III AKEL WILLIAMS JILLIAN CARA COGER JOHNNY SAGAN v. KINGS COUNTY DEMOCRATIC COUNTY COMMITTEE KINGS COUNTY DEMOCRATIC COUNTY COMMITTEE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE NEW YORK STATE DEMOCRATIC COMMITTEE ANOTHONY BECKFORD MICHELLE TEGE DOUG SCNEIDER LYDIA BELLA GREEN ARLENY ALVARADO MCCALLA HERIBERTO MATEO KENNESHA TRAYNHAM COOPER HENRY BUTLER MICHAEL BOOMER MERCEDES NARCISSE ROXANNE PERSAUD (2026)

The following e-filed papers read herein: NYSCEF Doc Nos.:

Notice of Motion/Order to Show Cause/

Petition/Cross Motion and

Affidavits (Affirmations) Annexed 1-15, 21-22, 23, 25, 37-40

Opposing Affidavits/Answer (Affirmations) 16, 17, 18-20, 41

Affidavits/ Affirmations in Reply

Other Papers:

Upon the foregoing papers, petitioners Julio Pena III, Akel Williams, Jillian Cara Coger, and Johnny Sagan (petitioners) move for a judgment declaring: (1) That outgoing members of the Executive Committee may not exercise functions in substantial matters, including the adoption of rule changes, bylaw amendments, amendments to party rules, governance changes, officer actions, committee actions, changes to voting eligibility for the next Chair, or other substantial matters, during the period between the primary election and the County Committee Organizing Meeting; (2) That only elected State Committee members from Kings County and persons properly elected by the Executive Committee to fill vacancies in Executive Committee membership resulting from vacancies in the State Committee may vote on the Executive Committee under Article V, § 1 of the KCDCC Bylaws; (3) That Former State Committee Members who lost election or re-election or declined to seek re-election to the State Committee at the 2026 primary election are no longer State Committee members pursuant to Election Law § 2-106 and lack voting rights on the Executive Committee; (4) That any substantial action purportedly adopted at the August 25, 2026 meeting is null, void, and of no force or effect if adopted by outgoing members, by persons lacking voting rights under Article V, § 1 of the Bylaws, or through votes cast by persons who were no longer State Committee members; (5) That any rules amendment purportedly adopted at the August 25, 2026 meeting, including Proposal 10, may not be used to govern the 2026 County Committee Organizing Meeting or to alter the rights, procedures, voting rules, or governance structure applicable to the incoming County Committee; (6) That any rules amendment(s) violating the statutorily required democratic governance of political parties is null, void, and of no force or effect; and (7) That the August 25, 2026 meeting was a public meeting because no majority vote was taken to enter executive session as required by Article V, Section 12 of the KCDCC Bylaws and Robert's Rules of Order Chapter IV 9:24, and that the meeting violated the Party Rules of the Democratic State Committee of New York by failing to be held publicly and to provide timely public notice as required by Party Rules Sections 2(a) and 2(b).

Petitioners further move for an order: (1) Enjoining and restraining respondents from counting, recognizing, certifying, implementing, ratifying, or giving effect to any vote cast at the August 25, 2026 meeting by any person who lost election or re-election or failed to seek re-election to the State Committee at the 2026 primary election and therefore no longer held the State Committee membership on which Executive Committee voting rights depend; (2) Enjoining and restraining respondents from implementing, ratifying, or giving effect to any resolution, rule change, bylaw amendment, amendment to party rules, change to governance structure, change to the electorate eligible to vote for Chairperson of the Executive Committee, officer action, committee action, or other action of substantial consequence adopted or purported to be adopted at the August 25, 2026 meeting or any adjournment thereof, pending the convening of the duly constituted KCDCC Organizing Meeting; (3) Enjoining and restraining Respondents from permitting any person to vote as a voting member of the KCDCC Executive Committee unless that person is a State Committee member elected from Kings County or a person properly elected by the Executive Committee to fill a vacancy in Executive Committee membership resulting from a vacancy in the State Committee, as required by Article V, § 1 of the KCDCC Bylaws; (4) Enjoining and restraining Respondents from implementing, ratifying, or giving effect to any resolution, rule change, bylaw amendment, amendment to party rules, change to governance structure, change to the electorate eligible to vote for Chairperson of the Executive Committee, officer action, committee action, or other action which would substantially deny Brooklyn Democratic voters the right to democratically govern their party; (5) Enjoining and restraining Respondents from conducting any future meeting of the KCDCC Executive Committee in executive session without first obtaining a majority vote of the Executive Committee to enter executive session, as required by Article V, Section 12 of the KCDCC Bylaws and Robert's Rules of Order Chapter IV 9:24; and (6) Enjoining and restraining Respondents from conducting or treating any public meeting of the KCDCC Executive Committee as other than a public meeting open to all members of the Democratic Party of New York, and from failing to publicize fully and in such manner as to assure timely notice to all interested persons the time and place for all such public meetings, as required by Party Rules Sections 2(a) and 2(b) of the Democratic State Committee of New York.

Respondents Kings County Democratic County Committee (County Committee), Kings County Democratic County Committee Executive Committee (Executive Committee), and Rodneyse Bichotte Hermelyn (Bichotte Hermelyn) (collectively, the Committee Respondents) move to dismiss, pursuant to CPLR 1001, 1003, and 3211 (a) (10), on the ground that petitioners failed to join necessary parties.

BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On June 23, 2026, the Democratic Party primary election was held, which included electing members for the party positions of County Committee as well as Kings County Democratic Party State Committee (State Committee). Prior to the primary election, respondents Anthony Beckford, Michelle Tege, Doug Schneider, Lydia Bella Green, Arleny Alvarado-McCalla, Heriberto Mateo, Kenesha Traynham-Cooper, Henry Butler, Michael Boomer, Mercedes Narcisse and Roxanne Persaud were State Committee members, as well as voting members of the Kings County Democratic County Committee Executive Committee (the Executive Committee) (collectively referred to as the outgoing State Committee members or the outgoing Executive Committee members). In this regard, under the Rules for the Government of the Kings County Democratic County Committee (Party Rules) that existed at the time of the primary election, the voting members of the Executive Committee consisted of elected State Committee members and those persons elected by the Executive Committee to fill vacancies in its membership resulting from vacancies on the State Committee (Party Rules art V, § 1). At the primary election, all of the outgoing Executive Committee members either lost their bid for re-election to the State Committee or did not run for re-election for this party position.

On August 19, 2026, acting in her capacity as Chair of the Executive Committee, Bichotte Hermelyn issued a special meeting notice to the members of the Executive Committee informing them that a meeting would be held on August 25, 2026 regarding certain proposed amendments to the Party Rules. The notice further advised that attendance at the meeting would be limited to Executive Committee members and that the meeting would be held in Executive Session. All of the outgoing Executive Committee members received this notice while none of the individuals who successfully ran to replace the outgoing Executive Committee members received such notice.

Attached to the meeting notice was a list of 10 proposed changes to the Party Rules which set forth the current rule, the proposed amendment, and the amended rule if adopted. While all of the proposed changes to the Party Rules involved substantial matters of governance, the most significant change would increase the size of the Executive Committee by some 48 voting members who would be appointed by the Party Chair. As previously noted, under the existing rules, voting members of the Executive Committee were limited to "those persons who were elected as State Committee members and those persons elected by the Executive Committee to fill vacancies in its membership resulting from vacancies on the State Committee" (Party Rules, art V, § 1).

On August 24, 2026, petitioners commenced a related proceeding under Kings County Index Number 531958/26 against respondents Bichotte Hermelyn and the Executive Committee by filing a petition and proposed order to show cause. Among other things, the petition sought a temporary restraining order preventing the Executive Committee from holding the meeting noticed for August 25, 2026. The gravamen of petitioners' claim was that the outgoing Executive Committee members were not authorized to cast votes at the scheduled meeting under the Election Law. Specifically, petitioners pointed to Election Law § 2-106, which provides in pertinent part that State Committee members "shall hold office until the next election at which members of the committee are elected" (Election Law § 2-106 [4]). Here, since the primary election had already been held, petitioners maintained that the outgoing State Committee members no longer held office and were therefore no longer members of the State Committee or the Executive Committee.

After hearing both parties on the matter on August 24, 2026, the court declined to sign the proposed order to show cause on the ground that the proceeding was premature but ruled that the matter could be renewed after the meeting occurred.

The Executive Committee meeting was held on August 25, 2026. With the exception of respondent Roxanne Persaud, all of the outgoing Executive Committee members appeared at the meeting and voted on the proposed amendments to the Party Bylaws. After voting on the matter, all 10 of the proposed amendments to the Party Bylaws were adopted and the votes of the outgoing Executive Committee members were the deciding factor in each vote. Regarding the vote on Amendment Proposal 4, which would amend Party Rules Article V with respect to who would constitute the voting members of the Executive Committee, there were 21 votes in favor of the amendments, 19 votes against, and one abstention. According to petitioners, had the outgoing Executive Committee members been excluded from the vote, the vote would have been 13 in favor, 17 against, and one abstention. It thus appears that two of the outgoing Executive Committee members voted against the proposed amendments.¹

On August 28, 2026, petitioners commenced the instant proceeding seeking injunctive and declaratory relief as set forth above. On September 2, 2026, the parties appeared before the court and the matter was adjourned to September 3, 2026 to allow respondents Heriberto Mateo, Henry Butler and Arleny Alvarado-McCalla additional time to retain counsel.² Although Mateo, Butler and Alvarado-McCalla had requested one to two weeks to do so, the court granted only the additional day because, under Election Law § 2-112 (1) (b), the Democratic Party organizational meeting is required to be held between September 17 and October 6, 2026, and the instant matter needs a resolution before the organizational meeting takes place. On September 3, 2026, the court signed an amended order to show cause in order to give petitioners an opportunity to serve Bichotte Hermelyn, who was not served pursuant to the requirements of the original order to show cause dated August 28, 2026.³

On September 7, 2026, the Committee Respondents moved to dismiss, by way of order show cause, on the ground that necessary parties were not joined. This motion did not raise any issue with service or any other CPLR 3211 grounds for dismissal. Petitioners filed a memorandum of law in opposition to the motion to dismiss on September 8, 2026. At the hearing held on that date, the court deemed the Committee Respondents' order to show cause and its supporting papers served on petitioners and the court heard the parties' respective arguments relating to the motion to dismiss and the merits of the petition.

DISCUSSION

Motion to Dismiss

The Committee Respondents move, pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (10), CPLR 1001 and CPLR 1003, to dismiss the instant proceeding for failure to name and serve necessary parties prior to the expiration of the 10-day statute of limitations set forth in Election Law § 16-102 (2). In support of this motion, respondents initially note that CPLR 1001 (a) provides that "[p]ersons who ought to be parties if complete relief is to be accorded between the persons who are parties to the action or who might be inequitably affected by a judgment in the action shall be made plaintiffs or defendants." The Committee Respondents further note that, amongst the relief sought by petitioners is an order declaring that the Amendments adopted at the August 25, 2026 Executive Committee meeting to be "null, void, and of no force or effect." Thus, the Committee Respondents maintain that the non-outgoing members of the Executive Committee who voted in favor of the proposed amendments would clearly be inequitably affected by such a declaratory order since it would have the effect of nullifying their affirmative votes at the meeting. Accordingly, the Committee Respondents maintain that the non-outgoing Executive Committee members who voted in favor of the amendments were necessary parties to this proceeding.

In further support of their motion, the Committee Respondents note that petitioners seek to nullify Amendment Proposals 2 and 4 to the Party Rules which, among other things, made Executive Committee officers  ⁴ , County Committee officers, as well as former (no longer elected) Chairs of the Executive Committee, voting members of the Executive Committee. Thus, the Committee Respondents maintain that seated officers of the County and Executive Committee, as well as former Executive Committee Chair Clarence Norman, would be inequitably affected by the relief sought by petitioners and are necessary parties since any nullification of the rules adopted at the August 25, 2026 Executive Committee meeting would remove them as voting members of the Executive Committee.

As a final matter, the Committee Respondents maintain that petitioners' failure to name and serve necessary parties in this proceeding is a fatal jurisdictional defect. In particular, the Committee Respondents argue that the instant proceeding is governed by the statute of limitations set forth in Election Law § 16-102 (2), which requires that the proceeding be instituted within 10 days of the holding of the meeting. Here, the last day to commence was September 4, 2026 (i.e., 10 days after the August 25, 2026 meeting). Thus, the Committee Respondents maintain that it is too late to add these necessary parties as respondents in this proceeding.

In opposition to the Committee Respondents' motion, petitioners maintain that every person or entity necessary to adjudicate the challenged action is already a respondent in this matter. In particular, petitioners note that the central issue in this proceeding is whether or not the Executive Committee acted lawfully under the Election Law and the Party Rules when it purported to amend the Party Rules at the August 25, 2026 meeting. As such, petitioners maintain that the proper institutional respondents are the Executive Committee that acted, the County Committee whose rules were purportedly amended, and the Executive Committee Chair responsible for conducting and implementing the challenged action — all three of which are named respondents. Thus, petitioners maintain that a judgment in this proceeding can operate fully and effectively upon those respondents.

In further opposition to the Committee Respondents' motion, petitioners point out that none of the cases cited by the Committee Respondents in their memorandum of law stand for the proposition that a petitioner asserting a legal challenge to the amendment of a party rule by a party committee (which is what occurred here), must name every individual on the committee and every individual potentially affected by the rule change. Instead, petitioners maintain that the cases cited by the Committee Respondents involve the failure to join individuals whose election to an office at an organizational meeting is being challenged, whose nomination or designation to run in an election is being challenged, or the failure to join a party committee whose rule changes are being challenged. Here, petitioners note that the petition does not challenge any individual's election to an office or designation/nomination to run in an election as no nominations, designations or elections occurred at the August 25, 2026 meeting. Petitioners further note that they did name and serve both the County Committee and Executive Committee that was responsible for the amendment process being challenged.

Petitioners also point out that Amendment Proposal 4 sets October 7, 2026 as its effective date, which is one day later than the last possible day to hold the County Committee organizational meeting under the Election Law. Thus, petitioners argue that none of the County Committee Officers, Executive Committee Officers, or former Chairs would be stripped of a present exercisable voting right if a judgment concerning the validity of the amendments is issued. According to petitioners, a contingent authority scheduled to arise after the organizational meeting is not a present right requiring individual representation in this proceeding. Further, petitioners aver that it cannot be said that these individuals would be stripped of any authority by a judgment in petitioners' favor since the amendments that purportedly conveyed that authority were not validly adopted.

As a final matter, petitioners note that the amendments created new County-wide Executive Committee positions and other future officeholders who have not yet been elected or selected. Accordingly, petitioners maintain that these hypothetical future officeholders are not necessary parties because their identities are unknown at this time.

The failure to join a necessary party in an election proceeding is jurisdictional and requires dismissal of the petition (see Stein v Kings County Democratic County Comm, 206 AD3d 845, 846 [2d Dept 2022]; see also Matter of Morgan v de Blasio, 29 NY3d 559, 560 [2017]; Matter of Quis v Putnam County Board of Elec., 22 AD3d 585, 586 [2d Dept 2005]; Matter of Cornicelli v Scannell, 307 AD2d 1006, 1006 [2d Dept 2003]). Specifically, who constitutes a necessary party is governed by CPLR § 1001(a), which provides in pertinent part that necessary parties are those "[p]ersons who ought to be parties if complete relief is to be accorded between the persons who are parties to the action or who might be inequitably affected by a judgment in the action . . ."

The court finds no merit to the Committee Respondents' contention that the non-outgoing Executive Committee members who cast votes adopting the amended rules are necessary parties to this proceeding. Each of these individuals were duly elected members of the State Committee, and consequently, they are also members of the Executive Committee, having been elected at the June 23, 2026 Democratic Primary. As petitioners named the Executive Committee as a respondent herein, as well as the Chair of the Executive Committee, the interests of said non-outgoing Executive Committee members are represented. Further, the case of Stein, which the Committee Respondents cite in support of their argument that these individuals are necessary parties, is readily distinguishable from the facts in the instant case. In Stein, the Appellate Division, Second Department held that, where the authority and actions of the Executive Committee were being challenged in a legal proceeding, the Executive Committee is a necessary party to that proceeding (Stein, 206 AD3d at 846). Indeed, Stein is merely the latest of a series of cases in which the Second Department has held that, where the actions, jurisdiction and authority of an executive committee is challenged, the executive committee is a necessary party to the proceeding (Matter of Schaffer v Withers, 186 AD2d 836, 836 [2d Dept 1992]; Matter of Rizzo v Withers, 158 AD2d 497, 498 [2d Dept 1990]). Other Second Department case law has held that the Chair presiding over the executive committee meeting where the challenged activity took place is also a necessary party to the proceeding (Matter of Curcio v Wolf, 133 AD2d 188, 189 [2d Dept 1987]). Here, petitioners are also challenging the acts and authority of the Executive Committee, but unlike in the caselaw cited above, both the Executive Committee and its Chair are named respondents. Nothing in Stein, Matter of Schaffer, Matter of Rizzo, or Matter of Curcio, suggests that the individual members of the Executive Committee are necessary parties when the collective acts and authority of the Executive Committee are being challenged. Moreover, while the petition does challenge the outcome of the vote adopting the rule changes, this challenge is based on the fact that the amendments would not have been adopted but for the votes cast by the outgoing Executive Committee members, all of whom are named respondents in this petition. The petition does not challenge the validity of the individual votes cast in favor of the amendments by the non-outgoing members of the Executive Committee.

The court also finds the Committee Respondents' argument that the sitting officers of the County and State Committee, as well as former Executive Committee Chair Clarence Norman, are necessary parties to this proceeding lacks merit. The cases cited by respondents in support of this proposition involve individuals whose election to an office or nomination/designation by a party to run in an election is being challenged. In particular, in Matter of Marin v Board of Elections (67 NY2d 634, 636-637 [1986]), the Court of Appeals held that persons whose election at a party organizational meeting was being challenged in a legal proceeding were necessary parties to the proceeding. The Court of Appeals made an identical ruling in Greenspan v O'Rourke (27 NY2d 846, 846-847 [1970]). Similarly, in Matter of Max v Ward (107 AD3d 1597, 1599 [4th Dept 2013]), the Appellate Division, Fourth Department noted that officers elected at a party organizational meeting were necessary parties to a legal proceeding which sought to set aside their election. In Bunch v Baker (175 AD3d 835, 836-837 [3d Dept 2019]), the Appellate Division, Third Department held that successful nominees for Town offices were necessary parties in a proceeding seeking to invalidate their nomination and preclude their inclusion on the general election ballot. Finally, in McGrath v Abelove (87 AD3d 803, 804 [3d Dept 2011]), the Third Department held that where a proceeding could result in a candidate's removal from the ballot, that candidate was a necessary party to the proceeding. Here, the challenged August 25, 2026 meeting was limited to considering proposed amendments to the Party Rules and none of the individuals identified by the Committee Respondents as purported necessary parties were elected to any office or nominated/designated to run in an election at that meeting. Further, any invalidation of the process employed to make the rule changes would leave each current officer in the same office held before the meeting.

Furthermore, the court notes that the amendment to KCDCC Rule Article V, Section 1 (i.e., Amendment proposal 4) states that "[t]he Executive Committee shall be a standing committee of the County Committee. It shall be composed of enrolled Democrats, who are State Committee members elected from Kings County, persons elected by the Executive Committee to fill vacancies in its membership resulting from vacancies in the State Committee, the officers of the Executive Committee and County Committee, (effective October 7, 2026) " (emphasis added). That the individuals identified by the Committee Respondents held officer positions in the County Committee and Executive Committee on August 25, 2026 is of no matter, as it is unknown who in fact will be elected to said offices/positions at the organizational meeting at which time such individuals would gain voting authority under Amendment proposal 4. As such, to the extent that the Committee Respondents contend that the individuals who will fill the newly created County-wide Executive Committee positions are necessary parties, it would be impossible to join such persons to the instant proceeding as their identities are currently unknown.

Accordingly, the Committee Respondents' motion to dismiss the instant proceeding based upon the failure to join necessary parties within the applicable statute of limitations period is denied.

Other Preliminary Matters

The court also rejects respondents' contention that the rule change is not ripe for review at this juncture. Here, the rule change vote is final and cannot be changed or cured by administrative means available to petitioners and the challenge to the vote involves a purely legal question (see Amazon.com, LLC v New York State Dept. of Taxation & Fin., 81 AD3d 183, 201-203 [1st Dept 2010], affd 20 NY3d 586 [2013], cert denied 571 US 1071 [2013] and cert denied 571 US 1071 [2013]; Matter of McGloine v Natrella, 189 AD2d 873, 873-874 [2d Dept 1993]; cf. Church of St. Paul & St. Andrew v Barwick, 67 NY2d 510, 519-523 [1986]).

The court additionally notes that one of the respondents' affirmative defenses is that the declaratory judgment relief sought in the petition is only cognizable in a plenary action. However, respondents, in their memorandum of law submitted in support of their motion to dismiss based on the failure to join necessary parties, appear to withdraw this defense and concede that this action should be considered a special proceeding under Article 16 of the Election Law. Even if respondents had stood by their assertion that the action was commenced in an improper form, dismissal of the action would not be warranted as this court has the authority under CPLR 103 (c) to convert the proceeding to a declaratory judgment action and deem the order to show cause the summons, the petition to be the complaint and a motion for summary judgment on the declaratory relief sought, and respondents answer and opposition to be separate cross-motions for summary judgment dismissing the complaint (see Matter of Progressive Dr. Ins. v Malone, 228 AD3d 759, 760-761 [2d Dept 2024]; Matter of Quinn v Cuomo, 183 AD3d 928, 930 [2d Dept 2020]).

Merits of the Petition

On the merits, the controversy involves an internal dispute regarding the governance of the County Committee. " '[I]nternal issues arising within political parties are best resolved within the party organization itself and judicial involvement should only be undertaken as a last resort' " (Matter of Wong v Cooke, 87 AD3d 659, 660 [2d Dept 2011], lv denied 17 NY3d 706 [2011], quoting Matter of Bachmann v Coyne, 99 AD2d 742 [2d Dept 1984]; see Matter of Auerbach v Suffolk County Comm. of the Conservative Party, 171 AD3d 731, 737 [2d Dept 2019]). " 'Judicial intervention is only warranted upon a clear showing that a party or its leaders have violated [the Election Law] or the party's own rules adopted in accordance with law, or otherwise [have] violat[ed] the rights of party members or the electorate' " (Matter of Wong, 87 AD3d at 660, quoting Harding v Harrington, 127 Misc 2d 5, 5-6 [Sup Ct, NY County 1984], affd 104 AD2d 544 [1984], lv denied 63 NY2d 606 [1984]; see Matter of Auerbach, 171 AD3d at 737). Here, petitioners assert that court intervention is warranted because the vote that included the outgoing Executive Committee members was conducted in violation of Article V, § 1 of the Party Rules and Election Law § 2-106 (4).

Petitioners' primary contention is that the state committee members on the Executive Committee who lost their bids for election or re-election to the state committee, or who declined to seek re-election and whose terms of office had therefor expired, did not have authority to vote at the August 25, 2026 meeting called for purposes of amending the Party Rules. In making this assertion, petitioners note that, under Article V, § 1 of the Party Rules, the voting members of the Executive Committee consist of State Committee members elected from Kings County and members elected by the Executive Committee to fill vacancies.⁵ Given this rule, and in view of Election Law § 2-106 (4), which provides that state and county committee members "hold office until the next election at which members of the committee are elected,"⁶ petitioners assert that the outgoing Executive Committee members who did not run or who were not reelected at the June 23, 2026 primary were no longer "elected" to the Executive Committee and had no authority to vote at the Executive Committee meeting held to amend the Party Rules.

Conversely, respondents contend that the issue is determined by Election Law § 2-112 (1) (b), which provides that "Every county committee shall meet no earlier than September seventeenth and no later than October sixth following the June primary. Until such organization meeting, the existing county committee shall exercise all legal authority. Upon the conclusion of such organization meeting, the new county committee shall assume all legal authority vested in the previously organized county committee."⁷ In respondents' view, section 2-112 (1) (b) extends the authority of the outgoing Executive Committee members to vote at meetings in the period between the primary and the organizational meeting is held.

Election Law § 2-106 (4), which provides that county and state committee members hold office from the primary at which they are elected until the next election at which committee members are elected, continues the rule from the version of the Election Law in effect since at least the 1940s (see former Election Law § 13; Matter of Torchin v Cohen, 286 NY 544, 547-548 [1941]). Former Election Law § 2-112 (1), which had likewise long been in effect in a similar form (see former Election Law § 15; Matter of Torchin, 286 NY at 547-548), and was in effect until June 2019 (see L 2019, ch 498), provided, as is relevant here, that "Every state committee shall within fifteen days after its election, every county committee shall within twenty days after its election, and all other committees shall within the time specified by party rules, meet and organize by electing a chairman, a secretary, a treasurer and such other officers as they may by their rules provide." Reading these sections together, a long line of cases held that with the election of a new county committee in a primary election (which then generally occurred in early September), the previously elected outgoing county committee had no further official authority. Further, no rule adopted by such former county committee could extend the authority of it or its committees to continue to exercise functions in substantial matters after the primary election of the new county committee members (see e.g. Matter of Auerbach v Suffolk County Comm. of the Conservative Pary of NY State, 159 AD3d 695, 697 [2d Dept 2018]; Matter of Brocato v Tinari, 157 AD3d 782, 784 [2d Dept 2018], lv denied 31 NY3d 907 [2018]; see also Matter of Torchin, 286 NY at 547-548; Matter of Mazur v Kelly, 170 AD2d 1037, 1038 [4th Dept 1991]; Matter of Bauman v Fusco, 21 AD2d 470, 472 [1st Dept 1964]).⁸

It was following the enactment of the statute changing the primary date from the first Tuesday in September to the fourth Tuesday in June (see Election Law § 9-100 [a], as amended [L 2019, ch 779, § 17]), that the legislature amended Election Law § 2-112 (1) and provided that the organizational meetings of party state and county committees were to be held in September into early October and provided that the "existing" state and county committees "shall exercise all legal authority" until such organizational meetings (Election Law § 2-112 [1] [a], [1] [b], as amended L 2019, ch 498). In view of the cases generally holding that a county committee and its committees could not act in the period after the election of the new members and before the organizational meeting (see e.g. Matter of Auerbach, 159 AD3d at 697; Matter of Brocato, 157 AD3d at 784), this amendment to Election Law was clearly intended to ensure that county and state committees could continue to function during the nearly three-month period between the primary and the date that an organizational meeting could first be held. The legislature, however, did not also amend Election Law § 2-106 (4) when it amended section 2-112, which may create some ambiguity in how the sections are to be read together.

Any such ambiguity regarding the intended impact of the changes to Election Law § 2-112, however, does not affect what constitutes the voting membership of the Executive Committee here. Namely, given that Article V, § 1 of the Party Rules provides that the voting members of the Executive Committee consist of State Committee members "elected" from Kings County and members elected by the Executive Committee to fill vacancies, the voting members are the committee members elected or re-elected at the primary pursuant to Election Law § 2-106 (4) (see Party Rules art VIII, § 2),⁹ particularly in the absence of any assertion that any relevant vacancy was filled by the Executive Committee. The voting membership of the Executive Committee is thus in no way tied to any vote by the county committee or the County Committee's organizational meeting. If Election Law § 2-112 (1) (b) must be deemed to apply to the Executive Committee here, the newly elected members of the state committee become members of the "existing" committee automatically by operation of Party Rules art V, § 1 and art VIII, § 2 upon their election at the primary and they function as the existing committee until after the County Committee organizational committee holds its vote and the organizational meeting for the new Executive Committee is held (Party Rules art V, § 2 [A]).

Significantly, Matter of Gibbs v Manhattan Democratic Party — NY County Democratic Comm. (226 AD3d 590 [1st Dept 2024]), the only appellate case addressing the actions of a county or state committee decided after the amendment to Election Law § 2-112, constitutes persuasive authority supporting this conclusion. In Matter of Gibbs, the court addressed a dispute involving a meeting of a divisional committee of the New York County Democratic Committee (NY Committee) held after the June 2023 primary but before the NY Committee's organizational meeting (id. at 591). In addressing the propriety of the meeting notice that was sent to NY Committee divisional committee members elected at the June 2022 primary, not the June 27, 2023 primary, the court stated that:

"Under Election Law § 2-106 (4), county committee members 'shall hold office until the next election at which members of the committee are elected.' Upon the election of their successors at the primaries, the outgoing members were no longer empowered to 'exercise functions in substantial matters' (Matter of Bauman v Fusco, 21 AD2d 470, 472 [1st Dept 1964], citing Matter of Torchin v Cohen, 286 NY 544, 548 [1941]; see also Matter of Auerbach v Suffolk County Comm. of the Conservative Party of NY State, 159 AD3d 695, 697 [2d Dept 2018]). Accordingly, the notice for the organizing meeting should have been sent to the members elected in the June 2023 primaries, not the outgoing 2022 members" (Matter of Gibbs, 226 AD3d at 591-592).¹⁰

The Court opines that this holding supports a finding that the outgoing Executive Committee members who were not re-elected at the June 2026 primary had no authority to vote at the August 25, 2026 meeting with respect to the rule amendments. It should also be noted that this Court believes first, that the sole holding in Gibbs is that the Respondents did not have a quorum. The Court understands that the idea that the committee could not do "substantial" work during this interregnum period is dicta and not the holding of Gibbs. It is, however, authoritative, as the Second Department has never addressed this issue. Moreover, the cases relied upon by the First Department in Gibbs existed prior to the change in the law in 2019. Initially, prior to the amendment of Election Law § 2-112, there were a matter of weeks between the primary and the earliest date on which the organizational meeting could be scheduled. There is almost one-third of the year, a fact that was impossible for earlier Courts to consider, that is now crucially relevant to the matter sub judice. And while the Court is bound to apply the existing law as set forth in Gibbs, this is actually an issue which needs to be addressed by the legislature. While the respondents here disagree with the precedential impact of the decision in Matter of Gibbs, and the impact of Election Law § 2-112 (1) (b), they make no assertion that the rule changes here can be considered anything other than substantial changes.

Given that the court finds that the vote at the meeting by the outgoing Executive Committee members was improper and given that the votes of these outgoing members made the difference in the passage of the rule change at the meeting, the court finds that the rule changes must be declared a nullity and a permanent injunction enjoining the implementation of these amended rules is thus warranted (see Burke v Aspland, 56 AD3d 1001, 1004 [3d Dept 2008], lv denied 12 NY3d 709 [2009]).

Having reached this conclusion, this court need not address petitioners' additional contention that closing the August 25, 2026 meeting to the public violated the open meeting requirements of the Rules of the Democratic State Committee of New York and Party Rule art. V, § 12. The fact that this single meeting was possibly closed in violation of these rules does not warrant an injunction compelling respondents to comply with their open meeting requirements in the future as the single allegedly violative action here fails to demonstrate a threat of future imminent harm (see Electrolux Corp. v Val-Worth, Inc., 6 NY2d 556, 565 [1959]; see also Matter of Max, 107 AD3d at 1600). Likewise, given the above determination, the court need not address whether the Executive Committee violated the amendment procedure requirements of its Party Rules and the court declines to grant injunctive relief relating to the application of the amendment procedure requirements to future attempts to amend the rules by the Executive Committee (see Electrolux Corp., 6 NY2d at 565).

Finally, this court wishes to emphasize that it believes this case presents an issue of first impression relating to party governance during the period of time between the June primary and the County Committee organizational meeting caused by the ambiguities arising from attempting to reconcile Election Law § 2-106 (4) and Election Law § 2-112 (1) (b), which the court reserves for the legislature to address. The court, however, finds that Matter of Gibbs, while not directly on point, is sufficiently persuasive authority binding the court to find that the votes by the outgoing members at the August 25, 2026 meeting were improper.

Accordingly, it is hereby,

ORDERED that the petition is granted to the extent that the court declares that the August 25, 2026 vote on the proposed amendments to the Party Rules that included the votes of the outgoing members of the Executive Committee (i.e., State Committee members from Kings County who were not re-elected at the June 23, 2026 primary or who did not seek re-election at that primary) in adopting the proposed amendments was improper and that the rule changes adopted as the result of such votes are a nullity; it is further

ORDERED that a permanent injunction is issued enjoining and restraining respondents from attempting to certify, implement or give effect to the rule changes adopted as the result of the August 25, 2026 vote; and it is further

ORDERED that a permanent injunction is issued enjoining and restraining respondent Executive Committee from allowing the outgoing members of the Executive Committee (i.e., State Committee members from Kings County who were not re-elected at the June 23, 2026 primary or who did not seek re-election at that primary) from exercising functions on substantial matters as part of the Executive Committee; and it is further

ORDERED that the petition is otherwise denied; and it is further

ORDERED that respondents' motion to dismiss for failure to join necessary parties is denied.

This constitutes the decision, order, and final judgment of the court.

E N T E R F O R T H W I T H

Honorable Jill R. Epstein, J. S. C

FOOTNOTES

1.   The court notes that, while the Committee Respondents, in their answer, generally denied the factual allegations of the verified petition, they, and the other respondents, have made no argument that petitioners' factual allegations regarding who voted and how the vote occurred are incorrect. Rather, as discussed below, their opposition rests on legal arguments that, among other things, necessary parties were not joined, and the vote was legal under Party Rules and the Election Law.

2.   The court notes that the State Committee appeared on the initial return date and filed an answer on NYSCEF. Although the State Committee, in this answer, asserted that it has a party rule that provides that the State Chair is empowered to convene binding arbitration panels for consideration of intra-party disputes and that this dispute should be resolved through such arbitration, the State Committee makes no assertion that the State Chair has in fact convened such an arbitration panel and that the instant proceeding is barred because such an arbitration has in fact been commenced.

3.   The original order to show cause generally allowed service to be done by personal delivery or, alternatively, by overnight mail delivery. However, Bichotte Hermelyn's name was not included in any of the sections of the order providing for overnight mail delivery, which was the method of delivery by which petitioners here attempted service.

4.   Under the preexisting Party Rules, officers of the Executive Committee were not necessarily members of the State Committee or Executive Committee (Party Rules, art V, § 1).

5.   Prior to the amendments at issue, Party Rules art V, § 1, provided that, "The Executive Committee shall be a standing committee of the County Committee. It shall be composed of State Committee members elected from Kings County, persons elected by the Executive Committee to fill vacancies in its membership from vacancies in the State Committee, and the Chairperson, Secretary, Treasurer, and Assistant Treasurer of the County Committee; except that only those persons who were elected as State Committee members and those persons elected by the Executive Committee to fill vacancies in its membership resulting from vacancies on the State Committee shall be authorized to vote" (emphasis added).

6.   In this regard, Party Rules art VIII, § 2 provides that, "In each even numbered year, members of party committees to be elected by the direct vote of the duly enrolled Democratic voters shall be elected at the primary elections."

7.   Similarly, Election Law § 2-112 (1) (a), provides that, "Every state committee shall meet no earlier than September seventeenth and no later than October first following the June primary. Until such organization meeting, the existing state committee shall exercise all legal authority. Upon the conclusion of such organization meeting, the new state committee shall assume all legal authority vested in the previously organized state committee."

8.   The decision in Matter of Baker v Jenson (30 AD2d 969, 969-970 [2d Dept 1968], affd 22 NY2d 959 [1968]), found an exception to this general rule for an executive committee of a county committee that consisted of state committee members and district leaders elected in that county (id.). Another exception to the general rule allowed an outgoing executive committee to make a party nomination where such nomination was required to be made after a primary and it was effectively impossible for the newly elected county committee to organize and act in the required time period for such acts (see Matter of Settineri v DiCarlo, 197 AD2d 724, 728 [2d Dept 1993, Balletta, J.P., dissenting], revd on dissenting op below 82 NY2d 813, 816 [1993]).

9.   The court in Matter of Baker v Jenson (30 AD2d 969, 969-970 [2d Dept 1968], affd 22 NY2d 959 [1968]) reached the same conclusion for an executive committee of a county committee that was similarly made up of state committee members and district leaders. The court questions the precedential value of Matter of Baker, however, given that it was decided long before the amendments to Election Law § 2-112.

10.   This discussion forms the basis for the court's holding in Matter of Gibbs that meeting notice sent to the outgoing members was improper and that the notice for the new meeting needed to be sent to the newly elected members (Matter of Gibbs, 591-592). Although not specifically mentioned by the court in Matter of Gibbs, the respondents in Gibbs had argued, in view of the requirements of Election Law § 2-112 (1) (b) relating to the continued authority of the "existing" county committee, that the notices were properly sent to the outgoing committee (see brief for respondents — respondents in Matter of Gibbs, 226 AD3d 590, available at 2024 WL 2242181).

Jill R. Epstein, J.