DARIN MARTIN v. STANLEY RICHARDS (2026)

Petitioner Darin Martin was detained by respondent Department of Corrections and Community Supervision (DOCCS) for allegedly violating conditions of release during his community supervision. Petitioner seeks to challenge the legality of his detention by way of a writ of habeas corpus. In a prior order, this court granted petitioner's release pursuant to CPLR 7009 (e) pending final disposition of this habeas proceeding. In the remaining grounds of the petition, petitioner argues that his preliminary parole revocation hearing was untimely. For the reasons stated herein, the petition is DENIED, and the proceeding is DISMISSED.

Petitioner was arrested on Tuesday, February 3, 2026. Later that day, DOCCS received notice that petitioner was in police custody at a hospital. A DOCCS bureau chief requested that the arresting agency notify DOCCS when petitioner was discharged from the hospital so that the parole warrant could be transmitted to the police department. On Wednesday, February 11, DOCCS emailed the parole warrant to Kings County prearraignments, and a sergeant confirmed receipt that day. A recognizance hearing was held on Sunday, February 15, at which petitioner was remanded. A preliminary hearing was scheduled for Tuesday, February 17.

The February 17 hearing did not proceed because petitioner remained hospitalized. The matter was adjourned back to the bureau for monitoring. On February 18, DOCCS confirmed petitioner's continued hospitalization. Later that day, petitioner's attorney requested a virtual preliminary hearing. DOCCS responded that preliminary hearings are conducted in person after medical discharge. DOCCS again confirmed petitioner's hospitalization on February 19 and 20. Petitioner was released from custody on March 4. The preliminary hearing was rescheduled for March 6.

The March 6 hearing did not proceed because petitioner did not appear. The matter was adjourned to March 13. Petitioner was arrested again on March 11.

The March 13 hearing did not proceed because petitioner was hospitalized again. The matter was adjourned to March 20. DOCCS confirmed that petitioner remained hospitalized on March 19. Petitioner was later transferred to Rikers Island without DOCCS being notified.

The March 20 hearing did not proceed because petitioner was in custody at Rikers Island but was not produced. The matter was adjourned to March 27.

The March 27 hearing was held in its entirety in petitioner's absence. Petitioner now challenges the timeliness of the preliminary hearing.

The timeliness of a preliminary hearing depends on whether DOCCS proceeds by notice alone or by warrant, whether the releasee remains in custody after the recognizance hearing, and whether any subsequent delay is justified.

If DOCCS proceeds by notice of violation for alleged technical violations and no warrant is executed, DOCCS must afford the releasee a preliminary hearing "within ten days of the issuance of the notice of violation" (Executive Law § 259-i [3] [c] [i] [A]).

If a parole warrant is executed, the execution date may determine when both the recognizance and preliminary hearings must occur (Executive Law § 259-i [3] [a] [iv]; [c] [i] [B]). An authorized officer executes a parole warrant by "taking such person and having [them] detained" under the warrant (Executive Law § 259-i [3] [a] [ii]). If the releasee is already incarcerated, the warrant may be executed by serving the warrant "on petitioner at the correctional facility where [they were] incarcerated for related criminal charges" (People ex rel. Morant v Warden, Rikers Is., 35 AD3d 208, 209 [1st Dept 2006]). Personal service on the releasee is not always required (Matter of People ex rel. Subramaniam v Annucci, 227 AD3d 26, 31 [1st Dept 2024] [holding that service upon DOCCS "effectuated its 'execution' " and constituted service upon petitioner as DOCCS's ward]).

Within 24 hours after execution of the parole warrant, DOCCS must present the releasee to the appropriate court for a recognizance hearing (Executive Law § 259-i [3] [a] [iv]).

If the court orders release on recognizance, then DOCCS must afford the releasee a preliminary hearing within ten days of the issuance of such release order (Executive Law § 259-i [3] [c] [i] [A] [governing preliminary-hearing period for alleged technical violations following issuance of a notice of violation]; [B] [governing preliminary-hearing period for any alleged violations following execution of a warrant]).

If the court orders detention, DOCCS must afford the releasee a preliminary hearing within five days of the issuance of such order to detain or execution of a warrant, as specified in Executive Law § 259-i [3] [c] [i] [B]. The starting point for this five-day period depends on the timeliness of the recognizance hearing: if it is timely, it begins with the detention order; if untimely, it begins with the warrant's execution (Subramaniam, 227 AD3d at 28-30). Thus, the five-day window is determined by which of these events occurs later in relation to the hearing's timeliness.

When the last day of the preliminary hearing period falls on a Saturday, Sunday, or public holiday, then "such act may be done on the next succeeding business day" (General Construction Law § 25-a [1]; see People ex rel. Atkinson v Warden of Rikers Is. Correctional Facility, 201 AD2d 271, 271-272 [1st Dept 1994] [applying § 25-a [1] to a time period under Executive Law § 259-i]; cf. Matter of Picciano v Hammock, 92 AD2d 1043, 1044 [3d Dept 1983] [applying § 25-a [1] to the deadline for a final revocation hearing]).

The deadline for the preliminary hearing is not violated if the hearing " 'has been timely scheduled, or held in whole or in part, and thereafter is adjourned for legitimate reasons, without prejudice to the petitioner' " (Morant, 35 AD3d at 209, quoting Matter of Emmick v Enders, 107 AD2d 1066, 1067 [4th Dept 1985]). DOCCS must, however, act "energetically and scrupulously" to ensure that any resulting delay extends no longer than reasonably necessary (People ex rel. Burley v Warden, NY City House of Detention at Riker's Is., 70 AD2d 518, 519 [1st Dept 1979]).

Here, DOCCS was notified on February 3, 2026, that petitioner was in police custody at a hospital. Rather than immediately transmitting the warrant, the DOCCS bureau chief directed that notification of petitioner's discharge be provided before sending the warrant to the police department. It was not until February 11, 2026, that DOCCS transmitted the parole warrant to Kings County prearraignments. The warrant was neither served on petitioner nor lodged with the correctional facility detaining him prior to this date. As a result, the warrant could not serve as the legal basis for petitioner's detention until February 11 (see Executive Law § 259-i [3] [a] [ii]; Morant, 35 AD3d at 209; Subramaniam, 227 AD3d at 31). Therefore, February 11 is properly identified as the date on which the parole warrant was executed.

Because the recognizance hearing was untimely, the five-day preliminary hearing period would have run from February 11 (Subramaniam, 227 AD3d at 31 [measuring the five-day statutory period for a preliminary hearing from the date of warrant execution when the recognizance hearing is untimely]). The fifth day fell on Monday, February 16, a public holiday, which extended the hearing deadline to Tuesday, February 17 (General Construction Law § 25-a [1]). Thus, the preliminary hearing was scheduled in a timely manner within the statutory period, which extended through February 17.

The February 17 hearing did not proceed because petitioner remained hospitalized. A releasee's medical condition may justify the adjournment of a preliminary hearing where the releasee is "incapacitated by reason of illness from being present at the hearing" (Burley, 70 AD2d at 518; see People ex rel. Moore v Warden of Rikers Is. Correctional Facility, 36 AD3d 494, 495 [1st Dept 2007] [finding no timeliness violation where a timely scheduled preliminary hearing was adjourned to "accommodate petitioner's religious and medical needs"]). DOCCS confirmed petitioner's continued hospitalization on February 18, 19, and 20. Petitioner was released from custody on March 4, and the hearing was promptly rescheduled to March 6 (see People ex rel. Goldberg v Warden of Rikers Is. Correctional Facility, 45 AD3d 356, 356 [1st Dept 2007] [finding no timeliness violation where a timely scheduled hearing was adjourned because of medical confinement, the parole authority rescheduled the hearing after learning that confinement ended, and no prejudice resulted from the delay]). Although petitioner argues that DOCCS could have afforded petitioner a virtual preliminary hearing, DOCCS is not required to do so (see Executive Law § 259-i [3] [c] [ii] [providing that a preliminary hearing "shall be scheduled and held in a courthouse" and if a courthouse is not reasonably available, that DOCCS "may designate a suitable office or other similar facility" for the hearing]). While these circumstances may prompt concern about potential due process implications due to the delay, the documented inquiries followed by prompt rescheduling after petitioner's release demonstrate that DOCCS acted energetically and scrupulously to minimize the delay resulting from petitioner's medical confinement (Morant, 35 AD3d at 209; Burley, 70 AD2d at 519).

The March 6 hearing did not proceed because petitioner failed to appear. Petitioner's failure to appear constituted a legitimate reason for adjournment (see Morant, 35 AD3d at 209 [finding no prejudice from delay where "adjournment of the hearing was due, at least in part, to issues [the releasee] had raised"]; cf. Executive Law § 259-i [3] [f] [i] [C] [extending time limit for final revocation hearing where the releasee "by [their] actions otherwise precludes the prompt conduct of such proceedings"]).

The March 13 hearing did not proceed because petitioner was hospitalized again. As before, petitioner's medical unavailability supplied a legitimate reason for the adjournment (Burley, 70 AD2d at 519; Goldberg, 45 AD3d at 356). The matter was rescheduled for March 20, and DOCCS confirmed on March 19 that petitioner remained hospitalized.

The March 20 hearing did not proceed because petitioner had been transferred to Rikers Island without notice to DOCCS and was not produced. That unexpected transfer in custody constituted a legitimate reason for the adjournment (see Morant, 35 AD3d at 209 [finding no timeliness violation where a timely scheduled preliminary hearing was "adjourned for legitimate reasons, without prejudice to the petitioner"]). DOCCS had confirmed just the previous day that petitioner remained admitted to the hospital. Once the unexpected transfer prevented the March 20 hearing from proceeding, the matter was adjourned to March 27 and held in its entirety. On this record, DOCCS acted with sufficient diligence by checking petitioner's status the day before the scheduled hearing and completing the hearing one week after the transfer prevented the March 20 hearing from proceeding (id.; Burley, 70 AD2d at 519).

In summary, because each adjournment of the preliminary hearing was prompted by legitimate reasons, including petitioner's hospitalization, petitioner's nonappearance, and unforeseen custodial transfers, and because DOCCS acted diligently to reschedule each hearing as soon as practicable, the record does not support petitioner's claim that the preliminary hearing was untimely.

Accordingly, it is hereby

ORDERED and ADJUDGED that the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is DENIED, and, as a result, this habeas corpus proceeding is hereby DISMISSED in its entirety; it is further

ORDERED and ADJUDGED that petitioner is REMANDED to the custody of respondent and shall be detained pursuant to the securing order issued by the recognizance court in connection with parole warrant No. 864115.

Dated: September 8, 2026

Bronx, New York

HON. VERENA C. POWELL, A.J.S.C.

Verena C. Powell, J.