ESCOBAR v. Marysol Vargas Caicedo, defendant-respondent. (2026)

DECISION & ORDER

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendant Erlin Jose Sanchez appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Robert I. Caloras, J.), entered January 27, 2025. The order, insofar as appealed from, (1) granted that branch of the motion of the defendant Marysol Vargas Caicedo which was for summary judgment dismissing all cross-claims insofar as asserted against her, (2) granted those branches of the motion of the plaintiff Omar Sanchez Escobar which were for summary judgment on the issue of liability against the defendant Erlin Jose Sanchez and dismissing his first, sixth, and eighth affirmative defenses, and (3) granted the cross-motion of the plaintiff Silvia R. Rodriguez for summary judgment on the issue of liability against the defendant Erlin Jose Sanchez.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with one bill of costs.

In September 2022, the plaintiffs, Omar Sanchez Escobar and Silvia R. Rodriguez, commenced this action against the defendants, Erlin Jose Sanchez and Marysol Vargas Caicedo, to recover damages for personal injuries the plaintiffs allegedly sustained in July 2022, when a vehicle in which they were passengers, which was being operated by Caicedo, was struck in the rear by a tractor-trailer owned and operated by Sanchez. The defendants separately answered the complaint, asserting various affirmative defenses and cross-claims. Thereafter, Caicedo moved, inter alia, for summary judgment dismissing all cross-claims insofar as asserted against her. Rodriguez cross-moved for summary judgment on the issue of liability against Sanchez. Escobar moved, among other things, for summary judgment on the issue of liability against Sanchez and dismissing his first, sixth, and eighth affirmative defenses. In an order entered January 27, 2025, the Supreme Court, inter alia, granted the cross-motion and those branches of the respective motions. Sanchez appeals.

“A driver of a vehicle approaching another vehicle from the rear is required to maintain a reasonably safe distance and rate of speed under the prevailing conditions to avoid colliding with the other vehicle” (Laureano v. EAN Holdings, LLC, 225 AD3d 754, 755 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1129[a]). “A rear-end collision with a stopped or stopping vehicle establishes a prima facie case of negligence on the part of the operator of the rear vehicle, requiring that operator to come forward with evidence of a nonnegligent explanation for the collision in order to rebut the inference of negligence” (Abramov v. Martinez, 224 AD3d 794, 796; see Tutrani v. County of Suffolk, 10 NY3d 906, 908).

The emergency doctrine provides that “when an actor is faced with a sudden and unexpected circumstance which leaves little or no time for thought, deliberation or consideration, or causes the actor to be reasonably so disturbed that the actor must make a speedy decision without weighing alternative courses of conduct, the actor may not be negligent if the actions taken are reasonable and prudent in the emergency context” (Rivera v. New York City Tr. Auth., 77 N.Y.2d 322, 327). However, the emergency doctrine does not apply where “the party seeking to invoke it created or contributed to the emergency” (Mead v. Marino, 205 A.D.2d 669, 669; see Pearson v. Northstar Limousine, Inc., 123 AD3d 991, 991–992).

Here, Caicedo established her prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law dismissing all cross-claims insofar as asserted against her. In support of her motion, Caicedo submitted, among other things, her own affirmation wherein she stated that she was driving slowly due to heavy traffic when her vehicle was struck in the rear by the vehicle operated by Sanchez. Caicedo also stated that her brake lights were in proper working condition at the time of the accident. Likewise, the plaintiffs established their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law on the issue of liability against Sanchez by submitting evidence demonstrating that the vehicle in which they were passengers was slowing down due to heavy traffic when it was struck in the rear by the vehicle operated by Sanchez (see Yonghong Xia v. Zhao Xian Zeng, 219 AD3d 914, 915–916; Mahmud v. Feng Ouyang, 208 AD3d 861, 862).

Escobar further established his prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law dismissing Sanchez's first affirmative defense, alleging culpable conduct (see Yonghong Xia v. Zhao Xian Zeng, 219 AD3d at 915–916), sixth affirmative defense, alleging the emergency doctrine (see Capuozzo v. Miller, 188 AD3d 1137, 1138), and eighth affirmative defense, alleging failure to use seatbelts (see Giwa v. Bloom, 154 AD3d 921, 923).

In opposition, Sanchez failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether there was a nonnegligent explanation for the happening of the accident or whether the emergency doctrine applied to this case (see Radosta v. Caronia, 244 AD3d 890, 891–892; Capuozzo v. Miller, 188 AD3d at 1138). An affidavit submitted by Sanchez contradicted his statements immediately following the accident, as reflected in a police accident report, and must be viewed as a belated attempt to avoid the consequences of his earlier admission by raising a feigned issue of fact (see Newkirk v. Safe Coach Bus, Inc., 218 AD3d 477, 478; Odetalla v. Rodriguez, 165 AD3d 826, 827).

Finally, contrary to Sanchez's contention, the motions and cross-motion were not premature on the issue of liability (see CPLR 3212[f]). Sanchez's proffered need to conduct depositions did not warrant denial of the motions or cross-motion. Sanchez had personal knowledge of the relevant facts, and his mere hope or speculation that evidence might be uncovered was insufficient to deny the motions and cross-motion (see Yonghong Xia v. Zhao Xian Zeng, 219 AD3d at 916–917; Quintanilla v. Mark, 210 AD3d 713, 715).

Sanchez's remaining contention is improperly raised for the first time on appeal.

IANNACCI, J.P., WOOTEN, VENTURA and OTTLEY, JJ., concur.