PEOPLE v. MANZI (2026)

DECISION & ORDER

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the County Court, Dutchess County (Jessica Segal, J.), rendered November 7, 2024, convicting him of criminal mischief in the third degree, upon his plea of guilty, and imposing sentence.

ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.

The defendant pleaded guilty to criminal mischief in the third degree and was sentenced to a period of probation. As part of the sentence of probation, the County Court imposed a condition of probation requiring the defendant, “[i]f deemed appropriate by Probation staff,” to “faithfully attend and successfully complete the Community Transitions Center program and follow all recommendations made by program staff” (hereinafter Condition No. 13), a condition of probation requiring the defendant, “[i]f deemed appropriate,” to “enter into and successfully complete both the Intensive Treatment Alternative Program and the Intensive Supervision Program” and, “[i]f deemed appropriate by ITAP and/or Probation staff,” to “reside in Transitional Housing and abide by all their rules and directives” (hereinafter Condition No. 16), and a condition of probation requiring the defendant, “[i]f deemed appropriate by Probation [s]taff,” to “reside at the Transitional House Community Residence” and to “abide by all rules and regulations and cooperate with all elements of the transitional housing program until discharged” (hereinafter Condition No. 17). The defendant appeals.

Pursuant to Penal Law 65.10(1), the conditions of probation “shall be such as the court, in its discretion, deems reasonably necessary to insure that the defendant will lead a law-abiding life or to assist him [or her] to do so.” Moreover, Penal Law § 65.10(2) (e) permits a court to direct a defendant to participate in a substance abuse or intervention program “approved by the court after consultation with the local probation department having jurisdiction.” Here, contrary to the defendant's contention, the County Court did not improperly delegate its judicial authority to impose conditions of probation or violate Penal Law § 65.10(2)(e) by granting the Probation Department, as part of Condition Nos. 13, 16, and 17, the ability to determine whether and when the programs and placements specified by the court would become appropriate for the defendant during the period of probation (see People v Hyer, 226 AD3d 1147, 1148–1149; cf. People v Fuller, 57 N.Y.2d 152, 156–159).

The defendant's contention that Condition Nos. 13, 16, and 17 were improperly imposed on the ground that these conditions are not individually tailored in light of the defendant's background and the nature of the underlying offense, and thus, are not reasonably related to the defendant's rehabilitation, is unpreserved for appellate review, since he did not challenge the conditions on this ground before the County Court (see CPL 470.05[2]; People v. Brazeal, ––– NY3d ––––, 2026 N.Y. Slip Op 03910, *5). The defendant's additional contention that he was coerced into accepting those conditions as part of his sentence of probation is also unpreserved for appellate review (see People v. Nicholson, 31 AD3d 468, 469).

The defendant's remaining contentions are without merit.

CONNOLLY, J.P., DOWLING, TAYLOR and HOM, JJ., concur.