NEIL v. AREEBA INC (2026)

DECISION & ORDER

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Timothy J. Dufficy, J.), dated October 15, 2024. The order, insofar as appealed from, denied those branches of the plaintiff's motion which were pursuant to CPLR 3025(b) for leave to amend the complaint to add causes of action alleging violations of Labor Law §§ 200 and 240(1).

ORDERED that the order is modified, on the law and in the exercise of discretion, by deleting the provision thereof denying that branch of the plaintiff's motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3025(b) for leave to amend the complaint to add a cause of action alleging a violation of Labor Law § 200, and substituting therefor a provision granting that branch of the motion; as so modified, the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, without costs or disbursements.

The plaintiff commenced this action to recover damages for personal injuries he allegedly sustained when he was struck by loose sheets of plywood. During discovery, the plaintiff moved, inter alia, pursuant to CPLR 3025(b) for leave to amend the complaint to add causes of action alleging violations of Labor Law §§ 200 and 240(1). In an order dated October 15, 2024, the Supreme Court, among other things, denied those branches of the plaintiff's motion. The plaintiff appeals.

Leave to amend a pleading should be freely given provided the amendment is not palpably insufficient, does not prejudice or surprise the opposing party, and is not patently devoid of merit (see CPLR 3025[b]; LaBoy v. Diven, 244 AD3d 1201, 1204). The burden of demonstrating prejudice or surprise or that a proposed amendment is palpably insufficient or patently devoid of merit falls upon the party opposing the motion (see Avenue 37, LLC v. Imperial Palace II, Inc., 244 AD3d 1038, 1039–1040; Lucido v. Mancuso, 49 AD3d 220, 226–227).

Here, the plaintiff's proposed cause of action alleging a violation of Labor Law § 240(1) is palpably insufficient and patently devoid of merit. While the reach of Labor Law § 240(1) is not limited to work performed on actual construction sites, the task in which an injured employee was engaged must have been performed during “the erection, demolition, repairing, altering, painting, cleaning or pointing of a building or structure” (id.; see Martinez v. City of New York, 93 N.Y.2d 322, 326). This definition excludes routine maintenance (see Soto v. J. Crew Inc., 21 NY3d 562, 568–569). The plaintiff's deposition testimony demonstrated that he was employed as a porter and not in the erection, demolition, repairing, altering, painting, cleaning, or pointing of a building or structure within the meaning of Labor Law § 240(1) when he put his hand on the unsecured plywood (see Soto v. J. Crew Inc., 21 NY3d at 569; Kusayev v. Sussex Apts. Assoc., LLC, 163 AD3d 943, 945). Accordingly, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in denying that branch of the plaintiff's motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3025(b) for leave to amend the complaint to add a cause of action alleging a violation of Labor Law § 240(1).

However, the Supreme Court improvidently exercised its discretion in denying that branch of the plaintiff's motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3025(b) for leave to amend the complaint to add a cause of action alleging a violation of Labor Law § 200. Labor Law § 200 codifies the common-law duty of an owner or general contractor to maintain a safe workplace (see Ortega v. Puccia, 57 AD3d 54, 60). Contrary to the defendants' contention, the protection of Labor Law § 200 is not confined to construction work but covers all places to which the Labor Law applies (see Jock v. Fien, 80 N.Y.2d 965, 967; Rocha v. GRT Constr. of N.Y., 145 AD3d 926, 928).

The defendants' remaining contentions either are improperly raised for the first time on appeal or need not be reached in light of our determination.

DUFFY, J.P., CHRISTOPHER, LANDICINO and QUIRK, JJ., concur.