KAREEM GRIFFITH v. STANLEY RICHARDS (2026)

Petitioner Kareem Griffith was detained by respondent Department of Corrections and Community Supervision (DOCCS) for allegedly violating specified conditions of release during his community supervision. In this proceeding, petitioner challenges the legality of his continued detention by way of a writ of habeas corpus, specifically contending that the charge established at the preliminary parole revocation hearing constitutes a technical violation that cannot lawfully justify his continued detention pending the final hearing. For the reasons stated herein, the petition is DENIED, and the writ is DISMISSED.

On June 22, 2026, petitioner was adjudicated guilty in Lee County, Florida, of refusal to submit to DUI testing subsequent offense, a first degree misdemeanor (Fla Sta § 316.1939 [1] [e]). Subsequently, petitioner was arrested on August 4, 2026. The next day, August 5, 2026, a recognizance hearing was held, during which petitioner was remanded. A preliminary hearing occurred on August 7, 2026. At that preliminary hearing, DOCCS proceeded on charge 14, alleging a violation of rule 8 of the conditions of release, which prohibits conduct that violates a law punishable by imprisonment. The charge specifically referenced the June 22, 2026, adjudication of guilt for refusal to submit to DUI testing. At the conclusion of the hearing, the hearing officer found by a preponderance of the evidence that petitioner had violated a condition of release in an important respect. Petitioner now contends that the charge established at the preliminary hearing could not authorize his continued detention because as it was allegedly a technical violation for which he faces no sanction of reincarceration.

A preliminary hearing fulfills the due process requirement articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Morrissey v Brewer (408 US 471, 485 [1972]), which mandates that parolees are entitled to an initial hearing to determine whether there is probable cause to believe a violation has occurred, thereby providing a lawful basis for continued detention while awaiting a final revocation hearing. ). Consistent with Morrissey, the statutory scheme also conditions continued detention on the existence of violations that, if established, may result in reincarceration (Executive Law §§ 259-i [3] [a] [i], [f] [xii]).

The statutory framework for parole revocation proceedings distinguishes between technical and non-technical violations in part by the sanctions each may carry. A non-technical violation always carries the possibility of reincarceration if sustained, while a technical violation does so only in specified circumstances (see Executive Law § 259-i [3] [f] [xi], [xii]). Technical violations encompass "any conduct that violates a condition of community supervision in an important respect, other than the commission of a new felony or misdemeanor offense under the penal law" (Executive Law § 259 [6]). Non-technical violations include "the commission of a new felony or misdemeanor offense" (Executive Law § 259 [7] [a]). Certain conduct by a releasee serving a sentence for a sex offense or incest may also constitute a non-technical violation (Executive Law § 259 [7] [b]). The statutory definitions of both technical and non-technical violations refer to "a new felony or misdemeanor offense." Still, only the definition of a technical violation adds the words "under the penal law."

The two definitions were enacted together within the same statute (L 2021, ch 427, § 1). As a principle of statutory construction, "[w]hen different terms are used in various parts of a statute or rule, it is reasonable to assume that a distinction between them is intended" (Matter of Albano v Kirby, 36 NY2d 526, 530 [1975]). By including the words "under the penal law" in only one provision and excluding them from the other, the statute distinguishes the two categories. Thus, felonies and misdemeanors prosecuted under the New York Penal Law are automatically excluded from classification as technical violations and are instead classified as non-technical violations, which always carry the possibility of reincarceration. Felonies and misdemeanors arising outside the New York Penal Law, by contrast, may qualify as technical violations, non-technical violations, or both.

An alternative construction interprets the phrase "under the penal law" as modifying to both technical and non-technical violations, thereby seeking to prevent any overlap between the two categories (People ex rel. Jaeb v Martuscello, 81 Misc 3d 317, 320 [Sup Ct, Dutchess County 2023]). Under this approach, all felonies and misdemeanors prosecuted under the New York Penal Law would be treated as non-technical violations, while all such offenses arising under laws outside the Penal Law would be treated as technical violations. Proponents of this reading argue that it provides clarity and ensures mutually exclusive categories for violation classification. However, this interpretation is subject to statutory limitations, as the phrase "under the penal law" appears only within the definition of a technical violation. Thus, importing the phrase into the definition of non-technical violations is not compelled by the statutory language and would constitute a judicial amendment of the statute, a practice courts have expressly rejected: "a court cannot amend a statute by inserting words that are not there . . . ." (Matter of Chemical Specialties Mfrs. Assn. v Jorling, 85 NY2d 382, 394 [1995], quoting McKinney's Cons Laws of NY, Book 1, Statutes § 363). Consequently, while the alternative construction addresses concerns of categorical overlap, it ultimately conflicts with established principles of statutory interpretation and the plain meaning of the enacted text.

Implicit in this alternative construction is the idea that technical and non-technical violation categories cannot overlap. Yet there are categories of conduct that could qualify as both technical and non-technical violations. Absconding, for example, is commonly classified as a technical violation as it may constitute "conduct that violates a condition of community supervision in an important respect, other than the commission of a new felony or misdemeanor offense under the penal law" (Executive Law § 259 [6]). However, absconding may also constitute a non-technical violation for a releasee serving a sentence for an article 130 sex offense (Executive Law § 259 [7] [b]; see People ex rel. Marrero v Stanford, 218 AD3d 1105, 1108-1109 [3d Dept 2023]). Thus, conduct that otherwise qualifies as a technical violation may also qualify as a non-technical violation. The possibility that violation categories can overlap does not require reading the phrase "under the penal law" into the definition of a non-technical violation.

By regulation, a case "shall be considered a non-technical violation case" when at least one charge alleges "a felony or misdemeanor offense in and pursuant to the laws of any jurisdiction" (9 NYCRR 8004.8 [b] [1]). The regulation requires no separate showing that such an offense has an equivalent under the New York Penal Law.

The classification of the alleged violation turns on the violation "as noticed and sustained" (People ex rel. Baker v Martuscello, 89 Misc 3d 1237[A], 2026 NY Slip Op 51179[U], *3 [Sup Ct, Bronx County 2026]). Here, the violation established at the preliminary hearing was petitioner's refusal to submit to DUI testing (Fla Sta § 316.1939 [1] [e]), which Florida law classifies as a misdemeanor. The established charge therefore constitutes "a new felony or misdemeanor offense" and qualifies as a non-technical violation (Executive Law § 259 [7] [a]).

Because the established charge qualifies as a non-technical violation, the statutory framework permits reincarceration if the charge is ultimately sustained at the final revocation hearing (Executive Law § 259-i [3] [f] [xii]). In this context, the existence of a non-technical violation provides sufficient legal basis for DOCCS to continue petitioner's detention pending the final hearing, as it satisfies the requirement that continued detention is permissible when the alleged violation, if proved, may result in reincarceration. Therefore, since petitioner's detention stems from a non-technical violation that could lawfully justify further custody, petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on this basis.

Accordingly, it is hereby

ORDERED and ADJUDGED that the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is DENIED, and, as a result, this habeas corpus proceeding is hereby DISMISSED in its entirety; it is further

ORDERED and ADJUDGED that petitioner is REMANDED to the custody of respondent and shall be detained pursuant to the securing order issued by the recognizance court in connection with parole warrant No. 857033.

Dated: September 8, 2026

Bronx, New York

HON. VERENA C. POWELL, A.J.S.C.

Verena C. Powell, J.