KEVIN BLACKBURN v. JOE JAX TRUCKIN INC (2026)

I. Introduction

In the instant trial, the two Plaintiffs, Jessica Best and Kevin Blackburn, appeared pro se, i.e., represented themselves. The situation posed a predicament of various conundrums for the Court with respect to certain trial matters, including the format of their testimony considering they were not attorneys, concerns how the jury would consider the situation, and adherence to court procedure. This decision explains the Court's resolution of those matters.

II. Background

This action arose out of an alleged motor vehicle accident that occurred at approximately 7:00 a.m., on August 12, 2019, on Kent Avenue near its intersection with Division Avenue, in the County of Kings, City and State of New York. Plaintiff Jessica Best ("Best") claimed in the complaint that she was riding her bicycle in the bike lane on Kent Avenue, a northbound thoroughfare, when Defendant Michael Moynahan ("Moynahan") crossed into the bike lane and struck her. Moynahan was operating a tractor trailer owned by Defendant Joe Jax Truckin Inc. on Kent Avenue near its intersection with Division Avenue. Best alleged that she sustained numerous injuries, including long-term disabilities.

Plaintiff Kevin Blackburn ("Blackburn") was not a direct witness to the accident as he was bicycling ahead of Best at the time of the alleged accident. Blackburn was and still is the husband of Best and has lived and cohabitated with Best then and ever since the alleged accident took place. By reason of the foregoing, Plaintiff Blackburn was a party in this matter, alleging that he was deprived of the services, society, companionship, and consortium of his wife.

Plaintiffs Best and Blackburn retained an attorney following the alleged accident. However, prior to trial, Best and Blackburn had changed attorneys on three or four different occasions.

III. General Case Law Regarding Pro Se Litigants

"The Court recognizes that pro se litigants might not be familiar with legal procedures (e.g. Brown v Lavine, 45 AD2d 753 [2d Dept 1974] [new administrative hearing afforded pro se individual who erroneously thought pre-hearing off-the-record defense presented to hearing officer was on the record]), and that certain latitude may be afforded (e.g. Haverlin v Gottlieb, 49 Misc 3d 131[A], 2015 NY Slip Op 51750[U] [App Term, 9th & 10th Dists. 2015] [motion providently construed as one to renew]; Bank Trust Natl. Assn. v Dubrowski, 2024 WL 3312482 [Sup Ct, NY County 2024] [court will examine claim under uncited provision as well as cited one]; Matter of J.E.P. v People, 9 Misc 3d 1104[A], 2005 NY Slip Op 51397[U] [Fam Ct, Nassau County 2005] [incorrect caption and minor technical deficiencies in papers excused])" (Cesario v Badr, 88 Misc 3d 1259[A], 2026 NY Slip Op 50590[U] [Sup Ct, Kings County 2026]).

However, it is often said that "[a] litigant appearing pro se acquires no greater right than any other litigant and such appearance may not be used to deprive [Defendants] of the same rights enjoyed by other[s]" (Matter of Evert, 72 AD3d 1081, 1082 [2d Dept 2010] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Roundtree v Singh, 143 AD2d 995, 996 [2d Dept 1988], quoting Morgan v Sylvester, 125 F Supp 380, 388 [SD NY 1954], affd 220 F2d 758 [2d Cir 1955], cert denied 350 U.S. 867 [1955]). Moreover, "[t]he fact that one appears pro se is not a license to abuse the process of the court" (Kane v New York, 468 F Supp 586, 592 [SD NY 1979], affd 614 F2d 1288 [2d Cir 1979]).

Although courts can afford pro se litigants some latitude, "[t]he courts are not obliged to indulge the excesses of a pro se litigant at the expense of decorum, judicial economy and fairness to opposing parties. Proceeding pro se is not a license to ignore court orders [or] engage in dilatory and obstructive conduct . . ." (Couri v Siebert, 48 AD3d 370, 371 [1st Dept 2008]; see Bank of Am., N.A., v Afflick, 172 AD3d 1146 [2d Dept 2019], quoting Mirzoeff v Nagar, 52 AD3d 789, 789 [2d Dept 2008]).

While the Court recognized that Best and Blackburn were appearing pro se, this self-representation could not be used to deprive Defendants of a fair trial.

IV. Pre-Trial Conference & Trial Proceedings

When the Court first encountered the parties at the pre-trial conference, on July 15, 2026, Plaintiffs Best and Blackburn informed the Court that they represented themselves. At the opening of the trial, the next day, July 16, 2026, they again stated that they represented themselves. The Court apprised Best and Blackburn that being represented by counsel was more advantageous. Both Best and Blackburn replied that they understood and still wished to proceed with the trial and represent themselves.¹

(A) Testimony Format

During the pre-trial conference that was conducted on July 15, 2026, Plaintiffs stated that they were going to call three witnesses for their presentation of evidence: (1) Best; (2) Blackburn; and (3) Moynahan. Because Plaintiffs were acting as their own attorneys it was discussed how Best and Blackburn would bring forth this testimony, acting as both attorneys and witnesses simultaneously during trial. Plaintiffs stated that they planned to testify in a narrative format. Defense counsel objected to this testimony format and submitted a memorandum, essentially functioning as a motion in limine, at the outset of the trial beginning on July 16, 2026. The defense argued that Plaintiffs, proceeding in a pro se capacity, should be precluded from testifying in a narrative fashion on the grounds that testifying via monologue deprived Defendants of an the opportunity to know the basis of what Plaintiffs would say in their testimony and to interpose objections. Defendants also argued during the pre-trial conference that Plaintiffs should be required to submit in advance the questions they were intending to ask themselves. This resulted in a predicament for the Court: How should each Plaintiff testify when called as a witness by himself or herself?

In New York, pro se litigants have been allowed to testify in narrative format prior to this trial (e.g. Basmanov v Shiwcharan, 224 AD3d 435 [1st Dept 2024] [pro se defendant encouraged by court to testify in narrative format in bench trial after he initially concluded it was unnecessary]; Matter of Smith v Francis, 206 AD3d 914 [2d Dept 2022] [father testified in narrative form]; Sonbuchner v Sonbuchner, 96 AD3d 566 [1st Dept 2012] [court permitted pro se plaintiff to testify in narrative form, introduce exhibits during his testimony, cross-examine witnesses]); Aleksandr V. v Juliya V., 79 Misc 3d 1231[A]; 2023 Slip Op. 50756[U] [defendant testified in the narrative]). However, it is noted that permitting narrative testimony is not always the resulting product of a court's determination when objection was interposed by the adverse party.

While there is scant case law on pro se litigants testifying in narrative format during trial in New York where it served as an issue in dispute, there is more law on the topic in the federal courts and in other states.

Within the Fourth Circuit, a district court held that it was well in their discretion to deny the pro se litigant's request to proceed with witness testimony in narrative fashion (see United States v Beckton, 740 F3d 303 [4th Cir 2014]). Although the court can use its discretion regarding pro se litigants, "[a]ppearing pro se does not relieve a litigant of his obligation to follow legitimate rules" (id. at 306 n). Furthermore, it has since been held in the Second Circuit Court of Appeals that it is within the trial court's discretion to permit or deny narrative testimony (see United States v Young, 745 F2d 733 [2d Cir 1984] [officer narrated and offered opinions as government played videotape for jury]).

Similarly, in New Jersey federal court, it was established that courts, in their broad discretion, possess the authority to direct the method by which a pro se litigant offers testimony during trial (see Williams v Bosley, 2026 WL 222253 [D NJ 2026]). "Courts have 'broad discretion over the mode and order of examining witnesses and presenting evidence and may allow testimony in narrative form at trial if the Court finds that it would be helpful to the jury' " (id., *2, quoting Chichakli v Gerlach, 2018 WL 3625840, *3 [WD Okla 2018]). "This includes the discretion to permit pro se litigants to testify in narrative form, but none of these decisions establish that a court is required to permit narrative testimony or vice versa" (id., quoting United States v. Williams, 2024 WL 3540519, *3 [D NJ 2024] [internal quotation marks omitted]).

In Nevada federal court, narrative fashion testimony given by pro se litigants was allowed as long as the district judge conducted trial fairly and impartially (see Clark v Thomas, 2014 WL 2573738 [D Nev 2014]). "Litigants are permitted under 28 U.S.C. § 1654 to 'plead and conduct their own cases personally,' consistent with court rules" (id., *6). Because pro se litigants are not represented by attorneys, their informalities are tolerated more freely than informalities by counsel. However, the judge must still conduct a fair trial, and, in acting more than "a moderator or umpire," the judge is responsible to "to promote a fair and expeditious development of the facts unencumbered by irrelevancies." (Id.) Thus, the pro se party can testify in narrative format, whereby the judge can question the witness to clarify matter or fully develop facts for the jury's benefit (see id.)

Additionally, in Illinois, a court denied pro se defendants' request to use a non-party, non-attorney to pose questions to proceed in the conventional question-and-answer format (see Firstkey Homes, LLC v Mahwikizi, 2025 IL App (1st) 241613-U, ¶ 39 [2025]). The defendants were required to present the testimony in narrative format as the trial judge explained that it was common practice for a self-represented party to sit in the witness box and testify in the narrative (see id.). The trial court further explained that they could not permit someone other than an attorney to question them during trial "because a lay person is not entitled to act as an attorney for a party and conduct a trial examination" (id., *41, citing Downtown Disposal Servs., Inc. v City of Chicago, 979 NE2d 50 [2012]).

Therefore, the consensus is that while pro se litigants may receive some leeway during trial it is ultimately up to the discretion of the trial court judge to determine if narrative format testimony will be allowed.

Although Best and Blackburn were essentially appearing as attorneys on their own behalf, they were accorded the right to testify as witnesses — each one on his or her own behalf — using a narrative format. Nonetheless, the Court attempted to avoid a situation whereby Blackburn would act as Best's attorney and Best would act as Blackburn's attorney. A person appearing pro se is not licensed to practice law and may not appear on behalf of another litigant (see Matter of Beissel v New York City Police Dept., 2016 NY Slip Op 32289[U], *6 [Sup Ct, Queens County 2016], quoting Whitehead v Town House Equities, Ltd., 8 AD3d 369 [2d Dept 2004] & citing Salt Aire Trading LLC v Sidley Austin Brown & Wood, LLP, 93 AD3d 452 [1st Dept 2012]).

At the start of the trial, before the jury was brought in, the Court addressed the motion in limine submitted by Defendants. The Court denied the motion in limine, stating that it was within its discretion to allow pro se Plaintiffs the opportunity to testify in narrative format if either wished to be called as a witness on his or her own behalf during trial. In other words, if one of the Plaintiffs wished to call himself or herself as a witness, that person would be permitted to testify in narrative fashion, but if one Plaintiff called the other Plaintiff as a witness, testimony would have to be elicited in question-and-answer format. Contrary to the Defendants' insistence, Plaintiffs did not need to submit questions in advance but rather were required to differentiate themselves as attorney and witness if they wished to call themselves to the stand to testify. To prevent disruption and flow of the trial, Plaintiffs acting as witnesses would be permitted to sit in the witness box. However, if a pro se Plaintiff needed to address the Court or otherwise act as an attorney, the Court advised them to position themselves at the counsel table.²

Examining the limited case law in New York, as well as federal and out-of-state precedent, the Court's determinations were supported. It offered Best and Blackburn the opportunity to testify in the narrative on each one's direct case if they elected to do so. The Court, in its pre-trial research, concluded that there was no definitive decision denying narrative format testimony, but rather there were decisions confirming that a narrative format was permitted. Because pro se litigants may not be familiar with legal procedures, certain latitude may be awarded, including the Court's decision to allow the Plaintiffs to proceed with this testimony format if they wished. Therefore, the Court concludes that it was proper and in conformity with the law to deny the, in effect, motion in limine made by defense counsel and his other objections to the trial structure which the Court devised.

As matters turned out, Best did not wish to testify. That left Blackburn as the only witness presenting the testimony for Plaintiffs. Best called him as her witness, struggled to ask questions, but still elicited some testimony. Defendants were permitted to cross-examine Blackburn, and Blackburn cross-examined himself. The Court feels that the format it prescribed for the situation was the best possible one for all concerned, while adhering to ethical strictures and affording fairness to all.

The Court also dealt with the dilemma of how the pro se litigants would address themselves. This occurred because they would be acting as both attorneys and witnesses. It is well known that an attorney cannot also be a witness on substantive matters.³ The Court resolved this by determining that the pro se Plaintiffs would have to refer to themselves in the third person to the jury when making opening and closing arguments. For example, rather than Plaintiff Best being allowed to say, "I saw . . . ," when acting as an attorney, the Plaintiffs had to state, "Best saw. . . ." The Court ruled that the Plaintiffs, acting as attorneys, had to refer to themselves in the third person, in order to maintain consistency and afford the jury an opportunity to understand the evidence presented without confusion.

(B) Instructions to Plaintiffs

Further predicaments resulted from the Court's observation that neither Plaintiff's knowledge of trial procedure rose to the level of an attorney's and some instruction would be needed in order to further adherence to the rules of evidence, maintain decorum, and permit the jury to hear testimony in an orderly process, while at the same time not providing advice to them. Toward that end, the Court determined that the Plaintiffs should be provided with certain instructions.

Since the Court recognized that the pro se litigants were not familiar with court procedures, the Court afforded Best and Blackburn some leniency. However, the Court was charged with maintaining order and fairness, and because Best and Blackburn elected to be self-represented, therefore, the Court did not wish to apply different standards to the two sides.

First, Best and Blackburn were required to speak in the third person to maintain consistency and clarity for the jury. Thus, when Best and Blackburn were referring to themselves during opening and closing statements, as well as during the line of questioning, they were to refer to themselves as "Best" or "Blackburn," instead of "me" or "I."

Similarly, the parties were also informed that there must be a distinction between when they were appearing as "attorneys" and when they were appearing as "witnesses." This distinction was especially important for the jury when a witness was testifying. This distinction came into play when Blackburn cross-examined himself during Plaintiffs evidence. Here, since Blackburn was on cross-examination, he was not allowed to speak in the narrative fashion. Rather than starting at the counsel table when asking the question to himself, then running over to the witness box to answer the question, the Court permitted Blackburn to stay seated in the witness box to maintain propriety in the courtroom.Because Blackburn appeared as both an attorney and witness, the Court did require that Blackburn return to the counsel table during witness testimony when procedural questions emerged. This was to highlight the distinction between his status as a witness and his status as an attorney. As an attorney, his statements were not to be construed by the jury as testimony.

Accordingly, before the jury was sworn in, the Court gave the following complete set of instructions to Plaintiffs, reproduced as follows from the record:

THE COURT: Plaintiffs, you're expected to conform to the following. You will have to bifurcate yourselves into attorneys and witnesses. When you sit at the counsel table you are attorneys. If you are situated in the witness box, the witness stand giving testimony, you're a witness.

Let's discuss your role as attorneys. In your questioning of witnesses as attorneys you must conform to the rules of evidence. In a trial there's an opening statement and a closing statement. We will deal with your opening statement because that comes first. During your opening statement to the jury as attorneys you may not testify. The purpose of opening statements is to tell the Jury about your contentions so they will have a better understanding of the evidence as it is introduced. During your opening statements you are to refer to yourselves in the third person. In other words, do not tell the jurors I saw this, I felt this, I fell, I was hit, or similar statements. You must say, for example, the evidence will show that Plaintiff Best, et cetera, et cetera, or the evidence will show that Defendant Moynahan, et cetera, et cetera. In your opening statements do not tell the jury you are more credible or believable than the Defendants. This phase of the trial is about liability — not damages, not injuries. This phase of the trial is solely about how the alleged accident occurred and who, if anyone, was at fault. Therefore, there will be no mention of any injuries or body parts in your opening statement. It is solely for the purpose of telling the jury what you intend to prove through evidence. Evidence is . . . either . . . testimonial or documentary evidence. Again, you must refer to yourselves if you are going to refer to yourselves you must call yourselves Ms. Best or Mr. Blackburn, even when you are talking about yourself in your opening statement.

If you are acting as an attorney and ask a question of a witness that is objected to by the Defendants' attorney, do not argue the matter in front of the jury. Wait for my ruling. If I sustain an objection that means the witness will not be answering your question. If I overrule an objection to a question of yours when you act as an attorney, the witness will be answering the question. There are times when attorneys ask the same question repeatedly. Under the law do not repeat the same questions. That's called asked and answered. You are charged with understanding all legal rules governing questioning of witnesses, which include on direct examination do not ask leading questions. If you cross-examine someone who is hostile to your side, you may ask leading questions which are usually answered yes or no. Do not address the jury at any time as a lawyer other than opening and closing statements. Do not argue with opposing counsel, especially if he interposes an objection.

The other half of you will be if you testify then you will be a witness. Witnesses testify from the witness stand. If it should happen that you are a witness testifying from the witness stand, you may testify in a narrative format as to who, what, when, where and how the alleged accident occurred because this is the liability phase of the trial. You are not to discuss where you were injured or damages or injuries. Again, this phase of the trial is about who, if anyone, was negligent. Who is at fault, if anyone. And if anyone was negligent, whether the negligence was the proximate cause. So if you have testimony relevant to that, you may give it as witnesses. If you go into injuries then you will be violating my instructions to you now. When you're witnesses on the witness stand do not argue. Just provide the who, what, when, where, how of what occurred which led you to claim that Defendant Moynahan was negligent and any negligence on his part was a substantial factor in bringing about what you claim occurred. When you testify as a witness from the witness stand in narrative format, if the Defendants' attorney objects to anything you say, you are to immediately stop. Wait for my ruling. Listen to my ruling very carefully and obey it. (Tr July 16, 2026, at 8, line 15, through 11, line 13 [transcript slightly corrected].)

To speed up the trial proceedings and so that Plaintiffs were apprised as to the basis for an objection to questions of theirs, defense counsel was instructed as follows:

Counsel for Defendants, if you have an objection please do not elaborate it on it in extended format, just very briefly state the basis for it (id. at 11, lines 13-16).

(C) Opening Charges to Jury Regarding Pro Se Plaintiffs

In light of the unusual predicament of parties representing themselves pro se at a jury trial, the Court gave thought to whether special instructions should be given to the jury in addition to the standard ones. It determined they should.

Opening charges to a jury are important because these instructions are guidelines given by a judge that the jury must comply with throughout the entirety of the trial. While a court can follow the standardized Pattern Jury Instructions ("PJI"), the court can use its discretion to make modifications (see Spadaccini v Dolan, 63 AD2d 110, 117 [1st Dept 1978]). Accordingly, specific jury instructions vary depending upon the substantive issues presented. However, there are five general principles that should be observed: (1) the trial judge has the duty to charge the jury in a comprehensible fashion; (2) the court and counsel may find specific jury instructions in the New York PJI, "which, although they do not carry the force of law, and are not binding upon the courts, have been endorsed by the Court of Appeals"⁴ ; (3) the charges should not recite the abstract rules of law as this is of little use to the jury; (4) an attorney has a right to request that certain charges be granted; and finally (5) "the court should exercise sound discretion and great care when there is occasion to give the jury supplemental instructions after they have commenced deliberations." (8 New York Civil Practice: CPLR P 4110-b.02 [2026].)

As such, PJI charges are only intended to serve as a guide for counsel and trial judges (see generally People v Stevens, 203 AD3d 958 [2d Dept 2022]; Kunnemeyer v Long Is. R.R., 202 AD3d 74 [2d Dept 2021]). The opening charges by the Court during trial on July 16, 2026, were modified to apprise the jury about the situation — it was critical that they understood that Best and Blackburn were self-represented. The Court reiterated to the jury during opening instructions that they should not draw conclusions merely based on the fact the Plaintiffs were not represented by an attorney.

Accordingly, in charging the jury with pre-trial instructions, the Court added the following after PJI 1:2B (split trial — liability) was read:

In this trial, the Defendants Michael P. Moynahan and Joe Jax Trucking, Inc., are represented by an attorney. In this trial the Plaintiff Jessica Best is representing herself. In this trial Plaintiff Kevin Blackburn is representing himself. Another way to describe representing herself or representing himself, is that each of the Plaintiffs is proceeding pro se. You are to draw no conclusion merely from the fact that each of the Plaintiffs is representing themself pro se. Practically speaking, what will transpire is that in effect each Plaintiff will be his or her own attorney. It may be that each of the Plaintiffs will also be testifying as a witness. You must differentiate the actions here in Court of the Plaintiffs when they act as attorneys from when they testify as witnesses. I will explain to you shortly how that matters.

I will be charging you with instructions with respect to attorneys. When I mention the word "attorney" or "attorneys," you are to consider the actions of the Plaintiffs taken when they sit or stand at the counsel table to fit within the word "attorney" or "attorneys." When Plaintiffs act as attorneys, you are not to take what they say as testimony.

I will be charging you with instructions with respect to witnesses. When I mention the word "witness," "witnesses," or "testimony," you are to consider the actions of the Plaintiffs, if and when they testify on the witness stand, as fitting within the word "witness," "witnesses," or "testimony." (Id. at 18, line 22, through 19, line 23 [transcript slightly corrected].)

Additionally, following the reading of PJI 1:3 (openings and evidence), the Court added:

Because the Plaintiffs are representing themselves pro se, it would be awkward for them to flip back and forth between the Counsel table and the witness stand asking questions as an attorney and then answering them as a witness. Therefore, I will permit them to testify in narrative format as witnesses from the witness stand. (Id. at 20, line 24, through 21, line 5.)

Further, following the reading of PJI 1:8 (weighing testimony), the following was added:

In evaluating the testimony, you are not to give any greater weight or lesser weight to the testimony of the Plaintiffs if they testify, merely because they are acting as their own attorneys (id. at 25, lines 4-7 [transcript slightly corrected]).

As such, the Court apprised the jury of necessary additional information regarding pro se litigants, as well as described the distinction the jury should make when the pro se parties are acting as counsel and when they are acting as a witness. Because the Court has discretion regarding jury charges, and PJI charges merely are intended to serve as a guide, the Court's opening instructions to the jury regarding pro se parties were proper and in conformity with the law.

(D) Opening Statements to Jury

Opening statements  ⁵ allow parties to apprise the jury as to the issues in the case, including any applicable cross-claims, counterclaims, or defenses. CPLR 4016 does not directly address the scope of permissibility of opening statements. Rather, the permissible scope is defined by what cannot be included within these statements (see CPLR 4016). At a minimum, opening statements are limited by the Code of Professional Conduct  ⁶ or what is prejudicial to the other party. Hence, parties may reveal the substance of the pleadings in the openings, including any statements, admissions, and allegations, because the pleadings are before the court, not as evidence, but to point out the object to which evidence is to be directed. (See Braun v Ahmed, 127 AD2d 418, 422 [2d Dept 1987]; Rice v Ninacs, 34 AD2d 388, 392 [4th Dept 1970]; Carrasquillo v City of New York, 22 Misc 3d 171, 173-174 [Sup Ct, Kings County 2008).

"The right to open and close is most sensitive, and most coveted, in a trial by jury. It is customary and proper for counsel to tell a jury what the issues are and what is expected to be proven (DeVito v Katch, 157 AD2d 413, 556 N.Y.S.2d 649 [2d Dep't. 1990] [opinion by Rosenblatt, J.]). They provide the all-important opportunity for counsel to address the jurors directly. The denial of a party's right to opening and closing statements would be found to be reversible error where the trial is by jury (Id., citing Conselyea v Swift, 58 Sickels 604, 103 NY 604, 9 N.E. 489 [1886])." (Hon. Marc C. Dillon, Prac Commentaries, McKinney's Cons Laws of NY, CPLR C4016:1.)

As such, parties are allowed to make these statements to explain to the jurors the issues that will be presented and inform them of the potential witnesses they might hear from.

After the pre-trial jury charges were completed, the Court asked both Best and Blackburn if they wished to make an opening statement. Best declined. Blackburn wished to proceed. Defense counsel objected and a sidebar ensued. Defense objected, stating that Blackburn was not an attorney and could not make an opening statement on behalf of Best. Best stated that she had no recollection of the accident and therefore, she could not speak about it. Blackburn offered opposition to Defendants' objection, maintaining that he was a party with his own, derivative claim and should be allowed to make an opening statement. The Court overruled the objection from the defense, determining that Blackburn's derivative claim depended on the main claim of negligence and, therefore, he was entitled to make an opening statement regarding the evidence which would tend to prove negligence proximately caused by Moynahan, the driver, even if such an opening statement inured to Best's benefit.

Although pro se litigants must follow the rules of evidence, as well as court procedures, the Court can use its discretion regarding self-representation. Nevertheless, self-represented litigants are not relieved of following the rules of evidence, nor is the burden of proof during trial altered for pro se parties (see Gully v Varghese, 89 Misc 3d 1208[A], 2026 NY Slip Op 50864[U], *5 n 4 [Sup Ct, Albany County 2026]). Here, as long as Blackburn adhered to evidentiary rules when conducting his opening statement, it was within his rights to make an opening statement on his own behalf. Certainly, the case law cited herein supported the Court's determination.

The Court afforded some latitude in regard to Blackburn's opening statement as he made it, but overall the Court deemed it to be proper and in conformity with the law.

(E) Further Trial Matters

After Blackburn and Defendants concluded their opening statements, Plaintiff Best was asked by the Court to call her first witness. The Court called on her before Blackburn because she was the first-named Plaintiff. She called Blackburn to testify. Since Blackburn was called by another party (Best) as a witness, the questioning had to be in a question-and-answer format. During this line of questioning, defense counsel objected to nearly every question asked, as the questions were leading, not specific, or otherwise in improper form. After many objections were sustained, Best stated that she did not know how to word the questions, and the Court responded by stating that it understood. The Court's predicament was that Best was not an adept questioner when acting as the attorney for herself. In assessing the situation, the Court was faced with a conundrum: The questioning was dragging on in front of the jury due to improperly formulated questions and concomitant objections being repeatedly sustained, but, on the other hand, if the Court were to advise Best, it would be unfair to Defendants. Some leeway was allowed and the Court exercised its prerogative to reformulate questions into proper form, thus avoiding the provision of advice.⁷

The testimony of Blackburn was interrupted to enable Defendants to call Moynahan, who had a family emergency, out of turn. After Moynahan testified, Blackburn resumed the witness stand and further questioning of Blackburn took place.

Best had no witnesses other than Blackburn. She declined to call herself as a witness, thus ending up never testifying. Since Blackburn cross-examined himself as a witness and was permitted to ask questions beyond the scope of Defendants' cross-examination of him, he did not call himself as a separate witness for himself. All parties rested.

Defendants moved for a directed verdict pursuant to CPLR 4401. The motion was granted as no reasonable jury could conclude that Moynahan was negligent in operating his vehicle and proximately causing the accident to occur. Basically, the testimony adduced was that Best was bicycling behind Blackburn in the bike lane. At some point, Moynahan, seated in his truck, saw her go up in the air and land on the ground. While Blackburn testified that Moynahan's front tire was in the bike lane as he bicycled past him, there was nothing to show that Moynahan struck Best, or even that there contact between Best and Moynahan's truck. Nothing showed how Best was caused to be lifted into the air. Blackburn could not see what occurred behind him. The complaint was dismissed in its entirety and the trial concluded. The written opinion concerning Defendants' motion for a directed verdict is contained in Best v Moynahan (89 Misc 3d 1239[A], 2026 NY Slip Op 51207[U] [Sup Ct, Kings County 2026]).

V. Conclusion

Presented for the first time in its judicial career with the prospect of Plaintiffs representing themselves pro se during a trial, this Court attempted to conform to regular trial practice and procedure to the extent possible, yet at the same time afford all parties the opportunity to present their cases to the jury as best they could without providing improper assistance. In retrospect, the Court views the determinations it made prior to and during the trial as having met those goals.

HON. AARON D. MASLOW

Justice of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

FOOTNOTES

1.   The transcript contains the following: THE COURT: Do you understand that your better interest would be served if you were represented by an attorney? JESSICA BEST: I understand that. THE COURT: And, yet, you have elected to represent yourself; is that correct? JESSICA BEST: Yes. (Tr July 16, 2026, at 2, lines 15-21.) Also: THE COURT: Do you understand that it is [in] your better interest, Mr. Blackburn, if you were represented by an attorney? KEVIN BLACKBURN: Yes. THE COURT: And, yet, you have elected to represent yourself; is that accurate? KEVIN BLACKBURN: That is correct. (Tr July 16, 2026, at 3, lines 3-9.)

2.   Although at the pre-trial conference it was her declared intent to testify, Plaintiff Jessica Best declined to call herself as a witness during her presentation of evidence. Best did call Kevin Blackburn to testify as a witness. During the cross-examination of himself, Blackburn, as his own attorney, proceeded to ask himself questions in third-person format, as exemplified in the following from the transcript: THE COURT: No, do you have any questions as attorney Blackburn, do you have any questions for witness Blackburn? KEVIN BLACKBURN: I'm wearing two hats now? THE COURT: I'm letting you answer that without having to go back to the Counsel table. KEVIN BLACKBURN: Yes. THE COURT: Does attorney Blackburn KEVIN BLACKBURN: Yes, he does. I'm now attorney Blackburn questioning Plaintiff Blackburn — attorney Blackburn. . . . KEVIN BLACKBURN: Mr. Blackburn, did you become aware that something had transpired behind you while you were on your bike ride? MR. LIEBOWITZ: Objection. Asked and answered. THE COURT: Overruled. KEVIN BLACKBURN: Yes. . . . KEVIN BLACKBURN: Mr. Blackburn, did you stop your bike after passing truck number 2? MR. LIEBOWITZ: Objection. Outside the scope. Nothing I touched on. THE COURT: I will permit it. Overruled. KEVIN BLACKBURN: Yes, I did. Why did you stop your bike. I stopped my bike because something — something alerted me that something had occurred behind me. And what was that something? I don't know. I don't know if it is instinct or sound or anything else but there was something that told me to stop which I did. (Tr July 16, 2026, at 145, line 10, through 147, line 25.) After asking a question, Blackburn turned himself back into a witness. To maintain decorum within the courtroom, Blackburn was not required to flitter back and forth between the counsel table to ask himself questions, and the witness box to answer them. Seated in the witness box, he was permitted ask questions of himself. The Court was of the view that while one testifying as a witness being called by himself or herself could do so in narrative fashion, cross-examination required questions and answers. However, while Blackburn was in a witness capacity, he was required to descend from the witness box to turn himself into an attorney at the counsel table in order to ask the Court a procedural question. Stated otherwise, except for asking himself questions on cross-examination, "Blackburn the attorney" had to act as one while situated at the counsel table. Again, the purpose of this procedure was to impress upon the jury that his statements as an attorney and as a witness were to be considered in the respective contexts. Best's actions at trial were solely in the context of being an attorney.

3.   Rule 3.7 (a) of the Rules of Professional Conduct (22 NYCRR 1200.0) provides that, in general, "[a] lawyer shall not act as advocate before a tribunal in a matter in which the lawyer is likely to be a witness on a significant issue of fact." Plaintiffs were not attorneys but the Court desired to reduce the possibility that jurors might view Plaintiffs as having more credibility because they were also acting as attorneys, yet at the same time preserve Plaintiffs' right to represent themselves.

4.   The First Department has noted that Pattern Jury Instructions should be used with particular caution. "[T]he New York Pattern Jury Instructions are only intended as a guide to the Trial Justice. There may be situations when, as here, portions of what is recommended in Pattern Jury Instructions need not or should not be charged. As the instructions themselves advise, it is the Trial Justice's primary responsibility to instruct the jury on the applicable law in the case. It is also the responsibility of attorneys in representing their clients at the trial, to submit requests to charge which are warranted by the actual evidence and the relevant law . . ." (Spadaccini v Dolan, 63 AD2d at 117-118).

5.   This is in reference to closing statements as well. After Plaintiffs' close of evidence, Defense moved for a directed verdict pursuant to CPLR 4401. The Court granted this motion on the basis that Plaintiffs failed to establish that Moynahan negligently operated his vehicle, proximately causing the accident to occur.

6.    See 22 NYCRR § 1200.0.

7.   It should be noted that during the July 15 pre-trial conference and out of the presence of the jury during the July 16 trial, Plaintiffs and defense counsel were offered the opportunity to raise any matters with the Court: THE COURT: . . . Anything else? MR. LIEBOWITZ: No, sir. KEVIN BLACKBURN: I'm good, your Honor. Thank you. (Tr July 15, 2026 at 30, lines 22-25.) THE COURT: Anything else? MR. LIEBOWITZ: No, sir. (Id. at 32, lines 3-4.) THE COURT: . . . Anything else that anyone wishes to place on the record? MR. LIEBOWITZ: No, Sir. KEVIN BLACKBURN: No, your Honor. I'm fine. JESSICA BEST: Your Honor, no. Thank you. THE COURT: Okay. Please come back at 2:15. (Tr July 16, 2026 at 59, lines 11-16.) Similarly, the Court asked Best with respect to Moynahan, "Ms. Best, do you have any questions on cross-examination?" (id. at 74, lines 6-7). Following Blackburn's being cross-examined by Defendant's attorney, Best was asked by the Court, "Mrs. Best, do you have any questions for Mr. Blackburn on redirect?" and she answered, "Yes, your Honor," and then, "No, your Honor, I don't" (id. at 144, lines 21-25). After Blackburn cross-examined himself: THE COURT: Any further questions for this witness? MR. LIEBOWITZ: No, your Honor. THE COURT: From Mrs. Best? JESSICA BEST: No, your Honor. Sorry. THE COURT: Okay. Sir, you're excused as a witness. You may return to the Counsel table. (Id. at 151, lines 8-13.) There being no further questions for witness Blackburn, the transcript records the following: THE COURT: . . . Mrs. Best, do you have another witness to call? Mr. Blackburn has completed his testimony as your witness, do you have another witness to call? JESSICA BEST: No, your Honor. THE COURT: Does that mean you rest your case? JESSICA BEST: Yes, Your Honor. (Id. at 151, line 23, through 152, line 6.) When Defendant's attorney made a motion for a directed verdict, the Court addressed Plaintiffs: THE COURT: Ms. Best, do you wish to give argument in opposition to the motion for a directed verdict, which is made pursuant to CPLR 4401, do you wish to give argument, legal argument in opposition? JESSICA BEST: No, your Honor. THE COURT: Mr. Blackburn, do you wish to present argument in opposition to the motion? KEVIN BLACKBURN: I do. THE COURT: Go ahead. (Id. at 156, lines 8-16.) In thus manner, the Court facilitated the pro se Plaintiffs' presentation of their case, yet did not impermissibly provide them with advice.

Aaron D. Maslow, J.