Wilson I. Cruz, Plaintiff, v. UBER LLC SECHS NY LLC (2026)

In accordance with CPLR 2219(a), the decision herein is made upon consideration of all the papers filed by the parties in NYSCEF in connection with the motion (Motion #9), brought by defendants UBER TECHNOLOGIES, INC. and UBER USA, LLC i/s/h/a UBER U.S.A., LLC and SECHS-NY, LLC (collectively "Uber"), made pursuant to CPLR 3212 and 8303-a and 22 NYCRR 130.1(c), seeking an order: [1] awarding moving defendants summary judgment dismissing all claims and cross-claims against Uber; [2] sanctioning plaintiff WILSON I. CRUZ and plaintiff's counsel for the purportedly "frivolous" and "meritless" prosecution of this action; [3] directing the clerk to enter judgment in Uber's favor together with costs and disbursements; and [4] granting such other and further relief that is just and appropriate.

The Complaint/Allegations

In the complaint, plaintiff alleges that the Uber defendants are vicariously liable for the negligence of Uber driver MAAYNI CHEIKHMOHAMEDFADE ("the Driver") for causing a motor vehicle accident on May 16, 2018, because the Driver was an Uber employee. Plaintiff also alleges that Uber was negligent "by facilitating the use of the Uber App by its drivers which defendants knew or should have known, created an unsafe and hazardous monitoring distraction for its drivers".

Analysis

Uber moves for summary judgment dismissing all claims and cross-claims asserted against it. Summary judgment is a drastic remedy that deprives a litigant of their day in court, and it should be granted only where the moving party has tendered sufficient evidence to demonstrate the absence of any material issues of fact (see Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320 [1986]; Andre v Pomeroy, 35 NY2d 361, 364 [1974]).

To grant summary judgment, it must clearly appear that no material and triable issue of fact is presented. Issue finding, rather than issue determination, is the key to the procedure (see Matter of Suffolk County Dept. of Social Servs. v James M., 83 NY2d 178 [1994]; Sillman v Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 3 NY2d 395, 404 [1957]). In making this determination, the court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion and must give that party the benefit of every favorable inference which can be drawn from the evidence (see De Lourdes Torres v Jones, 26 NY3d 742, 763 [2016]; William J. Jenack Estate Appraisers & Auctioneers, Inc. v Rabizadeh, 22 NY3d 470, 475 [2013]; Nash v Port Washington Union Free School Dist., 83 AD3d 136, 146 [2d Dept 2011]).

Vicarious Liability

Uber contends that the Driver was an independent contractor, not an employee of Uber, and thus Uber cannot be held vicariously liable for his purported negligence. "The general rule is that a party who retains an independent contractor, as distinguished from a mere employee or servant, is not liable for the independent contractor's negligent acts" (Kleeman v Rheingold, 81 NY2d 270, 274 [1993]; Jones v Marshalls, 245 AD3d 472 [1st Dept 2026]). The determination of whether a person is an employee or an independent contractor typically involves a question of fact based on consideration of factors, with control of the method and means by which work is to be performed being a critical factor (Brown v Window King LLC, 224 AD3d 533, 534 [1st Dept 2024]; Goodwin v Comcast Corp., 42 AD3d 322, 322 [1st Dept 2007]). However, where the evidence on the issue of control presents no conflict, the matter may be properly determined as a matter of law (Goodwin v Comcast Corp., supra; see Marzec v City of New York, 136 AD3d 410 [1st Dept 2016]).

Determining whether an employer-employee relationship exists turns on whether the alleged employer exercises control over the results produced, or the means used to achieve the results, with control over the means being the more important consideration (Bynog v Cipriani Group, Inc., 1 NY3d 193 [2003]; Armacida v D.G. Neary Realty, Ltd, 65 AD3d 984 [1st Dept 2009]). Factors that are relevant to assessing control include whether the worker (1) worked at his own convenience, (2) was free to engage in other employment, (3) received fringe benefits, (4) was on the employer's payroll, and (5) was on a fixed schedule (Bynog v Cipriani Group, Inc., supra; see generally Rodriguez v Manhattan Restoration, LLC., 233 AD3d 555 [1st Dept 2024]).

The Court may also consider whether a person is treated for tax purposes as an independent contractor or designated in a contract as an independent contractor (Brielmeier v Leal, 226 AD3d 955 [2d Dept 2024]). The fact that a contract exists designating a person as an independent contractor is to be considered, but is not dispositive (Brielmeier v Leal, supra; see Park West Executive Services, Inc., v Gallo Vitucci & Klar, LLP, 245 AD3d 650 [1st Dept 2026]).

Nonetheless, minimal or incidental control over a person's work product without direct supervision or input over the means used to complete the work is insufficient to establish a traditional employment relationship (Sager v Frontpage Investments, 248 AD3d 1302 [2d Dept 2026]; Brielmeier v Leal, supra). Furthermore, the mere retention of supervisory powers over an independent contractor cannot form the basis for the imposition of liability against the principal (Goodwin v Comcast Corp., supra; Marzec v City of New York, supra).

In the moving papers, Uber makes a prima facie showing that the Driver was an independent contractor by establishing inter alia that the Driver was responsible for providing his own vehicle and automobile insurance, could freely choose which rides to accept or decline and set his own working hours. In addition, the Driver was not required to wear a uniform or display the Uber logo, was free to work for any of Uber's competitors, and was not paid a wage but rather earned a portion of the fare paid by the passenger after completing an Uber trip. Furthermore, Uber did not withhold taxes on the Driver's behalf and Uber did not provide the Driver with any fringe benefits. Moreover, the agreement between Uber and the Driver classified the Driver as an independent contractor.

Based on the record, therefore, Uber establishes prima facie entitlement to summary judgment dismissing plaintiff's claims of vicarious liability for the negligence of the Driver (Zeng Ji Lui v Bathily, 145 AD3d 558 [1st Dept 2016]; Chaouni v Ali, 105 AD3d 424, 425 [1st Dept 2013]; see also Coker v Perez, 211 AD3d 507 [1st Dept 2022]; Morand v Coachman Luxury Transport, Inc., 228 AD3d 463 [1st Dept 2024]; see Goodwin v Comcast, supra; Marzec v City of New York, supra; Bryson v Uber Technologies, Inc., 2026 WL 734178 [E. D. NY 2026]; State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co. v Diallo et al, 89 Misc 3d 1250 [Civ. Ct. Queens County 2026]; Bongiovi v Pulla, 83 Misc 3d 1204 (A) [Sup. Ct. Richmond County 2024]). Of note, Uber has submitted a litany of cases where the Supreme Court granted Uber summary judgment dismissing claims for vicarious liability on the legal grounds argued herein, i.e. the relevant drivers were independent contractors, not employees (Mayumi Menjivar et al. v Ravshan Mirmukhamedov, et al, Index No. 816850/2021E [Sup. Ct. Bronx County 2025]; Stanley Moultrie v Uber Technologies, Inc., et al., Index No. 804209/2023E [Sup. Ct. Bronx County 2025]; Lackhragi Persaud v Uber Technologies, Inc., a/k/a/ Uber Eats, USA, LLC, et al., Index No. 801549/2024E [Sup. Ct. Bronx County 2025]; Regina Vasquez v John Alejandro Ortiz, et al., Index No. 810826/2022E [Sup. Ct. Bronx County 2025])¹ .

In contrast, in view of the undisputed factual record described above, plaintiff fails to generate an issue of fact as to the issue (Marzec v City of New York, supra). Under these circumstances, any control by Uber over the Driver's performance of his work was limited to general administrative powers, as opposed to control over the means and method of the work, which is insufficient to form the basis for liability against Uber (id.).

Plaintiff's reliance on Bandele v Raiser, 251 AD3d 904 (2d Dept 2026) to support the finding of a question of fact is misplaced. In that opinion, the Second Department Appellate Court did not discuss what evidence, if any, Uber submitted to establish that a rideshare company's driver was an independent contractor, not an employee. By contrast, in this case, Uber submitted sufficient evidence to prove that its relationship with the Driver was an independent contractor arrangement as opposed to an employer-employee relationship (see State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v Diallo, 89 Misc 3d 1250[A] [Civ. Ct. Queens County 2026]).

Plaintiff's reliance on Uy v Hussein, 186 AD3d 1567 (2d Dept 2020) is similarly misplaced. In that case, the Appellate Division, Second Department found that Uber failed to establish that its driver was not acting in the scope of an employer-employee relationship at the time of the subject accident because Uber only submitted evidence that the driver was logged out of the Uber app at the time of the accident. The undisputed evidence submitted on this motion, in contrast, is sufficiently more detailed and supportive of the Court's finding of independent contractor status.

Similarly, the Appellate Division, First Department's decision in Soares v Rahmatulloev, 234 AD3d 644 (1st Dept 2025) found that Uber failed to establish that the driver was not acting within the scope of an employer-employee relationship at the time of the subject accident by merely submitting evidence that the driver was offline at the time. Furthermore, in Soares, there was deposition testimony that the driver would perform employment related tasks while logged out of the Uber app. In this case, however, the undisputed evidence establishes that the Driver at all times acted as independent contractor, not an employee. As such, the cause of action based on respondeat superior vicarious liability is properly dismissed.

Use of the Uber App

Turning to the branch of Uber's motion that seeks to dismiss plaintiff purported cause of action alleging that Uber was negligent "by facilitating the use of the Uber App by its drivers which defendants knew or should have known, created an unsafe and hazardous monitoring distraction for its drivers", plaintiff fails to oppose Uber's arguments in favor of summary judgment on the claim and the cause of action is therefore dismissed. In any event, under the undisputed facts, this allegation does not set forth a cognizable cause of action. Of import, plaintiff does not provide any case law or other legal authority recognizing the legitimacy of such a cause of action with regards to the use of the Uber App, or with regards to the use of any other similar "in-vehicle use" driving apps such as WAZE or Google Maps.

Negligent Supervision

As outlined above, a principal cannot ordinarily be held liable for the negligence of an independent contractor because the principal cannot control the manner in which the contractor's work is performed (Chainani v Board of Educ. of City of NY, 87 NY2d 370, 380-381 [1995]; Kleeman v Rheingold, 81 NY2d 270 [1993]). It is true that there are various exceptions to the general rule against vicarious liability for the acts of an independent contractor (Bennett v State Farm Fire and Cas. Co., 198 AD3d 857 [2d Dept 2021]; see Brothers v New York State Elec. & Gas Corp., 11 NY3d [2008]; Kleeman v Rheingold, supra). These exceptions fall into three basic categories: negligence of the employer in selecting, instructing or supervising the contractor; employment for work that is especially or inherently dangerous; and instances in which the employer is under a specific nondelegable duty (Kleeman v Rheingold, supra; Bennett v State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., supra).

In this action, plaintiff alleges that Uber may be held vicariously liable for the independent contractor's actions because Uber selected, instructed or supervised the Driver (Bennett v State Farm Fire and Cas. Co., supra; Kleeman v Rheingold, supra; Sandoval v Uber Technologies, Inc., 2026 WL 2079006 [Sup. Ct. New York County]). A necessary element of a cause of action for negligent hiring, training, supervision, and retention is that the employer knew or should have known of the employee's propensity for the conduct which caused the injury (Rodriguez v Manhattan Restoration LLC., 233 AD3d 555 [1st Dept 2024]; see O'Flaherty v Columbo, 247 AD3d 575 [1st Dept 2026]; Barton v City of New York, 187 AD3d 976, 978 [2d Dept 2020]. Only then may a principal be held liable for negligence in selecting, instructing or supervising an independent contractor (Kleeman v Rheingold, supra).

Based on the record, Uber demonstrates that the pleadings and undisputed facts do not include any allegation or proof that the Driver had some propensity for negligence or that Uber was aware of said propensity. In contrast, plaintiff declines to address the argument in the opposition papers and therefore fails to generate an issue of fact as to control or supervision. Accordingly, the cause of action is dismissed (Sandoval v Uber Technologies, supra).

Sanctions

That part of the motion that seeks to impose sanctions on the plaintiff for frivolous conduct is denied. The party seeking to impose sanctions under Part 130 has the burden of establishing that their adversary's conduct was frivolous withing the meaning of 22 NYCRR 130-1.1 (U.S. Bank N.A. v Tait, 234 AD3d 889, 891-892 [2d Dept 2025]). Advancing a meritless argument may serve as the basis for a finding of frivolity, but only if the argument is completely without merit and cannot be supported by a reasonable argument for a modification or extension of existing law (Schuette v Brookford LLC, 200 AD3d 479, 480 [1st Dept 2021]). Additionally, motion practice intended primarily to harass or injure the other party may also constitute frivolous conduct within the meaning of Part 130 (id.).

In support of the branch of its motion for sanctions, Uber submits the testimony of a nonparty witness who testified at deposition that plaintiff was not in the vehicle at the time of the subject accident. In contrast, plaintiff testified at deposition that he was in the vehicle at the time of the accident. Such conflicting testimony merely presents a question of fact for the jury. As such, Uber does not establish that plaintiff's allegations lack a good faith basis, warranting denial of the motion (Fishoff Family Found. v Frydman, 148 AD3d 601 [1st Dept 2017]). For the reasons set forth above, the imposition of sanctions pursuant to CPLR 8303-a is also not warranted.

The Court has considered the additional contentions of the parties not specifically addressed herein. To the extent that any contention raised by the parties is not addressed by the Court, it is hereby rejected.

Accordingly, it is hereby

ORDERED that the branch of the motion (Motion #9), brought by defendants UBER TECHNOLOGIES, INC., UBER USA, LLC i/s/h/a UBER U.S.A., LLC and SECHS-NY, LLC (collectively "Uber"), made pursuant to CPLR 3212, that seeks an order awarding moving defendants summary judgment dismissing all claims and cross-claims against Uber is GRANTED; and it is further

ORDERED that the part of the motion that seeks an order sanctioning plaintiff WILSON I. CRUZ and plaintiff's counsel, pursuant to CPLR 8303-a and 22 NYCRR 130.1(c), for the purportedly "frivolous" and "meritless" prosecution of this action is DENIED; and it is further

ORDERED that the Clerk shall enter judgment in Uber's favor dismissing the complaint and severing the counterclaim for continued litigation; and it is further

ORDERED that the Clerk is directed to mark Motion #9 as decided in all Court records.

The foregoing constitutes the Decision and Order of the Court.

Dated:October 8, 2026

Bronx, New York

Hon. Veronica G. Hummel, A.S.C.J.

FOOTNOTES

1.   In contrast, plaintiff submitted trial court decisions where Uber was denied summary judgment dismissing respondeat superior claims on the basis that triable issues of fact existed as to whether a driver was in fact an employee of Uber. These decisions are based on facts that are distinguishable from the facts presented herein or are unpersuasive.

Veronica G. Hummel, J.