K.G., etc., respondents, v. Barack Obama School For Justice, et al., defendants, City of Yonkers, et al., appellants. (2026)

Argued—March 11, 2026

DECISION & ORDER

G/

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, etc., the defendants City of Yonkers and Yonkers Public Schools appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Westchester County (David S. Zuckerman, J.), dated June 13, 2025.  The order denied the defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

ORDERED that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, and the defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is granted.

The plaintiffs commenced this action, inter alia, to recover damages for personal injuries the plaintiff K.G. (hereinafter the injured plaintiff) allegedly sustained when her ring finger was caught in a hinge of a door at the Barack Obama School For Justice in Yonkers.  The defendants moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.  The plaintiffs opposed the motion.  In an order dated June 13, 2025, the Supreme Court denied the motion.  The defendants City of Yonkers and Yonkers Public Schools appeal.

A school district or municipality, like any other owner or occupier of land, “has a duty to maintain its property in a reasonably safe condition to prevent the occurrence of foreseeable injuries” (Alkon v North Shore Towers Apts. Inc., 185 AD3d 765, 766;  see Akins v Glens Falls City School Dist., 53 N.Y.2d 325, 329).  Where, as here, a plaintiff sues a school district or municipality in its capacity as landowner to recover damages for personal injuries as a result of an allegedly defective condition upon its property, “ ‘it must be established that a defective condition existed and that the landowner affirmatively created the condition or had actual or constructive notice of its existence’ ” (Alkon v North Shore Towers Apts. Inc., 185 AD3d at 766, quoting Lezama v. 34–15 Parsons Blvd, LLC, 16 AD3d 560, 560).

A party moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of demonstrating its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by tendering sufficient evidence to demonstrate the absence of any material issues of fact (see Alvarez v. Prospect Hosp., 68 N.Y.2d 320, 324;  Leblanc v. City of New York, 241 AD3d 1320, 1321).  A defendant may sustain its initial burden by negating a single essential element of the cause of action against it or by establishing a defense that compels dismissal of the cause of action as a matter of law (see Leblanc v. City of New York, 241 AD3d at 1321;  Smith v. City of New York, 210 AD3d 53, 68).  “If the movant makes a prima facie showing, the burden shifts to the opposing party to produce evidence establishing the existence of material issues of fact which require a trial on that issue” (Sanchez v. Ageless Chimney, Inc., 219 AD3d 767, 767).  “An expert's conclusory or speculative opinion is of no probative force” (Snyder v. AFCO Avports Mgt., LLC, 232 AD3d 209, 219).

Here, the defendants established their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by demonstrating that the door at issue was not in a defective condition and that the defendants did not create or have actual or constructive notice of any defective or dangerous condition of the door (see Clark v Bridgeport & Port Jefferson Steamboat Co., 219 AD3d 1302, 1303;  Donnelly v. St. Agnes Cathedral Sch., 106 AD3d 773, 773–774).  The defendants' submissions included a transcript of the deposition testimony of the school's assistant principal, who was a few steps ahead of the injured plaintiff when the accident occurred, and the school's head custodian, who inspected the door minutes later.  Both witnesses testified that they did not observe any defective condition.  Moreover, the injured plaintiff's testimony demonstrated that she could not identify how the door caused her injury without engaging in speculation (see Cameron v. Palmeri, 230 AD3d 1100, 1101;  Ellis v. City of New York, 188 AD3d 594, 594).

In opposition, the plaintiffs failed to raise a triable issue of fact.  The injured plaintiff's affidavit was insufficient to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether her injuries were caused by a defective condition of the door (see Buckstine v. Schor, 213 AD3d 730, 731–732;  E.W. v. City of New York, 179 AD3d 747, 748), and an affidavit and report of the plaintiffs' experts, who inspected the site two years after the accident, were conclusory and speculative (see Siino v Little Disciple Learning Ctr., Inc., 241 AD3d 956, 957–958).

Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

CONNOLLY, J.P., CHRISTOPHER, WAN and QUIRK, JJ., concur.

ENTER:

Darrell M. Joseph

Clerk of the Court