PEOPLE v. MILLER (2026)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of Albany County (William Little, J.), rendered December 6, 2023, upon a verdict convicting defendant of the crime of rape in the third degree.

In February 2022, the minor victim disclosed that she had engaged in sexual intercourse with an individual whose phone number was linked to defendant's address.  As a result of this disclosure, defendant was interviewed and made various incriminating statements.  He was then charged by indictment with rape in the third degree (see Penal Law § 130.25 [former (2) ] ) and, following various unsuccessful motions, was ultimately found guilty as charged.  Defendant was then sentenced to six months in jail and 10 years of probation, and he appeals.

Defendant initially contends that the People failed to satisfy their disclosure obligations pursuant to CPL 245.20(1)(k)(iv), which then worked to deprive him of his statutory right to a speedy trial.  As part of the initial disclosures, the People provided personnel files for potential law enforcement witnesses, including the Albany Police Department detective who interviewed defendant.  The document provided was titled “Professional Standards:  Officer Resume” and provided a summary of internal complaints, including certain traffic infractions and vehicle accidents which were determined to be violations of internal policy, as well as citizen complaints that were deemed unfounded, not sustained or exonerated.  Defendant claims that, rather than this summary, he was entitled to the complete disciplinary history with any supporting documentation appended thereto.

The People are required to declare their readiness for trial within six months of the commencement of the criminal action when a defendant is charged with a felony (see CPL 30.30[1][a] ).  However, they are statutorily obligated to provide defendant with “all items and information that relate to the subject matter of the case” that are within their possession or control or within the possession or control of those under their direction (see CPL 245.20 [former (1) ] ).  Only after disclosing such materials and certifying their compliance may the People declare readiness for trial (see CPL 245.50).  The People must supply defendant with, among other things, “[a]ll evidence and information, including that which is known to police or other law enforcement agencies acting on the government's behalf in the case, that tends to ․ impeach the credibility of a testifying prosecution witness” (CPL 245.20 [former (1)(k)(iv) ] ).  This includes the disciplinary history of testifying law enforcement officers, “when relevant to a witness's credibility” (People v. Fuentes, 45 NY3d 325, 333 [2025];  see Public Officers Law § 86[6];  People v. Cooperman, 225 AD3d 1216, 1219 [4th Dept 2024] ).

Regarding those aspects of the detective's personnel file that related to alleged traffic infractions and/or the operation of her patrol vehicle in an unsafe manner, that “information did not relate to the subject matter of the case inasmuch as it was not material that tends to impeach the credibility of a testifying prosecution witness” (People v. Burrows, 237 AD3d 1481, 1482 [4th Dept 2025] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted], lv denied 43 NY3d 1054 [2025] ).  To the crux of defendant's argument related to the citizen complaints, “CPL 245.20(1)(k)(iv) does not require production of a document just because it provides additional information not in other impeachment material.  The question instead is whether the document tends to impeach the credibility of a testifying prosecution witness” (People v. Fuentes, 45 NY3d at 334 [internal quotation marks, ellipsis and citations omitted] ).  Initially, “the People undisputedly disclosed the source and full content of th[e] allegations before filing” the original and supplemental certificates of compliance and statements of trial readiness and, as a result, the underlying complaints themselves “ha[ve] no impeachment value” (id. at 335).  In any event, this is not an instance where the law enforcement officer has been found to be incredible in the past and that information was not provided to defendant (see People v. Hespinobarros, 245 AD3d 826, 829 [2d Dept 2026], lv denied 45 NY3d 972 [2026];  compare People v. Coley, 240 AD3d 122, 138 [2d Dept 2025] ), nor would the full records shed light on defendant's claim that his statements were the result of coercive interrogation practices.  Thus, the citizen complaints detailed in the Officer Resume do not work to impeach the detective's credibility inasmuch as the specific allegations do not “demonstrate[ ] an untruthful bent or significantly reveal[ ] a willingness to place the advancement of [her] individual self-interest ahead of ․ the interests of society” (People v. Smith, 27 NY3d 652, 661 [2016] [internal quotation marks, ellipsis and citations omitted];  accord People v. White, ––– AD3d ––––, ––––, 2026 N.Y. Slip Op 04475, *7 [1st Dept 2026];  see People v. Fuentes, 45 NY3d at 334–335).  Accordingly, we find that County Court correctly determined that the People exercised due diligence and made reasonable efforts to satisfy their obligations under CPL article 245 when filing their certificate of compliance and associated statement of trial readiness (see People v. Guthrie, 250 AD3d 754, 756 [2d Dept 2026], lv denied ––– NY3d –––– [Aug. 27, 2026];  People v. Hespinobarros, 245 AD3d at 829).¹

Next, defendant claims that the use of leg restraints during his interview rendered his Miranda waiver and any resulting statements involuntary.  “On a motion to suppress, the People bear the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant's statements to police were voluntarily given, including that any custodial interrogation was preceded by the administration and the defendant's knowing waiver of his or her Miranda rights” (People v. Saunders, 232 AD3d 1039, 1042 [3d Dept 2024] [internal quotation marks, brackets and citations omitted], lv denied 43 NY3d 1058 [2025] ).  “Whether a statement given to police is voluntary is a factual issue governed by the totality of the circumstances and the credibility assessments of the suppression court in making that determination are entitled to deference” (People v. Brown, 251 AD3d 1159, 1162, [3d Dept 2026] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted];  see People v. Henry, 237 AD3d 1258, 1260 [3d Dept 2025], lv denied 44 NY3d 982 [2025] ).  “It is the People's burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that statements of a defendant they intend to rely upon at trial are voluntary” and, to do so, “they must show that the statements were not products of coercion, either physical or psychological” (People v. Thomas, 22 NY3d 629, 641 [2014] ).

Upon being taken into custody, defendant was brought into an interview room and secured to a chair utilizing a leg restraint and his handcuffs were removed.  The detective commenced the interview by providing defendant with his Miranda rights and, following the recitation of those rights, asked defendant if he understood.  Defendant questioned if he needed to answer, stated he did not wish to do so and asserted that he was being questioned for “no reason.”  The detective continued to explain that she needed confirmation that defendant understood his rights to be permitted to speak with him, and he replied that she was disrespecting him.  She described to defendant that she can only speak to him if he acknowledges his understanding of his rights and that he wishes to speak with her, to which he stated that he will talk and again asserted that he was arrested for “no reason.”  The detective again asked defendant directly whether he understood each of the rights as she had explained them and, before she could finish her statement, he fervently confirmed his understanding.  She then asked defendant whether he was willing to speak to her considering these rights and defendant again stated in the affirmative.  After gathering biographical information, the detective concentrated her questioning to the facts at hand and provided defendant with images of him interacting with the victim and a recitation of events that may have occurred.  Defendant initially denied these events but, when the detective continued reciting a narrative, defendant acquiesced and confirmed that the victim had asked to use his phone and he allowed her to do so.  Defendant acknowledged that the victim was in his house, although denying that he let her in, and stated that she “rap[ed]” him.  The detective sought confirmation that the two had sexual intercourse and defendant denied doing so “consensually,” explaining that he did not consent.  Defendant continued to affirm that the two engaged in sexual intercourse but denied any wrongdoing on his part, continually stating that she had raped him and that he did not know how old she was.  However, defendant then claimed that he told the victim she was too young, but they had engaged in sexual intercourse because that is what she wanted.  While defendant did state that the story was a “fable” and did not happen, he also claimed that the victim “allow[ed] herself to be with [him].”  Notably, less than 15 minutes passed from the time defendant was brought into the interview room to when he began to make incriminating statements and, relatedly, the interview ceased less than 30 minutes after it began.  At the suppression hearing, the detective testified that she was not aware that defendant had any mental health history at the time of the interview and affirmed that he answered the questions being asked of him, leading her to believe that he appeared to understand what was being asked.

Initially, defendant failed to preserve his specific contention that the use of leg restraints rendered his statements involuntary (see CPL 470.05[2];  People v. Smith, 199 AD3d 1023, 1023 [2d Dept 2021], lv denied 38 NY3d 1190 [2022] ).  Nevertheless, while it may be a consideration in the totality of the circumstances, the use of restraints is not determinative of whether a defendant's statements were voluntary or involuntary (see generally People v. Youngs, 175 AD3d 1604, 1606 [3d Dept 2019];  People v. Byrd, 152 AD3d 984, 985–986 [3d Dept 2017];  People v. Rizvi, 126 AD3d 1172, 1173 [3d Dept 2015], lv denied 25 NY3d 1076 [2015] ).  Deferring to County Court's credibility determinations and considering the totality of the circumstances – particularly the exceedingly brief duration of the interview – we find no basis to disturb the determination that the People had proven beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant's statements were voluntary (see People v. Aycock, 238 AD3d 1063, 1064 [2d Dept 2025], lv denied 44 NY3d 981 [2025];  People v. Garcia, 79 AD3d 1248, 1250 [3d Dept 2010], lv denied 16 NY3d 797 [2011];  compare People v. Zeh, 144 AD3d 1395, 1397 [3d Dept 2016], lv denied 29 NY3d 954 [2017] ).  Even though defendant did state in passing that he had smoked marihuana and taken medication, he did not place these events in time and, therefore, did not give the impression that he was under the influence at the time of the interview.  Thus, even when combined with the broad allegations that defendant suffered from certain mental health issues, these facts did not meet defendant's shifted burden “to adduce evidence supporting his ․ contention that he ․ did not comprehend his ․ rights” (People v. Fox, 244 AD3d 1510, 1511–1512 [3d Dept 2025] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted], lv denied 45 NY3d 971 [2026] ).  The court, therefore, properly denied defendant's motion to suppress his statements.

Also without merit is defendant's assertion that County Court erred, both procedurally and substantively, in finding him competent to stand trial.  Principally, defendant maintains that the court failed to conduct a full inquiry into his competency and render an impartial determination as to the issue and, in a similar regard, that it disregarded trial counsel's representations of defendant's fitness in favor of its own courtroom observations.

“The key inquiry in determining whether a criminal defendant is fit for trial is whether he or she has sufficient present ability to consult with his or her lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding – and whether he or she has a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him or her” (People v. Phillips, 16 NY3d 510, 516 [2011] [internal quotation marks, brackets and citation omitted] ).  Courts in this state must follow the procedures set forth in CPL article 730 to ensure that “a defendant ‘who[,] as a result of mental disease or defect[,] lacks capacity to understand the proceedings against him [or her] or to assist in his [or her] own defense’ “ is not subject to criminal trial (People v. Tortorici, 92 N.Y.2d 757, 759 [1999], cert denied 528 U.S. 834 [1999], quoting CPL 730.10[1] ).  “The People bear the burden of proving a defendant's competency by a preponderance of the evidence, and the trial court's determination in this regard is accorded considerable deference” (People v. Hadfield, 119 AD3d 1217, 1219 [3d Dept 2014] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted], lv denied 25 NY3d 989 [2015];  see People v. Mendez, 1 NY3d 15, 19 [2003];  People v. Petty, 246 AD3d 831, 831 [2d Dept 2026], lv denied 45 NY3d 1018 [2026] ).  Despite that defense counsel is generally “in the best position to assess [a] defendant's capacity” (People v. Bickham, 189 AD3d 1972, 1976 [3d Dept 2020] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted], lv denied 36 NY3d 1095 [2021] ), a trial court may nevertheless elect to credit expert medical proof and its own observations over counsel's representations (see People v. Phillips, 16 NY3d at 517;  People v. Stanton, 200 AD3d 1307, 1308 [3d Dept 2021], lv denied 38 NY3d 954 [2022];  People v. Babcock, 152 AD3d 962, 963 [3d Dept 2017], lv denied 30 NY3d 947 [2017] ).

Initially, we find that County Court adhered to the procedural dictates of CPL article 730.  In relevant part, the court ordered psychiatric examinations of defendant, received the reports of those examiners – which did not conflict – and then conducted a hearing (compare People v. Vandegrift, 170 AD3d 1327, 1328 [3d Dept 2019] ).  Following that hearing, the court made “a full and impartial determination of [defendant's] mental capacity” and then continued to assess his capacity throughout the course of trial (id. [internal quotation marks and citations omitted] ).²  As to the substantive merits of the court's determination, defendant was examined by two psychiatric examiners who both opined that he was not an incapacitated person (see generally CPL 730.10[1] ).  While acknowledging certain mental health history and instances of confusion, these examiners described that defendant understood the charge against him, which he knew to be a felony and therefore more severe than a misdemeanor, and that, because he pleaded not guilty, the case was proceeding to trial.  Even though defendant draws attention to the fact that he misnamed trial counsel during his examinations, the slight error in his use of a similar sounding name does not demonstrate that he was incapable of understanding the proceedings against him or assisting in his own defense.  Considering the proof presented and according due deference to the court's credibility determinations, we cannot conclude that the court abused its discretion in finding defendant was not an incapacitated person and, therefore, that the criminal action “must proceed” (CPL 730.50[1];  see People v. Petty, 246 AD3d at 831–832).

Finally, County Court did not abuse its discretion in declining defendant's request for a missing witness charge.  “The proponent of a missing witness charge must first ‘promptly notify the court that there is an uncalled witness believed to be knowledgeable about a material issue pending in the case, that such witness can be expected to testify favorably to the opposing party and that such party has failed to call him [or her] to testify.’  Once the proponent has satisfied that initial burden, the burden shifts to the opponent ‘to account for the witness' absence or otherwise demonstrate that the charge would not be appropriate’ ” (People v. Khiamdavanh, ––– NY3d ––––, ––––, 2026 N.Y. Slip Op 03903, *2 [2026], quoting People v. Gonzalez, 68 N.Y.2d 424, 427, 428 [1986];  see Warner v. Kain, 186 AD3d 1844, 1848 [3d Dept 2020] ).  “This [now-shifted] burden can be met by demonstrating that the witness is not knowledgeable about the issue[;] that the issue is not material or relevant[;] that although the issue is material or relevant, the testimony would be cumulative to other evidence[;] that the witness is ‘not available’[;] or that the witness is not under the party's ‘control’ such that he would not be expected to testify in his or her favor” (People v. Gonzalez, 68 N.Y.2d at 428 [citations omitted];  see People v. Keen, 94 N.Y.2d 533, 539 [2000];  see e.g. People v. Smith, 33 NY3d 454, 459 [2019] ).  Nevertheless, “[i]f the opponent successfully rebuts the proponent's prima facie showing, the proponent retains the ultimate burden to show the charge would be appropriate” (People v. Khiamdavanh, ––– NY3d at ––––, ––––, 2026 N.Y. Slip Op 03903, *2).  Thus, “[t]he preconditions for this charge” have been said to be:  “(1) the witness's knowledge is material to the trial;  (2) the witness is expected to give noncumulative testimony;  (3) the witness is under the ‘control’ of the party against whom the charge is sought, so that the witness would be expected to testify in that party's favor;  and (4) the witness is available to that party” (DeVito v. Feliciano, 22 NY3d 159, 165–166 [2013];  see People v. Onyia, 70 AD3d 1202, 1204 [3d Dept 2010] ).

County Court did not improperly place the preliminary burden on defendant as the proponent of the charge.  To the contrary, the court allowed defendant's request to proceed by simply stating that the People did not produce the victim.  The People then placed the various facts that they believed rendered the charge inappropriate on the record and, thereafter, defendant was provided the opportunity to oppose the People's position.  Thus, while the court may not have made an express determination at every stage of the analysis, it did follow the required burden-shifting analysis and did not place any improper burden upon defendant (see generally People v. Smith, 33 NY3d at 459;  People v. Gonzalez, 68 N.Y.2d at 428).  It is true that in denying the charge, the court stated that the factors of control and availability “ha[d] not been met.”  Even so, review of the inducing discussion leads us to believe that the court used this as a shorthand.  Stated more fully, the court found that the People had established that the charge was not appropriate because the victim was unavailable and not under their control and that defendant did not then satisfy his “ultimate burden” of demonstrating appropriateness of the charge (People v. Khiamdavanh, ––– NY3d at ––––, 2026 N.Y. Slip Op 03903, *2).  At most, the court's language was a slip of the tongue that did not place any added burden upon defendant (compare Heinrich v. Serens, 240 AD3d 1223, 1226 [4th Dept 2025] ).

Finally, related to the merits of the charge, the People explained that the victim had been uncommunicative since her initial disclosure.  According to the People, after the underlying offense, the victim had been moved from the facility where she had been living in Albany County and was believed to now be living in Erie County.  However, efforts to locate her by communicating with Family Court in that jurisdiction had been unsuccessful.  As a result, prosecutors had not had any contact with the victim and at no point during the criminal action had she testified.  The foregoing establishes that the victim was unavailable to the People and that they “did not merely go through the motions of asking the witness to testify, with the ulterior goal of keeping the witness off the stand” (People v. Henriquez, 147 AD3d 706, 707 [1st Dept 2017] [internal quotation marks, brackets and citation omitted], lv denied 29 NY3d 1080 [2017];  see People v. Harrison, 162 AD3d 1207, 1208 n 1 [3d Dept 2018], lv denied 32 NY3d 1205 [2019];  People v. Womack, 143 AD3d 1171, 1174 [3d Dept 2016], lv denied 28 NY3d 1151 [2017];  cf.  People v. Williams, 215 AD3d 694, 696 [2d Dept 2023], lv denied 40 NY3d 931 [2023] ).  In opposition, defendant essentially argued that the People had not adequately laid out the efforts undertaken to secure the victim's testimony.  Based upon this record, we cannot say that County Court abused its discretion in denying defendant's request (see People v. Ferguson, 193 AD3d 1253, 1258 [3d Dept 2021], lv denied 37 NY3d 964 [2021];  see generally People v. Smith, 33 NY3d at 458).

ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Despite defendant's assertion to the contrary, the record establishes that he entered a waiver of his speedy trial rights (compare People v. Dickinson, 18 NY3d 835, 836 [2011] ).  A defense counsel's waiver of a defendant's unripe speedy trial rights “is equivalent to an extension of time for the People to proceed with prosecution.  [As such, w]hen defense counsel requests or acquiesces in a delay in the proceedings, such time is excludable for statutory speedy trial purposes” (People v. Garcia, 33 AD3d 1050, 1052 [3d Dept 2006], lv denied 9 NY3d 844 [2007] ).  In opposition to defendant's CPL 30.30 motion, the People affirmed, under penalty of perjury, that the case file evidenced that defendant signed a written waiver which was provided to the District Attorney's office on September 18, 2022 and effective for 60 days, ending on November 17, 2022.  Not only did defendant fail to take issue with that claim, but trial counsel conceded on the record to having executed such a waiver.  While defendant is correct that a written waiver is not included in the court record, that omission was likely because the People had no occasion to provide same in light of trial counsel's admission.  Thus, the People met their burden of demonstrating that defendant had waived his speedy trial rights for the period from September 18, 2022 to November 17, 2022 (see People v. Cole, 244 AD3d 1388, 1389 [3d Dept 2025], lv denied 45 NY3d 944 [2026];  People v. Wheeler, 159 AD3d 1138, 1141 [3d Dept 2018], lv denied 31 NY3d 1123 [2018] ).

2.   To the extent defendant seems to take issue with County Court's initial denial of the request for an examination and hearing, that request was granted later the same day.  Given that examinations were ultimately conducted, and a hearing held, the court's initial denial is not fatal to the issue at hand (see generally CPL 730.20;  People v. Tortorici, 92 N.Y.2d at 765–766).

Powers, J.

Garry, P.J., Fisher, Corcoran and Ryba, JJ., concur.