Jarnells E. Laignelet, appellants, v. City of New York, respondent. (2026)

Argued—March 16, 2026

DECISION & ORDER

G/

In an action, inter alia, to recover damages for personal injuries, etc., the plaintiffs appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Kevin J. Kerrigan, J.), dated September 16, 2024.  The order, insofar as appealed from, granted those branches of the defendant's motion which were pursuant to CPLR 3123(b) for leave to amend the defendant's response to the plaintiffs' notice to admit and for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.

In October 2019, the plaintiffs commenced this action against the defendant alleging that the plaintiff Jarnells E. Laignelet fell from a ladder while working inside a building located at 79–25 Winchester Boulevard in Queens (hereinafter the subject property) and asserting, among other things, causes of action to recover damages for violations of Labor Law §§ 200, 240(1), and 241(6) and common-law negligence.  After the defendant answered the complaint, the plaintiffs served a notice to admit, seeking, inter alia, admissions that the defendant owned the real property and “a building or structure” located at 79–25 Winchester Boulevard.  The defendant served a response denying knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of those matters asserted.  In an order dated September 22, 2020, the Supreme Court determined, pursuant to CPLR 3123(a), that the allegations set forth in the notice were deemed admitted as a consequence of the defendant's improper response.

In March 2024, the defendant moved, among other things, pursuant to CPLR 3123(b) for leave to amend its response to the plaintiffs' notice to admit and for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.  In an order dated September 16, 2024, the Supreme Court, inter alia, granted those branches of the defendant's motion.  The plaintiffs appeal.

CPLR 3123(a) authorizes the service of a notice to admit upon a party and provides that if a timely response thereto is not served, the contents of the notice are deemed admitted (see American Bldrs.   & Contrs.  Supply Co., Inc. v Vinyl is Final, Inc., 222 AD3d 708, 709;  32nd Ave. LLC v. Angelo Holding Corp., 134 AD3d 696, 698).  However, the purpose of a notice to admit is only to eliminate from contention those matters which are not in dispute in the litigation and which may be readily disposed of (see Priceless Custom Homes, Inc. v O'Neill, 104 AD3d 664, 665;  HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v. Halls, 98 AD3d 718, 721).  A notice to admit is not to be employed to obtain information in lieu of other disclosure devices or to compel admissions of fundamental and material issues or contested ultimate facts (see American Bldrs.   & Contrs.  Supply Co., Inc. v Vinyl is Final, Inc., 222 AD3d at 709;  Priceless Custom Homes, Inc. v. O'Neill, 104 AD3d at 665).  Furthermore, under CPLR 3123(b), a court may at any time permit a party to amend or withdraw any admission on such terms as may be just (see Altman v. Kelly, 128 AD3d 741, 743).

Here, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in granting that branch of the defendant's motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3213(b) for leave to amend its response to the plaintiffs' notice to admit.  As the defendant correctly contends, the notice to admit sought concessions that go to the essence of the controversy between the parties, to wit, whether the defendant owned the subject property where the incident occurred.  Thus, under the circumstances of this case and where the plaintiffs also commenced a separate action against the State of New York (see Laignelet v. State of New York, 205 AD3d 795), the plaintiffs could not have reasonably believed that the ownership of the subject property would not be in “substantial dispute at the trial” (CPLR 3123[a];  see American Bldrs.   & Contrs.  Supply Co., Inc. v Vinyl is Final, Inc., 222 AD3d at 709–710;  Williams v. City of New York, 125 AD3d 767, 768).

“Liability for a dangerous condition on property is generally predicated upon ownership, occupancy, control, or special use of the property” (Lorusso v. M & S Levy Realty, LLC, 243 AD3d 649, 650;  see Engelman v. County of Suffolk, 214 AD3d 769, 770).  Here, the defendant established, prima facie, that it did not owe a duty of care to the plaintiff because it did not own, occupy, control, or make a special use of the building where the accident occurred (see Acevedo v. Hope Gardens I, LLC, 226 AD3d 732, 733;  Wilson v. Rye Family Realty, LLC, 218 AD3d 836, 837).  In opposition, the plaintiffs failed to raise a triable issue of fact.  Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly granted that branch of the defendant's motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the cause of action to recover damages for common-law negligence.

Labor Law § 200 codifies the common-law duty to provide employees with a safe place to work (see Titov v. V & M Chelsea Prop., LLC, 230 AD3d 614, 617;  Rodriguez v. HY 38 Owner, LLC, 192 AD3d 839, 841).  “Labor Law § 240(1) imposes upon owners and general contractors, and their agents, a nondelegable duty to provide safety devices necessary to protect workers from risks inherent in elevated work sites” (Ennis v. Noble Constr.  Group, LLC, 207 AD3d 703, 704 [internal quotation marks omitted];  see Mitchell v 148th St. Jamaica Condominium, 221 AD3d 596, 598).  “Labor Law § 241(6) imposes upon owners and general contractors, and their agents, a nondelegable duty to provide reasonable and adequate protection and safety for workers, and to comply with the specific safety rules and regulations promulgated by the Commissioner of the Department of Labor” (Moscati v Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc., 168 AD3d 717, 718 [internal quotation marks omitted] ).

The defendant established its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law dismissing the causes of action to recover damages for violations of Labor Law §§ 200, 240, and 241(6) by demonstrating that it did not own, occupy, control, or manage the subject property (see Ragusa v. Drazie's Farm II, LLC, 226 AD3d 836, 838;  Alvarez v. Hudson Val. Realty Corp., 107 AD3d 748, 748).  In opposition, the plaintiffs failed to raise a triable issue of fact (see Rosario v. City of New York, 261 A.D.2d 380, 381).  Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly granted those branches of the defendant's motion which were for summary judgment dismissing the causes of action to recover damages for violations of Labor Law §§ 200, 240(1) and 241(6).

GENOVESI, J.P., FORD, VOUTSINAS and GOLIA, JJ., concur.

ENTER:

Darrell M. Joseph

Clerk of the Court