IN RE: Una SANDERS (2026)

DECISION & ORDER

In related proceedings pursuant to Family Court Act articles 6 and 8, the putative paternal grandmother appeals from (1) an order of the Family Court, Kings County (Turquoise Haskin, J.), dated July 14, 2025, and (2) an order of dismissal of the same court dated July 21, 2025.  The order, insofar as appealed from, without a hearing, granted those branches of the mother's motion which were to dismiss the putative paternal grandmother's petition to enforce an order of the same court (Ben Darvil, Jr., J.) dated March 13, 2024, and to vacate the order dated March 13, 2024, granted the mother's petition to modify the order dated March 13, 2024, vacated the order dated March 13, 2024, and dismissed the putative paternal grandmother's petition to enforce the order dated March 13, 2024.  The order of dismissal, upon the order dated July 14, 2025, dismissed the putative paternal grandmother's petition to enforce the order dated March 13, 2024.

ORDERED that the appeal from so much of the order dated July 14, 2025, as granted that branch of the mother's motion which was to dismiss the putative paternal grandmother's petition to enforce the order dated March 13, 2024, and dismissed the putative paternal grandmother's petition to enforce the order dated March 13, 2024, is dismissed, without costs or disbursements, as that portion of the order dated July 14, 2025, was superseded by the order of dismissal and is brought up for review on the appeal from the order of dismissal;  and it is further,

ORDERED that the order dated July 14, 2025, is affirmed insofar as reviewed, without costs or disbursements;  and it is further,

ORDERED that the order of dismissal is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.

In June 2022, the putative paternal grandmother (hereinafter the putative grandmother) of the subject child filed a petition for visitation with the child.  Pursuant to an order dated March 13, 2024, entered upon the mother's consent, the putative grandmother was awarded a specific schedule of visitation with the child (hereinafter the visitation order).  Before any visitation took place, however, the mother filed a petition to modify the visitation order.  Thereafter, the putative grandmother filed a petition to enforce the visitation order.  The mother moved, among other things, to dismiss the putative grandmother's enforcement petition and to vacate the visitation order.  In an order dated July 14, 2025, the Family Court, inter alia, without a hearing, granted those branches of the mother's motion, granted the mother's modification petition, vacated the visitation order, and dismissed the putative grandmother's enforcement petition, finding that, as a putative grandmother, the putative grandmother lacked standing to petition for visitation.  Subsequently, in an order of dismissal dated July 21, 2025, the court dismissed the putative grandmother's enforcement petition.  The putative grandmother appeals.

Initially, contrary to the Family Court's determination, a putative grandparent may petition for visitation as long as he or she establishes by clear and convincing evidence that he or she is the child's biological grandparent (see Matter of Jordan, 60 AD3d 764, 765;  Matter of Loretta D. v Commissioner of Social Servs. of City of N.Y., 177 A.D.2d 573, 574).  Here, the putative grandmother established by clear and convincing evidence that she is the child's biological grandmother.  However, even though the putative grandmother may have a right to petition for visitation, she will not be entitled to visitation unless she satisfies the requirements of Domestic Relations Law § 72(1).

Domestic Relations Law § 72(1) “does not create an absolute or automatic right of visitation.  Instead, the statute provides a procedural mechanism for grandparents to acquire standing to seek visitation with a minor grandchild” (Matter of Bell v. Bell, 241 AD3d 1556, 1556 [internal quotation marks omitted];  see Matter of Teresa S. v. Christopher H., 233 AD3d 691, 692).  “When a grandparent seeks visitation pursuant to Domestic Relations Law § 72(1), the court must make a two-part inquiry” (Matter of Sands v. Sands, 174 AD3d 628, 629 [internal quotation marks omitted] ).  “First, it must find that the grandparent has standing, based on, inter alia, equitable considerations.  If it concludes that the grandparent has established standing to petition for visitation, then the court must determine if visitation is in the best interests of the child” (Matter of Chakraverty v. Goodrich, 245 AD3d 934, 934 [citations and internal quotation marks omitted];  see Matter of Kruglov v. Shatskaya, 218 AD3d 585, 585).

Conferring standing based on equitable circumstances is a discretionary determination to be made only after the court has examined all the relevant facts (see Matter of Chakraverty v. Goodrich, 245 AD3d at 934;  Matter of Bell v. Bell, 241 AD3d at 1557).  “[A]n essential part of the inquiry is the nature and extent of the grandparent-grandchild relationship” (Matter of Emanuel S. v. Joseph E., 78 N.Y.2d 178, 182;  see Matter of Kelly v. Cairo, 198 AD3d 964, 964).  “In cases where the relationship between the grandparent and grandchild has been frustrated by a parent, the grandparent must show, inter alia, that he or she has made a sufficient effort to establish a relationship with the child, so that the court perceives the matter as one deserving the court's intervention” (Matter of Kelly v. Cairo, 198 AD3d at 965 [alterations and internal quotation marks omitted];  see Matter of Bell v. Bell, 241 AD3d at 1557).  “Moreover, a court should consider the nature and basis of the parents' objection to visitation in deciding the standing question” (Matter of Bell v. Bell, 241 AD3d at 1557 [internal quotation marks omitted];  see Matter of Lipton v. Lipton, 98 AD3d 621, 622).

Here, equitable considerations do not warrant judicial intervention to confer standing upon the putative grandmother (see Domestic Relations Law § 72;  Matter of Chakraverty v. Goodrich, 245 AD3d at 935).  The record demonstrates that the mother's objections to visitation were well founded, particularly in light of the mother's concerns regarding the child's safety.  Moreover, contrary to the putative grandmother's contention, the visitation order, standing alone, does not confer standing (see Matter of Burgess v. Ash, 41 AD3d 473, 474;  Matter of Fishburne v. Teelucksingh, 34 AD3d 804, 805).

Accordingly, the Family Court properly, without a hearing, granted those branches of the mother's motion which were to dismiss the putative grandmother's enforcement petition and to vacate the visitation order, granted the mother's modification petition, vacated the visitation order, and dismissed the putative grandmother's enforcement petition.

The putative grandmother's remaining contentions are not properly before this Court.

BARROS, J.P., WOOTEN, VENTURA and GOLDBERG VELAZQUEZ, JJ., concur.