Elizabeth Cartagena, Plaintiff, v. FREDRICK EASTMAN (2026)

The following e-filed documents, listed by NYSCEF document numbers (Motion 002) 25 - 40, 42 — 47 were read on this motion to/for SUMMARY JUDGMENT (AFTER JOINDER), and this cross-motion for SUMMARY JUDGMENT (AFTER JOINDER).

In this action, plaintiff Elizabeth Cartagena alleges personal injuries arising out of a motor vehicle collision between her parked car and a public bus, allegedly owned and operated by the New York City Transit Authority and Fredrick G. Eastman (collectively, Transit Defendants).

Now, plaintiff moves for summary judgment in her favor as to the issue of liability, to dismiss Transit Defendants' first and sixth affirmative defenses (culpable conduct and failure to wear a seatbelt respectively), and for an order directing a trial on damages only (notice of motion [NYSCEF Doc. No. 25]). Transit Defendants oppose the motion.

Transit Defendants cross-move for summary judgment dismissing the complaint (notice of motion [NYSCEF Doc. No. 33]). Plaintiff opposes the cross-motion.

BACKGROUND

According to the complaint, on November 19, 2022, a bus bearing plate number AU1222, allegedly owned and operated by Transit Defendants, collided with plaintiff's vehicle at or near the intersection of 122nd Street and Riverside Drive in Manhattan (Plaintiff's Exhibit A [NYSCEF Doc. No. 27], summons and complaint ¶¶ 27-28).

In their answer, Transit Defendants admit that "defendant New York City Transit Authority owned a bus bearing license plate number AU1222" which was "operated by New York City Transit Authority employee Frederick G. Eastman, who operated said bus within the scope of their employment and with the permission of New York City Transit Authority" (Plaintiff's Exhibit B [NYSCEF Doc. No. 28] Transit Defendants' Answer ¶ 4).

At plaintiff's statutory hearing, Cartagena testified that she parked her vehicle in a designated parking area prior to the incident (Plaintiff's Exhibit D [NYSCEF Doc. No. 30], Plaintiff's statutory hearing tr. at 23, lines 12-14). According to plaintiff, she "was heading to the park that's in front of the church. I was there with my sister-in-law, my brother, and my son, and we were going to do a photoshoot at the park" (id. at 24, lines 22-25). Prior to the incident, plaintiff stated that the engine of the vehicle was off (id. at 29, lines 7-10). Plaintiff further stated that she was not wearing a seatbelt "[b]ecause we weren't going anywhere" (id. at 33, lines 8-10).

In describing the incident, plaintiff testified, in relevant part, that:

(id. at 25, lines 1-16).

Plaintiff further testified that her brother was outside the car, on the left rear-passenger side, with the door slightly open (id. at 27, line 21 through 28, line 3). According to plaintiff, within about ten seconds of her brother stepping outside the car and thirty seconds after the door was open, the bus struck "the back left side of the car, the passenger side of the door, and then my door on the left side, on the driver side" (id. at 28, lines 4-8; at 39, lines 11-14; at 31, lines 12-24). Plaintiff further testified that she felt two distinct impacts, and that "[t]he first was medium. The second was heavy" (statutory hearing tr at 34, lines 7-9; at 35, lines 6-11).

Subsequently, plaintiff testified that, during the collision, her body moved, that "[a]t that moment I twisted or turned towards the left side" (id. at 32, lines 14-20). Plaintiff further clarified that her "lower back, [ ] hip, and [ ] neck" all twisted as a result of the collision (id., at 32, lines 21-24). According to plaintiff, just after the incident happened, plaintiff felt pain in her body (id. at 35, line 25 through 36, line 8).

At plaintiff's examination before trial, Cartagena corroborated her own testimony from her statutory hearing. Namely, plaintiff testified that she parked her car and went to the park across the street to take pictures with her brother, sister-in-law, and son (Transit Defendants' Exhibit 1 [NYSCEF Doc. No. 35], Plaintiff's EBT Tr. at 28, lines 4-19). Plaintiff also testified that she was located "inside the car," specifically in the "[d]river's seat" (id. at 29, lines 12-18). Cartagena further testified that her brother was standing outside the vehicle on the left passenger side, with the door ajar at the time of the incident (id. at 31, lines 8-21). In describing the collision, plaintiff stated that the bus made contact with "the left side in the back and the door that was open" (id. at 33, lines 12-15). Plaintiff clarified that it was "the left side back of the car" when questioned if the rear bumper was struck (id. at 34, lines 11-15).

In further support of her motion, Cartagena submits photographs depicting her vehicle after the collision, as she testified to taking photographs while at the scene (id. at 43, lines 23-25). In the final photograph, on page 4, plaintiff's vehicle can be seen entirely within the designated parking area, with the door fully open.

(Plaintiff's Exhibit F [NYSCEF Doc. No. 32], Photos [arrows added for emphasis]; see also plaintiff's EBT tr. at 89, line 16 through 91, line 6 [testifying that the "red pieces" in photographs marked as exhibit FF and GG were glass "[f]rom the back rear light" of her car]; exhibit 2 in opposition to motion and support of cross-motion [NYSCEF Doc. No. 36], marked photographs [with exhibits FF and GG from plaintiff's deposition annexed]).

Finally, in further support of her motion, plaintiff submits video footage from the bus at the time of the incident. From multiple camera angles, plaintiff's vehicle can be seen in the video as the bus proceeds to turn. In relevant part, the video from Cameras 07, 03, and 06 capture the position of plaintiff's vehicle at various points during the bus's turn:

(Plaintiff's Exhibit E [NYSCEF Doc. No. 31], Bus footage [circle added around plaintiff's vehicle for emphasis]).¹

(id. [circle added around plaintiff's vehicle for emphasis]).

(id. [circle added around plaintiff's vehicle for emphasis]).

DISCUSSION

"To prevail on a motion for summary judgment, the movant must make a prima facie showing by submitting evidence that demonstrates the absence of any material issues of fact. Once that initial showing has been made, the burden shifts to the opposing party to show there are disputed facts requiring a trial. All facts are viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party" (Nellenback v Madison County, 44 NY3d 329, 334 [2025] [internal citations omitted]).

Here, plaintiff has established that the bus struck her parked vehicle on "the back left side of the car, the passenger side of the door, and then my door on the left side, on the driver side" (statutory hearing at 31, lines 12-24). Plaintiff further established that the left rear door of her vehicle had been open for 30 seconds before the impacts (id. at 28, lines 4-8; at 39, lines 11-14).

"A collision with a stationary vehicle amounts to prima facie evidence of negligence on the part of the operator of the moving vehicle" (Guzman v Schiavone Const. Co., 4 AD3d 150, 150 [1st Dept 2004]). Plaintiff testified at her statutory hearing that her lower back, hip, and neck all twisted as a result of the collision. Therefore, plaintiff has satisfied her prima facie burden of summary judgment in her favor as to liability against defendant Eastman, the bus operator.

As previously mentioned, NYCTA is the admitted owner of the bus involved in the collision, and Eastman, the operator, was operating the vehicle within the scope of his employment with the NYCTA (see Plaintiff's Exhibit B [NYSCEF Doc. No. 28] Transit Defendants' Answer, ¶ 4). Therefore, plaintiff met her prima facie burden against NYCTA, who is vicariously liable for Eastman's negligence under Vehicle and Traffic Law § 388 (see Murdza v Zimmerman, 99 NY2d 375, 379 [2003]), as well as under the doctrine of respondeat superior (Riviello v Waldron, 47 NY2d 297, 302 [1979]; Ryga v New York City Tr. Auth., 17 AD3d 561, 562 [2d Dept 2005]).

Since plaintiff has satisfied her prima facie showing, the burden shifts to Transit Defendants to demonstrate there are material issues still in dispute.

In opposition, and in support of their cross-motion for summary judgment, Transit Defendants have two arguments: (1) that plaintiff was negligent as a matter of law for violating Vehicle & Traffic Law § 1214, and (2) that plaintiff's motion is premature. Both arguments are unavailing.

Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment is not premature. Although all depositions have not been held, any explanation for why Eastman struck plaintiff's vehicle was already present within defendant Eastman's own personal knowledge (see Stephenson v New York City Tr. Auth., 226 AD3d 546 [1st Dept 2024]; Ahmad v Behal, 221 AD3d 558, 559 [1st Dept 2023]; Ahmad v Behal, 221 AD3d 558, 559 [1st Dept 2023]). "The mere hope that additional discovery may lead to sufficient evidence to defeat a summary judgment motion is insufficient to deny such a motion" (Singh v New York City Hous. Auth., 177 AD3d 475, 476 [1st Dept 2019]).

Transit Defendants argue that "plaintiff violated VTL § 1214 by opening her car door on the side adjacent to moving traffic when it was not reasonably safe to do so" (Transit Defendants' Counsel's affirmation in opposition to motion and in support of cross-motion [NYSCEF Doc. No. 34] ¶ 5). They contend that the "reckless decision" of plaintiff's non-party brother Freddy Rodriguez "to open the left passenger's side door, rather than wait for the Transit Authority bus to clear and entirely pass was the only reason that the plaintiff's left passenger's side door came into contact with the subject bus" (Transit Defendants' Counsel's affirmation in opposition to motion and in support of cross motion ¶ 11).

Transit Defendants therefore conclude that such a violation both defeats plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and satisfies their own prima facie burden in establishing that plaintiff was negligent as a matter of law, and that plaintiff's negligence was the sole proximate cause of the incident.

However, the video footage from the bus cameras clearly shows that, at the moment of impact, plaintiff's brother, Rodriguez, was already standing outside of plaintiff's car with the door open, thus refuting the Transit Defendants' contention that the door was recklessly opened immediately prior to the collision:

(Continued on next page)

(Bus Surveillance Footage, Camera 6 at 15:54:44 [arrow added for emphasis])

Moreover, plaintiff correctly points out that, "while there is no dispute that the door was 'on the side available to moving traffic', there is evidence that plaintiff opened the door while traffic was stopped and that there was sufficient room for cars to pass without hitting him or his car" (id.; see Plaintiff's Exhibit F [NYSCEF Doc. No. 32], Photographs).

As reflected in plaintiff's photographs submitted as Exhibit F, plaintiff's parked vehicle was fully within the painted lines of the designated parking area, even when the left passenger door was completely open. Because the open door did not extend into a lane of travel, the Transit Defendants failed to demonstrate that plaintiff's brother had opened the door of plaintiff's vehicle when it was not safe to do so, in violation of Vehicle & Traffic Law § 1214.

Therefore, the court grants plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability against the Transit Defendants, and the Transit Defendants' cross-motion for summary judgment is denied.

To be clear, the determination of the Transit Defendants' fault as a matter of law on this motion does not include the issue of whether plaintiff suffered a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d), "which is a threshold matter separate from the issue of fault" (Reid v Brown, 308 AD2d 331, 332 [1st Dept 2003]). Therefore, the branch of plaintiff's motion for an order "[d]irecting a trial on the issue of damages only" is denied.

The first affirmative defense of culpable conduct is stricken. The bus footage, coupled with plaintiff's testimony, establish that plaintiff's vehicle was lawfully parked entirely within a designated parking area, even with the left passenger door open.

The sixth affirmative defense, failure to wear a seatbelt, is also stricken. Vehicle & Traffic Law § 1229-c (3) states, in relevant part: "[n]o person shall operate a motor vehicle unless such person is restrained by a safety belt approved by the commissioner." Here, as plaintiff testified that she was in a parked vehicle and that the engine was not running, plaintiff was not required to wear a seatbelt.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that plaintiff's motion for summary judgment is GRANTED IN PART TO THE EXTENT THAT plaintiff is granted partial summary judgment in her favor on the issue of liability against defendants New York City Transit Authority and Fredrick G. Eastman, who are jointly and severally liable; and it is further

ORDERED that the first affirmative defense (culpable conduct) and sixth affirmative defense (failure to wear a seatbelt) are both dismissed; and it is further

ORDERED that the remainder of plaintiff's motion is denied; and it is further

ORDERED that Transit Defendants' cross-motion for summary judgment is DENIED; and it is further

ORDERED that, within 60 days after entry of this decision and order, plaintiff's counsel is directed to retrieve the USB drive containing the video footage from IAS Part 21, 80 Centre Street Room 280 and to preserve the video footage intact pending the outcome of any appeal of this decision and order, or if no appeal is taken, until after the time to appeal from this decision and order has expired.²

Lastly, the parties are reminded to appear for an in-person status conference on

December 17, 2026, at 10:30 a.m., at 80 Centre Street, courtroom 280.

ENTER:

DATE 8/12/2026

RICHARD TSAI, J.S.C.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The still frames of the video in this decision (used for purposes of illustration) were cropped from the video while playback was paused.

2.   If the USB drive is not retrieved within 60 days after entry of this decision, court staff may discard the USB drive thereafter.

Richard Tsai, J.