NUNEZ v. 672 PARKSIDE LLC (2026)

DECISION & ORDER

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals from (1) an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Ingrid Joseph, J.), dated April 1, 2024, and (2) an order of the same court dated December 6, 2024.  The order dated April 1, 2024, insofar as appealed from, granted those branches of the motion of the defendants 672 Parkside, LLC, and Townhouse Builders, Inc., which were for summary judgment dismissing the causes of action alleging common-law negligence and a violation of Labor Law § 200 and so much of the cause of action alleging a violation of Labor Law § 241(6) as was predicated on violations of 12 NYCRR 23–1.7(d) and (e)(2) insofar as asserted against them.  The order dated December 6, 2024, insofar as appealed from, upon renewal, adhered to the determination in the order dated April 1, 2024, granting that branch of the motion of the defendants 672 Parkside, LLC, and Townhouse Builders, Inc., which was for summary judgment dismissing so much of the cause of action alleging a violation of Labor Law § 241(6) as was predicated on violations of 12 NYCRR 23–1.7(d) and (e)(2) insofar as asserted against them.

ORDERED that the appeal from so much of the order dated April 1, 2024, as granted that branch of the motion of the defendants 672 Parkside, LLC, and Townhouse Builders, Inc., which was for summary judgment dismissing so much of the cause of action alleging a violation of Labor Law § 241(6) as was predicated on violations of 12 NYCRR 23–1.7(d) and (e)(2) insofar as asserted against them is dismissed, as that portion of the order was superseded by the order dated December 6, 2024, made upon renewal;  and it is further,

ORDERED that the order dated April 1, 2024, is affirmed insofar as reviewed;  and it is further,

ORDERED that the order dated December 6, 2024, is affirmed insofar as appealed from;  and it is further,

ORDERED that one bill of costs is awarded to the respondents.

In March 2018, the plaintiff allegedly was injured while working at a construction site located in Brooklyn.  At the time of the accident, the plaintiff had been tasked with cleaning the first floor of a building, and, as he was carrying a cabinet from one end of the floor to the other, he allegedly slipped and fell on a sheet of metal covered in construction debris.

The plaintiff commenced this action to recover damages for personal injuries against the defendant 672 Parkside, LLC, the owner of the construction site, the defendant Townhouse Builders, Inc., the general contractor on the construction project, and another defendant, alleging common-law negligence and violations of Labor Law §§ 200 and 241(6).  Following the completion of discovery, 672 Parkside, LLC, and Townhouse Builders, Inc. (hereinafter together the defendants), moved, inter alia, for summary judgment dismissing the causes of action alleging common-law negligence and a violation of Labor Law § 200 and so much of the cause of action alleging a violation of Labor Law § 241(6) as was predicated on violations of 12 NYCRR 23–1.7(d) and (e)(2) insofar as asserted against them.  In an order dated April 1, 2024, the Supreme Court, among other things, granted those branches of the defendants' motion.  The plaintiff moved for leave to renew his opposition to that branch of the defendants' motion which was for summary judgment dismissing so much of the cause of action alleging a violation of Labor Law § 241(6) as was predicated upon violations of 12 NYCRR 23–1.7(d) and (e)(2) insofar as asserted against them.  In an order dated December 6, 2024, the court granted leave to renew and, upon renewal, adhered to the determination in the order dated April 1, 2024, granting that branch of the defendants' motion which was for summary judgment dismissing so much of the cause of action alleging a violation of Labor Law § 241(6) as was predicated on violations of 12 NYCRR 23–1.7(d) and (e)(2) insofar as asserted against them.  The plaintiff appeals.

“Labor Law § 241(6) imposes a nondelegable duty upon owners and contractors to provide reasonable and adequate protection and safety to construction workers.  To establish liability under Labor Law § 241(6), a plaintiff ․ must demonstrate that his [or her] injuries were proximately caused by a violation of an Industrial Code provision that is applicable under the circumstances of the case” (Canales v Rye Neck Union Free Sch. Dist., 238 AD3d 836, 839 [internal quotation marks omitted];  see Flores v. Fort Green Homes, LLC, 227 AD3d 672, 674).

Here, the Supreme Court, upon renewal, properly adhered to the prior determination granting that branch of the defendants' motion which was for summary judgment dismissing so much of the cause of action alleging a violation of Labor Law § 241(6) as was predicated on violations of 12 NYCRR 23–1.7(d) and (e)(2) insofar as asserted against them.  The defendants established, prima facie, that the construction debris that covered the sheet of metal upon which the plaintiff allegedly slipped was an integral part of the work he was performing (see Lech v. Castle Vil. Owners Corp., 79 AD3d 819, 821;  Galazka v WFP One Liberty Plaza Co., LLC, 55 AD3D 789, 789–790;  Marinaccio v Arlington Cent. School Dist., 40 AD3d 714, 715).  In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact.

Owners and general contractors, and their agents, have a common-law duty to provide employees with a safe place to work, and Labor Law § 200 merely codified that duty (see Kelly v. RBSL Realty, LLC, 244 AD3d 1086, 1088;  Annicaro v. Corporate Suites, Inc., 98 AD3d 542, 544).  “Cases involving Labor Law § 200 fall into two broad categories:  namely, those where workers are injured as a result of dangerous or defective premises conditions at a work site, and those involving the manner in which the work is performed” (Ortega v. Puccia, 57 AD3d 54, 61;  see Cagua v. Bushwick Holdings, LLC, 238 AD3d 698, 700).  However, “[t]he duty to provide workers with a safe place to work does not extend to hazards that are part of, or inherent in, the very work the worker is performing or defects the worker is hired to repair” (Pacheco v. Judlau Contr., Inc., 186 AD3d 1700, 1701;  see Gasper v. Ford Motor Co., 13 N.Y.2d 104, 110).

Here, the defendants established, prima facie, that the plaintiff's job responsibilities included clearing construction debris from a particular area and that his alleged injuries were caused in the normal course of his removing debris in that area (see Pacheco v. Judlau Contr., Inc., 186 AD3d at 1701;  Annicaro v. Corporate Suites, Inc., 98 AD3d at 544).  In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact.  Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly granted that branch of the defendants' motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the causes of action alleging common-law negligence and a violation of Labor Law § 200 insofar as asserted against them.

The parties' remaining contentions need not be reached in light of our determination.

GENOVESI, J.P., FORD, VOUTSINAS and GOLIA, JJ., concur.