Erik Pratt, Plaintiff, v. CHARLES BAKER (2026)

Plaintiff, Erik Pratt, commend this action by filing a summons and complaint on September 4, 2026, against the National Collegiate Athletic Association (the "NCAA") and Charles D. Baker, in his official capacity as President of the National Collegiate Athletic Association, on behalf of the National Collegiate Athletic Association. The complaint contains one cause of action for breach of contract and one cause of action for breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.

On the same day that the complaint was filed, Mr. Pratt moved via Order to Show Cause [NYSCEF Doc. Nos. 3-16 & 22] seeking an Order (a) enjoining the NCAA, and their officers, servants, employees, and all persons acting in concert with them, from enforcing NCAA by-laws 12.6 and 12.9.4.2, or any related eligibility rule, against Plaintiff or any NCAA member institution based upon actions taken in compliance with any order of this Court; (b) enjoining the NCAA from enforcing against Plaintiff any subsequently adopted, amended, or superseding by-law, interpretation, or rule that would have the effect of denying Plaintiff eligibility to compete during the 2026-2027 season; (c) enjoining the NCAA from treating Plaintiff's 2023-2024 season at Texas A&M University as a used season of competition, pursuant to NCAA bylaw 12.6.4, given his participation in fewer than 30% of that team's games due to circumstances beyond his control; (d) enjoining NCAA from enforcing the Rule of Restitution against Plaintiff or any institution that plays intercollegiate athletics for complying with and/or relying on any order entered by this Court; and (e) enjoining the NCAA from treating Plaintiff's recently signed professional basketball contract with a team in Turkey as a bar to the relief sought herein. The NCAA opposes said relief [NYSCEF Doc. Nos. 17-21].

On September 10, 2026, the parties, by their counsel, appeared before this Court for oral argument related to plaintiff's order to show cause seeking a temporary restraining order. After oral argument, the Court granted plaintiff's request for a temporary restraining order (the "TRO") and scheduled a hearing for September 17, 2026 on plaintiff's preliminary injunction request.

On September 17, 2026, the Court heard arguments from counsel and testimony from plaintiff Erik Pratt in support of a preliminary injunction and Jerry L. Vaughn, Jr., in opposition thereto. Plaintiff's counsel moved to strike the NCAA's Memorandum of Law [NYSCEF Doc. No. 23] as it was filed after the close of business September 16, 2026 in contravention of the TRO which required the filing by September 14, 2026. The lateness of the filing prevented plaintiff from filing a sur-reply as permitted in the TRO and therefore plaintiff's oral application to strike defendant's Memorandum of Law is granted. The Court also incorporates by reference the proceedings and colloquy of counsel at the TRO hearing conducted; and after due deliberation, it is

ORDERED that Mr. Pratt is conditionally granted preliminary injunctive relief to the extent that the NCAA is further enjoined until October 31, 2026, from taking any of the actions contained in the TRO, at which time the injunction will expire unless Mr. Pratt is an enrolled student in an educational member institution under the jurisdiction of the NCAA who has filed an application for an eligibility extension ("Eligibility Extension Application") on his behalf. If an Eligibility Extension Application is filed by October 31, 2026, the NCAA will have until November 30, 2026, to render a decision on the Eligibility Extension Application during which time the preliminary injunction will continue. If no decision on the Eligibility Extension Application is made by the NCAA by November 30, 2026, the injunction imposed herein is automatically extended until a final disposition of this action. The injunction shall otherwise terminate upon the later of ten days after Mr. Pratt's receipt of a decision on his Eligibility Extension Application or November 30, 2026. Mr. Pratt is free to seek further injunctive relief on the issues of whether: (i) the NCAA decision of denial on the Eligibility Extension Application (with explanation) is arbitrary and capricious; (ii) the NCAA decision of denial on the Eligibility Extension Application violates the NCAA by-laws; or (iii) an administrative (NCAA) appeal of the denial of the Eligibility Extension Application to the Committee on Student Athletic Re-instatement is warranted.

DECISION

The decision to grant or deny injunctive provisional relief, which requires the Court at the injunction hearing to weigh a variety of factors, is a matter ordinarily committed to the sound discretion of the lower courts. Nobu Next Door LLC v Fine Arts Housing Inc., 4 NY3d 839, 800 NYS2d 48 (2005). The party seeking a preliminary injunction must demonstrate a probability of success on the merits, a danger of irreparable injury in the absence of an injunction and a balance of equities in its favor. See CPLR § 6301, Doe v Axelrod, 73 NY2d 748, 536 NYS2d 44 (1988). In this case, the probability of success on the merits is the element that the Court believes deserves most attention. The two causes of action - whose merits must be weighed - involve common law breach of contract theories related to third-party beneficiary rights and a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.

The Court's inquiry at the TRO and Preliminary Injunction hearings established the following undisputed facts:

1. The NCAA conceded on the record during the TRO hearing, that Mr. Pratt's two-years playing Junior College basketball (hereafter "JUCO") would not count towards his collegiate athletic eligibility and that the issue of his JUCO participation is irrelevant and need not be considered by the Court in the context of this injunction application;

2. Similarly, it was also the Court's understanding at the TRO hearing that the issue of Mr. Pratt's having signed a contract to play professional basketball in Turkey would not be considered for the purpose of this application - although the NCAA reserved the right to raise it in its answer to the subject complaint;¹

3. On February 10, 2026, Stony Brook University (hereafter "Stony Brook") filed an application with the NCAA seeking an extra year of athletic eligibility for Mr. Pratt under the NCAA by-laws as they existed on said date. This application involved the 2022-2023 season when Mr. Pratt played basketball for Texas A&M;

4. Prior to the Eligibility Extension Application, Mr. Pratt played for two years at the University of Wisconsin (Milwaukee) during the 2023-2024 and 2024-2025 seasons and one year at Stony Brook during 2025-2026 season equating to the expenditure of three years of athletic eligibility;

5. During 2026, the NCAA amended its by-laws to establish a 5-year participation period without the availability of hardship extension waivers. At the time of the Eligibility Extension Application, the NCAA by-laws allowed 4 years of athletic participation with the availability of hardship extensions;

6. Mr. Pratt did not receive a decision upon Stony Brook's Eligibility Extension Application. Rather, Mr. Pratt/Stony Brook received a "Cancellation" notice (from the NCAA)[NYSCEF Doc. No. 21] pertaining to the Eligibility Extension Application on June 23, 2026, over four months after it was submitted;

7. The parties dispute whether the Eligibility Extension Application was made under NCAA bylaw 12.6.4 or 12.6.6. However, it is undisputed that nowhere in the by-laws is the term "cancellation" defined or a process declared as to how "cancellation" is a decisional option to respond to an Eligibility Extension Application. The NCAA by-laws allow for an appeal of a hardship waiver denial to the Committee on Student Athletic Reinstatement which does not occur in the event of a non-merit-based "cancellation;"

8. The NCAA asserts that Stony Brook certified that Mr. Pratt had exhausted his athletic eligibility when Stony Brook applied for a "Pavia" JUCO waiver. The NCAA by-laws do not acknowledge or otherwise define the conditions for granting a Pavia waiver even though they appear to have been universally granted for the 2025-2026 season;

9. There are several NCAA by-laws which allow for the extension of athletic eligibility such as Hardship (12.6.4); Extra Season of Competition (12.6.6); and Five-Year Eligibility Rule Waiver (12.6.1.7); and

10. Mr. Pratt is not currently an enrolled student at any collegiate institution.

The NCAA Failed to Proffer Evidence of a Waiver

The NCAA first argues that Stony Brook waived Mr. Pratt's right under the NCAA by-laws to apply for an eligibility extension for his Texas A&M 2022-2023 season because he allegedly certified in February 2026 that he had exhausted his years of eligibility when Stony Brook applied for the Pavia waiver.

"Waiver" is the voluntary and intentional relinquishment of a contract right; as an intentional relinquishment of a known right, a waiver should not be lightly presumed. Diversified Building Co., LLC v Nader Enterprises, LLC, 243 AD3d 542 (2d Dept. 2025). Although a party to a contract may waive his or her rights, such relinquishment must be knowing and voluntary. Kwasnik v King, 123 AD3d 1264 (2d Dept. 2014). An effective waiver of such rights must be free from any indicia of duress or coercion. Id. at 1266 citing Gould v Board of Educ. of Sewanhaka Cent. High School Dist., 81 NY2d 446 (1993).

The NCAA's counsel, when queried by the Court, acknowledged that the NCAA has not proffered written evidence of Stony Brook's application that contained the alleged certification that Mr. Pratt exhausted his years of eligibility — the sole explanation provided in the "cancellation" of his Eligibility Extension Application. Indeed, the NCAA witness could not point to a by-law requiring such a certification before entertaining a Pavia waiver.

A waiver may be proved by undisputed acts or language inconsistent with the party's purpose to stand upon his rights as to leave no opportunity for a reasonable inference to the contrary. Kamco Supply Corp. v On the Right Track, LLC, 149 AD3d 275 (2d Dept. 2017). At this stage in the litigation, the NCAA has failed to show that Mr. Pratt certified he waived or otherwise exhausted his years of athletic eligibility.

"Cancellation" of Plaintiff's Eligibility Extension Application

The NCAA next argues that because the Eligibility Extension Application was "cancelled" Mr. Pratt is ineligible to play in the 2026-2027 season. It is significant that the NCAA by-laws do not define cancellation or declare how cancellation is a decisional option to an Eligibility Extension Application.

Defendant's witness, the NCAA's Director of Athletic eligibility, testified that the NCAA employed a "Denial Directive" for recipients of Pavia eligibility extensions. This was described as an internal standing policy directing the NCAA staff to cancel hardship waiver requests regardless of the individual facts presented. Mr. Pratt argues that he is likely to succeed in showing that the NCAA breached its duty to him by cancelling his Texas A&M hardship waiver request pursuant to a predetermined Denial Directive that instructs the NCAA staff to deny requests for additional seasons of competition, without the individualized, good faith consideration implied in the performance of its contractual duties.

The NCAA's determination to "cancel" Mr. Pratt's Eligibility Extension Application, as opposed to denying same (for failure to meet a threshold requirement), is significant for several reasons. First, the NCAA has failed to show that threshold requirement(s) are in the NCAA by-laws. Second, by "cancelling" his application, Mr. Pratt was deprived of an opportunity to appeal a denial decision to the Committee on Student Athletic Re-instatement as provided for in the by-laws. Third, the cancellation denied Mr. Pratt's application an individualized review.

Based upon the pleadings, documents, arguments and testimony, the Court determines that it is likely that a trier of fact would find that the NCAA's issuance of a "cancellation" in lieu of a decision of approval or denial is a violation of its by-laws and is a sufficiently arbitrary and capricious act so as to violate Mr. Pratt's common law contractual rights as detailed in his complaint.

The equities in the action favor Mr. Pratt. The prejudice to the NCAA if the Court grants injunctive relief is de minimis compared to the prejudice which would be suffered by Mr. Pratt in the absence of the requested relief. Any prospective monetary relief is speculative in the absence of preserving the status quo and would not provide a totally appropriate remedy. As such a preliminary injunction is warranted and is conditionally granted. Mr. Pratt will not be required to post an undertaking as required by New York CPLR 6312 (b).

Dated: September 21, 2026

Hon. C. Stephen Hackeling, JSC

FOOTNOTES

1.   While not stipulated by the NCAA, this posture appears appropriate as it was uncontested that it granted over 120 professionalism blanket waivers for basketball players in 2025 to allow for post professional college athletic participation. The JUCO and professionalism issues possibly involve Sherman Anti-Trust violation issues which are not presented for consideration in the instant lawsuit. As NYSCEF Doc. No. 22 was stricken, the Court will not consider the professionalism argument first raised therein.

C. Stephen Hackeling, J.