Dallas Scott, Petitioner, v. The Trustees of Columbia University in the City of New York, Respondent. (2026)

Petitioner Dallas Scott brings this Art. 78 proceeding and order to show cause for a preliminary injunction (motion seq. 001) challenging a determination by Columbia University to hold in abeyance petitioner's request for a discretionary extension of time to complete his degree through the Fall 2026 term, pending a final determination of certain harassment complaints against petitioner currently pending within the university's Office of Institutional Equity ("OIE"). Petitioner asserts that the final determination of the OIE complaints likely will not be issued until October 2026, which would render moot his request for leave to matriculate in Fall 2026 and would make him ineligible for university housing. Thus, under motion sequence 001, petitioner seeks an order directing Columbia to render an expedited decision on his application for an extension of time to complete his degree without waiting for a final determination by OIE on the harassment complaints against him.

Under motion seq. 003, petitioner moves by order to show cause for leave to amend the caption to proceed under the pseudonym "D.S."; and to seal the entire docket or, in the alternative, to redact "sensitive" filings. Columbia opposes both motions.

Background

Petitioner has been enrolled in Columbia's School of Engineering and Applied Science ("SEAS"), working to complete a Master of Science in computer science. During the Spring 2026 term, which was the anticipated term for completion of petitioner's degree, petitioner converted two required courses in which he was enrolled to "pass/fail." The effect of this conversion was that the two pass/fail courses did not satisfy petitioner's remaining degree requirements, and petitioner would have to submit a program extension request to SEAS for additional time to complete his degree.

On or about August 3, 2026, OIE determined that petitioner engaged in prohibited harassment in two separate cases. Petitioner sought, and was granted, an extension of time to appeal the OIE determinations, from August 17 to August 31, 2026; petitioner sought further adjournment of the appellate deadline and was denied (Petition at ¶¶ 14-15 [NYSCEF Doc. 1]; Ex. C to Petition [NYSCEF Doc. 8]).

The deans of SEAS arranged an August 5, 2026 meeting with petitioner to discuss a possible path to degree completion, but petitioner declined the meeting and it was cancelled. By follow-up emails, the SEAS deans explained to petitioner that the OIE matters are "serious," he had the right to appeal OIE's determination, any sanction would follow the completion of the appellate process, and petitioner's extension request would be held in abeyance "[b]ecause a potential sanction may ultimately effect [his] ability to access campus (and thus [his] ability to continue [his] studies and reside in University housing)" (Petition at ¶¶ 16-18; Ex. B to Petition [NYSCEF Doc. 7]). The deans further emphasized that "[r]e-enrollment/extension is not an automatic right, and it is within the School's discretion to hold that decision in abeyance until the OIE matters conclude in light of the seriousness of the two initial determinations" (id.). The parties anticipate the final determination by OIE will not issue until October 2026.

SEAS offered petitioner a possible alternative path to graduation whereby petitioner would be permitted to "uncover" the two pass/fail grades and convert them to letter grades, thus satisfying petitioner's degree requirements without him having to return to campus or complete further coursework. Petitioner has denied this offer because "the underlying grades are below his current cumulative academic performance and would reduce his GPA" (8/17/26 email at 2 [NYSCEF Doc. 11]; 8/17/26 email at 2 [NYSCEF Doc. 10]; 8/19/26 email [NYSCEF Doc. 39]; Memo of Law at 3 [NYSCEF Doc. 31]).

Article 78 and Preliminary Injunction

"Courts have a 'restricted role' in reviewing determinations of colleges and universities" (Powers v St. John's University School of Law, 25 NY3d 210, 216 [2015]; Maas v Cornell Univ., 94 NY2d 87, 92 [1999]; Storino v New York Univ., 193 AD3d 436, 438-439 [1st Dept 2021]). "A determination will not be disturbed unless a school acts arbitrarily and not in the exercise of its honest discretion, it fails to abide by its own rules or imposes a penalty so excessive that it shocks one's sense of fairness" (Powers v St. John's University School of Law, 25 NY3d at 216 [citations omitted]).

Under CPLR 6301, "[t]he party seeking a preliminary injunction must demonstrate a probability of success on the merits, danger of irreparable injury in the absence of an injunction and a balance of the equities in its favor" (Nobu Next Door, LLC v Fine Arts Housing, Inc., 4 NY3d 839, 840 [2005]). "A mandatory preliminary injunction (one mandating specific conduct), by which the movant would receive some form of the ultimate relief sought as a final judgment, is granted only in unusual situations, where the granting of the relief is essential to maintain the status quo pending trial of the action" (Board of Mgrs. of 25 Prince St. Condominium v NYC Prince Holdings LLC, 233 AD3d 605, 606 [1st Dept 2024][citation omitted]).

Petitioner argues that Columbia's decision to hold his extension request in abeyance, pending a final determination of the OIE harassment proceeding, is arbitrary and capricious, and that the school is required to render a decision on his request without taking into account the OIE proceeding or any possible future sanction. Petitioner seems to rely on language purportedly published on SEAS's website concerning "Change of Status" requests generally (see Petition ¶ 13; Ex. H to Petition [NYSCEF Doc. 14]; Ex. B to Schilling Affirm. in Opp, SEAS's Change of Status Webpage [NYSCEF Doc. 71]). He also seems to argue that his petition became moot on September 18, 2026, which was the cut-off for engineering students to enroll. Notably, petitioner fully concedes that the approval of his extension request is not guaranteed and is within Columbia's discretion to decide (see Petition at ¶¶ 10, 13, 32-33).

Columbia argues that its abeyance decision was reasonable and practical under the circumstances. Rather than deny petitioner's extension request outright — which it is undisputed the school has the right to do in an exercise of its discretion — it reasonably concluded that petitioner's request should be held in abeyance pending the outcome of the OIE appeal and sanction decision, particularly given that the possible sanction could restrict petitioner's access to campus during the Fall 2026 term. Columbia stresses that petitioner has been found responsible for engaging in prohibited harassment in two separate matters (see Ex. C to Petition [NYSCEF Doc. 8]), and that the completion of his coursework during the Fall 2026 term would not be achievable should his OIE appeals fail and sanctions be imposed.

Columbia maintains that, even if petitioner's extension request constituted a "Change of Status," nothing in the "Change of Status" language petitioner cites limits factors the school may consider in deciding such requests in an exercise of its broad academic and administrative discretion. In fact, the SEAS website warns that "[p]rogram extensions are not guaranteed" (see Ex. B to Schilling Affirm. in Opp, SEAS's Change of Status Webpage at 7 [NYSCEF Doc. 71]), and Columbia contends that nothing in SEAS policies or procedures imposes a deadline by which the school must decide a program extension request. In its view, students who are dissatisfied with the pace of university decision-making should not be afforded recourse to the courts to seek an order compelling the university to make a decision on a timeline of the student's own choosing.

The Court finds that petitioner has failed to meet his burden of establishing that Columbia's decision to hold in abeyance his request for an extension of time to complete his degree during the Fall 2026 term, pending a final determination by OIE of the harassment matters, was arbitrary and capricious, not in the exercise of Columbia's honest discretion, exhibited a failure to abide by the school's own rules, or imposed a penalty so excessive that it shocks one's sense of fairness (Powers v St. John's University School of Law, 25 NY3d at 216; see, e.g., Storino v New York Univ., 193 AD3d 436, 438-439 [1st Dept 2021][rational basis in the record and not arbitrary and capricious]; Matter of Bondalapati v Columbia Univ., 170 AD3d 489, 490 [1st Dept 2019][decision made in accordance with school policy, was rationally based and not arbitrary and capricious]). Columbia's abeyance decision clearly falls within its academic and administrative discretion, and was not contrary to school policies or rules. Moreover, Columbia has demonstrated its honest discretion and good faith by offering petitioner an alternative option for completion of his degree, which would obviate any prejudice petitioner claims here, including the need for university housing, financial aid, and enrollment in further courses. Accordingly, the petition is denied.

As to petitioner's order to show cause for a mandatory preliminary injunction, petitioner cannot establish a likelihood of success on the merits of his Art. 78 petition, which has been denied. In any event, petitioner has not demonstrated irreparable harm given Columbia's offer to permit him to complete his degree by uncovering the two "pass/fail" courses, and the fact that Columbia has the undisputed discretion to deny petitioner's extension application, or to hold its decision in abeyance. Under the circumstances, the equities clearly weigh against petitioner (Nobu Next Door, LLC v Fine Arts Housing, Inc., 4 NY3d 839, 840 [2005]; CPLR 6301). Petitioner's order to show cause for an injunction is, therefore, denied.

Motion to Seal Record and Amend Caption

Petitioner seeks permanent sealing or redaction of case filings reflecting his identity and "sensitive nonpublic University-process, educational, disability/accommodation, private communication, housing, or personal contact information" (Affirm. in Supp., ¶¶ 2, 8, 14 [NYSCEF Doc. 54]; Memo in Supp., 1-2 [NYSCEF Doc. 56]). He explains that he conducted an internet search of his name and discovered that a commercial docket aggregator had copied information concerning this proceeding, including filed documents, and that such information was the second result for the search of his name. Petitioner particularly notes that the information available online about this case includes his full name and Columbia email address (Affirm. in Supp. at ¶¶ 5-6). He concedes that "[o]nce copied and indexed by third parties, later removal from the court docket may not undo dissemination already [afforded] by unrestricted public access" (id. at ¶ 9). With respect to his alternative request for redaction, petitioner seeks "targeted sealing and public redacted versions sufficient to disclose the legal issues, the parties' positions, and the Court's rulings" (id. at ¶ 12), but does not specify which documents or sections of documents he seeks to redact.

Columbia argues in opposition that petitioner has not established the compelling circumstances needed to warrant retroactive sealing of the docket or to proceed pseudonymously. It underscores that petitioner chose to file this case publicly and his identity and the exhibits he filed are already a matter of public record. Columbia contends that petitioner has not identified any specific, identifiable harm to his privacy, let alone one that differs from that of any litigant in any case in which a legal research platform re-publishes public filings, which is a routine and common occurrence. Columbia insists that the issues before the Court are discrete and do not pose any threat of harm to any significant privacy interest of petitioner (Schilling Affirm. in Opp. [NYSCEF Doc. 66]).

"[T]here is a broad presumption that the public is entitled to access to judicial proceedings and court records" (Mosallem v Berenson, 76 AD3d 345, 348 [1st Dept 2010]). "[C]onfidentiality is the exception and not the rule" and "the party seeking to seal court records has the burden to demonstrate compelling circumstances to justify restricting public access" (Maxim Inc. v Feifer, 145 AD3d 516, 517 [1st Dept 2016] [citations omitted]). Although the term "good cause" is not defined, "22 NYCRR § 216.1 (a) provides that the determination of 'good cause' [for sealing] rests on a consideration of the interests of the public as well as the parties" (Gryphon Dom. VI, LLC v APP Intl. Fin. Co., B.V., 28 AD3d 322, 325 [1st Dept 2006]). The court is required to make its own inquiry to determine whether sealing is warranted, and should not approve wholesale sealing of motion papers, even when both sides to the litigation request it (Applehead Pictures LLC v Perelman, 80 AD3d 181, 192 [1st Dept 2010]). While it may be easier for the parties and the motion court to seal an entire court record, rather than make a sealing determination on a document-by-document basis, administrative convenience is not a compelling reason to justify sealing (Vergara v Mission Capital Advisors, LLC, 187 AD3d 495, 496 [1st Dept 2020]).

"The determination of whether to allow a plaintiff to proceed anonymously requires the court to use its discretion in balancing plaintiff['s] privacy interest against the presumption in favor of open trials and against any potential prejudice to defendant" (Anonymous v Lerner, 124 AD3d 487, 487 [1st Dept 2015][internal quotation marks and citation omitted]). "[P]ermission to use a pseudonym will not be granted automatically" (Twersky v Yeshiva University, 201 AD3d 559, 559 [1st Dept 2022]). "A plaintiff seeking permission to proceed anonymously by employing a pseudonym must provide facts specific to the plaintiff that will allow the motion court to exercise its discretion in an informed manner" (id. at 560). Claims of public humiliation and embarrassment are not sufficient grounds for allowing a plaintiff to proceed anonymously (Anonymous v Lerner, 124 AD3d at 488).

Here, petitioner's request to seal the entire record is denied, as he has failed to overcome the broad presumption of public entitlement to judicial proceedings and court records (W.O. v New York Univ., 226 AD3d 577 [1st Dept 2024]; Norddeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v Tilton, 165 AD3d 447, 448-449 [1st Dept 2018]; Kramer Levin Naftalis & Frankel LLP v Cornell, 148 AD3d 430, 431 [1st Dept 2017]). Most of the categories of information petitioner cites are neither confidential, nor so sensitive as to support sealing of the record (Maxim Inc. v Feifer, 145 AD3d 516, 517 [1st Dept 2016]). As to petitioner's alternative request for redactions, the Court is unable to determine whether such relief might be appropriate, because petitioner has not identified specific documents or proposed redactions.

Turning to petitioner's application to proceed anonymously, the Court notes that petitioner commenced this proceeding in his name, attaching numerous emails and other exhibits to his petition and various orders to show cause. By petitioner's own account, the documents he chose to publicly file are already accessible online and that fact cannot be remedied. Moreover, the Court has denied the petition, so this special proceeding has drawn to its end. Under the circumstances, petitioner's application to proceed anonymously is denied (Doe v Combs, 251 AD3d 459 [1st Dept 2026]; Doe v Doe, 189 AD3d 406, 406-407 [1st Dept 2020]; Wilder v Fresenius Medical Care Holdings, Inc., 175 AD3d 406, 410 [1st Dept 2019]; cf. Doe v KIPP New York, Inc., 238 AD3d 447, 448 [1st Dept 2025]; N.S. v Frankenhoff, 215 AD3d 592, 593 [1st Dept 2023]).

For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby

ORDERED that the Art. 78 petition and petitioner's order to show cause for a preliminary injunction are DENIED and this proceeding is DISMISSED (mot. seq. 001); and it is further

ORDERED that that part of petitioner's order to show cause for permanent sealing of the entire record and to amend the caption to proceed anonymously is DENIED, and that part of the application seeking to redact certain unspecified items is DENIED without prejudice (mot. seq. 003).

This constitutes the decision and order of the Court.

DATE 9/25/2026

ASHLEE CRAWFORD, J.S.C.

Ashlee Crawford, J.