SOUTAR v. CITY OF NEW YORK (2026)

DECISION & ORDER

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendants appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Anne J. Swern, J.), dated November 7, 2024.  The order, insofar as appealed from, granted the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability on the cause of action alleging a violation of Labor Law § 240(1) and denied those branches of the defendants’ motion which were for summary judgment dismissing the causes of action alleging violations of Labor Law §§ 200 and 240(1) and so much of the cause of action alleging a violation of Labor Law § 241(6) as was predicated on violations of 12 NYCRR 23–1.21(b)(1) and (3).

ORDERED that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.

The defendants, City of New York and New York City Fire Department, owned a fire station located in Brooklyn that was undergoing renovation.  The plaintiff was employed by a subcontractor to install air conditioning units at the fire station.  The plaintiff allegedly was injured when he fell backwards as a ladder he was climbing became unbolted from a wall.  Thereafter, the plaintiff commenced this action against the defendants alleging violations of Labor Law §§ 200, 240(1), and 241(6).  The plaintiff moved for summary judgment on the issue of liability on the cause of action alleging a violation of Labor Law § 240(1).  The defendants thereafter moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

In an order dated November 7, 2024, the Supreme Court, inter alia, granted the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability on the cause of action alleging a violation of Labor Law § 240(1) and denied those branches of the defendants’ motion which were for summary judgment dismissing the causes of action alleging violations of Labor Law §§ 200 and 240(1) and so much of the cause of action alleging a violation of Labor Law § 241(6) as was predicated on violations of 12 NYCRR 23–1.21(b)(1) and (3).  The defendants appeal.

“Labor Law § 240(1) imposes upon owners and general contractors, and their agents, a nondelegable duty to provide safety devices necessary to protect workers from risks inherent in elevated work sites” (McNamara v. Gusmar Enters., LLC, 204 AD3d 779, 781 [internal quotation marks omitted];  see Guaman v. 178 Ct. St., LLC, 200 AD3d 655, 657).  Accordingly, to establish liability pursuant to Labor Law § 240(1), a plaintiff must show a violation of the statute and that such violation was a proximate cause of his or her injuries (see Masmalaj v New York City Economic Dev. Corp., 197 AD3d 1292, 1293;  Leon–Rodriguez v Roman Catholic Church of Sts. Cyril & Methodius, 192 AD3d 883, 885).  “Specifically, with respect to accidents involving ladders, ‘liability will be imposed when the evidence shows that the subject ladder was ․ inadequately secured and that ․ the failure to secure the ladder, was a substantial factor in causing the plaintiff's injuries’ ” (Guaman–Sanango v. 57 E. 72nd Corp., 227 AD3d 677, 679 [internal quotation marks omitted], quoting Mora v 1–10 Bush Term. Owner, L.P., 214 AD3d 785, 786).  “[W]here a ladder slides, shifts, tips over, or otherwise collapses for no apparent reason, the plaintiff has established a violation” (Roasrio v. Horizon Networks, Inc., 240 AD3d 537, 539 [internal quotation marks omitted];  see Acatila v. Really Neat Realty, Inc., 239 AD3d 926, 927).  There can be no liability under Labor Law § 240(1) where the plaintiff's own actions are the sole proximate cause of the accident (see Cahill v Triborough Bridge & Tunnel Auth., 4 NY3d 35, 39;  Iannaccone v. United Natural Foods, Inc., 219 AD3d 819, 820).  A plaintiff may be the sole proximate cause of his or her own injuries when, acting as a recalcitrant worker, he or she “(1) had adequate safety devices available, (2) knew both that the safety devices were available and that [he or she was] expected to use them, (3) chose for no good reason not to do so, and (4) would not have been injured had they not made that choice” (Iannaccone v. United Natural Foods, Inc., 219 AD3d at 820 [internal quotation marks omitted];  see Biaca–Neto v Boston Rd. II Hous. Dev. Fund Corp., 34 NY3d 1166, 1167–1168).

Here, the plaintiff established his prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law on the issue of liability on the cause of action alleging a violation of Labor Law § 240(1) through the submission of a transcript of his own deposition testimony.  The plaintiff testified that he was instructed to use an external ladder that allowed access to the second floor roof, which suddenly unbolted from the wall (see Ruiz v. Ewan, 240 AD3d 541, 542–543).

In opposition, the defendants failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to a violation of Labor Law § 240(1) or their recalcitrant worker defense (see Ramirez v. Pace Univ., 230 AD3d 811, 812).  Contrary to the defendants’ contention, there was no evidence that the plaintiff could have done the work he was assigned to do without the use of the external ladder.  Moreover, the fact that the plaintiff had used the same ladder several times that day without incident was insufficient to refute the plaintiff's testimony that the ladder was unstable at the time of the accident (see Ramirez v. I.G.C. Wall Sys., Inc., 140 AD3d 1047, 1049).  For the same reasons, the Supreme Court properly denied that branch of the defendants’ motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the cause of action alleging a violation of Labor Law § 240(1).

Labor Law § 241(6) imposes a nondelegable duty upon owners and contractors to provide reasonable and adequate protection and safety to construction workers (see Aragona v. State of New York, 147 AD3d 808, 809).  “To establish liability under Labor Law § 241(6), a plaintiff ․ must demonstrate that his [or her] injuries were proximately caused by a violation of an Industrial Code provision that is applicable under the circumstances of the case” (Verdi v. SP Irving Owner, LLC, 227 AD3d 932, 936 [internal quotation marks omitted];  Stewart v Brookfield Off. Props., Inc., 212 AD3d 746, 746–747).

Here, the Supreme Court properly denied that branch of the defendants’ motion which was for summary judgment dismissing so much of the cause of action alleging a violation of Labor Law § 241(6) as was predicated on violations of 12 NYCRR 23–1.21(b)(1) and (3).  The defendants failed to establish, prima facie, that 12 NYCRR 23–1.21(b)(1) and (3) were inapplicable to the circumstances of the case (see Araujo v. Monadnock Constr., Inc., 241 AD3d 470, 474).  Since the defendants failed to make a prima facie showing, that branch of their motion which was for summary judgment dismissing so much of the cause of action alleging a violation of Labor Law § 241(6) as was predicated on violations of 12 NYCRR 23–1.21(b)(1) and (3) was properly denied, regardless of the sufficiency of the plaintiff's opposition papers (see Winegrad v. New York Univ. Med. Ctr., 64 NY2d 851, 853).

Labor Law § 200 codifies the common-law duty to provide employees with a safe place to work (see Ross v Curtis–Palmer Hydro–Elec.  Co., 81 NY2d 494, 505;  Rodriguez v. HY 38 Owner, LLC, 192 AD3d 839, 841).  Labor Law § 200 “applies to owners, contractors, and their agents” (Rodriguez v. HY 38 Owner, LLC, 192 AD3d at 841).  Cases involving Labor Law § 200 fall into two broad categories:  namely, those where workers are injured as a result of dangerous or defective premises conditions at a work site and those involving the manner in which the work is performed (see Rodriguez v. HY 38 Owner, LLC, 192 AD3d at 841;  Chowdhury v. Rodriguez, 57 AD3d 121, 128).  “[W]hen a claim arises out of an alleged dangerous premises condition, a property owner or general contractor may be held liable in common-law negligence and under Labor Law § 200 when the owner or general contractor has control over the work site and either created the dangerous condition causing an injury, or failed to remedy the dangerous or defective condition while having actual or constructive notice of it” (Mushkudiani v Racanelli Constr.  Group, Inc., 219 AD3d 613, 616 [internal quotation marks omitted];  see Rodriguez v. HY 38 Owner, LLC, 192 AD3d at 841).  A defendant has constructive notice of a defect when it is visible and apparent and has existed for a sufficient length of time before the accident such that it could have been discovered and corrected (see Nicoletti v. Iracane, 122 AD3d 811, 812).

Here, the defendants failed to establish their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law dismissing the cause of action alleging a violation of Labor Law § 200.  The defendants failed to eliminate triable issues of fact as to whether they controlled the work site, created the dangerous condition causing an injury, or failed to remedy the dangerous or defective condition while having actual or constructive notice of it (see Anjos v Tappan Zee Constructors, LLC, 243 AD3d 886, 889).  Since the defendants failed to make a prima facie showing, that branch of their motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the cause of action alleging a violation of Labor Law § 200 was properly denied, regardless of the sufficiency of the plaintiff's opposition papers (see Winegrad v. New York Univ. Med. Ctr., 64 NY2d at 853).

BARROS, J.P., WAN, GOLIA and GOLDBERG VELAZQUEZ, JJ., concur.