The People of the State of New York v. Loudjy Manoly, Defendant. (2026)

The defendant is charged in the instant indictment with Robbery in the First Degree and other related offenses in connection with an incident alleged to have occurred on October 19, 2025. This seven-count indictment charges the defendant along with codefendant Marccus Misere (the codefendant) with having acted in concert with one another to commit the charged offenses. On September 16, 2026, the defendant moved for severance (NYSCEF Doc No. 24).¹ The People e-filed opposition on September 29, 2026 (NYSCEF Doc No. 25).

Relevant Background

It is alleged, in relevant part, that on October 19, 2025, the defendants struck the complainant with their fists, pointed a firearm at him, demanded money, and took the complainant's phone, food, and $60 in cash. The indictment charges the defendants with "acting in concert with each other each aiding the other" in commission of the alleged crimes. On December 31, 2025, counsel for the codefendant filed an omnibus motion seeking, inter alia, severance. By decision and order dated March 16, 2026, another justice of this court denied the motion to sever. On June 29, 2026, this court conducted a combined Huntley/Dunaway/Wade for the defendant and a combined Huntley/Dunaway/Wade/Mapp hearing for the codefendant. By decision and order dated August 25, 2026, the court (i) denied the defendants' motions to suppress identification evidence; (ii) denied the codefendant's motion to suppress physical evidence; (iii) granted the codefendant's motion to preclude unnoticed statements; and (iv) granted in part the defendants' motion to suppress statements. The defendant now moves for severance.

Discussion

Timeliness

Generally, all pretrial motions, including a motion to sever, must be served or filed within 45 days after arraignment and before commencement of trial (see CPL §§ 200.40[1] [motion seeking severance shall be filed within the period provided by CPL section 255.20 upon a showing of good cause], 255.20[1]; People v Johnson, 224 AD2d 635, 638 [2d Dept 1996] [motion for severance was untimely as it was filed more than 45 days after arraignment and the defendant failed to demonstrate good cause for the delay]). Notwithstanding, "the court must entertain and decide on its merits, at anytime before the end of the trial, any appropriate pre-trial motion based upon grounds of which the defendant could not, with due diligence, have been previously aware, or which, for other good cause, could not reasonably have been raised within the [statutory] period specified" (CPL § 255.20[3]). Moreover, "[a]ny other pre-trial motion made after the forty-five day period may be summarily denied, but the court, in the interest of justice, and for good cause shown, may, in its discretion, at any time before sentence, entertain and dispose of the motion on the merits" (id.).

Here, the defendant was arraigned in Supreme Court on December 5, 2025. The instant motion was filed on September 16, 2026, 285 days after the defendant's arraignment, 240 days after the statutory period for motions expired, and 22 days after the court issued its decision on the defendants' pretrial suppression hearings. Notably, this court denied suppression of physical evidence recovered from the codefendant, specifically, cash and a cellphone identified as the complainant's. It stands to reason that the defense strategy advanced by defendant Manoly in the instant motion—that the codefendant from whom the robbery proceeds were recovered acted alone—could not have been effectively asserted until the court ruled on the codefendant's suppression motion (see generally People v Hidalgo, 80 Misc 3d 329, 334 [Sup Ct, Bronx County 2023] [in decision on omnibus motion, court deferred motion for severance to trial court for decision following court-ordered suppression hearings]).

In the interest of justice and for good cause shown, the court exercises its discretion to address the merits of the motion.

Merits

CPL section 200.40(1) provides, in relevant part, that two or more defendants may be jointly charged in a single indictment where "(a) all such defendants are jointly charged with every offense alleged therein; or (b) all the offenses charged are based upon a common scheme or plan; or (c) all the offenses charged are based upon the same criminal transaction" (CPL § 200.40[1][a]-[c]). Here, the defendants are jointly charged with every offense alleged in the indictment. Accordingly, they are properly joined under CPL section 200.40(1)(a).

The defendants are also properly joined under CPL section 200.40(1)(b) in that it is alleged, under an acting in concert theory, that the defendants each aided the other in the commission of the charged offenses (see People v Wright, 166 AD3d 1022, 1023-1024 [2d Dept 2018] ["The charges were properly joined, as they were part of a common scheme or plan]; People v Everspaugh, 171 AD2d 950, 951 [3d Dept 1991] ["Inasmuch as every count of the indictment was predicated upon criminal conduct committed by defendant and Wallis in concert with one another, only 'the most cogent reasons warrant a severance' "]).

Finally, the defendants are properly joined under CPL section 200.40(1)(c). Criminal transaction is defined as "conduct which establishes at least one offense, and which is comprised of two or more or a group of acts either (a) so closely related and connected in point of time and circumstance of commission as to constitute a single criminal incident, or (b) so closely related in criminal purpose or objective as to constitute elements integral parts of a single criminal venture" (CPL § 40.10[2]). In determining whether two acts are part of the same criminal transaction, the court must look at the nature of the crime and the underlying facts (People v Griffin, 137 AD2d 558, 559 [2d Dept 1988]). Here, it is alleged that on October 19, 2025, both defendants acted in concert to strike and point a firearm at the complainant, and took cash and a phone from the complainant. The defendants are charged with acting together and aiding each other in committing the alleged robbery. Under these circumstances, "all the offenses charged are based upon the same criminal transaction."

Notwithstanding that the defendants are properly joined, upon a showing of good cause, the court has the discretion to order "that any defendant be tried separately from the other or from one or more or all of the others" (CPL § 200.40[1]). Good cause includes a finding that the defendant or the People will be unduly prejudiced by a joint trial (id.).

As an initial matter, the People submit that this court should deny the instant motion to sever "for the same reasons as articulated in" the denial of the codefendant's severance motion issued by another justice of this court on March 16, 2026. In that decision, the codefendant's motion was denied because the codefendant "set[ ] for[th] no facts in support of severance" (People's Exhibit 1). That rationale, however, is inapplicable here. The papers before this court present facts and circumstances in support of the defendant's application for severance, as set forth more fully below.

The defendant contends that he and the codefendant have antagonistic defenses (Defense Aff ¶ 6). The defendant further argues that severance is proper here because any Sandoval ruling made by the court limiting the prosecution's cross-examination of the defendant on prior bad acts is inapplicable to the codefendant, and would thus "impede[ ] the [d]efendant's assertion of his right to testify" (Defense Aff ¶¶ 13-16). The People counter that severance is unnecessary because at a joint trial, the court may limit the scope of cross-examination by codefendants to "good faith questions" (People's Memo at 9).

Although some degree of prejudice is inherent in every joint trial, "that alone does not outweigh the factors favoring joinder of defendants" (People v Mahboubian, 74 NY2d 174, 183-184 [1989]). Moreover, " 'where proof against the defendants is supplied by the same evidence, only the most cogent reasons warrant a severance' " (Mahboubian, 74 NY2d at 183 quoting Bornholdt, 33 NY2d 87 [1973]). The Court of Appeals has emphasized " 'severance is not required solely because of hostility between the parties, differences in their trial strategies or inconsistencies in their defenses. [Rather], it must appear that a joint trial necessarily will result in unfair prejudice to the moving party and substantially impair his defense' " (Mahboubian, 74 NY2d at 184, quoting People v Cruz, 66 NY2d 61, 73-74 [1985]).

Where defendants are tried jointly and one defendant chooses to testify, "the competing interests require a choice between (1) the procedural right of a defendant to a prospective ruling under Sandoval and (2) the constitutional right of a codefendant to an unimpeded cross-examination of witnesses against him" (People v McGee, 68 NY2d 328, 333 [1986]). The Court of Appeals has therefore held that "when defendants are tried together a Sandoval ruling made with respect to one does not apply to limit the scope of cross-examination of that defendant by the other" and that the remedy is a timely motion to sever so that the court may "determine whether the rights of either defendant will likely be prejudiced in a joint trial" (id.; see also People v Williams, 142 AD2d 310, 314 [2d Dept 1988]). Severance on the ground that a codefendant's cross-examination of his prior bad acts would interfere with the exercise of his right to testify is appropriate when the defendant "demonstrate[s] by concrete evidence that the defendants' positions are antagonistic to one another" (People v Martin, 154 AD2d 554, 554 [2d Dept 1989], lv denied 75 NY2d 815 [1990]).

To be sure, severance is not required where the possibility of antagonistic defenses "is merely colorable or speculative" (Bornholdt, 33 NY2d at 87; Martin, 154 AD2d at 554). Rather, severance is appropriate "where the core of each defense is in irreconcilable conflict with the other and where there is a significant danger, as both defenses are portrayed to the trial court, that the conflict alone would lead the jury to infer defendant's guilt" (Mahboubian, 74 NY2d at 184).Here, the defense's contentions are not "merely speculative." The defense specifically submits that:

[the codefendant's] attorney has made clear that they intend to rely on surveillance video showing a person they claim to be [the defendant] fanning out dollar bills in the hallway of the building the two defendants were arrested in after the alleged robbery as well as police body camera showing recovery of money from [the defendant] that was not seized at the police precinct to argue that it was [the defendant] who engaged in any robbery that occurred and that [the defendant] can be seen with proceeds from that robbery and if [the codefendant] is guilty of anything it is simply of having the proceeds of that robbery on [the codefendant's person] at the time of his arrest, given to him by [the defendant]

(Defense Aff ¶ 10). The defense further asserts that the defendant "disclaims any participation in the robbery, and certainly would have an interest in pointing to the jury that the complainant's phone and the money that was vouchered as arrest evidence in this case were both recovered from [the codefendant] and not from himself" (id.). The defendant contends that his and the codefendant's defenses are clearly antagonistic, that a jury could not credit both defenses, and that their strategies necessitate each becoming a "second prosecutor" against the other (id. ¶¶ 10-11).

As set forth by the defendant in his papers, he intends to point the finger at the codefendant and the codefendant intends to point the finger at him. Where, as here, the defendants' respective defenses are "in irreconcilable conflict with the other," severance is appropriate (Mahboubian, 74 NY2d at 184). Moreover, given their antagonistic defenses, it is foreseeable that the codefendant's counsel may take an "aggressive adversarial stance" against the defendant, "in effect becoming a second prosecutor" (see People v Cardwell, 78 NY2d 996, 997-998 [1991] [finding that the trials should have been severed where, inter alia, counsel for a codefendant "took an aggressive adversarial stance against" the other defendants, and counsel for the other codefendant elicited information harmful to the defendant]). Such an adversarial stance assumed by counsel for the codefendant would unduly prejudice the defendant (see People v Lessane, 142 AD3d 562 [2d Dept 2016] [finding that the defendant was unduly prejudiced by a joint trial because his defense was antagonistic to that of his codefendant]; People v Braham, 91 AD3d 666, 667 [2d Dept 2012] [trial court erred in granting a joint trial before two separate juries where defendant was prejudiced during the joint trial in that codefendant's counsel took an aggressive adversarial stance against the defendant and elicited damaging evidence against him]).

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above, the defendant's motion to sever his trial from that of his codefendant is granted and a separate trial is ordered.

This constitutes the decision and order of the court.

Dated: October 13, 2026

Brooklyn, New York

Hon. Joanne D. Quiñones, J.S.C.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Although the defendant's papers filed to NYSCEF do not indicate that a copy of this motion was served on the codefendant, counsel for the defendant emailed a copy of the motion to counsel for the codefendant on September 16, 2026.

Joanne D. Quiñones, J.