IN RE: Jason B. YEO (2026)

DECISION & ORDER

In related proceedings pursuant to Family Court Act article 8, Kok K. Yeo appeals from two orders of the Family Court, Queens County (Dean T. Kusakabe, J.), both dated July 16, 2025.  The first order denied the motion of Kok K. Yeo to vacate (1) an order of fact-finding and disposition of the same court dated March 12, 2025, finding, inter alia, that Kok K. Yeo committed the family offenses of menacing in the third degree and harassment in the second degree, and (2) an order of protection of the same court dated March 12, 2025, directing Kok K. Yeo, among other things, to stay away from Jason B. Yeo until and including March 11, 2030, both of which were entered upon the default of Kok K. Yeo in appearing for a hearing.  The second order denied the motion of Kok K. Yeo to vacate (1) an order of fact-finding and disposition of the same court dated March 12, 2025, finding, inter alia, that Kok K. Yeo committed the family offenses of assault in the third degree, menacing in the third degree, and harassment in the second degree, and (2) an order of protection of the same court dated March 12, 2025, directing Kok K. Yeo, among other things, to stay away from Yoke C. Quah until and including March 11, 2030, both of which were entered upon the default of Kok K. Yeo in appearing for a hearing.

ORDERED that the orders dated July 16, 2025, are affirmed, without costs or disbursements.

Yoke C. Quah (hereinafter the mother) and Kok K. Yeo (hereinafter the father) are the parents of Jason B. Yeo (hereinafter the son).  In March 2024, the son and the mother commenced these related family offense proceedings pursuant to Family Court Act article 8 against the father.  On March 12, 2025, the father failed to appear for a fact-finding hearing on the petitions.

In two orders of fact-finding and disposition, both entered upon the father's default, the Family Court, inter alia, found that the father committed the family offenses of menacing in the third degree and harassment in the second degree against the son and the family offenses of assault in the third degree, menacing in the third degree, and harassment in the second degree against the mother.  The court issued orders of protection directing the father, among other things, to stay away from the son and mother until and including March 11, 2030.

Thereafter, the father moved to vacate the orders of fact-finding and disposition and the orders of protection as to each petitioner.  In two orders, both dated July 16, 2025, the Family Court denied the father's motions.  The father appeals.

A party seeking to vacate a default must establish a reasonable excuse for the default, as well as a potentially meritorious claim or defense (see Matter of Harari v. Banash, 228 AD3d 661, 662;  Matter of Aiello v. Chaffat, 176 AD3d 802, 804).  The determination of whether to relieve a party of an order entered upon his or her default is within the sound discretion of the Family Court (see Matter of Harari v. Banash, 228 AD3d at 662;  Matter of Castellotti v. Castellotti, 165 AD3d 926, 927).

Here, the Family Court providently exercised its discretion in denying the father's motions, as he failed to establish a reasonable excuse for his failure to appear at the hearing (see Matter of Harari v. Banash, 228 AD3d at 662;  Matter of Dublin v. Morris, 224 AD3d 901, 902).  Since the father did not establish a reasonable excuse for his default, we need not determine whether he had a potentially meritorious defense (see Matter of Harari v. Banash, 228 AD3d at 662;  Matter of Dublin v. Morris, 224 AD3d at 902).

The father's remaining contentions are either not properly before this Court or improperly raised for the first time on appeal.

CONNOLLY, J.P., DOWLING, TAYLOR and HOM, JJ., concur.