IN RE: Timothy Rivicci (2026)

Argued—September 11, 2026

DECISION & ORDER

C/

In a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 to review a determination of the City of New York Reasonable Accommodation Appeals Panel dated February 20, 2022, which upheld a determination of the New York City Fire Department dated November 29, 2021, denying the petitioner's request for a reasonable accommodation from a vaccine mandate based on his religion, the New York City Fire Department and the City of New York appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Richmond County (Ralph J. Porzio, J.), dated October 19, 2022.  The judgment, upon an order of the same court dated October 7, 2022, inter alia, granted the petition, in effect, annulled the determination dated February 20, 2022, and awarded the petitioner back pay and attorneys' fees.

ORDERED that the judgment is reversed, on the law, with costs, the petition is denied, and the proceeding is dismissed.

The petitioner was a firefighter employed by the New York City Fire Department (hereinafter the FDNY).  By order dated October 20, 2021, the New York City Commissioner of Health and Mental Hygiene issued a mandate requiring all City employees, among others, to provide proof of COVID–19 vaccination by October 29, 2021 (hereinafter the vaccine mandate).  On November 1, 2021, the petitioner was placed on leave without pay status for noncompliance with the vaccine mandate.  On November 5, 2021, the petitioner requested a reasonable accommodation from the vaccine mandate based on his religion.  The FDNY denied the request on November 29, 2021.  The petitioner appealed to the City of New York Reasonable Accommodation Appeals Panel (hereinafter the Panel), which, in a determination dated February 20, 2022, upheld the FDNY's denial of the petitioner's request for a reasonable accommodation.  On March 15, 2022, the petitioner was terminated from his position.

The petitioner commenced this proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 against the FDNY and the City (hereinafter together the appellants), inter alia, to annul the Panel's February 20, 2022 determination, to recover back pay, and for an award of attorneys' fees.  In an order dated October 7, 2022, the Supreme Court, among other things, determined that the denial of the petitioner's reasonable accommodation request was made in violation of lawful procedure because the appellants failed to engage in a cooperative dialogue, as required by the New York City Human Rights Law (N.Y.CHRL) (Administrative Code of City of N.Y. § 8–107).  The court also determined that the denial of the petitioner's reasonable accommodation request was arbitrary and capricious.  In a judgment dated October 19, 2022, the court, inter alia, granted the petition, in effect, annulled the Panel's February 20, 2022 determination, and awarded the petitioner back pay and attorneys' fees.  This appeal ensued.

“The standard of judicial review in the instant proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 is whether the action was arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of discretion, in violation of [a] lawful procedure, or affected by an error of law” (Matter of DeFonte v. New York City Fire Dept., 246 AD3d 796, 797 [internal quotation marks omitted];  see Matter of Van Dunk v Orange–Ulster Bd. of Coop. Educ. Servs.  [BOCES], 219 AD3d 1434, 1436).  “Administrative action is arbitrary when it is without a sound basis in reason and is taken without regard to the facts” (Matter of DeFonte v. New York City Fire Dept., 246 AD3d at 798 [internal quotation marks omitted] ).  Here, the Panel's determination had a sound basis because the requested accommodation would cause an undue hardship on the FDNY (see Administrative Code of City of N.Y. § 8–107[3][b];  Matter of DeFonte v. New York City Fire Dept., 246 AD3d at 798;  Matter of Smith v. New York City Fire Dept., 239 AD3d 870, 872).  Contrary to the petitioner's contention, we need not limit our review to the language in the Panel's determination, as the Panel noted that it had carefully reviewed the FDNY's determination as well as all of the documentation submitted to the FDNY, and that it had based its determination on that review (see Matter of Rysiejko v. City of New York, 232 AD3d 432, 432–433).

Further, the petitioner failed to establish that the City's process for resolving requests for accommodations from the vaccine mandate fell short of the requirements of the NYCHRL.  The NYCHRL makes it an “unlawful discriminatory practice for an employer ․ to refuse or otherwise fail to engage in a cooperative dialogue ․ with a person who has requested an accommodation” (Administrative Code of City of N.Y. § 8–107[28][a];  see Matter of DeFonte v. New York City Fire Dept., 246 AD3d at 798;  Matter of Marsteller v. City of New York, 217 AD3d 543, 545).  Here, the City publicly offered information on its process for reviewing accommodation requests related to the vaccine mandate and informed employees on how to apply to their agency's equal employment opportunity office and how to appeal denials.  The petitioner availed himself of this process, communicating with the FDNY throughout the administrative appeals process.  The appellants also submitted evidence about the volume of requests for accommodations from the vaccine mandate from FDNY employees alone, which the City had to resolve under a constrained timeline during an evolving public emergency.  Under these circumstances, the petitioner failed to establish that the NYCHRL “required a more robust or individualized dialogue than the process he received” (Matter of Marsteller v. City of New York, 217 AD3d at 545;  see Matter of DeFonte v. New York City Fire Dept., 246 AD3d at 798).

The parties' remaining contentions either are without merit, improperly raised for the first time on appeal, or need not be reached in light of our determination.

Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have denied the petition and dismissed the proceeding.

CONNOLLY, J.P., DOWLING, TAYLOR and HOM, JJ., concur.

ENTER:

Darrell M. Joseph

Clerk of the Court