The People of the State of New York v. Shatiek Langston Martin, Defendant (2026)

The defendant moves for an order dismissing the indictment pursuant to CPL §§ 190.50, 210.20(1)(c), 210.35(4), 245.10(1)(c), and 245.80(1). The People oppose.

For the reasons set forth below, the motion is granted to the extent that the People are precluded from using the defendant's purported self-identification in their case-in-chief.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On February 25, 2026, the defendant was arraigned in lower criminal court on a felony complaint charging Robbery in the First Degree (PL § 160.15[3]) and other related charges. The People served CPL § 190.50 notice of their intention to present the case to the grand jury, with the defendant's time to testify set for March 2, 2026, at 1:00 P.M. The defendant served reciprocal CPL § 190.50 notice of their intention to testify before the grand jury. The court issued a monetary securing order, and the matter was adjourned to March 2, 2026, for grand jury action.

On February 27, 2026, at 11:13 AM, the People disclosed body-worn camera footage and an interrogation video containing the defendant's statements. The interrogation video revealed a police detective and a second officer showing the defendant three still images pulled from a surveillance video, and the defendant purporting to self-identify in one of the still images. The specific still images are not discernible from the video recording. On the same date as the disclosure, the defendant requested that the People provide copies of the three still images used in the interrogation and specify which still image was used in the purported self-identification. The defendant reasoned that the additional disclosure was necessary to understand the substance of the defendant's oral statements, and specifically which still image the defendant purportedly self-identified. Later that same afternoon, the People disclosed the surveillance video from which the still images were taken but did not respond to the defendant's request to disclose the three still images and specify which specific still image was used for the purported self-identification.

On March 2, 2026, before the calendar call, the defendant emailed the People to reiterate their request for disclosure of the still images used in the interrogation. In response, the People disclosed only one still image. Still, they could not clarify whether it was used in the interrogation or specify whether it was used in the purported self-identification. At the call of the calendar in lower criminal court on March 2, 2026, the defendant argued that the People had violated CPL § 245.10(1)(c) by failing to disclose the three still images used during the interrogation and by failing to specify which still image was used for the defendant's purported self-identification.

The defendant repeated the argument that the discovery was necessary to understand the context of the defendant's statement, particularly the purported self-identification. The defendant asserted that the appropriate remedy for the People's failure to disclose the materials and information was the defendant's release from custody. The lower court judge ordered the People to turn over "the photographs" to the defendant and second-called the case for production of the disclosure materials and for the assigned Assistant District Attorney to appear.

The People then called the case detective to ask which still images were used but did not reach the detective because it was the detective's regular day off. The People did not call the second officer who was present during the defendant's interrogation. The People then provided the defendant with copies of eleven still images taken from the surveillance videos. However, the People still could not identify which three still images were used during the interrogation or which specific still image was used in the purported self-identification. However, the People told the defendant that they would not call the case detective to testify in the grand jury presentation.

The parties appeared in lower criminal court for a second time on March 2, 2026, at which time the defendant reiterated their request for release based on the People's violation of CPL § 245.10(1)(c). The lower court judge denied the defendant's application. The defendant then withdrew the reciprocal § 190.50 notice, arguing that they could not adequately prepare to testify without identification of the photographs. The defendant was subsequently indicted.

On April 9, 2026, the defendant was arraigned on this indictment. On April 13, 2026, the defendant filed the instant motion to dismiss. The court held oral argument on the instant motion on July 29, 2026. As of the date of oral argument, the People still had not disclosed which three still images were used in the interrogation, or specified which one was used for the defendant's purported self-identification.

ANALYSIS

1. Dismissal on CPL § 190.50 Grounds

The right to testify before the grand jury is not a constitutional right, but rather a statutory right conferred by CPL § 190.50 (People v Smith, 87 NY2d 715, 719 [1996]; People v Lighthall, 6 AD3d 1170 [4th Dept.], lv denied 3 NY3d 643 [2004]). A defendant's right to testify before the grand jury is an important right that "must be scrupulously protected" (Smith, 87 NY2d at 721, citing People v Corrigan, 80 NY2d 326, 332 [1992]; People v Fields, 258 AD2d 593, 594 [2d Dept 1999]). Where a defendant has been arraigned on a felony complaint and serves timely notice of their intent to testify before the grand jury, the People must provide the defendant with a reasonable opportunity to testify in the grand jury before there is a vote (CPL § 190.50[5][a]; People v Evans, 79 NY2d 407, 412-413 [1992]; People v Sawyer, 96 NY2d 815 [2001], rearg denied 96 NY2d 928 [2001]). A reasonable opportunity depends on the particular facts of each case (Sawyer, 96 NY2d at 816).

To challenge an indictment on the grounds that the People violated the defendant's § 190.50 rights, the defendant must have served reciprocal CPL § 190.50 notice and that notice must have remained in effect when the indictment is filed (CPL § 190.50[5]). When an indictment is voted in violation of the defendant's reciprocal notice to testify in the grand jury, a defendant may then challenge the indictment (CPL § 190.50[5][c]).

A grand jury proceeding is considered defective where a defendant who wants to testify is not allowed to appear and testify before the grand jury (CPL § 210.35[4]; People v Sutherland, 104 AD3d 1064, 1065 [3d Dept 2013]). A defendant's right to effective assistance of counsel in the grand jury is crucial to ensure the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Denial of effective assistance of counsel may prevent the defendant from exercising the right to testify before a grand jury (see, e.g., People v Lincoln, 80 AD2d 877 [2d Dept 1981]). However, once a defendant's notice of intent to testify in the grand jury is withdrawn, a defendant's right to challenge an indictment in violation of CPL § 190.50 is extinguished (see, e.g., People v Duran, 266 AD2d 230, 231 [2d Dept], lv denied 94 NY2d 822 [1999]; cf. People v Castillo, 89 Misc 3d 1221[A] [Sup Ct, Queens County 2026]).

Here, the defendant withdrew reciprocal CPL § 190.50 notice before the indictment was voted and is no longer permitted to challenge the grand jury proceedings on these grounds (CPL § 190.50[5][c]; Duran, supra; Castillo, supra). The Court is mindful that under the new grand jury discovery scheme, a defendant is placed in a precarious position when they are unwilling to testify because of a purported discovery violation but must preserve a CPL § 190.50 violation. However, the Legislature did not provide for a CPL § 190.50(5)(c) challenge on the grounds of a CPL § 245.10(1)(c) discovery violation after withdrawing CPL § 190.50 notice. As such, the Court is constrained to deny a CPL § 190.50(5)(c) challenge when a defendant has withdrawn reciprocal CPL § 190.50 notice (Duran, supra).

Accordingly, the motion to dismiss the indictment pursuant to CPL § 190.50(5)(c) is denied.

2. Dismissal on CPL § 245.10(1)(c) Grounds

In 2019, the Legislature enacted discovery requirements before a defendant's opportunity to testify in the grand jury. In pertinent part, CPL § 245.10(1)(c) provides:

The prosecution shall disclose statements of the defendant as described in paragraph (a) of subdivision one of section 245.20 of this article to any defendant who has been arraigned in a local criminal court upon a currently undisposed of felony complaint charging an offense which is a subject of a prospective or pending grand jury proceeding, no later than forty-eight hours before the time scheduled for the defendant to testify at a grand jury proceeding pursuant to subdivision five of section 190.50 of this part. Provided, however, that if no grand jury is open and available to hear cases in the time frame necessary to allow the prosecution to provide a forty-eight hour notice, such statement shall be provided no later than twenty-four hours prior to the scheduled time for the defendant to testify before the grand jury pursuant to subdivision five of section 190.50 of this part.

The statements that must be disclosed before a defendant's testimony before the grand jury are defined as all written or recorded statements, and the substance of all oral statements, made to a public servant engaged in law enforcement activity or to a person then acting under their direction or in cooperation with them that relate to the subject matter of the charges against the defendant in the case, or a defense against the charges (CPL § 245.20[1][a] [emphasis added]). The law contemplates three distinct types of statements: (1) those written by the defendant; (2) recorded statements; and (3) oral statements that are heard by other people (typically law enforcement) but not necessarily recorded (id.).

While the Legislature enacted a specific sanction for failing to provide discovery before withdrawing a pre-indictment offer (CPL § 245.25[1]), it declined to enumerate a specific sanction for failing to comply with grand jury discovery requirements. Rather, the Legislature left it to the trial court to determine an appropriate sanction proportionate to the prejudice suffered by the party entitled to disclosure pursuant to CPL § 245.80(1)(a).

When the defendant claims a discovery violation, they must show prejudice from the delay in disclosure to be entitled to sanctions (People v Ramjattan, 219 AD3d 1348, 1351 [2d Dept], lv denied 40 NY3d 1040 [2023]). The superior court has proper jurisdiction to evaluate a claim of a discovery violation in the grand jury and to consider any proportionate sanctions (People v Burgess, 84 Misc 3d 1246[A] [Crim Ct, Kings County 2024]). After evaluating and determining that prejudice has been shown, the court must impose a proportional sanction for late discovery or, at a minimum, provide the defendant with additional time to review the discovery and prepare for further proceedings (CPL § 245.80[1][a]). In determining the appropriate sanction, the court must consider the People's due diligence in obtaining the discoverable materials (see People v Bay, 41 NY3d 200 [2023]). Dismissal is an extreme remedy (id. at 210), and preclusion of evidence is a severe remedy (People v Jenkins, 98 NY2d 280, 284 [2002]); both are available only when all lesser remedies are inadequate. Preclusion may be appropriate even where the discovery violation is without bad faith or lack of due diligence and the People take immediate steps to provide late discovery (People v Emanuel, 239 AD3d 767 [2d Dept], lv denied 44 NY3d 1011 [2025]).

a.Disputed Discovery

At the outset, the defendant erroneously sought relief for the claimed grand jury discovery violation in lower criminal court, which has no jurisdiction over grand jury proceedings (Burgess, supra). As a result, there was no opportunity to address the alleged discovery violation before the grand jury vote or any prejudice arising from the missing discovery.

Prior to 2019, a defendant was not entitled to any pre-indictment discovery. In 2019, the Legislature required the People to provide a defendant with their own statements before a defendant testified in the grand jury (CPL § 245.10[1][c]). The grand jury discovery requirement is significant and gives a defendant the opportunity to make knowing and intelligent choices, in consultation with their attorney, about whether to testify before the grand jury. The decision to testify before the grand jury, although ultimately an attorney's decision (People v Brown, 116 AD3d 568, 569 [1st Dept], lv denied 24 NY3d 1001 [2014]), is one that requires a defendant to waive their Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. As such, not only must the People provide the defendant's statement, but it must be provided in a meaningful way that allows the defendant to make a knowing and intelligent waiver of their Fifth Amendment rights, receive effective assistance of counsel as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment, and allows an attorney to make a professional determination on the potential pitfalls of allowing the defendant to testify in the grand jury.

The People's use of video evidence and still images taken from video has become commonplace for identification in criminal actions. As such, a still image used for self-identification may be crucial to a defendant's consideration of the evidence when preparing to testify in the grand jury.

The disclosure of a video recorded statement generally satisfies the People's grand jury discovery obligations. In many video recordings, the evidentiary value of the statement can be easily ascertained by simply watching the video. However, when the defendant purports to self-identify in the video while pointing to a still image that cannot be identified from the video itself, the defendant cannot make an intelligent decision about whether to testify before the grand jury without more information. Moreover, defense counsel, who was most likely not present when the statement was made, also will not have sufficient information to give meaningful legal advice or determine whether the defendant should testify before the grand jury (Brown, supra). Under such circumstances, failing to disclose the specific still image that constitutes the self-identification is a violation of the People's obligation to provide the sum and substance of the defendant's oral statement as contemplated by CPL § 245.10(1)(c).

Here, the People properly provided the defendant's recorded statement. The defendant's argument that CPL § 245.10(1)(c) required discovery to be disclosed less than 48 hours before their scheduled testimony, exclusive of the weekend, is not persuasive. The Defendant was scheduled to testify on March 2, 2026, at 1:00 PM. The People provided body-worn camera footage and the interrogation video containing the defendant's statements on February 27, 2026, at 11:13 AM, more than 72 hours before the defendant was scheduled to testify (CPL § 245.10[1][c]).

However, the defendant's recorded statement contained an oral statement of a purported self-identification from a still image and the mere disclosure of the recorded statement was insufficient to satisfy the People's grand jury discovery obligations. Neither the People nor the defendant could determine which still images were used in the video recording, or which one constituted the purported self-identification. Thus, the defendant and defense counsel could not determine the evidentiary significance of the purported self-identification from the People's disclosure. The defendant properly conferred in an effort to obtain specificity as to the still images used in the interrogation and the purported self-identification. The People failed to provide that specificity.

The still images are inextricably interwoven with the purported self-identification. They are necessary to understand the sum and substance of the oral statement that was disclosed as part of the recorded statement. Providing almost a dozen still images, without identifying the one used in the purported self-identification, was insufficient to satisfy the People's discovery obligations and only caused more ambiguity. Thus, disclosing the recorded statement without disclosing the specific still images used and the one identified was insufficient (CPL § 245.10[1][c]). The People were required to disclose the still images used in the interrogation and identify the specific still image that the defendant purportedly self-identified. This disclosure is necessary to provide the defendant with the sum and substance of the oral statement and allow the defendant a meaningful opportunity to evaluate the statement's evidentiary value (see People v Castillo, 89 Misc 3d 1221[A] [Sup Ct, Queens County 2026]).

The People asserted that they would not call the detective in the grand jury. This self-imposed sanction was meaningless. The detective was already unavailable and would not have testified regardless of the discovery dispute. Moreover, the People's statutory obligation to provide grand jury discovery is not predicated upon their use of the required discovery. The law is designed to provide defendants with the evidence against them so that they can make an informed decision to exercise or waive the right to testify in the grand jury.

b. Prejudice to the Defendant

The People's failure to meet their discovery obligation caused the defendant to withdraw reciprocal CPL § 190.50 notice. The defendant lost the opportunity to testify in the grand jury. The grand jury voted to indict the defendant. Prior to the grand jury vote, the defendant failed to seek a remedy in the superior court, the only court with authority to address the claim. This Court is mindful that the appellate courts have not ruled on this issue and the law remains unsettled. Thus, the defendant's attempt to seek a remedy in the lower criminal court, while erroneous, does not negate the prejudice suffered. Concomitantly, the People's initial failure to provide the still images and identify the one used in the purported self-identification is understandable. However, the failure to provide the discovery after conferral by the defendant was prejudicial. The court also considers that the defendant has not indicated that they have meaningful testimony to give in the grand jury, only that they lost the ability to make an informed decision about whether to testify in the grand jury.

On balance, the defendant suffered prejudice by losing the ability to make an informed decision to waive the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination after consultation and authorization to testify by effective counsel, as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment, and, along with that, the right to testify in the grand jury.

c. Due Diligence

After the defendant requested the three still images used in the interrogation and specifically the one in which the defendant purportedly self-identified, the People shared one still image. Still, they could not specify if it was used in the purported self-identification. The People further confused the issue by providing eleven additional still images but provided no clarity as to which still image was used in the purported self-identification. When the People failed to contact the off-duty case detective, they made no effort to contact the second officer present at the interrogation, or the case detective's supervisor to ascertain information about the still images. Indeed, as of the date of oral argument on this motion (July 29, 2026), the People still had neither identified the still images that were used in the interrogation and the purported self-identification nor provided any reason for the failure to disclose this information.

The knowledge of which three still images were used in the interrogation, and which one was purportedly self-identified, is within the People's constructive possession (CPL § 245.20[2]). The defendant should not be penalized by the People's failure to meet their statutory obligation (see Evans, supra). The People did not act diligently or make reasonable inquiries to ascertain the materials subject to discovery after conferral by the defendant or take any steps after the defendant was indicted to provide the discovery. The People were responsible for ensuring they met their discovery obligations, particularly considering the limited statutory time to provide discovery during grand jury proceedings.

d. Proportional Sanctions

Dismissal of the indictment is not proportional in light of the defendant's actions that precluded jurisdictionally authorized court intervention, and a more appropriate lesser remedy exists. Instead, the facts warrant preclusion. Weighed against the defendant's own failings, the People's lack of diligence before the grand jury vote is inexplicable and compounded by their continued failure to disclose the disputed discovery approximately four months later. No sanction less than preclusion is proportional to the prejudice suffered by this defendant.

Accordingly, the defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment for violation of CPL § 245.10(1)(c) is granted to the extent that the People are precluded from using in their case-in-chief the defendant's purported self-identification made during the defendant's interrogation (CPL § 245.80[1]; see Emanuel, supra).

The foregoing constitutes the Decision and Order of the Court.

Dated: October 2, 2026

Kings County, New York

Hon. Dale Fong-Frederick, A.J.S.C.

Dale Fong-Frederick, J.