Abraham Einhorn, Petitioner, v. Chaim Y. Hirsch, Respondent. (2026)

The following papers numbered 1-4 were read and considered on Petitioner Abraham Einhorn ("Petitioner") motion (Motion Sequence No. 2) for an order: pursuant to Civil Practice Law and Rules § 5251, (a) holding Respondent Chaim Y. Hirsch ("Respondent") in contempt for his failure to comply with a post-judgment restraining notice and information subpoena dated March 16, 2026; (b) directing Respondent to provide a full and complete response to the information subpoena within ten days of service of the Court's order; and (c) imposing sanctions upon Respondent, including costs and attorneys' fees; and also considered and read Respondent's Order to Show Cause (Motion Sequence No. 3) for an order, pursuant to Civil Practice Law and Rules § 5015, vacating the judgment entered in this proceeding on March 9, 2026, and cancelling the notices of pendency filed by Petitioner:

PAPERS NUMBERED

Notice of Motion (Motion Seq. No. 2)/Affirmation of Kenneth J. Rubinstein, Esq./ Exhibits 1-7 1

Affirmation in Opposition (Motion Seq. No. 2)/Exhibits A-F 2

Affidavit of Service/Letter to Court (Motion Seq. No. 2) 3

Order to Show Cause (Motion Seq. No. 3)/Affirmation of Joseph Haspel, Esq./

Exhibits A-F/Affidavit of Service 4

Upon the foregoing papers, and for the reasons set forth below, Respondent's motion (Motion Sequence No. 3) is denied, and Petitioner's motion (Motion Sequence No. 2) is granted in part and denied in part.

I. BACKGROUND

A. The Award, the Petition, and the Judgment

This special proceeding arises from a loan dispute that the parties submitted to arbitration before a rabbinical tribunal. The submission identified two matters: a $350,000 loan secured by a mortgage on 4 Rita Avenue, Units B and C, and a $250,000 loan made in 2019. See Haspel Affirm.

¶ 20 [NYSCEF Doc. No. 63]. On December 24, 2025, the arbitrator issued an award (the "Award") that determined that Respondent owed nothing on the $250,000 loan but owed the $350,000 loan, in full, with interest. See id. ¶ 21; Rubinstein Affirm. ¶ 2 [NYSCEF Doc. No. 28]. The Award further provided that, until payment was made, Petitioner was entitled to place a lien on properties owned or controlled by Respondent or entities affiliated with him, including properties identified by address, and declared null and void a purported sale of 4 Rita Avenue, Unit C by Respondent to his son. See Haspel Affirm. ¶ 23.

On January 7, 2026, Petitioner commenced this proceeding by filing a verified petition and notice of petition to confirm the Award pursuant to Civil Practice Law and Rules § 7510. See NYSCEF Doc. No. 1; Rubinstein Affirm. ¶ 3. The Notice of Petition was returnable February 10, 2026. See Haspel Affirm. ¶ 3. According to the affirmation of service of Nicholas DiCanio, a licensed process server, on January 13, 2026 at 9:27 a.m., the process server delivered the notice of petition, the verified petition, its exhibits, and a notice of electronic filing to a person identified as Respondent's daughter, who refused to give her first name, at 12 Elaine Place, #201, Spring Valley, New York 10977, which the process server identified as Respondent's dwelling place and usual place of abode; the affirmation describes the recipient as a person of suitable age and discretion and states that a copy of the papers was mailed to Respondent at the same address, in an envelope marked "Personal and Confidential," on January 13, 2026. The affirmation of service was filed on January 15, 2026. See NYSCEF Doc. No. 7.

Respondent did not appear. By order dated February 27, 2026, the Court granted the Petition (NYSCEF Doc. No. 19), and on March 9, 2026, judgment was entered in favor of Petitioner and against Respondent in the sum of $516,180.00, with interest at the rate of 2% per month from March 1, 2026, until satisfaction (the "Judgment"). See NYSCEF Doc. No. 23; Rubinstein Affirm. ¶¶ 4-5. Petitioner represents that no part of the Judgment has been paid. See Rubinstein Affirm. ¶ 6.

B. Post-Judgment Enforcement

On March 16, 2026, Petitioner served Respondent with a restraining notice (the "Restraining Notice") and an information subpoena (the "Information Subpoena"). See id. ¶ 7 & Exh. 1. According to Petitioner's counsel, the response to the Information Subpoena was due on April 14, 2026. On April 15, 2026, Respondent contacted Petitioner's counsel and requested additional time to respond, and counsel agreed, by e-mail, to extend Respondent's time to April 30, 2026. See id. ¶¶ 7-8 & Exh. 2. Counsel reminded Respondent of the extended deadline on April 28, 2026, and thereafter, by e-mails dated May 14 and May 18, 2026, he advised Respondent that Petitioner would seek judicial intervention if no response was forthcoming. See id. ¶¶ 9-12 & Exhs. 3-6. Counsel avers that Respondent's only reply was to refer to other, purportedly unrelated, proceedings before a Beis Din (see id. ¶ 13 & Exh. 7), and that Respondent has neither furnished a written response to the Information Subpoena nor produced any of the documents it requests. See id. ¶ 14.

Petitioner thereafter made Motion Sequence No. 2 by Notice of Motion dated May 26, 2026, returnable June 12, 2026. The notice of motion bears the warning prescribed by Judiciary Law § 756 and, pursuant to Civil Practice Law and Rules § 2214(b), demanded that answering papers be served no later than seven days before the return date. See NYSCEF Doc. No. 27.

C. Motion Sequence No. 3

On June 9, 2026, Respondent, now represented by counsel, moved by Order to Show Cause to vacate the Judgment and to cancel the notices of pendency, returnable June 17, 2026. See NYSCEF Doc. No. 70. The same affirmation of counsel was filed both in support of that application and in opposition to Motion Sequence No. 2. See NYSCEF Doc. Nos. 63, 71. Respondent has not submitted an affidavit or affirmation of his own. By letter dated June 10, 2026, Petitioner's counsel advised that Petitioner would not submit reply papers on Motion Sequence No. 2, characterizing Respondent's opposition as untimely and as offering no substantive response apart from the arguments advanced in support of vacatur. See NYSCEF Doc. No. 80.

II. MOTION SEQUENCE NO. 3

Because Respondent's jurisdictional challenge, if meritorious, would render the Judgment a nullity and deprive the enforcement devices at issue on Motion Sequence No. 2 of any foundation, the Court turns to Motion Sequence No. 3 first, and within it, the jurisdictional branch.

A. Lack of Personal Jurisdiction (Civil Practice Law and Rules § 5015[a][4])

Respondent advances two jurisdictional contentions. The first, asserted only in passing, is that he was not served at all. See Haspel Affirm. ¶¶ 7, 16. The second, on which the application principally rests, is that even assuming service, the notice of petition afforded him insufficient time between the completion of service under Civil Practice Law and Rules § 308(2) and the return date, such that the Court never acquired jurisdiction to grant the Petition. See id. ¶¶ 7-12. Neither contention has merit.

1. Service Under Civil Practice Law and Rules § 308(2)."A process server's affidavit of service constitutes prima facie evidence of proper service." Scarano v Scarano, 63 AD3d 716, 716 [2d Dept 2009]; See Washington Mut. Bank v Huggins, 140 AD3d 858, 859 [2d Dept 2016]. A mere conclusory denial of service is insufficient to rebut the presumption of proper service arising from the process server's affidavit; to warrant a hearing, the denial must be substantiated by specific, detailed facts that contradict the affidavit of service. See Matter of Rockman v Nassau County Sheriff's Dept., 224 AD3d 758, 759-760 [2d Dept 2024].

The affirmation of service here recites delivery of the initiatory papers to a person of suitable age and discretion at Respondent's dwelling place and usual place of abode, followed by a mailing to Respondent at the same address and the filing of proof of service with the clerk. See NYSCEF Doc. No. 7. It thus constitutes prima facie evidence of proper service pursuant to Civil Practice Law and Rules § 308(2). Respondent offers nothing to rebut it. He submits no sworn denial of any kind — neither from himself nor from the person identified as his daughter. He does not dispute that 12 Elaine Place, #201 was his dwelling place and usual place of abode, that the person to whom the papers were delivered was of suitable age and discretion, or that the mailing was made. The only support for his assertion is counsel's statement that Respondent "maintains" there was no service and was not personally served "if he was served at all." See Haspel Affirm. ¶¶ 7, 16. Counsel does not claim personal knowledge of the underlying facts, and his affirmation is therefore without probative value on this issue. See Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557, 563 [1980]. That Respondent was served by substituted rather than personal delivery is of no moment; Civil Practice Law and Rules § 308(2) is an authorized method of service upon a natural person. No hearing is warranted.

2. The Timing of the Notice of Petition. Respondent principally contends that service under Civil Practice Law and Rules § 308(2) was not complete until January 25, 2026, ten days after the proof of service was filed. Counsel argues that a respondent served in that manner must be afforded the time to appear under Civil Practice Law and Rules § 320(a). This would provide a defendant served with a summons, for a total of forty days; and the February 10, 2026, return date therefore fell short, depriving the Court of jurisdiction. See Haspel Affirm. ¶¶ 7-11.¹

This argument misidentifies the governing statute. An application to confirm an arbitration award, as the first application arising out of an arbitrable controversy, is brought as a special proceeding. See Civil Practice Law and Rules §§ 7502[a], 7510. The procedure governing special proceedings is prescribed by Article 4 of the Civil Practice Law and Rules. A notice of petition must be served in the same manner as a summons in an action (see Civil Practice Law and Rules § 403[c]), and it must be served, together with the petition and supporting affidavits, "at least eight days before the time at which the petition is noticed to be heard." Civil Practice Law and Rules § 403[b]. Article 75 prescribes no longer period for a petition to confirm. Respondent does not dispute that service was complete under Civil Practice Law and Rules § 308(2) on January 25, 2026, ten days after the January 15, 2026, filing of proof of service. Even measured from that date, the February 10, 2026 return date afforded Respondent sixteen days' notice — twice the statutory minimum. And the Court did not determine the petition until February 27, 2026.

The authorities on which Respondent relies do not support a different rule. The passage Respondent quotes from Beach House Condominium Assn. of Key W., Inc. v Beatrice (40 Misc 3d 1240[A] [Sup Ct. Kings County 2013]) speaks of the time between service of "the summons and motion papers" and the return date, and of the defendant's time to appear under Civil Practice Law and Rules § 320(a). See Haspel Affirm. ¶ 9. That is the framework of Civil Practice Law and Rules § 3213, which expressly provides that the minimum time on which a motion for summary judgment in lieu of complaint may be noticed "shall be as provided by subdivision (a) of rule 320 for making an appearance." No comparable provision governs a petition to confirm an arbitration award, and Respondent's own framing of the rule — as one applicable to "a petition under CPLR 7510" — appears in counsel's text, not in the quoted authority. See id. ¶ 8. The remaining decisions Respondent cites, as the passages he quotes reflect, concerned whether service had been completed by a particular date. See id. ¶ 10. They confirm the settled principle that service under Civil Practice Law and Rules § 308(2) is complete ten days after proof of service is filed — a principle the Court has applied here — but they do not establish that a notice of petition in an Article 75 proceeding must afford forty days' notice.

The Court further notes that even on Respondent's own theory that he was entitled to thirty days after the completion of service within which to appear, that period expired on February 24, 2026, three days before the Court determined the petition. Respondent did not appear, seek an adjournment, or otherwise respond within that period or at any time before the Judgment was entered.

Personal jurisdiction over Respondent was validly obtained, and the branch of the motion seeking vacatur pursuant to Civil Practice Law and Rules § 5015(a)(4) is denied.

B. Excusable Default (Civil Practice Law and Rules § 5015[a][1]) and Civil Practice Law and Rules § 317

A party seeking to vacate a default pursuant to Civil Practice Law and Rules § 5015(a)(1) must demonstrate both a reasonable excuse for the default and a potentially meritorious defense. See Eugene Di Lorenzo, Inc. v A.C. Dutton Lbr. Co., 67 NY2d 138, 141 [1986]. Respondent's application, made within one year of the entry of the Judgment, is timely. But the only excuse offered is that Respondent "did not have proper notice of the lawsuit." Haspel Affirm. ¶ 19. That contention restates the jurisdictional argument rejected above, and it is, in any event, conclusory and advanced solely by counsel without personal knowledge. See Zuckerman, 49 NY2d at 563. Respondent offers no sworn explanation of why, having been served at his residence in January 2026, he did not respond to the petition before it was determined; nor does he explain why, after being served with the Restraining Notice and Information Subpoena on March 16, 2026 — and after personally contacting Petitioner's counsel about them on April 15, 2026 — he waited until June 9, 2026 to seek relief from the Judgment. Absent a reasonable excuse, the Court need not determine whether Respondent has demonstrated a potentially meritorious defense.

Respondent fares no better under Civil Practice Law and Rules § 317. That provision permits a person served other than by personal delivery, who did not appear, to defend within one year after obtaining knowledge of the entry of judgment, but only "upon a finding of the court that he did not personally receive notice of the summons in time to defend and has a meritorious defense." Respondent submits no affidavit averring that he did not personally receive notice of the petition in time to defend. Counsel's statement that Respondent "was not personally served" (see Haspel Affirm. ¶ 16) addresses the manner of service, not whether Respondent received notice of the proceeding, and in any event is not based on personal knowledge.

Moreover, Respondent has not demonstrated a potentially meritorious defense to the Judgment. Respondent expressly acknowledges that the arbitrator's determination that he owes the $350,000 loan, plus interest, "is within the arbitrator's jurisdiction." Id. ¶ 21. His merits objections are directed instead at the provisions of the Award authorizing liens on specified properties and declaring void the transfer of 4 Rita Avenue, Unit C. See id. ¶¶ 22-31. Those objections, even if credited, furnish no defense to the money component of the Judgment, and Respondent does not seek partial vacatur or modification; he asks that the Judgment be vacated in its entirety. Further, the contention that an arbitrator exceeded his power is a ground for vacatur under Civil Practice Law and Rules § 7511(b)(1)(iii), and an application to vacate or modify an award must be made within ninety days after its delivery. See Civil Practice Law and Rules § 7511[a]. The Award was issued on December 24, 2025. Respondent does not contend that it was not delivered to him, and his papers do not address how grounds that were never interposed within that period remain available to him more than five months later.

The branch of the motion seeking vacatur pursuant to Civil Practice Law and Rules § 5015(a)(1) and Civil Practice Law and Rules § 317 is therefore denied.

C. The Notices of Pendency

A notice of pendency may be filed in an action in which "the judgment demanded would affect the title to, or the possession, use or enjoyment of, real property." Civil Practice Law and Rules § 6501. Because the device permits a party to encumber property without a prior adjudication, its requirements are strictly applied, and the court's inquiry on a motion to cancel is limited to whether, on the face of the pleading, the action is one that falls within the statute. See 5303 Realty Corp. v O & Y Equity Corp., 64 NY2d 313, 320-321 [1984].

Respondent's principal argument is that the notices of pendency would be proper only if confirmation of the Award could create an interest in real property other than a judgment lien, and that because the arbitrator exceeded his authority in providing for liens and in voiding the transfer of 4 Rita Avenue, Unit C, the notices must be cancelled. See Haspel Affirm. ¶¶ 24-27. That argument is, at bottom, a challenge to the Award itself, which, for the reasons stated above, Respondent has not established any present basis to maintain. Measured, as it must be, by the face of the petition, the judgment demanded — confirmation of an Award that, among other things, authorizes Petitioner to encumber identified parcels of real property and declares a conveyance of real property null and void — is one that would affect the title to, or the use and enjoyment of, real property within the meaning of Civil Practice Law and Rules § 6501. Indeed, Respondent acknowledges that if the confirmation reaches beyond a judgment lien, the notices of pendency may be viable. See id. ¶ 27.²

Respondent separately contends that the notices of pendency directed at 28 Twin Avenue and 114 Decatur Avenue, Spring Valley, are ineffective on their face because, as of their February 17, 2026 date, those parcels were owned by 30 Twin LLC and Twelve Elaine LLC, respectively — entities that are not parties to this proceeding — while the notices direct indexing against Respondent's name in a county that does not maintain a block index (id. ¶ 28, citing Civil Practice Law and Rules § 6511 and Kolel Damsek Eliezer, Inc. v Schlesinger, 90 AD3d 851 [2d Dept 2011]. The argument may have force if its factual premise is established, since a judgment in this proceeding binds Respondent and could not affect title held of record by non-parties. But the support offered for the premise that those parcels were owned by non-party entities is counsel's affirmation. No deed, record of title, or affidavit of a person with knowledge is submitted. This branch of the motion is therefore denied, without prejudice to renewal pursuant to Civil Practice Law and Rules § 6514 upon proper papers, including documentary evidence of record ownership, on notice to Petitioner.

Finally, to the extent the order to show cause, as signed, contained any interim stay of enforcement of the Judgment pending the determination of Motion Sequence No. 3, that stay is vacated.

III. MOTION SEQUENCE NO. 2

A. The Timeliness of the Opposition

Because the notice of motion was served at least sixteen days before the return date and demanded answering papers at least seven days before that date, Respondent's opposition was due on or before June 5, 2026. See Civil Practice Law and Rules § 2214[b]). It was not filed until June 9, 2026, and is therefore untimely. Although Respondent offers no explanation for the delay, Petitioner has identified no prejudice, affirmatively elected not to submit a reply, and requested that the motion be addressed together with Motion Sequence No. 3. See NYSCEF Doc. No. 80. Under these circumstances, and because consideration of the opposition does not alter the result reached herein, the Court has considered it. See Civil Practice Law and Rules § 2001, 2004.

B. The Branch of the Motion Seeking to Compel Compliance

Respondent's principal opposition to Motion Sequence No. 2 is that "a void judgment cannot give rise to judgment enforcement proceedings." Haspel Affirm. ¶ 41. With the denial of Motion Sequence No. 3, that premise fails. The Judgment stands, and with it the obligations that Article 52 attaches to it. A judgment creditor may compel disclosure of all matter relevant to the satisfaction of a judgment "[a]t any time before [the] judgment is satisfied or vacated" (Civil Practice Law and Rules § 5223), and a judgment debtor served with a restraining notice is forbidden to transfer or interfere with his property, except as the statute permits, "until the judgment or order is satisfied or vacated." Civil Practice Law and Rules § 5222[b].

A judgment creditor may compel disclosure of "all matter relevant to the satisfaction of the judgment" by serving a subpoena upon any person (Civil Practice Law and Rules § 5223), including an information subpoena accompanied by written questions, which are to be answered in writing under oath. See Civil Practice Law and Rules § 5224[a][3]. Where a person fails to comply with a subpoena that is not returnable in a court, the party on whose behalf it was issued may move in the Supreme Court to compel compliance, and "[i]f the court finds that the subpoena was authorized, it shall order compliance and may impose costs not exceeding fifty dollars" Civil Practice Law and Rules § 2308[b][1]).

The record establishes that Respondent is the judgment debtor; that he was served with the Information Subpoena on March 16, 2026; that he had actual knowledge of it, as evidenced by his own request, made on April 15, 2026, for additional time to respond; that he was granted an extension to April 30, 2026; that he was reminded of that deadline and repeatedly warned that judicial intervention would follow; and that he has not responded. See Rubinstein Affirm. ¶¶ 7-14 & Exhs. 1-7. The Information Subpoena was authorized by Civil Practice Law and Rules §§ 5223 and 5224, and Respondent does not contend that it was improperly served, overbroad, or directed at privileged or irrelevant matter. Compliance must therefore be ordered.

Respondent's reliance upon the asserted direction of the rabbinical arbitrator does not warrant a different result. The Court does not question the sincerity of the regard in which Respondent holds the tribunal to which the parties chose to submit their dispute. But that tribunal has rendered its Award, Petitioner has invoked the jurisdiction of this Court to confirm it, and judgment has been entered upon the confirmation. See Civil Practice Law and Rules § 7514[a]). The obligations Respondent now resists are those that the Civil Practice Law and Rules imposes as incidents of a judgment of this Court. No arbitrator or other extrajudicial body possesses the authority to suspend them; relief from enforcement, if warranted, must be sought from this Court, as by a stay under Civil Practice Law and Rules § 2201 or a protective order under Civil Practice Law and Rules § 5240. Moreover, the record contains no affidavit from Respondent attesting to any such direction or to his reliance upon it, and the correspondence upon which counsel relies, by counsel's own description, post-dates the April 30, 2026 deadline to which Respondent himself agreed.³

Petitioner requests that Respondent be directed to respond within ten days of service of the Court's order. Given that Respondent has only recently appeared through counsel, the Court will afford twenty days, a period that is ample for a complete response without unduly delaying Petitioner's enforcement of the Judgment.

C. The Branch of the Motion Seeking to Hold Respondent in Contempt

Civil Practice Law and Rules § 5251 renders the refusal or willful neglect of any person to obey a subpoena or restraining notice issued pursuant to Article 52 punishable as a contempt of court. The relief Petitioner seeks — an order coercing compliance and indemnifying Petitioner for the costs of obtaining it — is remedial in nature, and the motion is accordingly construed as one for civil contempt. Respondent's arguments concerning criminal contempt, which rest in part on the mistaken premise that "there is neither a special proceeding" here (Haspel Affirm. ¶ 35; See Civil Practice Law and Rules § 7502[a]), are therefore academic.

To prevail on a motion to hold a party in civil contempt, the movant must establish, by clear and convincing evidence, that a lawful order of the court, clearly expressing an unequivocal mandate, was in effect; that the order was disobeyed; that the party to be held in contempt had knowledge of its terms; and that the movant was prejudiced by the offending conduct. See El- Dehdan v El-Dehdan, 26 NY3d 19, 29 [2015]; See also Matter of Department of Envtl. Protection of City of NY v Department of Envtl. Conservation of State of NY, 70 NY2d 233, 240 [1987]; McCain v Dinkins, 84 NY2d 216 [1994]. Whether to impose the drastic remedy of contempt rests within the sound discretion of the court.

The Court, in the exercise of that discretion, declines to adjudicate Respondent in contempt on the present record. The Information Subpoena was issued by counsel, not by the Court. For a subpoena of that character, the Legislature has prescribed an order compelling compliance as the court's initial response to noncompliance. See Civil Practice Law and Rules § 2308[b][1]). Although Civil Practice Law and Rules § 5251 independently renders the refusal to obey an Article 52 subpoena punishable as a contempt, the more measured course here is first to issue an order of this Court that directs compliance clearly, unequivocally, and within a fixed period, and to reserve the remedy of contempt for any disobedience of that mandate. That course is further counseled by the circumstances that Respondent has only now appeared through counsel, that his challenge to the Judgment has only now been resolved, and that enforcement may have been subject to an interim stay while that challenge was pending. With those matters resolved, Respondent's obligation is unambiguous.

To the extent the motion seeks to hold Respondent in contempt for failing to comply with the Restraining Notice, it is denied for an additional reason. A restraining notice forbids the judgment debtor to transfer or interfere with property in which he has an interest. See Civil Practice Law and Rules § 5222[b]); it does not call for a response. Petitioner has not identified any transfer or other act by Respondent in violation of the Restraining Notice, and there is thus no showing, let alone a clear and convincing one, that the Restraining Notice was disobeyed.

Respondent is cautioned, however, that the Restraining Notice remains in effect according to its terms, and that should he fail to comply with the directive set forth below, Petitioner may renew its application. Upon a renewed application, the Court may, among other things, impose a fine sufficient to indemnify Petitioner for any actual loss or injury caused by Respondent's misconduct, including reasonable attorneys' fees (see Judiciary Law § 773), and may direct that Respondent be committed until he has performed the act that it remains within his power to perform (see Judiciary Law § 774). Any renewed application shall conform to Judiciary Law § 756 and shall be served in accordance with Judiciary Law § 761 and the directive set forth below.⁴

D. Costs, Sanctions, and Attorneys' Fees

An award of attorneys' fees under Judiciary Law § 773 is an incident of an adjudication of contempt. Because the branch of the motion seeking contempt is denied without prejudice, the branch seeking attorneys' fees and other sanctions is likewise denied without prejudice to renewal in connection with any renewed contempt application. Respondent's argument that any fine would be limited to $250 absent proof of actual damages is, for the same reason, academic at this juncture. Petitioner is, however, entitled to relief under Civil Practice Law and Rules § 2308(b)(1), which authorizes the Court, upon ordering compliance with an authorized subpoena, to impose costs not exceeding fifty dollars. In light of Respondent's unexplained failure to comply despite an agreed extension and repeated reminders, the Court imposes costs in that amount.

IV. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, it is hereby

ORDERED that the motion of Respondent Chaim Y. Hirsch (Motion Sequence No. 3) is DENIED in its entirety, except that the branch seeking cancellation of the Notices of Pendency directed at 28 Twin Avenue and 114 Decatur Avenue, Spring Valley, New York, is DENIED without prejudice to renewal pursuant to Civil Practice Law and Rules § 6514 upon proper papers, including documentary evidence of record ownership, on notice to Petitioner; and it is further

ORDERED that any interim stay of enforcement of the Judgment contained in the order to show cause by which Motion Sequence No. 3 was brought is VACATED; and it is further

ORDERED that the motion of Petitioner Abraham Einhorn (Motion Sequence No. 2) is

GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART, as set forth herein; and it is further

ORDERED that the branch of Motion Sequence No. 2 seeking an order compelling Respondent to comply with the Information Subpoena is GRANTED, and Respondent Chaim Y. Hirsch shall, within twenty (20) days after service upon his counsel of a copy of this Decision and Order with notice of entry, serve upon Petitioner's counsel complete answers, in writing and under oath, to each of the written questions accompanying the Information Subpoena dated March 16, 2026, together with all documents, if any, called for therein; and it is further

ORDERED that the branch of Motion Sequence No. 2 seeking to hold Respondent in contempt is DENIED, without prejudice to renewal in the event Respondent fails to comply with the preceding decretal paragraph; and it is further

ORDERED that, pursuant to Judiciary Law § 761, any such renewed application may be served upon Respondent's counsel of record via NYSCEF, together with service upon Respondent by first-class mail addressed to his last known residence, and such service shall be deemed sufficient; and it is further

ORDERED that, pursuant to Civil Practice Law and Rules § 2308(b)(1), Respondent shall pay to Petitioner costs in the sum of $50.00 within twenty (20) days after service upon his counsel of a copy of this Decision and Order with notice of entry; and it is further

ORDERED that the branch of Motion Sequence No. 2 seeking sanctions, including attorneys' fees, is otherwise DENIED, without prejudice to renewal in connection with any renewed application for contempt; and it is further

ORDERED that Petitioner shall serve a copy of this Decision and Order with notice of entry upon Respondent's counsel via NYSCEF within ten (10) days of its entry.

The foregoing constitutes the Decision and Order of the Court on Motion Sequence Nos. 2 and 3.

Dated: September 23, 2026

New City, New York

HON. JOHN P. COLLINS, JR., J.S.C.

ENTER:TO:

All Counsel via NYSCEF

FOOTNOTES

1.   Respondent's papers are not internally consistent on these points. Counsel identifies the return date of the Notice of Petition as February 10, 2026 (see Haspel Affirm. ¶ 3) and later as February 15, 2026, in a paragraph that refers to "Plaintiff's motion" (see id. ¶ 11); and counsel describes the mailing as having been made on January 15, 2026 (see id.), whereas the affirmation of service recites a mailing on January 13, 2026. See NYSCEF Doc. No. 7. None of these discrepancies affects the analysis, which applies the date most favorable to Respondent for the completion of service.

2.   The Court's determination is confined to the notices of pendency. Nothing herein adjudicates the effect, if any, of the Award's property-related provisions upon the rights of persons or entities who were not parties to the arbitration or to this proceeding, none of whom is before the Court.

3.   Counsel describes the correspondence as an e-mail dated May 29, 2026, annexed as part of Exhibit 7 to the moving papers. See Haspel Affirm. ¶ 40. The moving papers, however, are dated and were filed on May 26, 2026, and Petitioner's counsel describes Exhibit 7 as Respondent's response to counsel's May 18, 2026, e-mail. See Rubinstein Affirm. ¶¶ 12-13. The Court need not reconcile the discrepancy, as the correspondence post-dates the April 30, 2026 deadline on either account.

4.    Judiciary Law § 761 provides that an application to punish for contempt in a civil contempt proceeding "shall be served upon the accused, unless service upon the attorney for the accused be ordered by the court or judge." Because Respondent has now appeared by counsel, the Court directs the manner of service of any renewed application in the decretal paragraphs below.

John P. Collins, Jr., J.