IN RE: Grace–Monae Jesse W. (Anonymous). Abbott House (2026)

Submitted—September 15, 2026

DECISION & ORDER

A/

In a proceeding pursuant to Social Services Law § 384–b, the mother appeals from an order of fact-finding and disposition of the Family Court, Kings County (Alicea Elloras–Ally, J.), dated November 12, 2024.  The order of fact-finding and disposition, after fact-finding and dispositional hearings, found that the mother permanently neglected the subject child, terminated the mother's parental rights, and transferred guardianship and custody of the subject child to the petitioner and the Commissioner of the Administration for Chidlren's Services of the City of New York for the purpose of adoption.

ORDERED that the order of fact-finding and disposition is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.

The petitioner commenced this proceeding pursuant to Social Services Law § 384–b to terminate the mother's parental rights to the subject child, inter alia, on the ground of permanent neglect.  In an order of fact-finding and disposition dated November 12, 2024, after fact-finding and dispositional hearings, the Family Court found that the mother permanently neglected the child, terminated the mother's parental rights, and transferred guardianship and custody of the child to the petitioner and the Commissioner of the Administration for Children's Services of the City of New York (hereinafter the Commissioner) for the purpose of adoption.  The mother appeals.

“In a proceeding to terminate parental rights because of permanent neglect, the agency must demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that it has fulfilled its statutory duty to exercise diligent efforts to encourage and strengthen the parent-child relationship” (Matter of Ryder S.R. [Shaquana R.], 236 AD3d 1045, 1046 [internal quotation marks omitted];  see Matter of Dynasty S.G. [Paula G.], 228 AD3d 657, 658).  “Those efforts must include counseling, making suitable arrangements for [parental access], providing assistance to the parents to resolve the problems preventing the child's discharge, and advising the parents of the child's progress and development” (Matter of Alonso S.C.O. [Angela O.M.], 211 AD3d 952, 953 [internal quotation marks omitted];  see Matter of Shimon G. [Batsheva G.], 206 AD3d 732, 733).  “Once the petitioner establishes that it made diligent efforts to strengthen the parental relationship, it bears the burden of proving that, during the relevant period of time, the parent failed to maintain contact with the child or plan for the child's future, although physically and financially able to do so” (Matter of Benz G. [Nadia B.], 241 AD3d 681, 683 [internal quotation marks omitted];  see Matter of Christian M.L. [Christopher M.L.], 238 AD3d 761, 762).  “A parent who has only partially complied with his or her service plan and who has not gained insight into the issues that caused the removal of the child has not planned for the child's future” (Matter of Christian M.L. [Christopher M.L.], 238 AD3d at 762 [internal quotation marks omitted];  see Matter of Shimon G. [Batsheva G.], 206 AD3d at 733).

Further, the petitioner established that, despite its efforts, and notwithstanding the services completed by the mother, she failed to plan for the return of the child, as she failed to gain insight into the issues that caused the child's removal and were preventing the child's return to her care (see id. at 683–684;  Matter of Christian M.L. [Christopher M.L.], 238 AD3d at 762).  The record demonstrates that following the failed trial discharge, the mother did not visit the child or engage in services for several months.  Moreover, the record shows that during multiple virtual visits, the mother cursed at the child, and insulted the child, the foster parent, and agency staff, such that visits frequently had to be ended early.  The mother also testified that she did not think she needed mental health services and that she only complied with such because the agency required it of her.  Accordingly, the Family Court properly found that the mother permanently neglected the child, terminated her parental rights, and transferred guardianship and custody of the child to the petitioner and the Commissioner for the purpose of adoption.

“A dispositional order suspending judgment provides a brief grace period to give a parent found to have permanently neglected a child a second chance to prepare for reunification with the child” (Matter of Bryant D. [Brianna G.], 249 AD3d 727, 730;  see Matter of Ahking–Tyheem C.J. [Letitia M.E.], 238 AD3d 754, 757).  “ ‘A suspended judgment is permitted only where the court determines that such disposition is in the child's best interests' ” (Matter of Alonso S.C.O. [Angela O.M.], 211 AD3d at 955, quoting Matter of Malazah W. [Antoinette W.], 206 AD3d 1003, 1004).  “To warrant a suspended judgment, a parent must demonstrate progress in overcoming their problems” (Matter of Bryant D. [Brianna G.], 249 AD3d at 730;  see Matter of Alonso S.C.O. [Angela O.M.], 211 AD3d at 955).  Contrary to the mother's contention, a suspended judgment was not appropriate in light of her continued failure to gain insight into the conditions that led to the child's removal despite beneficial services being provided to her (see Matter of Keylin D.C.D. [Maria S.], 239 AD3d 849, 850).

The mother's remaining contention is without merit.

Accordingly, we affirm the order of fact-finding and disposition.

CHAMBERS, J.P., CHRISTOPHER, WAN and LANDICINO, JJ., concur.

ENTER:

Darrell M. Joseph

Clerk of the Court