CHEDVA BENELYAHOU v. Village of Saddle Rock, Respondents. (2026)

The following papers were read on this motion:

NYSCEF Nos. 45-66,

Upon the foregoing e-filed documents, the application interposed by the defendant, the Village of Saddlerock [hereinafter the Village], for an order pursuant to CPLR § 3212 dismissing the complaint (Sequence #003) and the application interposed by the plaintiff, Sharok Jacobi [hereinafter the Plaintiff], for an order pursuant to CPLR § 3212 granting summary judgment in his favor on the complaint (Sequence #004) are consolidated for disposition and determined as set forth below.¹

In the years 2018 through 2020, there were "several serious pedestrian injuries" in the Village resulting from "drivers failing to stop at stop signs" in response to which the Village sent correspondence to its residents "reminding all drivers to comply with the speed limits and obey the stop signs" situated within the municipality (NYSCEF Doc No. 53 at ¶¶ 3,4,5). Subsequent to installing three surveillance cameras at Gristmill Lane, Byron Lane, as well as Emerson Drive, the Village utilized the data collected thereby and conducted an analysis "from February to April 2022" which established that "most vehicles failed to stop at the stop signs installed at these intersections" (id. at ¶¶ 6-8; NYSCEF Doc No. 88 at ¶30).

On May 3, 2022, the Board of Trustees for the Village enacted Local Law 1-2022 [hereinafter the Law], which provides the following:

Section 1: Section 142.3 of the Village of Saddle Rock code: obedience to signs, was expanded as follows: Added: 142.3.1 the board of trustees unanimously elected to install surveillance cameras on certain intersections in the Village of Saddle Rock to monitor stop sign violators and issue summons.

Section 2. The Village of Saddle Rock and the elementary school in its jurisdiction do not have sidewalks. The pedestrians and the school children walking at the side of the roads face enormous risks when vehicle operators ignore the stop sign law. This put many lives at risk to injury or fatality.

Section 3. The board of trustees unanimously voted with regard to section 142.3.1 to issue the stop sign violators a fine of $60.00. (Village code 142.4 & 142.4.1)

Section 4. [T]his local law shall take effect immediately upon filing with the NY secretary of state pursuit [sic] to municipal home rule law (NYSCEF Doc No. 54).

On May 18, 2022, the Village entered into a service contract with nonparty, Stop For Kids LLC, "to provide video monitoring of vehicles that violate" the Law regarding which "[s]ignage was placed at all entrances to the Village advising all drivers that the Village was monitoring stop sign compliance and issuing enforcement tickets" [hereinafter the Enforcement Program] (NYSCEF Doc No. 53 at ¶¶ 9,12). On or about June 2, 2023, notices were issued to the Plaintiff advising that he was in violation of the Law having on two occasions passed the stop sign located in the vicinity of Emerson Drive and Byron Road [hereinafter the Violations] (NYSCEF Doc No. 52 at pp. 16,22). These notices imposed monetary fines [hereinafter the Fines], which the Plaintiff concedes he has failed to pay (id. at pp. 22,23).

On June 16, 2023, the Plaintiff commenced the underlying action asserting the following four causes of action: [1] the Violations were issued "without any lawful basis" in contravention of § 11 of the Civil Rights Law; [2] the Fines "were excessive" in contravention of Article 1, § 5 of the New York State Constitution as "the Village . . . was not authorized to issue any fines for the conduct in question"; [3] the Enforcement Program constitutes an infringement of Article 1, § 6 of the New York State Constitution as it was enacted "without a basis in law" and "contrary to the will and intent of the State Legislature"; and [4] the Fines were monies to which the Village was not lawfully entitled and the Plaintiffs seek restitution under a theory of unjust enrichment (NYSCEF Doc No. 2 at ¶¶ 58-67).

The Village now moves for summary judgment dismissing the complaint principally contending that the Law and ensuing Enforcement Program were enacted in accordance with applicable local codes and state statutes and do not run afoul of the New York State Constitution (NYSCEF Doc No. 88 at pp. 10-21). In support of the application, the Village submits, inter alia, the affidavit from its Mayor, Dan Levy, who states that the Law and Enforcement Program were adopted in response to the Village's concern with respect to the afore-referenced serious pedestrian injuries and to address "the fact that the Village does not have any sidewalks requiring all walkers, runners, dog walkers and children coming and going to school to walk in the roadway" (NYSCEF Doc No. 53 at ¶¶ 3,19,20). The Plaintiff opposes the Village's application and simultaneously moves for summary judgment in his favor on the complaint asserting that the Village lacked Home Rule authority to enact the Law and was impliedly preempted from assessing the Fines "on vehicle owners for allegedly failing to coming [sic] to a full stop at certain stop signs" as there is already a comprehensive state scheme in place to regulate traffic (NYSCEF Doc No. 59 at pp. 3-13).

A party moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of demonstrating prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by proffering proof, in admissible form, which establishes the absence of material issues of fact (Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557, 562 [1980]). However, once the proponent of the motion establishes a prima facie showing, the burden shifts to the opposing party to come forth with admissible proof to establish triable issues of fact, the existence of which precludes summary judgment and necessitates a trial of the action (Alvarez v Prospect Hospital, 68 NY2d 320, 324 [1986]).

"Article 9 of the New York Constitution confers upon local governments, . . . , home rule powers including the power (i) 'to adopt and amend local laws not inconsistent with the provisions of this constitution or any general law relating to its property, affairs or government' and (ii) 'to adopt and amend local laws not inconsistent with the provisions of this constitution or any general law relating to[, inter alia, fines], whether or not they relate to the property, affairs or government of such local government, except to the extent that the legislature shall restrict the adoption of such a local law relating to other than the property, affairs or government of such local government' " (McGrath v Suffolk County, 232 AD3d 879, 884 [2d Dept 2024] quoting NY Const, art IX, § 2[c][i], [ii];Municipal Home Rule Law § 10[1][i], [ii][a][9Ba]). "Thus, in general, '[s]o long as local legislation is not inconsistent with the State Constitution or any general law, localities may adopt local laws both with respect to their property, affairs or government, and with respect to other enumerated subjects, except to the extent that the legislature shall restrict the adoption of such a local law' " (McGrath v Suffolk County, 232 AD3d at 884 quoting Albany Area Bldrs. Assn. v Town of Guilderland, 74 NY2d 372, 376 [1989] [citations and internal quotation marks omitted]). " 'A local law will be preempted either where there is a direct conflict with a state statute (conflict preemption) or where the legislature has indicated its intent to occupy the particular field (field preemption)' " (id. quoting Garcia v New York City Dept. of Health & Mental Hygiene, 31 NY3d 601, 617 [2018][internal quotation marks omitted]).

As relevant here, "[a]n order, rule or regulation which contains a penalty therein may be adopted by local law" as approved by the Village "board of trustees" (Village Law § 20-2000). Additionally, pursuant to Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1640 entitled "Traffic regulations in all cities and villages", the Village is empowered to adopt "reasonable local laws, ordinances, orders, rules and regulations with respect to traffic as local conditions may require subject to the limitations contained in the various laws of this state" (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1640 [16]).

Having reviewed the parties' submissions, the Court finds the Village has established prima facie entitlement to summary judgment dismissing the complaint by demonstrating that the Law and attendant monetary Fines are not inconsistent with Article 9 of the New York State Constitution and rather were enacted under the cloak of authority conferred by the state statutes embodied in Village Law § 20-2000, as well as Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1640 (Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d at 562 ;McGrath v Suffolk County, 232 AD3d at 884;Village Law § 20- 2000; Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1640 [16]). In opposition, the Plaintiff has failed to either raise a material issue of fact or to establish prima facie entitlement to judgment in his favor (Alvarez v Prospect Hospital, 68 NY2d at 324). While the Plaintiff correctly contends that the Vehicle and Traffic law is a comprehensive statutory scheme enacted by the state legislature to regulate traffic, the Law enacted by the Village is not "impliedly" preempted thereby but was adopted to address "local conditions" as expressly contemplated by Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1640 such as those outlined by Mayor Levy regarding the Village's founded concerns as to pedestrian safety (McGrath v Suffolk County, 232 AD3d at 884; Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1640 [16]).

Based upon the foregoing, it is hereby

ORDERED, that the Village's application for an order pursuant to CPLR § 3212 dismissing the complaint is GRANTED and the complaint is dismissed (Sequence #003); and it is further

ORDERED, that the Plaintiff's application for an order pursuant to CPLR § 3212 granting summary judgment in his favor on the complaint is DENIED (Sequence #004).

ORDERED, that all requests for relief not specifically addressed herein are DENIED

The foregoing constitutes the Decision and Order of this Court.

It is SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 23, 2026

Mineola, New York

HON. RHONDA E. FISCHER

A.J.S.C.

FOOTNOTES

1.   This action was discontinued by plaintiff, Chedva Benelyahou (NYSCEF Doc No. 32).

Rhonda E. Fischer, J.