affirmed that decision on September 2, 2026. See Morgan v McLeod, 2026 NY Slip Op 05179 (2d Dep't Sept. 2, 2026).

In the meantime, Morgan attempted to rescind the mortgage (not the contract of sale) pursuant to her understanding of the federal Truth in Lending Act (TILA). At some point before January 19, 2023, Morgan sent Quicken (now known as Rocket Mortgage) a letter claiming that she was executing her right to rescind within the three-year limitations period under TILA. NYSCEF No. 118. She did not offer to return the money she received from the mortgage transaction. Id. Quicken/Rocket sent her a response letter objecting to her claims and stating the mortgage was transferred to RoundPoint. Id. Eventually, Morgan defaulted on the mortgage by failing to make payments for the home she could not live in. NYSCEF No. 56 at Ex. 3 (ledger). Plaintiff therefore initiated this foreclosure action against her on January 29, 2024. NYSCEF No. 1. Morgan, pro se, answered on January 3, 2025. NYSCEF No. 36. More than a year after entering this case, Morgan also sent Freedom a letter claiming to rescind the mortgage under New York common law. NYSCEF No. 116.

Freedom now moves for summary judgment against Morgan and to appoint a referee as well as for additional relief that would clear away defaulting or unknown defendants. Morgan cross-moves for summary judgment, claiming that she validly rescinded the mortgage prior to the start of the action, and that Freedom has no standing.

DISCUSSION

"To prevail on a motion for summary judgment, the movant must make a prima facie showing by submitting evidence that demonstrates the absence of any material issues of fact." Nellenback v. Madison County, 44 NY3d 329, 334 (2025) (citing CPLR 3212(b)). Once such prima facie showing has been made, the burden shifts to the opposing party to show there are material issues of fact requiring a trial. Bazdaric v. Almah Partners LLC, 41 NY3d 310, 316, (2024) (citing Alvarez v. Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320, 324 (1986)). The Court must view the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Nellenback, 44 NY3d at 334.

A. Plaintiff Meets Its Prima Facie Burden

"[I]n moving for summary judgment in an action to foreclose a mortgage, a plaintiff establishes its prima facie case through the production of the mortgage, the unpaid note, and evidence of default." HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v. Bermudez, 175 AD3d 667, 668 (2d Dep't 2019). "[A] plaintiff can establish a default by submission of an affidavit from a person having personal knowledge of the facts, or other evidence in admissible form." Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Gross, 202 AD3d 882, 885 (2d Dep't 2022). "Once this showing has been made, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to produce evidentiary proof in admissible form sufficient to establish the existence of material issues of fact that require a trial for resolution." Giuffrida v Citibank Corp., 100 NY2d 72, 81 (2003).

Here, Freedom met its initial burden by submitting the Mortgage, the unpaid Note, and evidence of Morgan's default via the affidavit of Kyeshia Renee Wickware, who is employed by Freedom as an "FCL Specialist II" and who is familiar with Freedom's records. See NYSCEF No. 56 at pdf pgs. 1-3, 5-7, 9-35. Specifically, as authenticated by Wickware, Freedom submits the promissory note and mortgage executed by Morgan in the amount of $654,000.00 to fund purchase of a residential home. Id.; see also NYSCEF No. 78 at pdf pg. 1 (Morgan's loan application checking boxes for "purchase" and "primary residence").

The burden therefore shifts to Morgan to defeat summary judgment. Morgan raises many arguments, all of which boil down to three contentions. First, Morgan argues Freedom does not have standing to enforce the mortgage. Second, Morgan argues that she validly rescinded the mortgage pursuant to TILA. Additionally, on reply and at oral argument, Morgan raised a third issue: that she had recently rescinded via New York common law.² None of these arguments has any merit.

B. Plaintiff Has Standing to Bring This Action

Morgan first argues that Freedom does not have standing to enforce the mortgage because Freedom fails to adequately allege details of how the mortgage was physically delivered from its originator (non-party Quicken and/or its assigns) to Freedom. Morgan quotes in support of this argument what she claims is the Second Department's opinion in Aurora Loan Services, LLC v. Taylor, 114 AD3d 627 (2d Dep't 2014). But there are two problems with her citation: (a) she actually quotes from the partial dissent; and (b) the Court of Appeals affirmed the majority and rejected this partial dissent, ruling that details of the physical delivery are not necessary where there are other indicia that the Note and mortgage were transferred. See Aurora Loan Services, LLC v. Taylor, 25 NY3d 355, 362 (2015).

As for standing in general, "[a] plaintiff has standing where it is the holder or assignee of the underlying note at the time the action is commenced." HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v. Caesar, 249 AD3d 711, 714 (2d Dep't 2026) (citing Aurora Loan Servs., 25 NY3d at 361-362). "Either a written assignment of the underlying note or the physical delivery of the note prior to the commencement of the . . . action is sufficient to transfer the obligation, and the mortgage passes with the debt as an inseparable incident." Id. (citing Dyer Trust 2012-1 v. Global World Realty, Inc., 140 AD3d 827, 828 (2d Dep't 2016)).

"Here, the plaintiff established, prima facie, its standing by demonstrating that the original note was in its possession when it commenced the action, as evidenced by its attachment of a copy of the original note, endorsed in blank, to the summons and complaint when the action was commenced." See Deutsche Bank Natl. Tr. Co. v. Kingsbury, 171 AD3d 871, 872 (2d Dep't 2019); NYSCEF No. 65 at pdf pgs. 11-13. Contrary to Morgan's arguments, there is no issue in these circumstances with attaching a copy of the note, particularly given the attachment of the letters from Freedom and its predecessors in interest advising Morgan of the transfer of the mortgage. See NYSCEF No. 56 at pdf pgs. 45-64.³ Thus, Freedom has standing.

C. Morgan Did Not Have a Right to Rescind the Mortgage

Morgan's second argument is that she validly rescinded the mortgage pursuant to Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.23(a)(1) of TILA. NYSCEF No. 84 at 7. That regulation states:

In a credit transaction in which a security interest is or will be retained or acquired in a consumer's principal dwelling, each consumer whose ownership interest is or will be subject to the security interest shall have the right to rescind the transaction, except for transactions described in paragraph (f) of this section.

12 C.F.R. § 226.23(a)(1). Morgan asserts that this regulation allowed her to rescind.

Plaintiff argues that under 15 U.S.C. § 1635(e)(1)—which is the underlying statute that Regulation Z is implementing—section 226.23 does not apply to "residential mortgage transactions" as defined in 15 U.S.C. § 1602(x).⁴ In other words, Freedom argues that TILA does not provide a right to rescission for mortgages like Morgan's.

Plaintiff is correct. Under 15 USC § 1635(e)(1), TILA's right to rescind does not apply to residential mortgage transactions. Similarly, Regulation Z contains an identical clause that expressly states "[t]he right to rescind does not apply to the following: (1) residential mortgage transactions." 12 C.F.R. § 226.23(f)(1). Section 1602(x) defines "residential mortgage transaction" as "a transaction in which a mortgage, deed of trust, purchase money security interest arising under an installment sales contract, or equivalent consensual security interest is created or retained against the consumer's dwelling to finance the acquisition or initial construction of such dwelling." 15 U.S.C. § 1602(x) (emphasis added). Regulation Z contains an almost identical definition except that it specifies "principal dwelling" rather than dwelling generally. See 12 C.F.R. § 226.2(a)(24).

Here, Morgan executed the mortgage to finance the purchase of her primary residence. See NYSCEF No. 78 at pdf pg. 1 (Morgan's loan application checking boxes for "purchase" and "primary residence").⁵ Morgan therefore made a residential mortgage transaction, and so under both 15 USC § 1635(e)(1) and Regulation Z (12 CFR § 226.23(f)(1)), Morgan had no right of rescission.

Morgan nevertheless argues that § 1602(x) (and by extension § 226.2(a)(24)) does not apply because this carve-out is only for residential mortgage transactions that involve "installment sales contracts" or alternatively an "equivalent consensual security interests" against the "initial construction of [the] dwelling." Morgan's argument misreads the definition of "residential mortgage transaction." She appears to read the phrase "installment sales contract" to modify all preceding terms, including "mortgage" and "deed of trust." Similarly, she appears to read the phrase "initial construction of [the] dwelling" to somehow eliminate the preceding phrase "to finance the acquisition." But that interpretation is incorrect. The statute can be reasonably read only as providing a list of four items that can be "created or retained against the consumer's dwelling to finance [either] the acquisition or initial construction of" a dwelling: (1) mortgages, (2) deeds of trust, (3) purchase money security interests arising under an installment sales contract, and (4) "equivalent consensual security interest[s]" to any of the preceding three. The first three are all specific types of "consensual security interests," and the last is the catch-all. Thus, the phrase "arising under an installment sales contract" modifies only "purchase money security interests," not the entire category of consensual security interests. Similarly, the statute applies to either acquisition or initial construction, not only initial construction.

In short, because Morgan took out a mortgage to finance her purchase of a dwelling, the rights to rescission under Regulation Z (§ 226.23(a)(1)) and § 1635(a)(1) do not apply pursuant to § 226.23(f)(1) and § 1635(e)(1). Morgan could not legally rescind her mortgage under TILA.

D. There was No Valid Common Law Rescission

For the first time on reply to her cross motion, Morgan argues that she also rescinded the mortgage under New York common law in July 2026. As an initial matter, this argument must be rejected given that it was raised for the first time on reply. See Waldorf v. Maher, 221 AD3d 1052, 1052 (2d Dep't 2023).

But even if the Court were to consider the argument on the merits, it would fail. Morgan relies primarily on the general principle that "[t]hose who make a contract, may unmake it." Beatty v. Guggenheim Expl. Co., 225 NY 380, 387 (1919). While true in general, Morgan misses two key points. First, Beatty is not a case about unmaking a mortgage; rather it held that parties cannot bar oral modifications to contract, a holding that has long been overruled by statute. See Israel v. Chabra, 12 NY3d 158, 167 (2009). Second, and more importantly, the general rule must give way to the specific rules around how rescission actually works, and more particularly in the context of a residential mortgage.

Here, Morgan argues that her rescission letter should be considered sufficient to automatically rescind the mortgage with no interference from the Court. None of her case law supports her theory that merely sending such a letter is legally effective to rescind a contract. No case she cites includes a similar letter or suggests that a litigant in these circumstances can simply declare by letter that a contract is rescinded and have it be so without input from a court. Morgan must follow the rules like everyone else.

Nevertheless, Morgan is pro se, and so the Court will interpret her arguments generously. Morgan's claim of "common law recission" appears to be her attempt to request the remedy of "equitable rescission" based on the original lender's alleged fraudulent concealment of information relating to the outstanding DOB violations on the Property. "Fraud sufficient to support [equitable] rescission requires only a misrepresentation that induces a party to enter into a contract resulting in some detriment .... Even an innocent misrepresentation will support rescission." Air-Sea Packing Group, Inc. v. Applied Underwriters, Inc., 228 AD3d 20, 33—34 (2d Dep't 2024). "[U]nlike a cause of action in damages on the same ground, proof of scienter and pecuniary loss is not needed." Bd. of Managers of Soundings Condo. v. Foerster, 138 AD3d 160, 164 (1st Dep't 2016) (quoting D'Angelo v. Bob Hastings Oldsmobile, Inc., 89 AD2d 785, 785 (4th Dep't 1982), affd. 59 NY2d 773 (1983)).

Thus, to make out her defense of rescission based on fraudulent concealment, Morgan needs to establish (1) a misrepresentation or a material omission of fact which was false; (2) that she justifiably relied on the misrepresentation or material omission; and (3) that counterparty had a duty to disclose the material information. See Bannister v. Agard, 125 AD3d 797, 798 (2d Dep't 2015); see Air-Sea Packing Group, 228 AD3d at 33—34. "[T]he mere nondisclosure of a material fact, unaccompanied by some deceptive act, does not constitute fraud absent a confidential or fiduciary relationship." Scott v. Fields, 85 AD3d 756, 758 (2d Dep't 2011). "Even in the absence of a fiduciary relationship, a duty to disclose may arise when one party's superior knowledge of essential facts renders nondisclosure inherently unfair." Barrett v. Freifeld, 64 AD3d 736, 738 (2d Dep't 2009).

Morgan potentially can attempt to make out these elements, but not against Freedom. All of the issues Morgan raises are against the seller of the property and, potentially, her own attorney and other professionals she may have retained to advise her on that sale. She claims that they hid the various outstanding violations from her as well as the lack of certificate of occupancy. NYSCEF No. 115 at 5-7. These facts could rise to the level of fraud, although notably her own rescission letter indicates that perhaps she was more aware of the condition of the property than she claims. See NYSCEF No. 116 at § 3.1(E)(iv). (two weeks prior to sale, Morgan's attorney told her "the contract [of sale] stated the property was being purchased 'as is' "); id. at ¶ D.iii. (plaintiff wrote to her attorney regarding the outstanding violations). In any event, claims of fraud arguably could have been litigated in her action against the seller and others, but as discussed earlier, that action was dismissed for failure to serve. See Morgan v McLeod, 2026 NY Slip Op 05179 (2d Dep't Sept. 2, 2026).⁶

However, nothing Morgan has submitted supports her theory that she can rescind her mortgage in this case. She argues only that because Freedom's predecessor "provided the 'processing, underwriting, and closing support' " for the loan, Freedom's predecessors should have revealed to her that there was no certificate of occupancy. But "the mere nondisclosure of a material fact, unaccompanied by some deceptive act, does not constitute fraud absent a confidential or fiduciary relationship." Scott, 85 AD3d at 758. Morgan cannot establish a confidential or fiduciary duty to disclose because "the relationship between a borrower and a bank is a contractual one which generally does not give rise to a fiduciary duty." Stand. Fed. Bank v. Healy, 7 AD3d 610, 612 (2d Dep't 2004). Nor has she established the original mortgagee had "superior knowledge of essential facts [that] renders nondisclosure inherently unfair," Barrett, 64 AD3d at 738, as her own description of pre-sale discussions with her attorney indicate she was on notice of the violations that she now claims prevented issuance of a certificate of occupancy. See, e.g., NYSCEF No. 115 at 11 (claiming her attorney emailed her on January 3, 2020, that "[i]t is not necessary for these violations to be removed by the seller prior to closing. The bank is not requiring clearance of same"); NYSCEF No. 116 at § 3.1(E)(iv) (message that she was purchasing "as is").

At bottom, Morgan might potentially have, or have had, a remedy against someone for what happened here, but it is not against the mortgagee that merely gave her the money to purchase the Property. Her true grievance is against the seller, her attorney, and other professionals she retained who she claims failed to protect her interests.

The Court has considered the remaining arguments and finds them unpersuasive. Thus, because Freedom met its prima facie burden and Morgan fails to raise any triable issue of fact, the branch of Freedom's motion requesting summary judgment is granted and the branch of Morgan's cross-motion requesting summary judgment is denied.

E. The Affirmative Defenses Must Be Dismissed

Additionally, Freedom's motion to dismiss all of Morgan's affirmative defenses pursuant to CPLR 3211(b) is granted. The affirmative defenses of lack of standing and that Freedom is not the real party in interest are dismissed because Freedom has standing and is the current holder of the mortgage for the reasons described above. Similarly, Morgan's affirmative defenses of illegality, fraud on the Court, estoppel, lack of subject matter jurisdiction, failure to state a claim, and wrongful acts are each dismissed because the mortgage could not be rescinded under TILA or common law for the reasons above.

CONCLUSION

The Court has considered the remaining arguments raised by Morgan in opposition to the remaining portions of Freedom's motion and in favor of Morgan's cross-motion and finds them unpersuasive and without legal merit. Therefore, for the reasons above, it is hereby

ORDERED that Freedom Mortgage Corporation's motion (MS 004) is granted in its entirety and defendant Victoria Morgan's cross-motion (MS 005) is denied in its entirety; and it is further

ORDERED that branch of Freedom Mortgage Corporation's motion seeking summary judgment pursuant to CPLR § 3212 is granted; and the branch of Freedom Mortgage Corporation's motion seeking dismissal of defendant Victoria Morgan's defenses asserted in her answer under CPLR 3211(b) is granted; and it is further

ORDERED that branch of Freedom Mortgage Corporation's motion seeking default judgment is granted against Defendants People Of The State Of New York, United States of America on behalf of the IRS and City Register Of The City Of New York, County Of Kings, and the defaults are fixed and determined pursuant to CPLR § 3215; and it is further

ORDERED, that this action is hereby referred to Sofia Balile, Esq. of 155 Water Street, Suite 4-1, Brooklyn, NY 11201-1016, (646) 580-6116, sofia@balilelaw.com, as Referee to compute the amount due to the Plaintiff and to examine and report whether the mortgaged premises can be sold in parcels pursuant to RPAPL § 1321, and that the Referee report to the Court with all convenient speed; and it is further

ORDERED, that, if required, the Referee take testimony pursuant to RPAPL § 1321. The Referee may ascertain and compute the amount due to the Plaintiff for principal, interest, and other disbursements advanced, on the papers submitted by the Plaintiff without holding a hearing on notice pursuant to CPLR § 4313, and it is further

ORDERED, that by accepting this appointment, the Referee certifies that he/she is in compliance with Part 36 of the Rules of the Chief Judge (22 NYCRR Part 36), including, but not limited to, § 36.2(c) ("Disqualifications from appointment") and § 36.2(d) ("Limitations on appointments based upon compensation"); and, if the Referee is disqualified from receiving an appointment pursuant to the provisions of that Rule, the Referee shall immediately notify the Appointing Judge; and it is further

ORDERED, that pursuant to CPLR § 8003(a), the statutory fee of $350.00 shall be paid to the Referee for the computation of the amount due and upon the filing of his/her report, the Referee shall not request or accept additional compensation for the computation unless it has been fixed by the Court in accordance with CPLR § 8003(a) and (b); and it is further

ORDERED, that the Referee is prohibited from accepting or retaining any funds for him/herself or paying funds to him/herself without compliance with Part 36 of the Rules of the Chief Administrative Judge; and it is further

ORDERED, that "John Doe" is removed as a party defendant in this action as no occupants reside at the premises, and that the caption of this action is amended to reflect the removal of "John Doe" as a party defendant; and it is further

ORDERED, that Unknown Heirs Of Elisha Langley, are removed from the action as necessary party defendants and that the caption of this action is amended to reflect the removal of Unknown Heirs of Elisha Langley as party defendants; and it is further

ORDERED, that the caption shall read as follows:

Index No. 502865/2024

FREEDOM MORTGAGE CORPORATION,

Plaintiff,

v.

VICTORIA MORGAN, SUSTAINABLE NEIGHBORHOODS LLC, PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ON BEHALF OF THE IRS, and CITY REGISTER OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, COUNTY OF KINGS,

Defendants.

MORTGAGED PREMISES: 144 Shepherd Avenue Brooklyn, NY 11208

; and it is further

ORDERED, that plaintiff Freedom Mortgage Corporation shall serve a copy of this Order with notice of entry on all parties and persons entitled to notice, including the Referee appointed herein.

E N T E R:

Dated: October 8, 2026

Brooklyn, New York

Hon. Andrew S. Amer

A.J.S.C.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The Court has reviewed the following papers in connection with determining this application: NYSCEF Nos. 55-90, 94, 97, 108-110, 113 (MS 004); 91-93, 95, 96, 98, 111-113, 115-118 (MS 005).

2.   Flowing throughout Morgan's papers is the suggestion of a fourth argument: allegations that she was not able to acquire a certificate of occupancy because of various DOB code violations that could only be remediated for $250,000 and which Morgan claims the original lender was aware of at the time the mortgage was issued. Morgan does not make this the direct basis for any of her arguments nor is it clear how such facts could affect this action.

3.   The letters are not perfect. Plaintiff submits the letters from RoundPoint and plaintiff, but not from Quicken. NYSCEF Nos. 56 at Ex. 2. While not fatal, this missing document could have cut a line in plaintiff's chain of custody. However, Morgan attaches a letter from Rocket Mortgage (formerly Quicken) which among other things states that Rocket Mortgage transferred the note to RoundPoint, thereby closing the gap. See NYSCEF No. 89.

4.   Although the statute and parties technically reference § 1602(w), that section was later redesignated to § 1602(x), and so the Court will reference only the current section.

5.   Morgan's loan application was attached to the affidavit of plaintiff's counsel, not of a person with personal knowledge of its accuracy, but it is admissible as a statement against interest. Moreover, given her argument that she has been unable to occupy the premises due to outstanding code violations, NYSCEF No. 84 at 4, Morgan does not appear to dispute that the mortgage was meant to purchase a residential home for her personal occupancy.

6.   It is not immediately clear whether Morgan has a claim for malpractice against the attorney who represented her in the sale process given her assertions that they continued to push her to close despite her repeated insistence leading up to closing that she was no longer interested. See NYSCEF No. 116 at § 3.1(E)(v).

Andrew S. Amer, J.