MARTINEZ v. EQUINOX HOLDINGS INC (2026)

DECISION & ORDER

In a putative class action, inter alia, to recover damages for violations of the Health Club Services Act (General Business Law §§ 620–631), the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Peter P. Sweeney, J.), dated October 24, 2024.  The order granted the defendant's motion pursuant to CPLR 7503 to compel arbitration and stay all proceedings in the action pending arbitration.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with costs.

In February 2024, the plaintiff commenced this putative class action against the defendant, inter alia, to recover damages arising out of the defendant's alleged violation of the Health Club Services Act (hereinafter the Health Club Act) (see General Business Law § 623[1] ).  The plaintiff alleged, among other things, that the defendant had charged the plaintiff and those similarly situated to him membership fees in excess of $3,600 per year in violation of the Health Club Act. Prior to interposing an answer, the defendant moved pursuant to CPLR 7503 to compel arbitration and stay all proceedings in the action pending arbitration.  The plaintiff opposed the motion on the ground that the defendant's violation of the Health Club Act rendered a membership agreement, including the arbitration provision contained therein, void and unenforceable.  In an order dated October 24, 2024, the Supreme Court granted the defendant's motion.  The plaintiff appeals.

“[O]n a motion to compel or stay arbitration, a court must determine, in the first instance ․ whether parties have agreed to submit their disputes to arbitration and, if so, whether the disputes generally come within the scope of their arbitration agreement” (Revis v. Schwartz, 192 AD3d 127, 134, affd 38 NY3d 939, 940 [internal quotation marks omitted];  see Wu v. Uber Tech., Inc., 43 NY3d 288, 298).  “Arbitration is a matter of contract, and arbitration clauses, which are subject to ordinary principles of contract interpretation, must be enforced according to their terms” (Wilson v. PBM, LLC, 193 AD3d 22, 30 [internal quotation marks omitted];  see Matter of Monarch Consulting, Inc. v National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, PA, 26 NY3d 659, 675).

“[A] broad arbitration provision is separable from the substantive provisions of a contract such that the agreement to arbitrate is valid even if the substantive provisions of the contract” render it unenforceable (Markowits v. Friedman, 144 AD3d 993, 997;  see Matter of Monarch Consulting, Inc. v National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, PA, 26 NY3d at 675).  “A party trying to avoid an arbitration clause must therefore show that the arbitration clause itself, not the overall agreement, was ․ unenforceable” (Mouli v. Stern, 236 AD3d 599, 601;  see Wu v. Uber Tech., Inc., 43 NY3d at 301).

Here, the plaintiff had entered into the membership agreement with the defendant, which provided, inter alia, that any and all disputes arising after execution of the membership agreement would be resolved exclusively through arbitration.  The arbitration provision in the membership agreement defined “dispute” as “any dispute, claim, or controversy ․ regarding any aspect” of the parties' relationship “includ[ing] without limitation the validity, enforceability or scope” of the membership agreement.  Thus, the membership agreement demonstrated that the parties clearly and unambiguously agreed to resolve any disputes arising out of the agreement, including those involving the enforceability of the agreement, through arbitration (see Yeled V'Yalda Early Childhood Ctr., Inc. v Attentive Behavior Mental Health Counseling, P.C., 208 AD3d 1209, 1211;  Rothberg v. Kaufman, 106 AD3d 975, 975).  Since the alleged violations of the Health Club Act related to other substantive provisions of the membership agreement rather than the arbitration provision itself, the arbitration provision remained enforceable, notwithstanding the alleged illegality of the agreement (see General Business Law §§ 623[1];  627[1];  Matter of Monarch Consulting, Inc. v National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, PA, 26 NY3d at 675–676;  Mouli v. Stern, 236 AD3d at 601).

Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly granted the defendant's motion pursuant to CPLR 7503 to compel arbitration and stay all proceedings in the action pending arbitration.

DUFFY, J.P., WARHIT, VENTURA and OTTLEY, JJ., concur.