E.D., Plaintiff, v. J.D., Defendant. (2026)

The following documents were considered in connection with Plaintiff's motion, dated September 14, 2026 (hereinafter "Motion Sequence No. 28"), seeking the entry of an order granting the following relief:

1. Directing the parties to cooperate with J.D.'s immediate interim re-enrollment in the [Redacted], including the Therapeutic Learning Center program at [Redacted] High School, consistent with his individualized education program and the placement recommended through the District's Committee on Special Education process, pending further order of this Court, further CSE action, or determination after a hearing;

2. In the alternative, directing the Defendant to arrange, provide, and be solely responsible for all transportation necessary for J.D. to attend [Redacted] to and from Plaintiff's residence during Plaintiff's parenting time, pending further order of this Court or determination after a hearing;

3. Setting this matter down for an expedited hearing and providing that the Attorney for the Child be heard on the relief requested; and

4. Granting such other and further relief as the Court deems just, proper, and in J.D.'s best interests.

PAPERS NUMBERED

Order to Show Cause/Affidavit in Support/

Memorandum of Law/Exhibits 1-25 1-28  ¹

Relevant Factual and Procedural History

On January 14, 2019, this matrimonial action was commenced with the Plaintiff's filing of a summons with notice,² after which a complaint  ³ was filed asserting that the parties had been married in August of 2008 and thereafter had two children of the marriage being: (1) J.D. (D.O.B.: [Redacted]) (hereinafter "J.D."); and (2) R.D. (D.O.B.: [Redacted]) (hereinafter "R.D.") (hereinafter collectively "Children").

On October 10, 2025, a judgment of divorce (hereinafter "Judgment of Divorce"),⁴ was entered dissolving the parties' marriage including the following pertaining to the custody of the Children:

"The Parties having resolved issues of child custody, parenting plan and access schedule pursuant to a So-Ordered Custody and Parenting Agreement, dated August 3, 2020 (NYSCEF Doc. #108-So-Ordered NYSCEF Doc. #109), as thereafter modified by the Decision and order of this Court dated and filed May 7, 2021 (NYSCEF Doc. #231); as further modified by Decision and Order dated and filed June 23, 2022 (NYSCEF Doc. #415); as further modified by Decision and Order dated November 20, 2023 (NYSCEF Doc #583); and as further modified and consolidated in the Order dated October 9, 2024 (NYSCEF Doc #740), and

* * *

ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED, the parties shall have joint legal custody of the minor Children of the marriage, with the Defendant having primary residential custody of the Children for school registration purposes so long as she continues to reside in [Redacted], NY, parenting, access and decision making regarding the Children all set forth in accordance [with] the parties' So-Ordered Custody and Parenting Agreement, dated and filed August 3, 2020 (NYSCEF Doc # 108 & 109) as thereafter modified by the Decision and Order dated and filed June 23, 2022 (NYSCEF Doc. #415); and filed June 23, 2022 (NYSCEF Doc #415);⁵ and further modified by Decision and Order dated November 20, 2023 (NYSCEF Doc. # 583); and further modified and consolidated in the Order dated October 9, 2024 (NYSCEF Doc. #740), the terms of which are incorporated herein by reference as is more fully set forth, but which survive and shall not be merged into this judgment, and the parties are directed to comply with all the terms and conditions thereof as if such terms and conditions were set forth herein; and it is further."

As the Judgment of Divorce references five separate documents which address the custody of the Children, the relevant portions of each will be addressed herein for a complete understanding of both the initial agreement reached by the parties as to the issues before this Court and how that agreement was later modified by court order. Initially, the parties entered into a parenting agreement which was so-ordered (hereinafter "Parenting Agreement"),⁶ which set forth the manner in which the parties would share joint legal custody of the Children with Defendant having final decision making following a major decision protocol being utilized:

"1.1 Subject to and in accordance with the terms set forth herein, the parties Shall have joint legal custody, subject to the Mother's final decision-making authority set forth herein. The parties shall meaningfully consult with each other (in writing, by e-mail), on non-day-to-day "Major Decisions" relating to the Children, including, but not limited to education, tutoring, religion and religious education, non-routine and non-emergency medical and dental care, camp/organized summer activities and/or programs, extra-curricular activities, therapeutic, therapy, pharmaceutical and any other matters of similar importance affecting the Children (each a "Major Decision").

1.2 For each Major Decision, the parties shall discuss the issues (in writing) in an appropriate, civil, meaningful and respectful manner in accordance with the Major Decision Protocol set forth below. At all times, the Children's best interests shall be the paramount and overriding consideration for the parties.

1.3 Major Decision Protocol: The parties agree to the following process for making Major Decisions and acknowledge that delays in initiating and responding to communications will hinder the decision-making process. When a Major Decision arises, either parent may initiate the Major Decision Protocol by sending a message to the other party by e-mail. The initial communication shall identify the issues, and the initiating parties' opinion, and reasons for such opinion. The initiating party shall communicate by e-mail, with contemporaneous text message directing the other part[y] to the e-mail, and include or attach to the e-mail any materials or communications from any third party on which he or she is relying in forming his or her opinion. Absent exigent circumstances, the receiving parent shall respond with his or her opinion and reasons therefore as soon as reasonably practicable, but in no event more than forty-eight (48) hours days  ⁷ from initiating communication. The responding party shall also include or attach any materials or communications from any third party on which he or she is relying in forming his or her opinion. Each party shall ensure the other has access to all material information relating to the Major Decision, and each party shall have the right to speak with any of the Children's relevant professionals (e.g. doctor, dentist, therapist) for his or her professional recommendation regarding the Major Decision.

1.4 Of, after good faith consultation in accordance with the procedure above, the parties are unable to each a mutual decision within seven (7) days of the initiating communication, the Mother shall have the right to make the final decision which shall be communicated to the Father by email. Notwithstanding the foregoing, in the event time sensitive circumstances do not permit the full seven (7) day consultation period, the Mother shall promptly advise the Father of the need for the truncated time period. Time sensitive circumstances do not include when a party fails to initiate the notification process timely and a decision must be made post haste because of that failure.

1.5 Notwithstanding the above, provided the Father notifies the Mother of his objection and intention to seek a Stay within twenty-four hours of the e-mail notification of the final decision, absent emergency, the Mother shall withhold implementation for ten (10) business days during which time the Father may seek a Stay of the Mother's decision. If the Father does not seek and obtain a Stay from a Court of competent jurisdiction within the ten (10) business day period, the Mother's decision may be implemented (without prejudice to the Father's right to seek a determination of his application on the merits). The Father may not block the implementation of the Mother's final decision absent obtaining a stay from a Court of competent jurisdiction. If there is judicial intervention concerning a Major Decision, the substantially prevailing party shall be awarded reimbursement of reasonable legal fees and costs by the Court. The parties may reasonably seek second opinion(s), but may not seek repeated consultations from evaluators and treating professionals to ensure finding a provider to recommend what he or she wishes to implement."

However, irrespective of the foregoing provisions pertaining to the manner within which the parties defined major decisions and indicated how they would be made, the parties included a number of carve-outs pertaining to specific issues of importance involving the Children. These carve-outs set forth the parties' agreement as to how that specific issue would be addressed, in effect making the major decision by agreement rather than pursuant to the delineated protocol. These carve-outs included the occupational/physical therapy of J.D., that a new psychologist and psychiatrist would be obtained for J.D., that R.D. would immediately commence speech therapy, that neither party would impede or block any evaluation recommended for the Children such as J.D.'s then current neuropsychological evaluation and R.D.'s then anticipated speech evaluation, the preferred use of in-network providers, that particular providers of the Children would continue to then be used subject to identification of equivalent in-network providers, and the following provision pertaining to where the Children would attend school (hereinafter "School Provision #1"):

"1.12 The Children shall continue to attend public school in the district in which the Mother resides subject to the acknowledged fact that J.D. may require a specialized school environment if recommended by evaluating and/or treating professionals. It is acknowledged that it may be recommended that J.D. should attend an identified private school with curriculum and staff that have particular focus on assisting students with his identified issues. The parties shall act in the best interest of J.D. to secure the most appropriate educational environment for him, without prejudice to the right to raise claims and defenses based on financial resources and ability" [emphasis added].

The parties set forth their understanding as to the manner in which the Parenting Agreement would be modified:

"Modification: Neither this Custody Agreement nor any provision hereof shall be amended or modified except by an Agreement in writing duly subscribed and acknowledged with the same formality as this Custody Agreement, except as expressly provided herein, or Order of a Court of competent jurisdiction. Any application to a Court of competent jurisdiction shall be made before the Family Court of the State of New York, Westchester County, or Supreme Court of the State of New York, Westchester County."

On May 7, 2021, a decision (hereinafter "Modification Decision #1"),⁸ was entered which made changes only to the physical custody of the Children.

On June 23, 2022, a decision (hereinafter "Modification Decision #2"),⁹ was entered which included the following decretal provisions:

"Accordingly, it is hereby

ORDERED that the Custody and Parenting Agreement so-ordered on August 3, 2020, is modified so that forthwith, the parties shall meaningfully consult with each other in writing on non-day-to-day "Major Decisions" related to the children, with the defendant having final decision-making authority on all issues relating to education, tutoring, and religion and religious education and plaintiff having final decision-making authority on all issues relating to non-routine and non-emergency medical and dental care, camp/organized summer activities and/or programs, extracurricular activities, therapeutic, therapy, pharmaceutical and dental/orthodontic needs; and it is further

ORDERED that the Major Decision Protocol outlined in paragraph 1.3 of the Custody and Parenting Agreement remains in place; and it is further

ORDERED that paragraph 1.4 of the Custody and Parenting Agreement is modified to reflect that if, after good faith consultation in accordance with the procedure set forth in paragraph 1.3, the parties are unable to reach a mutual decision within seven days of the initiating communication, the party possessing the decision-making authority for that particular zone shall have the right to make the final decision, which shall be communicated to the other parent by email. In the event that the issue is time-sensitive, the parent with decision-making authority shall advise the other parent of the need for the truncated time period; and it is further

ORDERED that paragraph 1.5 of the Custody and Parenting Agreement is modified to reflect that notwithstanding the above, provided that the other parent notifies the parent with decision-making authority of his or her objection and intention to seek a stay within twenty-four hours of the email notification of the final decision, absent emergency, the parent with decision-making authority shall withhold implementation for ten business days during which time the other parent may seek a stay of the authorized parent's decision. If the other parent does not seek and obtain a stay from a Court of competent jurisdiction within the ten-business day period, the authorized parent's decision may be implemented (without prejudice to the other parent's right to seek determination of his or her application on the merits). The other parent may not block the implementation of the authorized parent's final decision absent obtaining a stay from a court of competent jurisdiction. All remaining provisions of paragraph 1.5 regarding legal fees and second opinions remain unmodified; and it is further

ORDERED that plaintiff's application to be the primary legal and residential custodial parent is denied; and it is further

ORDERED that plaintiff's application that the children attend school where plaintiff resides is denied; and it is further

ORDERED that the Article II of the Custody and Parenting Agreement is stricken and in its place is the regular access schedule set forth in the court's May 7, 2021, decision and order and the Vacation Access Chart proposed by plaintiff in Exhibit D of this application (NYSCEF Document number 334); and it is further

ORDERED that all prior stays issued by this court are lifted in accordance with this decision and order.

This constitutes the decision, and order of this Court" [emphasis added].

On November 20, 2023, an order of custody and parenting time was entered (hereinafter "Modification Decision #3"),¹⁰ which sought to consolidate, without impacting the enforceability of each as unmodified, the Parenting Agreement, and Modification Decisions #1 and #2, as the preamble provides the following:

"WHEREAS, the parties were married on August 2, 2008; and

WHEREAS, the parties are presently involved in the above-captioned matrimonial matter pending in the Supreme Court, County of Westchester (the "Action"); and

WHEREAS, there are two (2) Children born of the marriage, to wit: J.D., born on [Redacted] ("J.D."), and R.D., born on [Redacted] ("R.D.") (hereinafter "Children" individually or "Children" collectively), and

WHEREAS, the parties entered into a Custody and Parenting Agreement which was dated and So-Ordered by the Court, Lubell, J., on August 3, 2020 ("the Agreement/Order") (NYSCEF Doc 108 & 109); and

WHEREAS, the Agreement was modified by further Decisions and Orders of the Court (Blackwood, J.S.) dated May 7, 2021 and June 23, 2022, (NYSCEF Doc. 231 and Doc. 415) respectively; and at conferences dated August 28, 2023, and October 11, 2023, and

WHEREAS, this Order is a consolidation of all prior Agreements and Orders, and shall not impact the decisions therein in any manner, and said decisions and findings will be admissible in all future court proceedings, including the Agreement which was modified by further Decisions and Orders of the Court (Blackwood, J.S.), dated May 7, 2021 and June 23, 2022, the Decisions and Orders of the Court (Blackwood J.S.), dated May 7, 2021 and June 23, 2022, respectively; Court Conferences dated august 28, 2023, and October 11, 2022, and

NOW THEREFORE, by reason of the Court having modified the Agreement pursuant to the two custody modification orders referenced above, it is hereby Ordered as follows:"

Thereafter, within Modification Decision #3, is a confirmation of the then current provision pertaining to the education of the Children (hereinafter "School Provision #2"):

"SCHOOL DISTRICT  ¹¹ REGISTRATION

2.1 The Mother shall be the primary residential custodian for school registration purposes so long as she continues to reside in [Redacted].

2.2 The children shall continue to attend public school in the district in which the Mother resides, subject to the acknowledged fact that J.D. may require a specialized school environment if recommended by evaluating and/or treating professional. However, the Children are registered and shall continue to be registered and attend the [Redacted] School District so long as at least one parent resides in the school district. This means if Mother relocates outside the [Redacted] school district, and Father remains in the district, then children will be registered using Father's address" [emphasis added].

On October 9, 2024, a decision was entered (hereinafter "Modification Decision #4"),¹² which was similar in form to Modification Decision #3 in that it sought to consolidate custody orders of this Court and with respect to the Children's education included the School Provision.

Thereafter, this Court is not in receipt of any further decisions or agreements which modify the Parenting Agreement or Modification Decisions #1-#4.

On September 14, 2026, Motion Sequence No. 28 was filed by order to show cause  ¹³ seeking the above-referenced relief, which on that date was conformed,¹⁴ providing directives regarding service of the application and scheduling the return date for September 18, 2026, at which time oral argument would be received as to the relief requested and a briefing schedule would be set if needed.

No further submissions were made pertaining to Motion Sequence No. 28.

On September 15, 2026, the attorney for R.D. filed a letter requested that her appearance be excused which was granted by order entered that day.¹⁵

On September 19, 2026, a conference was held before the undersigned wherein appearances were made by Plaintiff and Defendant as self-represented litigants and the attorney for J.D., wherein oral argument was received pertaining to the instant application.

Legal Analysis

A. Plaintiff's Requests Pertaining to J.D.'s School Enrollment.

The Appellate Division Second Judicial Department has provided instruction on the manner by which matrimonial agreements are to be interpreted:

"A stipulation of settlement in a matrimonial action is a contract subject to the principles of contract interpretation (see Rainbow v. Swisher, 72 NY2d 106, 531 N.Y.S.2d 775, 527 N.E.2d 258; Douglas v. Douglas, 7 AD3d 481, 776 N.Y.S.2d 90 [2d Dept.2004]; De Luca v. De Luca, 300 AD2d 342, 751 N.Y.S.2d 766). Thus, where the stipulation is "clear and unambiguous on its face, the intent of the parties must be gleaned from within the four corners of the instrument, and not from extrinsic evidence" (Rainbow v. Swisher, supra at 109, 531 N.Y.S.2d 775, 527 N.E.2d 258)" (Sieratzki v. Sieratzki, 8 AD3d 552 [2d Dept 2004]).

When examining an agreement to ascertain the intent of the parties to the contract, the Court of Appeals has noted that it is necessary to review the entirety of the document rather than to focus on certain provisions within the larger text:

"In determining whether the parties entered into a contractual agreement and what were its terms, it is necessary to look, rather, to the objective manifestations of the intent of the parties as gathered by their expressed words and deeds (see Mencher v Weiss, supra; Homan v Earle, 53 NY 267, 272). In doing so, disproportionate *400 emphasis is not to be put on any single act, phrase or other expression, but, instead, on the totality of all of these, given the attendant circumstances, the situation of the parties, and the objectives they were striving to attain (see Arnold v Gramercy Co., 15 AD2d 762, affd 12 NY2d 687; Aker v Fredella & Co., 227 App Div 226; cf. Jemzura v Jemzura, 36 NY2d 496, 503-504)" (Brown Bros. Elec. Contractors v. Beam Const. Corp., 41 NY2d 397 [1977]).

Just over twenty years later, the Court of Appeals entered a similar decision wherein they directed:

"The subject of this dispute may be novel but the common-law principles governing contract interpretation are not. Whether an agreement is ambiguous is a question of law for the courts (see, Van Wagner Adv. Corp. v S & M Enters., 67 NY2d 186, 191). Ambiguity is determined by looking within the four corners of the document, not to outside sources (see, W.W.W. Assocs. v Giancontieri, 77 NY2d 157, 162-163). And in deciding whether an agreement is ambiguous courts "should examine the entire contract and consider the relation of the parties and the circumstances under which it was executed. Particular words should be considered, not as if isolated from the context, but in the light of the obligation as a whole and the intention of the parties as manifested thereby. Form should not prevail over substance and a sensible meaning of words should be sought" (Atwater & Co. v Panama R. R. Co., 246 NY 519, 524).*567 Where the document makes clear the parties' over-all intention, courts examining isolated provisions " 'should then choose that construction which will carry out the plain purpose and object of the [agreement]' " (Williams Press v State of New York, 37 NY2d 434, 440, quoting Empire Props. Corp. v Manufacturers Trust Co., 288 NY 242, 249)" (Kass v. Kass, 91 NY2d 554 [1998]).

It is not uncommon for agreements to include general provisions pertaining to a particular subject which contain carve-outs which the parties agree will be excepted from the general provision (see Providence Hotel Partners Fund I, LLC v. GCKC Provenance, LLC, 234 AD3d 531 [1st Dept 2025]; see also Greenky v. Aytes, 138 AD3d 460 [1st Dept 2016]). The Court of Appeals provided the following reasoning for harmonic reading of contract provisions and how conflicting clauses should be interpreted:

"The rules of construction of contracts require us to adopt an interpretation which gives meaning to every provision of a contract or, in the negative, no provision of a contract should be left without force and effect. 1 Restatement, Contracts, s 235, subd. (c), Fleischman v. Furgueson, 223 NY 235, 119 N.E. 400; Rentways, Inc., v. O'Neill Milk & Cream Co., 308 NY 342, 347, 126 N.E.2d 271, 273. Even if there was an inconsistency between a specific provision and a general provision of a contract (we find none), the specific provision controls. 1 Restatement, Contracts, s 236, bubd. (a)" (Muzak Cor. v. Hotel Taft Corp., 1 NY2d 42 [1956]).

In the absence of mutual mistake, signatories to a contract will be bound to the usual meaning imposed by law on words used within the document (see Mencher v. Weiss, 306 NY 1 [1953]). "Technical words in a contract must be taken in a technical sense unless the context of the instrument or a usage which is applicable clearly indicates a different meaning. American Law Institute, Restatement of Contracts, s 235(b)" (Nau v. Vulcan Rail & Construction Co., 286 NY 188 [1941]). When used in a contract, the word "shall" is to be interpreted as a mandatory obligation of the parties (see Spirits of St. Louis Basketball Club, L.P. v. Denver Nuggets, Inc., 84 AD3d 454 [1st Dept 2011]; see also New York State Elec. & Gas Corp. v. Aasen, 157 AD2d 965, 3d Dept 1990, [3d Dept 1990] [discussing the usage within a contract of "shall" versus "may"]).

In the context of custody agreements, it is very common for parties to set forth their mutually agreed understanding as to legal custody; what the parties define as major decisions which often includes decisions pertaining to the child's education, medical care and general welfare; and, the decision-making process to be implemented to make such major decisions. Often the parties elect to include carve-outs wherein they set forth their agreements as to issues pertaining to the subject child which would likely fall within the definition of what would constitute a major decision, doing so in order to both confirm their understanding as to how that issue will be addressed on consent, and to avoid the need to engage in the decision-making process set forth within the document. Such provisions afford both parties the comfort of having certain issues impacting their children being resolved within the agreement and often times these carve-outs represent material terms that the parties relied upon in order to accept the other custodial provisions within the agreement.

Here, the Parenting Agreement and decisions modifying same are clear and unambiguous. The Parenting Agreement set forth the parties' agreement that they would have joint legal custody of the Children with major decisions for the Children being made after good faith consultation with Defendant having the final decision-making authority. While education was included within the definition of a major decision, School Provision #1 was included as one of many carve-outs which the parties set forth within the Parenting Agreement. This leads to the interpretation that these items, including School Provision #1, were intended to be carve-outs as pre-determined major decisions and not subject to the consultation process set forth therein. Moreover, to the extent these provisions are determined to be inconsistent, School Provision #1 is clearly the more specific provision and must control as to the school enrollment of the Children. As to that provision, the parties use of "shall" when addressing the enrollment of the Children in public school is important as it sets forth their intent that such action be mandatory.

Thereafter, while the Parenting Agreement was modified by several decisions which ultimately directed that Defendant retained final decision-making authority pertaining to the education of the Children. The final two decisions (Modification Decision #3 and #4), included School Provision #2, which goes beyond merely requiring that the Children attend public school, as it indicates the Children shall continue to be registered and attend the [Redacted] School District as long as one parent resides in the school district. Similar to School Provision #1, School Provision #2 also uses the word "shall" twice to set forth the mandatory nature of the obligation for the Children to be enrolled in public school and to the extent one parent continues to reside within the [Redacted] School District, that the Children be enrolled in that public school. As with the contract interpretation above, when reading together the major decision protocols from the Parenting Agreement which remained intact following the modification decisions, and School Provision #2, it is clear that the latter is more specific and must prevail as it was intended to be a carve-out.

During the oral argument, the parties and the attorney for J.D. all made statements which confirmed not only that School Provision #2 should be enforced in this instance, but that at present no basis for a modification of that provision had been presented to this Court. Both parties confirmed that they resided in [Redacted] and that the [Redacted] School District recommended that J.D. be enrolled within the [Redacted] School District. Moreover, during the oral argument the attorney for J.D. acknowledged that School Provision #2 was a carve-out that could not be determined by Defendant as a major decision under the umbrella of education, but must be the subject of either a stipulation of the parties or a motion for modification. Accordingly, applying the plain language of School Provision #2, J.D. must be enrolled in the [Redacted] School District. While Defendant asserts that she engaged in the decision-making protocols for making the major decision of enrolling J.D. in another school, for the reasons set forth above this Court rejects that as a valid basis for doing so. The major decision was already set forth within School Provision #2 as a carve-out, and while it was contemplated within that clause that J.D. may require a specialized school environment if recommended by an evaluating and/or treating professional, such a change would require either an agreement of the parents or court order.

Therefore, Motion Sequence No. 28 is hereby granted to the extent that the parties shall immediately cooperate with J.D.'s immediate interim re-enrollment in the [Redacted] Central School District. In order to ensure that the parties are cooperating to effectuate this directive, by September 25, 2026, they and the attorney for J.D. shall have a conference call with the [Redacted] School District to obtain the process by which to re-enroll J.D., including, but not limited to, any information to be provided, documents to be completed and submitted, and a timeline to complete the re-enrollment. The parties will then appear at a status conference to provide an update to this Court on September 28, 2026, at 9:00 a.m.

B. Plaintiff's Additional Requested Relief.

To the extent any relief not granted or otherwise addressed herein, it is hereby denied.

Accordingly, it is hereby

ORDERED that Motion Sequence No. 28 is hereby granted to the extent that the parties shall immediately cooperate with J.D.'s immediate interim re-enrollment in the [Redacted] Central School District; and it is further

ORDERED that by September 25, 2026, the parties and attorney for J.D. shall contact the [Redacted] School District by conference call to obtain the process by which to re-enroll J.D., including, but not limited to, any information to be provided, documents to be completed and submitted, and a timeline to complete the re-enrollment; and it is further

ORDERED a status conference shall be held on September 28, 2026, at 9:00 a.m., wherein all parties and counsel shall appear to provide this Court with the status of J.D.'s re-enrollment in the [Redacted] School District; and it is further

ORDERED that by September 24, 2026, [Redacted], as attorney for the child J.D., shall serve a copy of this Decision and Order with Notice of Entry by NYSCEF filing, and by that date shall file proof of service with the Court; and it is further

ORDERED that any relief requested not expressly granted herein is denied.

The foregoing constitutes the Decision and Order of the Court.

Dated: September 23, 2026

White Plains, New York

ENTER:

Hon. James L. Hyer, J.S.C.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Note: While no further submissions were received with respect to this application, this Court declined to set a briefing schedule as oral argument was made on the return date.

2.    See, NYSCEF Doc. No. 1.

3.    See, NYSCEF Doc. No. 11.

4.    See, NYSCEF Doc. No. 802.

5.   Note: The inclusion of reference to NYSCEF Doc. No. 415 twice appears to be a scrivener's error.

6.    See, NYSCEF Doc. Nos. 108 & 109.

7.   Note: The inclusion of "days" appears to be a scrivener's error.

8.    See, NYSCEF Doc. No. 231.

9.    See, NYSCEF Doc. No. 415.

10.    See, NYSCEF Doc. No. 583.

11.   Note: A scrivener's error is included as "DISTRICT" is misspelled as "DISGTRICT".

12.    See, NYSCEF Doc. No. 740.

13.    See, NYSCEF Doc. Nos. 1001-1028.

14.    See, NYSCEF Doc. No. 1029.

15.    See, NYSCEF Doc. Nos. 1031-1032.

James L. Hyer, J.