The People, etc., respondent, v. Michael Cammarata, appellant. (2026)

Argued—September 8, 2026

DECISION & ORDER

K/

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Richmond County (Mario F. Mattei, J.), rendered November 17, 2021, convicting him of murder in the second degree, concealment of a human corpse, tampering with physical evidence (2 counts), and endangering the welfare of a child (2 counts), upon a jury verdict, and sentencing him to an indeterminate term of imprisonment of 23 years to life on the conviction of murder in the second degree under count 1 of the indictment, to indeterminate terms of imprisonment of 1 1/3 to 4 years on the convictions of concealment of a human corpse under count 3 of the indictment and tampering with physical evidence under count 4 of the indictment, to an indeterminate term of imprisonment of 1 to 3 years on the conviction of tampering with physical evidence under count 5 of the indictment, and to determinate terms of imprisonment of 1 year on each of the convictions of endangering the welfare of a child under counts 8 and 9 of the indictment, with the sentences imposed upon counts 1, 3, and 4 to run consecutively to each other, and with the sentences imposed under counts 5, 8, and 9 to run concurrently with each other and with the sentences imposed upon counts 1, 3, and 4. The appeal brings up for review the denial, after a hearing, of that branch of the defendant's omnibus motion which was to suppress his statements to law enforcement officials.

ORDERED that the judgment is modified, on the law, by providing that the sentence imposed on the conviction of concealment of a human corpse under count 3 of the indictment shall run concurrently with the sentence imposed on the conviction of tampering with physical evidence under count 4;  as so modified, the judgment is affirmed.

The defendant was convicted, upon a jury verdict, of murder in the second degree, concealment of a human corpse, two counts of tampering with physical evidence, and two counts of endangering the welfare of a child.

The Supreme Court properly denied that branch of the defendant's omnibus motion which was to suppress his statements to law enforcement officials.  The factual findings and credibility determinations made by the court after a suppression hearing are entitled to great deference on appeal, and will not be disturbed unless clearly unsupported by the record (see People v. Spann, 82 AD3d 1013, 1014;  People v. Smith, 77 AD3d 980, 981;  People v. Leggio, 305 A.D.2d 518, 519).  “The standard for assessing a suspect's custodial status is whether a reasonable person innocent of any wrongdoing would have believed that he or she was not free to leave” (People v. Paulman, 5 NY3d 122, 129;  see People v. Harris, 48 N.Y.2d 208, 215).  The issue of whether a suspect is in custody is generally a question of fact (see People v. Reardon, 124 AD3d 681, 683), and does not turn on the subjective beliefs of the defendant (see People v. Yukl, 25 N.Y.2d 585, 589), or the subjective intent of the police officer (see People v. Reardon, 124 AD3d at 683).  “The factors to be weighed include the amount of time which the defendant spent with the police, the manner, if any, in which his [or her] freedom was restricted, the location and atmosphere of his [or her] questioning, the degree of cooperation which he [or she] exhibited, whether he [or she] was apprised of his [or her] constitutional rights, and whether the questioning was investigatory or accusatory in nature” (People v. Petrovich, 202 A.D.2d 523, 524, affd 87 N.Y.2d 961;  see People v. Santjer, 190 AD3d 983, 984).  Contrary to the defendant's contention, the evidence presented at the suppression hearing supports the court's determination that a reasonable person, innocent of any crime, would not have believed that he or she was in custody at the time the statements were made (see People v. Yukl, 25 N.Y.2d at 589;  People v. Borukhova, 89 AD3d 194;  People v. Perez, 44 AD3d 441, 442).  Accordingly, the statements were not the product of custodial interrogation improperly conducted without the administration of Miranda warnings (see Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444).

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution (see People v. Contes, 60 N.Y.2d 620), we find it was legally sufficient to establish the defendant's guilt of the charge of tampering with physical evidence under count 5 of the indictment beyond a reasonable doubt.  Moreover, in fulfilling our responsibility to conduct an independent review of the weight of the evidence (see CPL 470.15[5];  People v. Danielson, 9 NY3d 342, 348), we nevertheless accord great deference to the jury's opportunity to view the witnesses, hear the testimony, and observe demeanor (see People v. Mateo, 2 NY3d 383;  People v. Bleakley, 69 N.Y.2d 490, 495).  Upon reviewing the record here, we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt on the conviction of tampering with physical evidence under count 5 of the indictment was not against the weight of the evidence (see People v. Romero, 7 NY3d 633).

However, as conceded by the People, the Supreme Court improperly imposed consecutive sentences for the conviction of concealment of a human corpse under count 3 of the indictment and the conviction of tampering with physical evidence under count 4 of the indictment.  Based on evidence adduced at trial, the People failed to establish that the convictions of concealment of a human corpse and tampering with physical evidence were separate and distinct (see People v. Whittingham, 246 AD3d 837;  People v. Williams, 243 AD3d 818).  Accordingly, the court should have directed the sentences imposed upon those convictions to run concurrently with each other (see People v. Laureano, 87 N.Y.2d 640, 643).

The aggregate sentence imposed, as modified, was not excessive (see People v. Suitte, 90 A.D.2d 80).

LASALLE, P.J., FORD, WAN and QUIRK, JJ., concur.

ENTER:

Darrell M. Joseph

Clerk of the Court