HIDALGO v. 590 OAK FAMILY LIMITED PARTNERSHIP (2026)

DECISION & ORDER

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (George M. Nolan, J.), dated September 17, 2024.  The order, insofar as appealed from, granted that branch of the defendants' motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the cause of action alleging a violation of Labor Law § 240(1) and denied the plaintiff's cross-motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability on the cause of action alleging a violation of Labor Law § 240(1).

ORDERED that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.

The plaintiff allegedly sustained personal injuries while working at a building owned by the defendant R.R. 590 Oak Family Limited Partnership, which was undergoing renovations overseen by the general contractor, the defendant Almas Construction, LLC. The plaintiff was employed by the third-party defendant Clearview Plate Glass Co., Inc. According to the plaintiff, he was in the process of loading a plate of glass onto a truck when the top of the plate of glass broke off and fell onto him, cutting his hands.  The plaintiff commenced this action against the defendants to recover damages for personal injuries alleging, inter alia, a violation of Labor Law § 240(1).

The defendants moved, among other things, for summary judgment dismissing the cause of action alleging a violation of Labor Law § 240(1), and the plaintiff cross-moved for summary judgment on the issue of liability on the cause of action alleging a violation of Labor Law § 240(1).  In an order dated September 17, 2024, the Supreme Court, inter alia, granted that branch of the defendants' motion and denied the plaintiff's cross-motion.  The plaintiff appeals.

Labor Law § 240(1) imposes upon owners and general contractors, and their agents, a nondelegable duty to provide safety devices necessary to protect workers from risks inherent in elevated work sites (see Rojas v. 616 First Ave., LLC, 245 AD3d 750, 751;  Guaman v. 178 Ct. St., LLC, 200 AD3d 655, 657).  “The extraordinary protections of Labor Law § 240(1) extend only to a narrow class of special hazards, and do not encompass any and all perils that may be connected in some tangential way with the effects of gravity” (Chuqui v. Amna, LLC, 203 AD3d 1018, 1020 [internal quotation marks omitted];  see Nieves v Five Boro A.C. & Refrig.  Corp., 93 N.Y.2d 914, 915–916).  In determining whether a plaintiff is entitled to the extraordinary protections of Labor Law § 240(1), the single decisive question is whether the plaintiff's injuries were the direct consequence of a failure to provide adequate protection against a risk arising from a physically significant elevation differential (see Kelly v. RBSL Realty, LLC, 244 AD3d 1086, 1087;  Chuqui v. Amna, LLC, 203 AD3d at 1020).  With respect to falling objects, Labor Law § 240(1) applies where the falling of an object is related to a significant risk inherent in the relative elevation at which materials or loads must be positioned or secured (see Narducci v. Manhasset Bay Assoc., 96 N.Y.2d 259, 267–268;  Flores v. Fort Green Homes, LLC, 227 AD3d 672, 673).  “Thus, for section 240(1) to apply, a plaintiff must show more than simply that an object fell causing injury to a worker” (Narducci v. Manhasset Bay Assoc., 96 N.Y.2d at 267).  “A plaintiff must show that the object fell, while being hoisted or secured, because of the absence or inadequacy of a safety device of the kind enumerated in the statute” (id. at 268).

Here, the defendants established, prima facie, that the accident was not the result of an elevation-related hazard or gravity-related risk encompassed by Labor Law § 240(1) (see Chuqui v. Amna, LLC, 203 AD3d at 1021) and, in any event, that the plaintiff's injury was not caused by the lack or failure of a device prescribed by Labor Law 240(1) (see Mendez v. Jackson Dev. Group, Ltd., 99 AD3d 677, 678).  In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact.

Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly granted that branch of the defendants' motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the cause of action alleging a violation of Labor Law § 240(1) and denied the plaintiff's cross-motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability on that cause of action.

CONNOLLY, J.P., BRATHWAITE NELSON, WARHIT and MCCORMACK, JJ., concur.