Ramon Rodriguez, respondent, v. John Duffy, appellant. (2026)

Argued—March 30, 2026

DECISION & ORDER

C/

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendant appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Paul E. Hennings, J.), dated September 24, 2025.  The order granted the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability and, in effect, dismissing the defendant's affirmative defenses alleging comparative negligence.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with costs.

The plaintiff commenced this action against the defendant to recover damages for personal injuries that he allegedly sustained when the rear of a vehicle in which the plaintiff was a passenger was struck by the front of a vehicle operated by the defendant.  The plaintiff moved for summary judgment on the issue of liability and, in effect, dismissing the defendant's affirmative defenses alleging comparative negligence.  In an order dated September 24, 2025, the Supreme Court granted the motion.  The defendant appeals.

A driver of a vehicle approaching another vehicle from the rear is required to maintain a reasonably safe distance and rate of speed under the prevailing conditions to avoid colliding with the other vehicle (see Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1129[a];  Merino v. Ferrante, 241 AD3d 1449, 1450;  Nsiah–Ababio v. Hunter, 78 AD3d 672, 672).  Accordingly, a rear-end collision establishes a prima facie case of negligence on the part of the operator of the rear vehicle, thereby requiring that operator to rebut the inference of negligence by providing a nonnegligent explanation for the collision (see Kelley v. Verizon Servs.  Corp., 241 AD3d 1309, 1310;  Mahmud v. Feng Ouyang, 208 AD3d 861, 861).  Although a sudden stop of the lead vehicle may constitute a nonnegligent explanation for a rear-end collision, vehicle stops which are foreseeable under the prevailing traffic conditions, even if sudden and frequent, must be anticipated by the driver who follows, since he or she is under a duty to maintain a safe distance between his or her vehicle and the vehicle ahead (see Yawagyentsang v Safeway Constr.  Enters., LLC, 225 AD3d 827, 828;  Jimenez–Pantaleon v. Aucancela, 221 AD3d 676, 676–677).

Here, the plaintiff established his prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law on the issue of liability (see Mahmud v. Feng Ouyang, 208 AD3d at 862;  Brothers v. Bartling, 130 AD3d 554, 556;  Le Grand v. Silberstein, 123 AD3d 773, 775).  In support of his motion, the plaintiff submitted his affirmation and a certified police accident report, which demonstrated that two travel lanes merged into one lane, and that the vehicle in which the plaintiff was traveling had already merged and was coming to a stop in the single lane due to traffic conditions when it was struck in the rear by the defendant's vehicle.  The plaintiff also established his prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law dismissing the defendant's affirmative defenses alleging comparative negligence by demonstrating that he was an innocent passenger who did not contribute to the happening of the accident (see Holton v. New York City Tr. Auth., 233 AD3d 663, 664;  Grecco v. Altice USA, Inc., 230 AD3d 655, 656–657).  In opposition, the defendant failed to raise a triable issue of fact.  The defendant's assertion that it was the sudden stop of the lead vehicle which caused the accident was insufficient, in and of itself, to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether there was a nonnegligent explanation for the rear-end collision (see Brothers v. Bartling, 130 AD3d at 556).

Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly granted the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability and, in effect, dismissing the defendant's affirmative defenses alleging comparative negligence.

IANNACCI, J.P., BRATHWAITE NELSON, LANDICINO and GOLDBERG VELAZQUEZ, JJ., concur.

ENTER:

Darrell M. Joseph

Clerk of the Court