Benjamin Pearce, Plaintiff, v. CHARLES BAKER (2026)

New York State Courts Electronic Filing (NYSCEF) Document Numbers 1-16, and 30-62, along with the oral argument held on September 16, 2026, were considered in connection with plaintiff Benjamin Pearce's motion for a preliminary injunction, which is determined as follows:

On September 2, 2026, plaintiff Benjamin Pearce, a 2026 graduate of Emory University and former Division III collegiate basketball player commenced this action against the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA), seeking declaratory and injunctive relief that would permit him to compete in a fifth year under the new eligibility rules adopted by NCAA Division I on June 24, 2026 (Bylaw 12.6).¹

Factual Background

A. NCAA and Student-Athlete Eligibility Rules

The NCAA is the governing body for college sports in the United States. It is a voluntary, self-governing association comprised of about 1,100 colleges, universities, and conferences organized into three divisions (NCAA Cons, preamble [Div I Manual 2026-2027] [NYSCEF Doc No. 38 at 1]; Edwards v Natl. Collegiate Athletics Assn., 2026 WL 2517623 *1, 2026 US Dist LEXIS 192757 [ED NY Aug. 26, 2026, No. 26CV5047 (OEM/TAM)]). Each division "ha[s] independent authority to organize itself, consistent with the principles of the Association" and "determine its own governing structure and membership" (NCAA Const, art 2, §§ B[1], [3] [NYSCEF Doc No. 38 at 5]). Approximately 350 schools compete in Division I (Ohio v Natl. Collegiate Athletic Assn., 706 F Supp 3d 583, 588 [ND W Va 2023]).

Prior to August 1, 2026, Division I Bylaw 12.6 permitted student-athletes to compete in four seasons of intercollegiate athletic competition over a five-year period that began upon their initial fulltime enrollment in a collegiate institution (former Div I Bylaw 12.6 [Div I Manual 2025-2026] [NYSCEF Doc No. 39 at 46]; see also Edwards, 2026 WL 251723 *1). Bylaw 12.6 was amended on June 24, 2026, to allow student-athletes to compete during the entire five-year eligibility period, provided they meet all other eligibility requirements (Edwards, 2026 WL 251723 *2; plaintiff's mem of law in support [NYSCEF Doc No. 4 at 2-3]; defendants' mem of law in opp [NYSCEF Doc No. 43 at 4]). The amendment was effective on August 1, 2026 (NYSCEF Doc No. 38 at 44). Bylaw 12.6, as amended, states:

"[a]n individual's period of eligibility for practice and competition shall be limited to five years. An individual's five-year period of eligibility begins with the earlier of the following:

(a) The regular academic term (semester or quarter) of an academic year in which the individual enrolls in a collegiate institution (domestic or foreign; see Bylaw 14.02.4) in a minimum full-time program of studies and attends a class in that term while enrolled full time; or

(b) The beginning of the regular academic year immediately after the individual's 19th birthday" (Proposal No. 2026-44 [NYSCEF Doc No. 40]; see also Div I Bylaw 12.6 [NYSCEF Doc No. 38 at 44-45]).

Inexplicably, on June 23rd—the day before the amendment to Bylaw 12.6 became final—the NCAA issued a press release (referred to during the September 16, 2026, hearing as "the guidance", and herein as either "the guidance" or "press release") (NYSCEF Doc No. 34). According to that document, student-athletes are not eligible for a fifth year of competition if, under the old rule, their fourth season of eligibility was completed in the 2025-2026 academic year (NYSCEF Doc No. 34 at 2; see also Edwards, 2026 WL 251723 *2; NYSCEF Doc No. 43 at 4; NYSCEF Doc No. 9 at 2). However, the version of Bylaw 12.6 that was voted upon and passed by the Cabinet did not address that issue. The record is silent as to whether it was debated and rejected, or whether it was discussed at all.

B. Plaintiff's Order to Show Cause

Plaintiff enrolled full-time at Emory University in August 2022. While enrolled at Emory, plaintiff played four consecutive seasons of Division III basketball from 2022-2023 through 2025-2026. As pled in the complaint, some of his accomplishments as a basketball player include: finishing his career as Emory's all-time leading scorer with 2,080 points and the only player in the program's history to score over 2,000 points, in 2025-2026, he won the Jostens Trophy, was named the D3hoops.com National Player of the Year, was named University Athletic Association Player of the Year, a First Team All-American, and the Small College Basketball Trevor Hudgins Award. Plaintiff never redshirted, sought or received a competition waiver, attended junior college, or played basketball professionally, and no non-NCAA season has been charged against him. (NYSCEF Doc No. 1, complaint at ¶17).

Plaintiff alleges he is currently in the NCAA Transfer Portal seeking a Division I roster spot for the 2026-2027 basketball season and contends that several schools have expressed interest, including North Carolina State University, Stanford University, University of California San Diego, Northeastern University, and Eastern Tennessee State University (id. at ¶19).

By order to show cause dated September 3, 2026, the court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining, among other things, (i) the enforcement of Division I Bylaw 12.6 with respect to plaintiff, (ii) interference with the decision of any NCAA member institution to permit plaintiff to practice, condition, train, and compete as a member of its men's varsity basketball team during the 2026-2027 academic year, and award him athletically related financial aid, (iii) communication to any NCAA member institution or conference that plaintiff is ineligible to play during the 2026-2027 academic year or that permitting him to play would subject the institution to any NCAA sanction, penalty, or adverse consequence.

Discussion

"[A] party seeking the drastic remedy of a preliminary injunction must establish a clear right to that relief under the law and the undisputed facts upon the moving papers" (Gagnon Bus Co., Inc. v Vallo Transp., Ltd., 13 AD3d 334, 335 [2d Dept 2004]). "The burden of proof is on the movant to demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits, the prospect of irreparable injury if the relief is withheld, and a balancing of the equities in the movant's favor" (id.). A movant must satisfy each requirement with "clear and convincing evidence" (Apa Sec., Inc. v Apa, 37 AD3d 502, 503 [2d Dept 2007]). "The decision to grant or deny a preliminary injunction lies within the sound discretion of the Supreme Court" (Arcamone—Makinano v Britton Prop., Inc., 83 AD3d 623, 625 [2d Dept 2011]). "The purpose of a preliminary injunction is to maintain the status quo pending determination of the action" (Automated Waste Disposal, Inc. v Mid-Hudson Waste, Inc., 50 AD3d 1072, 1073 [2d Dept 2008]).

As explained below, under the plain language of Bylaw 12.6, plaintiff is eligible to compete in a fifth year. The requested injunction which maintains the status quo is prohibitory (Phillip v Fairfield Univ., 118 F3d 131, 133-134 [2d Cir. 1997]).

A. Plaintiff has a Likelihood of Success on the Merits  ²

Plaintiff does not challenge the NCAA's authority to amend the eligibility rules or the process by which Bylaw 12.6 was amended. Plaintiff's argument is that the NCAA's interpretation of Bylaw 12.6 rendering him, and all other similarly situated student-athletes, ineligible constitutes a breach of contract and is arbitrary and capricious because the interpretation is not supported by the bylaw's text.

As a not-for-profit unincorporated association (Metro. Intercollegiate Basketball Assn. v Natl. Collegiate Athletic Assn., 337 F Supp 2d 563, 565 [SD NY 2004]), the NCAA's constitution and bylaws constitute a contract between the members and between each member and the NCAA (Polin v Kaplan, 257 NY 277, 281 [1931]). The constitution and bylaws are subject to general principles of contract interpretation (Olszewski v Cannon Point Assn., Inc., 148 AD3d 1306, 1308 [3d Dept 2017]). Because plaintiff is not a member of the NCAA, he is not a party to the constitution and bylaws and cannot enforce them as a contract (Alpha Phi Alpha Senior Citizens Ctr., Inc. v Zeta Zeta Lambda Co., Inc., 180 AD3d 630, 632-633 [2d Dept 2020]; Bounds v E. Coll. Athletic Conference, 69 Misc 2d 676, 678 [Sup Ct, Monroe County 1972]; Jacobson v Seddio, 2022 NY Slip Op 32748[U] *6-7 [Sup Ct, NY County 2022] [holding judicial candidate did not have standing to assert breach of contract claims based upon an alleged violation of the Kings County Democratic County Committee and Judicial Screening Committee rules because she was not a member of either entity]).

However, plaintiff contends that he is a third-party beneficiary to the NCAA's constitution and bylaws. A third-party beneficiary claim requires plaintiff to establish "(1) the existence of a valid and binding contract between other parties, (2) that the contract was intended for [his] benefit, and (3) that the benefit to [him] is sufficiently immediate to indicate the assumption by the contracting parties of a duty to compensate [him] if the benefit is lost" (Mandarin Trading Ltd. v Wildenstein, 16 NY3d 173, 182 [2011] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]). The conditions under which New York courts recognize a third party's right to enforce a contract are: "when the third party is the only one who could recover for the breach of contract or when it is otherwise clear from the language of the contract that there was an intent to permit enforcement by the third party" (Dormitory Auth. of the State of New York v Samson Constr. Co., 30 NY3d 704, 710 [2018]).

Student-athletes have been determined to be third-party beneficiaries of the NCAA's constitution, bylaws, and regulations because those documents evince a clear intent to benefit student-athletes, and the NCAA determines each student-athlete's eligibility to compete (Bloom v Natl. Collegiate Athletic Assn., 93 P3d 621, 623-624 [Colo Ct App]; Oliver v Natl. Collegiate Athletic Assn., 2008-Ohio-7143 [Ct Common Pleas 2008] vacated by settlement).

In Hall v Natl. Collegiate Athletic Assn., 985 F Supp 782, 796-797 (ND Ill 1997), the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois expressed some doubt that under Illinois Law student-athletes are third-party beneficiaries but for purposes of the preliminary injunction motion, assumed some likelihood they would succeed in proving they were. Likewise, in Weston v Big Sky Conference, 466 F Supp 3d 896, 909, 910 (ND Ill 2020), plaintiffs sued the NCAA and Big Sky Conference based on their alleged failure to adopt and implement adequate concussion treatment and concussion management safety protocols. Concluding that the complaint contained sufficient allegations that the NCAA's constitution and bylaws were promulgated to protect the safety and physical well-being of each student athlete, the District Court denied the motion to dismiss the third-party beneficiary contract claim (see also Richardson v Southeastern Conference, 612 F Supp 3d 753, 771-772 [ND Ill 2020] [applying Florida law]).

"In New York, our general contract interpretation principles are well established. The fundamental, neutral precept of contract interpretation is that agreements are construed in accord with the parties' intent and the best evidence of what parties to a written agreement intend is what they say in their writing. Where a contract was negotiated between sophisticated, counseled business people negotiating at arm's length, courts should be especially reluctant to interpret an agreement as impliedly stating something which the parties specifically did not include.

Evidence outside the four corners of the document as to what was really intended but unstated or misstated is generally inadmissible to add to or vary the writing. Extrinsic or parol evidence is admissible only if a court finds an ambiguity in the contract; such evidence is not admissible to create an ambiguity in a written agreement which is complete and clear and unambiguous upon its face. A contract's silence on an issue does not create an ambiguity which opens the door to the admissibility of extrinsic evidence to determine the intent of the parties Determining whether a contract is ambiguous is an issue of law for the courts to decide a contract is unambiguous if the language it uses has a definite and precise meaning, unattended by danger of misconception in the purport of the agreement itself, and concerning which there is no reasonable basis for a difference of opinion. Ambiguity in a contract arises when the contract, read as a whole, fails to disclose its purpose and the parties' intent, or when specific language is susceptible of two reasonable interpretations. Consistent with New York law, a written agreement that is complete, clear an unambiguous on its face must be enforced according to the plain meaning of its terms" (Donohue v Cuomo, 38 NY3d 1, 12-13 [2022]).

The plain language of Bylaw 12.6 states that the period of eligibility is limited to five years which begins with either the regular academic term in which they enroll in a collegiate institution in a minimum full-time program and attends a class or in the beginning of the academic year following their 19th birthday, whichever is earlier (NYSCEF Doc No. 38 at 44-45). Plaintiff falls within the bylaw's criteria because he enrolled full-time and attended classes at Emory beginning in the fall of 2022. The bylaw does not specifically exclude student-athletes who competed for a fourth year during the 2025-2026 academic year. Because the bylaw is clear and unambiguous it must be enforced as written without resort to extrinsic evidence such as the press release/guidance.

Notwithstanding Bylaw 12.6's plain language, the NCAA still could not rely on its press release of June 23, 2026, because the NCAA has provided no information about the purported guidance other than its existence. The student-athletes who are subject to it (and the court), have only a by-line with a name, and no evidence that the author accurately reported the events of the June 23, 2026, Cabinet meeting, which continued into the next day. The press release itself specifically warns "[t]he changes are not final until the Cabinet meeting concludes Wednesday" (NYSCEF Doc No. 34 at 1). Neither the court, nor the student-athletes who are subject to it, have any idea whether the Cabinet decided that the student-athletes such as plaintiff, and those similarly situated to him, should be precluded from benefitting from the amendment. Nothing in this record explains how a press release that was published before the changes became final can possibly be consistent with, or supplant, conflicting plain language of the amendments to Bylaw 12.6 that were finalized on June 24, 2026. In short, it is a nullity because it interprets that which does not yet exist.

Jerry Vaughn, the Managing Director of Division I Governance and Member Services submits an affirmation in opposition to the motion but all it does is authenticate the documents NCAA submits as exhibits (NYSCEF Doc No. 37). During oral argument, the NCAA only offered that, as with any rule change, a line had to be drawn somewhere. The NCAA also took the remarkable position that its reasons for interpreting the Age-Based Rule to exclude student-athletes that completed four years of competition as of the 2025-2026 academic year, are irrelevant.

Even if the press release/guidance did not fatally pre-date the actual amendment, the NCAA would still have to explain the origins of its interpretation of Bylaw 12.6 and how it is authorized by the Bylaws. Article 9 of the Division I bylaws sets forth the NCAA's legislative process and legislative and amendment procedures. Section 9.2 governs the amendment process and section 9.3.1 governs the process by which interpretations of the bylaws may be issued. Specifically, section 9.3.1.1 states that "[t]he Cabinet has overall oversight of interpretations of the bylaws and is empowered to make interpretations of the bylaws that are not subject to the authority of other committees. The Academics and Eligibility Committee is empowered to make interpretations of bylaws related to academics, including initial eligibility; two-year and four-year college transfers; progress toward degree and academic integrity; and eligibility, including period of eligibility" (NYSCEF Doc No. 38 at 19). Sports oversight committees only have power to make interpretations of sport specific bylaws of Articles 11, 13, 17 and 31 (id.). Notably, "the Cabinet, and other committees in the areas of their authority, may interpret legislation consistent with the intent of the membership in adopting the legislation if sufficient documentation and testimony are available to establish clearly that the wording of the legislation is inconsistent with that intent. A modification of wording shall be codified in the legislation" (id., § 9.3.1.1.1 [emphasis added]). Here, the NCAA has provided no evidence that it followed its own rules in promulgating its press release/guidance of June 23, 2026.

In the absence of any explanation from the NCAA as to the origin and basis of the guidance, along with any connection to the actual text of Division I Bylaw 12.6, or documentation that it is a product of the legislative interpretation and amendment procedures set forth in its bylaws, the court is hard pressed to conclude that the transition guidance reflects the intent behind the Age-Based Rule.

The NCAA argues that its application of unambiguous bylaws is not subject to judicial review by New York courts because it is not arbitrary and capricious. Assuming for the purposes of this motion, that arbitrary and capricious action by the NCAA is subject to judicial review (compare Suburban Scholastic Council v Section 2 of New York State Public High Sch. Athletic Assn., 23 AD3d 728 [3d Dept 2005] [reviewing the New York State Public High School Athletic Association's adoption of classification play governing regular season football games is arbitrary and capricious]; Matter of Caso v New York State Public High Sch. Athletic Assn, Inc., 78 AD2d 41, 48 [4th Dept 1980] ["courts should not interfere with the internal affairs, proceedings, rules and orders of a high school athletic association unless there is evidence of acts which are arbitrary, capricious or an abuse of discretion"]; Matter of Albany Academies v New York State Public High Sch. Athletic Assn., 54 Misc 3d 1204[A], 2015 NY Slip Op 52016[U] [Sup Ct, Albany County 2015] [CPLR article 78 proceeding reviewing whether revisions to the New York State Public High School Athletic Association's Transfer Rule were arbitrary and capricious] with Ivey v Coughlin, 111 AD2d 648, 648 [1st Dept 1985] [(a) voluntary, unincorporated association is not a body or officer against whom an article 78 proceeding can be maintained"]; Snyder-Plax v American Arbitration Assn., 196 AD2d 872, 875 [2d Dept 1993] [same]; Stillpoint Meadows PH-62, LLC v Residential Bd. of Mgrs. of the 62 Cooper Square Condominium, 85 Misc 3d 1245[A], 2025 NY Slip Op 50426[U] *2 [Sup Ct, NY County 2025] [same]), the NCAA's argument misses the mark. As discussed above, plaintiff demonstrated the NCAA's application of the amendment to him and those similarly situated is arbitrary and capricious.

Finally, contrary to the NCAA's argument, Martin v Curran, 303 NY 276 (1951) does not bar this action because plaintiff only seeks declaratory and injunctive relief (Matter of Agramonte v Local 461, Dist. Council 37, American Fedn. of State, County & Mun. Empls., 41 NY3d 483 [2024] [clarifying that when only injunctive relief is sought against an unincorporated association, Martin v Curran does not apply]).

B. Plaintiff is Irreparably Harmed in the Absence of a Preliminary Injunction

Irreparable injury is any injury for which money damages are insufficient (DiFabio v Omnipoint Communications, Inc., 66 AD3d 635, 636-637 [2d Dept 2009]). Plaintiff argues that "[a] single, non-recurring season of Division I competition in the last year of a finite athletic window" is exactly the unique and unquantifiable injury that cannot be fully compensated by money damages and is therefore an irreparable injury (NYSCEF Doc No. 4 at 13).

Courts have determined that "college students suffer from irreparable harm when they are denied the opportunity to play sports" (Ohio, 706 F Supp 3d at 597 [collecting cases]). "Missing regular season games constitutes a significant impact on the student-athletes' opportunities to develop as players in gametime conditions, develop in-game experience with their teammates, showcase their abilities to potential employers, and help their teams advance to their respective Conference Tournament and NCAA Tournament it may have life-altering impacts on the student-athlete's ability to pursue NIL deals and a professional career in their sport as well as impacts on their mental health. The substantial and very current harm to [plaintiff] is irreparable and cannot be easily remedied" (id. at 599). This court agrees—even more so here—because the 2026-2027 academic year is plaintiff's only opportunity to compete in a fifth year and finds that plaintiff will suffer irreparable harm in the absence of a preliminary injunction.

C. The Equities Balance in Plaintiff's Favor

The equities balance in plaintiff's favor when "the irreparable injury to be sustained is more burdensome to [him] than the harm caused to [the NCAA] through imposition of the injunction" (McLaughlin, Piven, Vogel, Inc. v W.J. Nolan & Co., 114 AD2d 165, 174 [2d Dept 1986]). The NCAA argues that "[t]he rules [plaintiff] seeks to enjoin impact opportunities for over 180,000 DI student-athletes, and allowing [him] to compete injures others" because "[c]ollege programs have finite roster spots, practice restrictions, and playing opportunities. Every game [he] plays reduces other student-athletes' opportunities (who are eligible under NCAA rules) to develop, earn playing time, secure NIL opportunities, and improve draft standing" (NYSCEF Doc No. 43 at 21). The NCAA notes that the harm of an erroneous injunction cannot be undone because "[g]ames cannot be unplayed, roster decisions cannot be revisited, and eligibility cannot be restored to its pre-injunction posture" (id.).

But the harm outlined by the NCAA is speculative, and it is not harm to it. The potential harm is to an unnamed other student-athlete, but only if the plaintiff outperforms that student-athlete to earn a roster spot. Unlike plaintiff, that unnamed student-athlete has other opportunities to compete, in subsequent years, and for other schools. And if a meritorious injunction were denied, the harm to plaintiff also cannot be undone. His opportunity to compete in a fifth year is the 2026-2027 academic year only. On balance, the court finds the equities favor allowing plaintiff the opportunity to compete in his fifth and final year of eligibility (see Ohio, 706 F Supp 3d at 600).

The court has considered the remainder of the factual and legal contentions of the parties and to the extent not specifically addressed herein, finds them to be either without merit or rendered moot by other aspects of this decision. Accordingly, it is hereby

ORDERED that plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction is GRANTED; and it is further

ORDERED that Defendants National Collegiate Athletic Association and Charles D. Baker, as President of the National Collegiate Athletic Association, and their officers, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys, and all persons in active concert or participation with them who receive actual notice of this Order, are hereby RESTRAINED AND ENJOINED:

(a) From enforcing NCAA Bylaw 12.6, the Five-Year Eligibility Rule, and any guidance to said Bylaw 12.6 to the exclusion of the 2022 cohort from the revised eligibility model and the transition provision governing student-athletes who used their final season of competition during 2025-26, or any successor or analogous provision, so as to declare Plaintiff Benjamin Pearce ineligible to practice or compete in intercollegiate athletics during the 2026-27 academic year, and from directing, instructing, or authorizing any member institution or conference to do so;

(b) From interfering with the decision of North Carolina State University, or of Stanford University, the University of California San Diego, Northeastern University, East Tennessee State University, or of any other NCAA member institution, to permit Plaintiff to practice, condition, train, and compete as a member of its men's varsity basketball team during the 2026-27 academic year, and to award him athletically related financial aid;

(c) From enforcing against Plaintiff, for the 2026-27 academic year, any NCAA Transfer Portal entry window or deadline that closed before Defendants adopted the revised eligibility model in June 2026, and from impeding his recruitment, transfer, roster placement, or eligibility certification on that basis;

(d) From assessing or threatening to assess any penalty pursuant to the NCAA Bylaws, including but not limited to NCAA Bylaw 12.9.4.2 concerning restitution and the rule commonly referred to as the ghost transfer rule, against Plaintiff, against any member institution that permits Plaintiff to practice or compete, or against that institution's coaches, compliance personnel, athletic department, or Plaintiff's teammates, by reason of Plaintiff's participation pursuant to this Order during the 2026-27 academic year;

(e) From communicating to any NCAA member institution or conference that Plaintiff is ineligible to practice or compete during the 2026-27 academic year, or that permitting him to practice or compete would subject the institution, its coaches, or its athletics personnel to any NCAA sanction, penalty, or adverse consequence; and

(f) From taking any adverse action with respect to Plaintiff's name, image, and likeness agreements, endorsement contracts, or earning opportunities during the 2026-27 academic year on the basis of the eligibility determination challenged herein; and it is further

ORDERED that the undertaking required by CPLR 6312(b) is fixed in the amount of $250.00, which plaintiff already filed with the Clerk of the Court (NYSCEF Doc No. 26).

The foregoing constitutes the Decision and Order of the Court.

Dated: October 2, 2026

White Plains, New York

HON. CHARLES D. WOOD

Justice of the Supreme Court

FOOTNOTES

1.   Similar lawsuits have been brought by student athletes throughout New York and across the country (see e.g. Iwuchukwu v Natl. Collegiate Athletic Assn, index No. 724294/2026 [Sup Ct, Queens County]; Ogbole v Natl. Collegiate Athletic Assn, index No. 72628/2026 [Sup Ct, Westchester County]); Tice v Natl. Collegiate Athletic Assn, index No. 009722/2026 [Sup Ct, Onondaga County]; Pratt v Natl. Collegiate Athletic Assn, index No. 626092/2026 [Sup Ct, Suffolk County]). Plaintiff was a member of two class actions brought in federal court: Pearce v Natl. Collegiate Athletic Assn, No. 3:26-cv-04734 (SD Cal.), which was voluntarily, and Moore v Natl. Collegiate Athletic Assn, No. 1:26-cv-03837 (D. Colo), from which plaintiff states he has withdrawn.

2.   Plaintiff does not allege an antitrust violation, thus, contrary to the NCAA's argument, the antitrust cases such as Wisne v Natl. Collegiate Athletic Assn, No. 26CV03063 (D Colo) have little relevance to this court's analysis of whether plaintiff has demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits.

Charles D. Wood, J.