PENNYMAC CORP v. 194 (2026)

DECISION & ORDER

In an action to foreclose a mortgage, nonparty 194 Grant Corp. appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Lawrence Knipel, J.), dated June 24, 2024.  The order denied that nonparty's motion, inter alia, pursuant to CPLR 2201 to stay enforcement of an amended judgment of foreclosure and sale of the same court (Mark I. Partnow, J.) dated August 13, 2019.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with costs.

The procedural background and history of this action is set forth in this Court's decision and order on a related appeal (see Pennymac Corp. v New York City Environ.  Control Bd., ––– AD3 –––– [Appellate Div. Docket No. 2023–07960] [decided herewith] ).

As relevant to this appeal, in March 2024, nonparty 194 Grant Corp. (hereinafter 194 Grant) moved, inter alia, pursuant to CPLR 2201 to stay enforcement of an amended judgment of foreclosure and sale dated August 13, 2019, which, among other things, directed the sale of the real property at issue.  The plaintiff opposed.  In an order dated June 24, 2024, the Supreme Court denied 194 Grant's motion.  194 Grant appeals.

The filing of a notice of pendency provides constructive notice of an action in which the judgment demanded may affect the title to real property (see CPLR 6501).  Pursuant to CPLR 6501, where, as here, a person's conveyance is recorded after the filing of a notice of pendency, that person is bound by all proceedings taken in the action after that filing to the same extent as if they were a party to the action (see Bank of Am., N.A. v. Burton, 233 AD3d 644, 645;  Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Lance, 196 AD3d 535, 536).

CPLR 2201 provides that the court in which an action is pending may grant a stay of proceedings in a proper case, upon such terms as may be just.  Courts have broad discretion to grant or deny a stay (see JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v Toju Realty Corp., 246 AD3d 881, 884;  Matter of Hersh, 198 AD3d 776, 778).  Under the circumstances of this case, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in denying 194 Grant's motion, inter alia, pursuant to CPLR 2201 to stay enforcement of the amended judgment of foreclosure and sale.  194 Grant's contentions in support of its motion were without merit (see CPLR 6501;  Felix v Law Offs. of Thomas F. Liotti, 129 AD3d 773).

The parties' remaining contentions either are without merit or need not be reached in light of our determination.

DUFFY, J.P., CHRISTOPHER, LANDICINO and QUIRK, JJ., concur.