PEOPLE v. SHAUN (2026)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court (Peter Lynch, J.), entered July 31, 2024 in Albany County, which denied defendant's motion for resentencing pursuant to CPL 440.47, after a hearing.

Following a March 2013 jury trial, defendant was convicted of burglary in the second degree and robbery in the third degree.  The convictions stem from a June 2012 incident in which defendant, acting with others, broke into the home of an 86–year–old victim and stole his rare coin collection after a codefendant struck him with a BB gun.  The victim was hospitalized and died eight months later from complications related to the attack.  Defendant was sentenced to a prison term of 15 years, to be followed by five years of postrelease supervision, for the burglary conviction along with a concurrent prison term of 2 to 7 years for the robbery conviction.  In August 2023, defendant obtained permission to file an application for resentencing pursuant to the Domestic Violence Survivors Justice Act (see CPL 440.47;  Penal Law § 60.12, as amended by L 2019, ch 31, § 1;  L 2019, ch 55, § 1, part WW, § 1 [hereinafter DVSJA] ).  Defendant then moved for resentencing and Supreme Court granted his request for a hearing.  Following the hearing, Supreme Court denied defendant's application, finding that (1) the abuse inflicted by his mother was not a significant contributing factor to his criminal conduct, and (2) his sentence was not unduly harsh given the nature and circumstances of the crime.  Defendant appeals, and we affirm.

The DVSJA, enacted “in recognition of the national epidemic of domestic violence and the failure of prior law to allow judges discretion to fully consider the impact of domestic violence in making sentencing determinations,” permits courts in appropriate cases to impose a less severe sentence on an eligible defendant who suffered domestic violence (People v. Brenda WW., 44 NY3d 594, 598 [2025] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted];  accord People v. Duane MM., 248 AD3d 1570, 1570 [3d Dept 2026], lv denied ––– NY3d –––– [Aug. 27, 2026] ).  “To ensure that the statute is applied as intended, trial judges have more discretion to ‘tak[e] into consideration the effect of the offender's own victimization in determining a just punishment’ where ‘the offender is able to meet the strict three-part standard of eligibility’ ” (People v. Croney, 251 AD3d 168, 173 [1st Dept 2026], lv denied 45 NY3d 1036 [2026], quoting N.Y. City Bar Assn, Rep on Legislation by Crim Just Operations, Dom Violence & Pro Bono & Legal Servs Comms at 3, Bill Jacket, L 2019, ch 31 at 14).  To obtain resentencing under the DVSJA, a defendant must show by a preponderance of the evidence that:  “(a) at the time of the instant offense, the defendant was a victim of domestic violence subjected to substantial physical, sexual or psychological abuse inflicted by a member of the same family or household as the defendant ․;  (b) such abuse was a significant contributing factor to the defendant's criminal behavior;  [and] (c) having regard for the nature and circumstances of the crime and the history, character and condition of the defendant,” a standard sentence would be “unduly harsh” (Penal Law § 60.12[1];  see People v. Angela VV., 44 NY3d 1061, 1062 [2025];  People v. Devon Y., 247 AD3d 1367, 1369 [3d Dept 2026], lv granted 45 NY3d 1000 [2026];  People v. Ava OO., 233 AD3d 1186, 1187 [3d Dept 2024] ).  When a defendant satisfies all three statutory requirements, the sentencing court “may instead impose” an alternative sentence (Penal Law § 60.12[1] ).  When reviewing the denial of a DVSJA application after a hearing, this Court may “make its own factual findings and, based on those findings, substitute its discretion ․ and reach a different judgment on each of the three statutory prongs” (People v. Brenda WW., 44 NY3d at 601;  see People v. Duane MM., 248 AD3d at 1571).

At the instant hearing, defendant testified that his mother physically abused him throughout his childhood and that he saw his father abuse his mother.  He also testified that, during the period of the charged offense, the mother of his child (who served as his disability benefits payee) refused to give him money to buy medication or marihuana.  Defendant explained that he committed the burglary and robbery to obtain money for drugs to suppress his mental health issues, testifying that he had “no other option to support [his] drug habit.”

Supreme Court credited defendant's proof to the extent it found that defendant “was the victim of domestic violence at the hands of his mother.”  However, the court made no finding about whether defendant was a victim of qualifying domestic violence “at the time of the instant offense” (Penal Law § 60.12[1][a] ).  Although the abuse and offense need not occur contemporaneously, the statute requires a temporal nexus between them (see People v. Devon Y., 247 AD3d at 1369–1370;  People v. Boyd P., 232 AD3d 1000, 1002 [3d Dept 2024], lv denied 43 NY3d 1006 [2025];  People v. Fisher, 221 AD3d 1195, 1197 [3d Dept 2023], lv denied 41 NY3d 1001 [2024] ).  The second prong requires defendant to prove that “such abuse was a significant contributing factor to the defendant's criminal behavior” (Penal Law § 60.12[1][b] ).  The abuse need not constitute the sole or primary cause of the offense, and the court should consider the combined effect of the abuse together with the events immediately surrounding the crime, with particular attention to defendant's living circumstances at the time (see People v. Ava OO., 233 AD3d at 1188;  People v. Wendy B.-S., 229 AD3d 1317, 1319 [4th Dept 2024], lv denied 42 NY3d 1022 [2024] ).

Defendant failed to establish entitlement to relief here.  Initially, defendant did not show the required temporal nexus between the abuse and his 2012 crimes, which occurred approximately 14 years after he was removed from his mother's care and several years after his last contact with his father.  The DVSJA was expected to “affect a relatively small number of offenders,” and it is “not enough that defendant was indisputably subjected to substantial physical ․ and psychological abuse in the past” (People v. Devon Y., 247 AD3d at 1370 [internal quotation marks and citations omitted] ).  Although childhood abuse may produce lasting and complex effects, the record here does not establish the temporal nexus required by Penal Law § 60.12(1)(a).¹

Defendant also failed to show that the abuse was a significant contributing factor to his criminal behavior.  Defendant admitted that he participated in the robbery to obtain money to buy drugs.  Although he claimed he used marihuana and alcohol to cope with symptoms of childhood trauma, he did not link his history of abuse to his decision, many years later, to commit a burglary and robbery against an elderly stranger.  Defendant's substance use may have been spurred by childhood abuse, but he did not show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that this abuse significantly contributed to the criminal conduct at issue (see People v. Angela VV., 44 NY3d at 1063;  People v. Duane MM., 248 AD3d at 1572;  People v. Mitchell, 245 AD3d 961, 962–963 [2d Dept 2026], lv granted ––– NY3d –––– [Aug. 27, 2026];  compare People v. Ava OO., 233 AD3d at 1188–1190).

Finally, defendant failed to establish that his sentence was unduly harsh (see Penal Law § 60.12[1][c] ).  Contrary to his contention, Supreme Court properly considered his lack of remorse and minimization of responsibility because they bear on his “character and condition” pursuant to Penal Law § 60.12(1)(c).  After evaluating those factors and the seriousness of the residential burglary and robbery, we agree with Supreme Court that the sentence was not unduly harsh (see People v. Duane MM., 248 AD3d at 1572;  People v. Boyd P., 232 AD3d at 1002;  People v. Rebecca XX., 230 AD3d 1491, 1494 [3d Dept 2024], lv denied 43 NY3d 946 [2025];  People v. Fisher, 221 AD3d at 1197).  Supreme Court therefore providently exercised its discretion in denying defendant's application for resentencing pursuant to CPL 440.47.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Supreme Court did not expressly decide whether the abuse was ongoing.  Our affirmance on the ground discussed above does not violate CPL 470.15(1) (see People v. Wendy B.-S., 229 AD3d at 1321) or People v. LaFontaine (92 N.Y.2d 470, 474 [1998] ), which bars affirmance on an alternative ground not decided adversely to a defendant.  LaFontaine does not bar review of an unaddressed factor within a multipronged legal ruling (see People v. Garrett, 23 NY3d 878, 885 n 2 [2014] ).  Penal Law § 60.12(1) creates a three-prong framework for DVSJA analysis, and consideration of the first prong “does not constitute the type of appellate overreaching prohibited by CPL 470.15(1)” (People v. Wendy B.-S., 229 AD3d at 1322 [internal quotation marks and citation omitted] ).

Corcoran, J.

Garry, P.J., Fisher, Powers and Ryba, JJ., concur.