SG v. EG (2026)

The following papers have been read on these motions and are consolidated by this Court for a single determination, sua sponte, as an exercise of discretion and in order to make "such other orders concerning proceedings therein, as may tend to avoid unnecessary costs or delay." See CPLR § 602(a). Their determination is made upon consideration and careful review of the following papers:

Plaintiff's Order to Show Cause dated May 7, 2026 x

Defendant's Notice of Cross-Motion dated June 24, 2026 x

Plaintiff's Opposition & Reply dated June 30, 2026 x

Defendant's Reply dated July 21, 2026 x

Plaintiff's Order to Show Cause dated July 28, 2026 x

Defendant's Opposition dated September 8, 2026 x

Plaintiff's Reply dated September 11, 2026 x

INTRODUCTION

It is the undersigned's opinion that the imposition of monetary sanctions should be reserved for the most egregious conduct in litigation. Far too often, sanctions motions are interposed for conduct that is not sanctionable. This case - and these consolidated motions - involve an important, but not timeworn, concept in matrimonial litigation for which sanctions should be considered: candor with a Tribunal.

The facts are simple and straight forward: the Defendant interposed an application seeking a downward modification of his pendente lite support obligations based upon, in sum and substance, a change in financial circumstances. That alleged "change" was that the Defendant lost his job and was living on a severance package. That application was filed on June 24, 2026. The Plaintiff thereafter discovered that the Defendant had actually obtained some type of employment in April of 2026, approximately two months prior to filing his application for a downward modification of his pendente lite support obligations. The Plaintiff thereafter interposed her application seeking the imposition of monetary sanctions upon the Defendant based upon, in sum and substance, his misrepresentation(s) as to his employment status. In opposition, the Defendant failed to submit a sworn Affidavit or an Affirmation sworn to under the penalties of perjury, instead having just his counsel submit an Affirmation in opposition. The Defendant never denied a single one of the Plaintiff's allegations regarding his employment status. The Defendant's overt and calculated misrepresentations and lack of candor to the Court concerning his income and employment status, when his employment status was the gravamen of his application seeking to downwardly modify his support obligations, constrains this Court to impose monetary sanctions upon him. For the reasons that follow in this Decision and Order, including the Defendant's wildly misleading conduct, the Court imposes monetary sanctions upon the Defendant pursuant to 22 NYCRR § 130-1.1(a), and sanctions the Defendant in the sum of $2,500.00 payable to the Clerk of the Court for transmittal to the Commissioner of Taxation and Finance in accordance with 22 NYCRR § 130-1.3.

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

The Plaintiff moves by Order to Show Cause dated May 7, 2026 (Motion Sequence No.: 012) seeking an Order: (a) An Order directing Defendant to pay the sum of $43,092.50 for his pro-rata share of the children's unreimbursed add-on expenses from November 2024 through March 2026, pursuant to the Court's May 19, 2025 Decision & Order; (b) Awarding Plaintiff $5,000 in interim counsel fees payable to Aiello & DiFalco, LLP, for the fees expended in enforcing the Court's Order; (c) Such other and further relief as to this Court may seem just, proper and equitable.

The Defendant cross-moves by Notice of Cross-Motion dated June 24, 2026 (Motion Sequence No.: 013) seeking an Order: (1) Modifying the existing Order of the Court setting the parties' respective pro rata obligation for all Court Ordered expenses, and therefore all expenses moving forward until trial, subject to further reallocation by the Court as a result of a financial change in circumstances; and (2) Ordering sanctions and fees to be paid to the Defendant directly in the amount of $10,000 pursuant to 22 NYCRR 130-1.1; (3) Pursuant to CPLR § 3211(a)(7), dismissing the Plaintiff's Emergency Order to Show Cause dated October 16, 2018 for failure to state a cause of action upon which relief may be granted; (4) For such other and further relief as this Court may deem just and proper.

The Plaintiff moves by Order to Show Cause dated July 28, 2026 (Motion Sequence No.: 014) seeking an Order: (a) An Order pursuant to 22 NYCRR 130-1.1 imposing sanctions against the Defendant and directing Defendant to pay the sum of $10,000, or an amount determined by the Court, to the Lawyer's Fund for Client Protection; (b) An award of counsel fees in the sum of $2,500 pursuant to 22 NYCRR 130-1.1(a) payable to Aiello & DiFalco, LLP; (c) Such other and further relief as to this Court may seem just, proper and equitable.

RELEVANT BACKGROUND

These parties were married on xxxx, 2011 and have three (3) children together, JG, IG and HG. This action for divorce and ancillary relief was commenced by the filing of a Summons with Notice with the Nassau County Clerk's Office on or about February 23, 2023. The Plaintiff appeared by and through counsel, Aiello & DiFalco, LLP. The Defendant initially appeared by and through counsel, Sunshine, Isaacson & Hecht, LLP. The parties appeared before the Court for a Preliminary Conference on August 8, 2023, at which time they executed the Preliminary Conference Stipulation & Order. On August 11, 2023, the Preliminary Conference Stipulation & Order was so ordered by the undersigned Justice. On August 11, 2023, this Court issued an Order Appointing Attorney for the Children whereby it appointed Lisa Daniels, Esq., as attorney for the subject children. On January 24, 2024, this Court issued an Order Appointing Forensic Evaluator whereby it appointed Nicole Berman, Psy.D., to conduct an expedited forensic evaluation. On May 20, 2024, this Court issued a Certification Order. On June 18, 2024, the Defendant executed a Consent to Change Attorney form whereby he substituted the firm of Tarter Krinsky & Drogin, LLP, in place and stead of Sunshine, Isaacson & Hecht, LLP. On August 28, 2024, the Plaintiff filed a Note of Issue & Certificate of Readiness for Trial. On August 28, 2024, the Plaintiff interposed a Verified Complaint. On November 7, 2024, the Defendant executed a Consent to Change Attorney form whereby he substituted himself pro se in place and stead of Tarter, Krinsky & Drogin, LLP. On December 4, 2024, this Court issued an Order Appointing Attorney for the Children whereby it appointed Jill C. Stone, Esq., as attorney for the subject children.¹

On May 19, 2025, this Court issued a Decision and Order (hereinafter referred to as the "May 2025 Order") which, inter alia and in sum and substance, directed the Defendant to pay interim counsel fees in the sum of $75,000.00, allocated certain stated statutory add-on expenses on behalf of the children with the Plaintiff paying 27% thereof and the Defendant paying 73% thereof, referred each party's application(s) for custody and/or parenting time to trial, and referred to trial the Plaintiff's application for an order of protection. On June 3, 2025, the Law Offices of Seidner & Associates, PC appeared on behalf of the Defendant by the filing of a Notice of Appearance. On November 6, 2025, the Defendant executed a Consent to Change Attorney form whereby he substituted himself pro se in place and stead of the Law Offices of Seidner & Associates, PC. On March 10, 2026. On March 10, 2026, the Early Law Group, P.C. appeared on behalf of the Defendant by the filing of a Notice of Appearance.

The trial of this matter is currently scheduled to commence on November 16, 2026.²

THE PARTIES' CONTENTIONS

Motion Sequence Nos.: 012 & 013:

Plaintiff's Contentions:

The Plaintiff alleges that in accordance with the May 2025 Order, the Defendant was directed to pay 73% of the children's existing extracurricular activities, unreimbursed health care costs, therapy costs, child care costs and summer camp expenses. She alleges that since November, 2024, through the present, she has paid $27,041.85 for the children's extracurricular activities, $27,218.08 for child care, summer camp and unreimbuesed health care expenses, and $4,769.91 for the children's therapy expenses. She alleges that these aggregate amounts total $59,030.82, and the Defendant's 73% share is $43,092.50 as of March 31, 2026. She alleges that the Defendant has not contributed any portion of his 73% share of the aforesaid. She alleges that the Defendant does not pay direct child support to her and that the Defendant has depleted the parties' joint account. She alleges that the Defendant works in investment banking and earned $364,944.58 in 2025. She alleges that she sent correspondence on October, 3, 2025 and March 25, 2026, outlining the alleged arrears and requesting reimbursement. She alleges that she has incurred $5,000 in counsel fees in the preparation of the instant application.

Defendant's Contentions:

The Defendant argues that the Plaintiff's application is frivolous. He argues that if the Plaintiff's application had any basis in fact or law, she certainly would have filed a contempt application against him. The Defendant alleges that the Plaintiff fails to prove outstanding costs pertaining to "then existing" extracurricular activities and she is enrolling the children in new activities without prior discussion. He alleges that there are thousands of dollars in therapy costs alleged for a therapist retained during the pendency of this action without consultation from him. He alleges that his income has been diminished through no fault of his own. He characterizes the expenses that the Plaintiff seeks reimbursement of as "ridiculous", "frivolous", and that they are being sought in "bad faith". He argues that counsel for the parties discussed addressing these arrears at trial. He alleges that the Plaintiff is "intentionally and strategically wasting my resources". He alleges that the Plaintiff's credibility is "irreparable [sic] tarnished". He argues that the Plaintiff should be sanctioned in the sum of $10,000 for filing this application.

Plaintiff's Opposition & Reply:

The Plaintiff alleges that she purposefully chose not to seek a finding of contempt. She argues that the Defendant, in opposition, does not specify his objections to her list of add-on expenses which is supported by receipts and invoices. She, in any event, denies enrolling the children in any new activities without discussion as the Defendant refuses to engage in meaningful discussion. She alleges that the children are still enrolled in their current activities, all three children have participated in soccer from Kindergarten through second grade, and IG has participated in dance for the past five years. She alleges that the only new activity that the children are enrolled in are gymnastics, but the children begged to participate in this activity and the children have previously done gymnastics camp over school breaks. She alleges that the Defendant fails to provide any evidence, such as proof of income, to support his request for a downward modification of his support obligation(s).

Defendant's Reply:

The Defendant, through only an affirmation of counsel, alleges that it was "widely understood by all parties and counsel that the issues of add-on expenses raised in the Plaintiff's application were expressly reserved for trial..."³ The Defendant's counsel alleges that the Defendant was laid off from his job in March of this year.⁴

Motion Sequence No. 014:

Plaintiff's Contentions:

The Plaintiff alleges that the Defendant misrepresented critical facts to the Court in his most recent application (see Motion Sequence No.: 013, supra), which application contains overt misrepresentations as to his employment status. She alleges that the Defendant sought, in sum, a downward modification based upon a "financial change in circumstances" and sought an award of sanctions against her. She alleges that Paragraph "9" of his moving Affidavit in support of Motion Sequence No.: 013 (see supra) alleges that he lost his job and was living on a severance packages that provides "significantly less income than my prior employer paid". She alleges that she learned that the Defendant, in or about April of 2026, started a new job as a Senior Analyst with XXXX, and the Defendant was actually employed at the time that he signed his supporting Affidavit in support of his cross-motion seeking a downward modification of support.

Defendant's Opposition:⁵

The Defendant alleges, through counsel only, that the Plaintiff's application revolves around "fictitious issues". His counsel characterizes the Plaintiff's application as "wildly frivolous" and "bordering on ridiculous". Counsel alleges that the Defendant "understands" that all of this has been and/or will be "referred to trial". Counsel argues that the Plaintiff filed this application as a way of "licking their wounds" after the Plaintiff's last motion, which counsel again argues is frivolous. The Defendant's counsel argues that the articles appended to the Plaintiff's moving papers are "ridiculous" and states that this is "[j]ust more poo to throw against the wall". Counsel alleges that "had plaintiff or her attorney inquired before filing yet another motion, Defendant would have happily furnished documentation that any work that Defendant has taken since being laid off are closed period contract work. Counsel then sets forth allegations concerning the Plaintiff's income. Counsel finally questions "which litigant has been more transparent to the Court?"

Plaintiff's Reply:

The Plaintiff alleges that the Defendant submits no proof whatsoever of his employment status or income, which was the very subject of her motion. She argues that the Defendant's responsive papers are emblematic of this litigation, and that when confronted about a misrepresentation, the Defendant fails to substantively respond, but answers with an attack on her.

DISCUSSION + ANALYSIS

SANCTIONS

Whether or not to impose sanctions pursuant to 22 NYCRR § 130-1.1 is a matter within the sound discretion of the court. Matter of Flanigan v. Smyth, 148 AD3d 1249 (3d Dept. 2017). 22 NYCRR § 130-1.1 provides:

(a) The court, in its discretion, may award to any party or attorney in any civil action or proceeding before the court, except where prohibited by law, costs in the form of reimbursement for actual expenses reasonably incurred and reasonable attorney's fees, resulting from frivolous conduct as defined in this Part. In addition to or in lieu of awarding costs, the court, in its discretion may impose financial sanctions upon any party or attorney in a civil action or proceeding who engages in frivolous conduct as defined in this Part, which shall be payable as provided in section 130-1.3 of this Part. This Part shall not apply to town or village courts, to proceedings in a small claims part of any court, or to proceedings in the Family Court commenced under article 3, 7 or 8 of the Family Court Act.

* * *

(c) For purposes of this Part, conduct is frivolous if:

(1) it is completely without merit in law and cannot be supported by a reasonable argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law;

(2) it is undertaken primarily to delay or prolong the resolution of the litigation, or to harass or maliciously injure another; or

(3) it asserts material factual statements that are false.

Sanctions are reserved for situations involving extreme and egregious conduct. Anonymous MJJ v. New York, 2024 NY Misc. LEXIS 65944 (Supreme Court New York County 2024).

The conduct of the Defendant, and what he and his counsel have certified to this Court, is set forth herein in detail. On June 24, 2026, the Defendant interposed a Notice of Cross-Motion seeking, inter alia:

"1. Modifying the existing Order of the Court setting the parties' respective pro rata obligation for all Court Ordered expenses, and therefore all expenses moving forward until trial, subject to further reallocation by the Court as a result of a financial change in circumstances..."

The Defendant's principal moving Affidavit in support of that application, dated June 24, 2026, provides:

9. Plaintiff is well aware that I lost my job (excessed) and am currently living on a severance package that provides significantly less income than my prior employer paid...

* * *

16. As detailed above, the only thing that has changed since the May 19, 2025 Decision and Order...is my income..."

The moving Affirmation of the Defendant's counsel, dated June 24, 2026, provides:

"1. In the instant matter...[i]t is also undisputed that the Defendant, through no fault of his own, was excessed from his previous employment and has been living on a severance stipend (expiring October 1, 2026), significantly reducing his actual income. This was made clear to the Court and Counsel for the Plaintiff and was documented in detail in Defendant's updated Statement of Net Worth with supporting papers...

* * *

6. ...[d]efendant has made many good-faith attempts to find a job that would utilize his skillset...yet is still interviewing and doing what he must while defending himself...

The reply Affirmation of the Defendant's counsel, dated July 21, 2026, provides:

"3. ...given that the Defendant was laid off from his job in March of this year and is financially supporting both households..."

The Court has reviewed the Defendant's Statement of Net Worth as of April 6, 2026 reflects, under the "Family Data" section, that the Defendant is an "Equity Research Analyst" and that he is "Presently Unemployed". Under the "Gross Income Information", same reflects the following:

$364,944.58

or

$341,444.58

including

$23.5K for 401K

Income change:

2025 bonus

(paid in Feb

2026) was

only $85K

vs. $140K in

2024 (paid

in Feb 2025)

Recently lost

job:

Projected

2026 income

is — $288K

including

YTD salary,

bonus, and

severance

Appended to the Plaintiff's moving papers in support of her application seeking monetary sanctions, a copy of the Defendant's LinkedIn profile containing his picture reflects that as of April, 2026 through "present" and for "4 mos" [sic], the Defendant is employed as a "Senior Analyst - Restaurants" with SRP (hereinafter referred to as "SRP"). Critically, however, in opposition, the Defendant himself fails to submit a sworn Affidavit, or Affirmation sworn to under the penalties of perjury, refuting the Plaintiff's assertion that he is, in fact, employed by SRP. Facts appearing in the movant's papers which the opposing party does not controvert, may be deemed to be admitted. Kuehne & Nagel, Inc. v. Baiden, 36 NY2d 539 (1975). The only response provided was from the Defendant's counsel wherein he wrote:

"5. Not proving your demands and allegations does not equal to false or frivolous information having been ordered to This Court. Case in point are the ridiculous articles attached to Plaintiff's application, without context or understanding by the Plaintiff. Just more poo [sic] to throw against the wall. Had plaintiff or her attorney inquired before filing yet another motion, Defendant would have happily furnished documentation that any work that Defendant has taken since being laid off are closed period contract work (emphasis added)".⁶

There are many problems with that Paragraph, aside from its tone (addressed in fn. 6, infra). First, the Defendant himself has an ongoing obligation to disclose his income and employment information in this action inasmuch as, at a minimum, child support remains in issue and unresolved. In other words, it is not incumbent upon the Plaintiff to ask; rather, it is incumbent upon the Defendant to provide that information. Second, even if it was not a continuing obligation, the Defendant himself interposed an application for a downward modification of his pro rata shares of the children's statutory add-on expenses. The Court has carefully - word for word, paragraph by paragraph - scrutinized the Defendant's principal moving Affidavit in support of his application seeking a downward modification. There is not even a mention of any sort of "contract" employment with SRP. Furthermore, there are two attachments appended to the Defendant's updated Statement of Net Worth: a 2025 W-2 Statement from KCM Inc. and a 2025 year-end paystub from KCM Inc. There is no information in the Defendant's updated Statement of Net Worth relative to his contract employment with SRP. Notably, the Defendant does not deny or dispute that he has (or had) employment with SRP. The Court finds that information is critical in determining the Defendant's application for a downward modification, but the Court finds that the Defendant actively concealed it from the Plaintiff, and, equally as important, the Court. Assuming, arguendo, that the Defendant's employment with SRP is "contract", the Defendant failed to provide this Court with a copy of the employment contract setting forth the financial terms of his employment, which the Court would have certainly had to consider within the context of his downward modification application. The Court also notes - critically - that the Defendant does not even set forth the actual terms of his contract employment with SRP, whether in his counsel's Affirmation or, better yet, an affidavit from him, swearing to that information under the penalties of perjury.

Here, the Court finds that the Defendant's active concealment of his employment with SRP, even if "contract" only, and even if that contract period had ended, was, and is, completely without merit. See 22 NYCRR § 130-1.1(c)(1). To this end, while he argues that "...[h]ad plaintiff or her attorney inquired...Defendant would have happily furnished documentation that any work that Defendant has taken since being laid off are closed period contact work...", the Defendant had an absolute and affirmative obligation to provide that information to the Court in the face of his downward modification application, rather than suggesting to the Court - as his papers do - that he has been completely laid-off without work and living off of a severance package. The Court additionally finds that the Defendant's active concealment of his employment, even if contract, with SRP was designed to harass and/or maliciously injure the Plaintiff. See NYCRR § 130-1.1(c)(2). To this end, to the extent that the Court was inclined to modify the Defendant's pro rata obligation towards the children's add-on expenses, it would have certainly decreased the Defendant's obligations towards same, but it would have increased the Plaintiff's obligations towards same. In other words, to increase the Plaintiff's financial obligations and decrease the Defendant's financial obligations is, by its very nature, financial harm to the Plaintiff. Finally, the Court finds that the Defendant's active concealment of employment with SRP was a misleading material factual concealment of a critical fact. The Defendant's position that he was "laid off" suggested to coupled with his misrepresentation (emphasis added) coupled with his counsel's statement that " ...[d]efendant has made many good-faith attempts to find a job that would utilize his skillset..." suggested to the Court that he was unemployed in totality since being laid-off from KCM Inc. That is, quite simply, a grossly misleading material factual statement. See NYCRR § 130-1.1(c)(3). Accordingly, and for all of the reasons, the Court issues this Decision and Order which sets forth in detail (see supra) the conduct of the Defendant upon which the award herein (see infra) is based and the reasons why the Court found the Defendant's conduct to be frivolous (see infra). See 22 NYCRR § 130-1.2. To this end, it is hereby:

ORDERED, that Branch (a) of the Plaintiff's Order to Show Cause dated July 28, 2026 be and the same is hereby GRANTED TO THE EXTENT set forth in this Decision and Order; and it is further

ORDERED, that, pursuant to 22 NYCRR § 130-1.1(a), the Court imposes monetary sanctions upon the Defendant, EG, in the sum of $2,500.00 within fourteen (14) days of the date of this Decision and Order; and it is further

ORDERED, that the aforesaid sanction of $2,500.00 (see supra), shall, pursuant to 22 NYCRR § 130-1.3, be payable by the Defendant, EG, by depositing same with the Clerk of the Court for transmittal to the Commissioner of Taxation and Finance; and it is further

ORDERED, that the Defendant shall file proof of payment with this Court by the filing of same onto NYSCEF within twenty-four (24) hours of such payment.

In addition, the Plaintiff seeks reimbursement of counsel fees for having to file her application seeking sanctions. 22 NYCRR § 130-1.1(a) provides, in part, that, "...[t]he court, in its discretion, may award to any party or attorney in any civil action or proceeding before the court...costs in the form of reimbursement for actual expenses reasonably incurred and reasonable attorney's fees, resulting from frivolous conduct as defined in this Part. In addition to or in lieu of awarding costs, the court, in its discretion may impose financial sanctions upon any party or attorney in a civil action or proceeding who engages in frivolous conduct..." Therefore, the Court has the authority to award the Plaintiff costs in the form of reimbursement of her reasonable attorney's fees for having to file her sanctions application in addition to imposing sanctions upon the Defendant for his frivolous conduct. Here, the Plaintiff was compelled to file her sanctions application because the Defendant engaged in frivolous conduct by misleading this Court relative to his employment status and failing to disclose necessary information, i.e., his employment information, in the face of his own downward modification application. The Court has reviewed the billing statements of the Plaintiff's counsel, and finds that, in the drafting of the Plaintiff's application for sanctions, she incurred two billable hours of attorney time at a rate of $500.00 per hour, incurred on July 24, 2026. The total amount billed was $1,000.00, which the Court awards her. Therefore, it is hereby:

ORDERED, that Branch (b) of the Plaintiff's Order to Show Cause dated July 28, 2026 be and the same is hereby GRANTED TO THE EXTENT that, pursuant to 22 NYCRR § 130-1.1(a), the Defendant shall pay directly to the Plaintiff's counsel, AIELLO & DiFALCO, LLP, the sum of $1,000.00, as and for costs in the form of reasonable attorney's fees, within fourteen (14) days of the date of this Decision and Order.

Finally, for the reasons that follow in the section of this Decision and Order dealing with the Plaintiff's application for a money judgment for child support add-on expense arrears (see infea), the Court finds that the Defendant's application seeking the imposition of monetary sanctions lacks merit inasmuch as the Court is granting, in its entirety, the Plaintiff's application for a money judgment. Therefore, it is hereby:

ORDERED, that Branch (2) of the Defendant's Notice of Cross-Motion dated June 24, 2026 be and the same is hereby DENIED.

MODIFICATION OF PENDENTE LITE ORDER

Modifications of pendente lite awards should rarely be made by an appellate court and then only under exigent circumstances, such as where a party is unable to meet his or her financial obligations, or justice otherwise requires. Capozzoli v. Capozzoli, 187 AD3d 834 (2d Dept. 2020). Any perceived inequities in pendente lite maintenance and child support can best be remedied by a speedy trial, at which the parties' financial circumstances can be fully explored. Capozzoli, 187 AD3d 834 (2d Dept. 2020). As a threshold matter, the Defendant's application would have, in the first instance, been denied without prejudice to renewal as he failed to append a copy of his 2025 income tax return to his moving papers. With that stated, however, the Court denies the application on the merits. Initially, while the Defendant claims that the reduction of his income due to the loss of employment constitutes a change of circumstances, he has not demonstrated, to the satisfaction of the Court, that he cannot meet his financial obligations. Additionally, he claims, unsupported by documentary evidence, that he has made many good faith efforts to find new employment, yet fails to submit one shred of documentation that he sought re-employment commensurate with his earning capacity. See generally Matter of Smith v. McCarthy, 143 AD3d 726 (2d Dept. 2016). The Defendant also fails to submit documentary evidence that he lost his employment and was laid-off through no fault of his own. Loss of employment may constitute a substantial change in circumstances where the termination occurred through no fault of the party seeking modification. Matter of Berg v. Berg, 166 AD3d 766 (2d Dept. 2018). Here, because of the absence of proof that the Defendant was laid-off through no fault of his own, same warrants denial of the application. Lastly, the Court would have declined, in any event, the Defendant's application for a downward modification because he failed to advise the Court that he became employed - even if only on a contract basis - with SRP. Therefore, it is hereby:

ORDERED, that Branch (1) of the Defendant's Notice of Cross-Motion dated June 24, 2026 be and the same is hereby DENIED.

ARREARS & MONEY JUDGMENT

DRL § 244 provides, in relevant part:

"...[w]here a spouse in an action for divorce....defaults in paying any sum of money as required by the judgment or order directing the payment thereof, or as required by the terms of an agreement or stipulation incorporated by reference in a judgment, such direction shall be enforceable pursuant to section fifty-two hundred forty-one or fifty-two hundred forty-two of the civil practice law and rules. Upon application the court shall make an order directing the entry of judgment for the amount of arrears of child support together with costs and disbursements. The court shall make an order directing the entry of judgment for the amount of arrears of any other payments so directed, together with costs and disbursements, unless the defaulting party shows good cause for failure to make application for relief from the judgment or order directing such payment prior to the accrual of such arrears...

The May 2025 Order provides, in part:

ORDERED, that...pendente lite, the Plaintiff shall pay 27% percent and the Defendant shall pay 73% percent of the children's currently existing extracurricular activities.

* * *

ORDERED, that...pendente lite, the Defendant shall pay 73% and the Plaintiff shall pay 27% percent of the unemancipated children's unreimbursed/uninsured health care costs and expenses, provided either in-network providers are utilized, absent an emergency, or the children have a pre-existing relationship with an out-of-network provider; and it is further

* * *

ORDERED, that...pendente lite, the out-of-pocket costs of the children's individual psychotherapy shall be paid such that the Plaintiff shall pay 27% of same and the Defendant shall pay 73% of same; and it is further

* * *

ORDERED, that...pendente lite, the Defendant shall pay 73% and the Plaintiff shall pay 27% of any child care costs and/or summer camp expenses incurred by the Plaintiff as may be necessary to enable the Plaintiff to work or incurred for necessary vocational training in furtherance of employment.

The Court has reviewed the papers and the exhibits in support of the Plaintiff's moving application, which exhibits are comprised of receipts and credit card statements for add-on expenses for the children. The Court finds that the expenses that the Plaintiff seeks reimbursement for fall under the ambit of the May 2025 Order. The Defendant, in opposition, does not contest that the Plaintiff actually paid these expenses out of her own pocket. The Defendant does not set forth a single specific and cognizable objection to any single stated expenses and/or invoice. The Defendant does not dispute that the Plaintiff has advanced his share of these expenses. The Defendant's rhetoric and adjectives in his opposition papers, as well as his voicing concerns about issues of parenting time which are not the subject of this application, lead this Court to conclude that he simply does not want to pay these expenses. Accordingly, it is hereby:

ORDERED, that Branch (a) of the Plaintiff's Order to Show Cause dated May 7, 2026 be and the same is hereby GRANTED TO THE EXTENT that the Clerk of the County of Nassau shall enter judgment in favor of the Plaintiff, SG, as against the Defendant, EG, in the sum of $43,092.50, with statutory interest as of the date of this Decision and Order, upon the presentation of a copy of this Decision and Order with a proposed Money Judgment without further notice and without further motion practice.

COUNSEL FEES

Domestic Relations Law § 238 provides, in relevant part, that:

"...[i]n any action or proceeding to enforce or modify any provision of a judgment or order entered in an action for divorce...the court may in its discretion require either party to pay counsel fees and fees and expenses of experts directly to the attorney of the other party to enable the other party to carry on or defend the action or proceeding as, in the court's discretion, justice requires having regard to the circumstances of the case and of the respective parties..."

In Mollah v. Mollah, the Second Department held that where a party was compelled to bring a motion to enforce the terms of an order, the court therein providently exercised its discretion in awarding attorney's fees, considering, inter alia, the relative merits of the parties' positions at the time and the documented time, effort, and skill of counsel. See generally Mollah v. Mollah, 136 AD3d 992 (2d Dept. 2016). An award of counsel fees may be based in part on the relative merit of the parties' positions, but should not be predicated solely on who won and who lost. Matter of Steven S. v. Yelena M., 129 AD3d 408 (1st Dept. 2015). Here, the Court has granted the Plaintiff a money judgment in the entirety of the amount she seeks based upon the Defendant's failure to comply with the May 2025 Order relative to the payment of child support add-on expenses. Inasmuch as the Plaintiff was forced to incur legal fees to enforce the May 2025 Order, the Court finds an award of counsel fees is appropriate. The Court has reviewed the billing statements of the Plaintiff's counsel and finds that the sum of $3,165 was incurred in connection with the preparation of the Plaintiff's motion seeking to enforce the May 2025 Order. The Court awards that sum. Accordingly, it is hereby:

ORDERED, that Branch (b) of the Plaintiff's Order to Show Cause dated May 7, 2026 be and the same is hereby GRANTED TO THE EXTENT that the Defendant shall pay directly to the Plaintiff's counsel, AIELLO & DiFALCO, LLP, attorneys for the Plaintiff, the sum of $3,165.00 as and for reimbursement of her reasonable counsel fees, within thirty (30) days of the date of service of the within Decision and Order with Notice of Entry; and it is further

ORDERED, that upon the failure of Defendant to pay the Plaintiff's counsel as set forth herein above, the Plaintiff's attorneys may file an Affidavit of Non-Compliance with the Clerk of the County, who shall enter a judgment, with statutory interest thereon as of the date of this Decision and Order, in favor of the firm of AIELLO & DiFALCO, LLP, attorneys for the Plaintiff, and against the Defendant, EG, without further proceedings.Any other relief requested not specifically addressed herewith is hereby DENIED.⁷

This constitutes the Decision and Order of this Court.

Dated: October 9, 2026

Mineola, New York

E N T E R :

Hon. Edmund M. Dane, J.S.C.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The substitution of Ms. Stone for Ms. Daniels was due only to Ms. Daniels's resignation from the Panel.

2.   On March 7, 2025, the Court set this matter down for trial from August 18, 2025 through August 22, 2025. On June 9, 2025, the Court adjourned the aforesaid August 2025 trial dates and set the matter down for trial from March 9, 2026 through March 18, 2026. On October 23, 2025, the Court adjourned the aforesaid March 2026 trial dates and set the matter down for trial from April 6, 2026 through April 10, 2026. On April 6, 2026, the Court adjourned the aforesaid April 2026 trial dates and set the matter down for trial from November 9, 2026 through November 20, 2026. On September 15, 2026, the Court revised the existing trial schedule and scheduled the trial of this matter to commence November 16, 2026. The parties are set to appear for a settlement conference before this Part on November 12, 2026 at 9:30 a.m.

3.   No stipulation to that effect was ever provided to the Court. In the absence of such a stipulation referring those issues for trial, the Court elects to adjudicate the instant application.

4.   It is telling to the Court that the Defendant asserts, in Paragraph "2" of the Reply, that these issues were referred to trial, but then in Paragraph "8" of the Reply requests that the Court deny the motion on the merits instead of referring it to trial.

5.   The Defendant, in opposition, does not submit a sworn Affidavit or an Affirmation sworn to under the penalties of perjury pursuant to CPLR § 2106. Instead, his opposition consists only of an Affirmation of his counsel.

6.   The Court cautions counsel for the Defendant, and urges him to act with pause in the future in the terminology and adjectives that he uses in motion papers. The Court declines further comment.

7.   The determination(s) herein rendered Branch (3) of the Defendant's Notice of Cross-Motion dated June 24, 2026 ACADEMIC.

Edmund M. Dane, J.