Brian Rodriguez, Plaintiff, v. Alhousseni Samassa, Defendant. (2026)

The following papers efiled on NYSCEF were used on this motion: 1-31.

Upon the foregoing papers, having heard oral argument  ¹ , and due deliberation having been had, the within motion is determined as follows.

Background

The instant action alleges causes of action premised upon a motor vehicle accident that occurred in early 2023. At approximately 9:00 p.m., on February 21, 2023, Plaintiff Brian Rodriguez was involved in a motor vehicle accident that occurred at Wilson Avenue at its intersection with Grove Street, in Kings County, New York (see NYSCEF Doc No. 7 ¶¶ 1-2). Plaintiff allegedly suffered injuries to his left leg as a result (see id. at ¶¶ 10-11).

Plaintiff initiated the lawsuit by filing a copy of the Summons and Verified Complaint on June 22, 2023 (see NYSCEF Doc No. 1). Defendant Alhousseni Samassa interposed an Answer on December 4, 2023 (see NYSCEF Doc No. 4). Plaintiff's attorney, Omrani & Taub, P.C., responded to Defendant's demand for a bill of particulars and other discovery demands (see NYSCEF Doc No. 7). Omrani &Taub, P.C. now moves to be relieved as counsel (see NYSCEF Doc No. 24).

Plaintiff's attorney claims that the "undersigned counsel has discussed this case in depth with the Plaintiff, and [they] strategically differ on how to procced in this matter" (NYSCEF Doc No. 24 ¶ 10). On May 26, 2026, an Order to Show Cause with attached papers was signed by the Court, bringing on the law firm's motion to be relieved as Plaintiff's counsel (see NYSCEF Doc No. 28). Plaintiff had until June 18, 2026, to respond.

During oral argument on June 26, 2026, Plaintiff's attorney reiterated the issue of strategic differences based on past conversations with Plaintiff and stressed their inability to continue representing him as Plaintiff.

Movant's Contentions

Movant law firm Omrani & Taub, P.C. requests to be relieved as counsel for Plaintiff with the proposal that Plaintiff have 30 days to retain new counsel if the application is granted. Movant cites CPLR 321 (b) (2), stating that "an attorney of record may withdraw or be changed by order of the court in which the action is pending" (NYSCEF Doc No. 24 ¶ 6), and citing case law to the effect that attorneys can be relieved of counsel upon a showing good cause (see id. ¶ 7).

During oral argument, the appearing attorney for Omrani & Taub, P.C. informed the Court: "Your Honor, as I have stated before[,] our office has had multiple conversations with Mr. Rodriguez about this case. Information learned more in discovery and based on the conversations that we have had we disagree on how to proceed with his case. And because of the disagreement on strategies we are unable to continue representation." (Tr at 5.)

Movant further relies on the Code of Professional Responsibility, which allows an attorney to withdraw from representation if the "client, by his or her conduct, 'renders it unreasonably difficult for the lawyer to carry out employment effectively' " 22 NYCRR 1200.15 (c) (1) (iv) (see NYSCEF Doc No. 24 ¶ 8).² Movant cites prior case law wherein the court relieved counsel from representation because of fundamental strategic differences in litigation (see id.). Movant Omrani & Taub, P.C. also contends that discovery is ongoing and no party will be prejudiced by it withdrawing as counsel at this time (see NYSCEF Doc No. 24 ¶ 11).

Opposition

Plaintiff did not submit papers in opposition but appeared for oral argument. Plaintiff stated he was informed only one week prior that the law firm did not want to represent him anymore. He further noted that "after 3 years [Omrani & Taub, P.C.] tell me they cannot represent me" (tr at 6). Plaintiff asked the Court to force the firm to represent him, and stated that if they will not, he intends to represent himself.

Discussion

It has long since been established by the Court of Appeals that an attorney may terminate an attorney-client relationship in litigation "at any time for a good and sufficient cause and upon reasonable notice" (Matter of Dunn [Brackett], 205 NY 398, 403 [1912]). An attorney's right to withdraw is not absolute, but rather counsel must provide sound reasons for why they should be allowed to withdraw (see Matter of Jamieko A., 193 AD2d 409 [1st Dept 1993]). Thus, "the decision to grant or deny permission to withdraw as counsel lies within the discretion of the trial court" (McDonald v Shore, 100 AD3d 602, 603 [2d Dept 2012]). The courts have "inherent and statutory power to regulate the practice of law" (Matter of First Natl. Bank of E. Islip v Brower, 42 NY2d 471, 474 [1977]).

A client's non-cooperation or otherwise rendering it difficult for the attorney to effectively carry out the representation is considered a valid reason to withdraw from representation (see Applebaum v Einstein, 163 AD3d 905, 907 [2d Dept 2018]; see also Aragona v Shaibani, 138 AD3d 649, 650 [2016]). A lawyer may also withdrawal as counsel if the client's conduct is unreasonably difficult, or for other good cause, like the existence of a fundamental strategic difference in litigation strategy (see generally Diaz v New York Comprehensive Cardiology, PLLC, 43 Misc 3d 759 [Sup Ct, Kings County 2014] [court granted attorney's request to withdraw as counsel due to irreconcilable differences and disagreements in litigation that could not be resolved]).

In the present case, Plaintiff's counsel set forth sufficient arguments showing that there was a fundamental strategic difference in litigation; an in-depth conversation with the client could not remedy the irreconcilable differences (see NYSCEF Doc No. 24 ¶ 10). The fundamental difference in litigation strategy is a sufficient reason for Omrani & Taub, P.C. to withdrawal as counsel.

Additionally, "when an attorney undertakes to represent a defendant in a civil action, there exists a presumption that the representation will continue in good faith throughout the course of the litigation" (Kalamata Capital Group, LLC v AJP Remodeling, LLC, 81 Misc 3d 1209[A], 2023 NY Slip Op 51301 [Sup Ct, Kings County 2023]). Pursuant to Rules of Professional Conduct rule 1.16 (c) (1), a lawyer may withdraw if "withdrawal can be accomplished without material adverse effect on the interests of the client." In Bok v Werner (9 AD3d 318 [1st Dept 2004]), the First Department granted the attorney's request to be relieved as counsel as discovery was not completed and attendant delay could be minimized, allowing the plaintiff time to secure new counsel. Here, discovery is ongoing, and, as such, no party would be prejudiced (see NYSCEF Doc No. 24 ¶ 11).

The Court rejects Plaintiff's entreaty to compel Omrani & Taub, P.C. to represent him. During oral argument Plaintiff failed to articulate a sound reason for doing so. He did not dispute that there were fundamental differences between him and the law firm concerning litigation strategy. Neither did he dispute the firm's assertion of lack of cooperation. Had Plaintiff established that he and the law firm were in sync in how to proceed and that he was cooperating, his request that the firm's motion be denied would have stood on better grounds (see Bank of America, N.A. v Chadha, 214 AD3d 695 [2d Dept 2023]).

Plaintiff did complain that he was recently confronted with their desire to withdraw ("What I don't understand is that they gave me only one week" [tr at 4].), although he did also say, "It's been one year that they have been telling me -- one year telling me that they are looking for -- and they told me that they are looking for another lawyer." (Id.) The one-week notice Plaintiff referred to was the order to show cause bringing on this motion. Orders to show cause are designed to expedite the resolution of matters, so the short notice is not a valid reason for denying a motion to be relieved as counsel.

On the other hand, appearing counsel did tell the Court that back in 2025, Plaintiff spoke about procuring another attorney. The motion to withdraw was filed because Plaintiff told the firm that nobody would take the case (see tr at 9). Plaintiff conceded as much: "[A] lot of firms I have called firms . . ." (tr at 8). That no other law firm will take the case is a legally insufficient reason to compel present counsel to continue their representation. It is evident that they are disinclined to do so based on ethical precepts. A functional attorney-client relationship is not possible in this instance (see Matter of Veronica LL. v Ethan LL., 248 AD3d 1528, 1530 [3d Dept 2026]). Under these circumstances, a trial court should not compel a law firm to remain as counsel (see Applebaum v Einstein, 163 AD3d 905; Engelberg v Perr, 172 AD3d 1169 [2d Dept 2019]).

Therefore, because Plaintiff's counsel provided a showing of good cause to withdraw, and the parties will not be materially affected because of this termination, Omrani & Taub, P.C. have met their burden to be relieved as counsel.

Conclusion

It is hereby ORDERED that Plaintiff's counsel's motion to be relieved is GRANTED. A supplemental order will be issued specifying counsel's responsibilities for implementing the disengagement.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Transcripts may be procured from the court reporter (see Matter of Lewandowski v Office of Ct. Admin., 173 Misc 2d 335 [Sup Ct, Albany County 1997]).

2.   Counsel's citation is incorrect. The Code of Professional Responsibility was replaced in New York over 15 years ago. The present equivalent would be Rules of Professional Conduct § 1200.0 rule 1.16 (c) (7) ("Except as stated in paragraph (d), a lawyer may withdraw from an engagement on behalf of a client if a reasonable lawyer would conclude that: . . . (7) the client fails to cooperate in or otherwise renders the engagement unreasonably difficult for the lawyer to carry out[.]")

Aaron D. Maslow, J.