IN RE: the APPLICATION OF RAMAPO FIELD (2026)

The following papers numbered 1-13 were read and considered along with oral argument before the undersigned on July 9, 2026  ¹ as to Petitioner's Order to Show Cause (Motion Seq. No. 1) for an Order (1) pursuant to Civil Practice Law and Rules § 7805, staying and suspending enforcement of the determination of the Village of Sloatsburg Zoning Board of Appeals denying Petitioner's appeal, pending the hearing and determination of this proceeding, (2) pursuant to Civil Practice Law and Rules § 6301, granting a preliminary injunction enjoining Respondents from: (a) enforcing the ZBA determination; (b) enforcing any citation issued in connection therewith; (c) issuing fines, penalties, or violations related to Petitioner's use of the subject property for ingress and egress; and (d) otherwise interfering with petitioner's use of the fifty foot strip for vehicular access; and also read and considered on the motion of respondent-defendant Sterling Carting, Inc. (Motion Seq. No. 2) for an order pursuant to Civil Practice Law and Rules § 3211 (a) (7) or, in the alternative, Civil Practice Law and Rules § 3211 (a) (1), dismissing the Amended Verified Petition and Complaint as against it:

PAPERSNUMBERED

Order to Show Cause (Motion Seq. No. 1)/Affirmation of Robert C. Zitt, Esq. Affirmation of Eric Caoili/Affirmation of Robert C. Zitt, Esq. pursuant to Uniform Rules 202.8-D and E/Exhibit 1/Memorandum of Law in Support

(NYSCEF Doc. Nos. 6-11) 1

Letter to Judge David Fried, A.J.S.C. dated March 25, 2026 (NYSCEF Doc. No. 14) 2

Letter to Judge David Fried, A.J.S.C. dated March 25, 2026 (NYSCEF Doc. No. 15) 3

Letter to Judge David Fried, A.J.S.C. dated April 17, 2026 (NYSCEF Doc. No. 18) 4

Letter to Judge David Fried, A.J.S.C. dated April 20, 2026 (NYSCEF Doc. No. 21) 5

Affirmation of Peter A. Pastore, Esq. in Opposition to Order Show Cause (Motion Seq

No. 1)(NYSCEF Doc. No. 22) 6

Affirmation of E. Connor Williams, Esq. in Opposition to Order to Show Cause (Motion Seq. No. 1)/Exhibits A-E/Memorandum of Law in Opposition (NYSCEF Doc.

Nos. 35-41 7

Reply Affirmation of Eric Caoili (Motion Seq. No. 1)/Exhibits 1-4/Memorandum of

Law in Reply(NYSCEF Doc. Nos. 46-51 8

Notice of Motion (Motion Seq. No. 2); Affirmation of Michael A. Orozco, Esq.,

with Exhibit A; Memorandum of Law in Support (NYSCEF Doc. Nos. 54-57) 9

Affirmation of Peter A. Pastore, Esq. Regarding Motion to Dismiss

(NYSCEF Doc. No. 60) 10

Affirmation of Albert J. Pirro, Jr., Esq., in Opposition with

Exhibit A (NYSCEF Docs. No. 61-62) 11

Memorandum of Law in Opposition (NYSCEF Doc. No. 63) 12

Reply Letter Brief of Michael A. Orozco, Esq. (NYSCEF Doc. No. 64) 13

Upon the foregoing papers, the motion is determined as set forth below.

BACKGROUND

This hybrid proceeding pursuant to Article 78 of the Civil Practice Law and Rules and plenary action arises from a determination of the Village of Sloatsburg Zoning Board of Appeals (the “ZBA”) dated April 2, 2026. Petitioner-Plaintiff Ramapo Field, LLC (“Ramapo Field”) alleges that it owns approximately forty-eight acres of land in the Town of Ramapo, the sole vehicular access to which is a fifty-foot-wide roadway (the “Road”) running from Sterling Mine Road across adjoining parcels to Ramapo Field's property. Ramapo Field alleges that it holds fee title to the Road, and that several neighboring commercial owners — among them Respondent- Defendant Sterling Carting, Inc. (“Sterling”) — use the Road for ingress and egress pursuant to easements conveyed by Ramapo Field's predecessors in title.

The Village Building Inspector issued an appearance ticket and order to remedy violation charging that the travel of commercial vehicles over the Road constituted a prohibited land use within the Village's Industrial Park zoning district. Ramapo Field appealed to the ZBA, which sustained the Building Inspector on the theory that use of the fifty-foot strip as a roadway is a separate, stand-alone use of land not among the uses permitted in the district. This proceeding followed.

The instant action was commenced by the filing of a Verified Petition and Complaint on March 25, 2026. See NYSCEF Doc. Nos. 1-4. On the same date the Petitioner-Plaintiff filed an Order to Show Cause (Motion Seq. no. 1) seeking a preliminary injunction pursuant to Civil Practice Law and Rules § 6301 and a stay pursuant to Civil Practice Law and Rules § 7805. See NYSCEF Doc. Nos. 6-11. On May 18, 2026, the Petitioner-Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint (“the Amended Complaint”). See NYSCEF Doc. No. 24.

The Amended Complaint pleads seven causes of action: (1) an Article 78 claim that the ZBA determination was affected by an error of law and was arbitrary and capricious; (2) an Article 78 claim premised on a failure to comply with SEQRA; (3) a cause of action for a judgment declaring that vehicular ingress and egress over the Road is not a separate or prohibited use of land, that use of the Road as an accessway is lawful, and that the ZBA's contrary interpretation is invalid and unenforceable; (4) a claim for a regulatory or de facto taking; (5) a substantive due process claim; (6) a claim for selective enforcement and denial of equal protection; and (7) a claim for injunctive relief and a stay pursuant to Civil Practice Law and Rules § 6301 and 7805.

In the Order to Cause (Motion Seq. No. 1), Ramapo Field sought a stay of enforcement of the Village of Sloatsburg's Building Inspector's determination, which had been held up by the ZBA based upon a denial of their appeal on March 19, 2026. In addition, the instant action was commenced to challenge the ZBA determination, as it prohibited the use of the fifty-foot wide strip of land that connects Sterling Mine Road and Ramapo Field's property. Ramapo Field's position as to the three prongs for a preliminary injunction is clear; (1) if the ZBA determination is enforced they will have no access to their property, as it is land locked, and will render Judge Fried's prior determination in Rampo Field, LLC v John J. Baratta, et al., Index No. 033423/2021 and they will suffer irreparable harm, (2) they have a strong likelihood of success on the merits based upon statutory interpretation and testimony of the Village's Building Inspector, and (3) the equities are in Ramapo Field's favor based upon Judge Fried's prior decision that recognized that the strip of land was an access roadway used for ingress and egress by Ramapo Field and other businesses.

In addition, Sterling moves to dismiss the Amended Complaint (Motion Seq. No. 2). Its position is succinct: apart from the paragraphs identifying Sterling, reciting its address at 99 Sterling Mine Road, and alleging that it uses the Road for trucks and other vehicles in its carting business, the pleading attributes no conduct to Sterling, and none of the seven causes of action demands any relief from Sterling.

Ramapo Field does not meaningfully contest that premise. It states that it asserts no claim that Sterling committed an independent wrong, and that the Amended Complaint does not seek to impose liability upon Sterling. It opposes on the ground that Sterling is nonetheless a necessary party under Civil Practice Law and Rules § 1001(a), because Sterling claims easement rights in the Road that will be affected by the declaratory relief sought, and because Sterling's continued unimpeded use of the Road is the comparator upon which its selective enforcement and equal protection claims rest.

Respondents-defendants John J. Baratta and the Estate of James O'Brien d/b/a BB&D Properties (the “Baratta defendants”) submit an affirmation taking no position on the motion but requesting that, should the motion be granted, the Amended Complaint be dismissed as against them as well. They did not cross-move.

APPLICABLE STANDARDS

A. Preliminary Injunction Pursuant to Civil Practice Law and Rules § 6301

“The party seeking a preliminary injunction must demonstrate a probability of success on the merits, danger of irreparable injury in the absence of an injunction and a balance of equities in its favor.” Nobu Next Door, LLC v Fine Arts Housing, Inc., 4 NY3d 839, 40 [2d Dept 2005] citing Civil Practice Law and Rules § 6301. The party moving for the preliminary injunction has the burden of demonstrating the three prongs. See Melrose Credit union v Itskovich, 208 AD3d 472, 473 [2d Dept 2022]. The purpose of a preliminary injunction is to preserve status quo and since it is a drastic remedy it should be used “sparingly.” See Soundview Cinemas, Inc. v AC I Soundview, LLC., 149 AD3d 1121, 1123 [2d Dept 2017].

B. Stay Pursuant to Civil Practice Law and Rules § 7805

The criteria used to assess an application for a preliminary injunction can be applied in making a determination as to whether to grant a stay pursuant to Civil Practice Law and Rules § 7805. See Jarrett v Westchester County Department of Health, 638 NYS2d 269, 271 [Supreme Ct, Westchester County, 1995].

C. Civil Practice Law and Rules § 3211 (a) (7)

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the pleading is afforded a liberal construction, the facts alleged are accepted as true, the pleader is accorded the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and the court determines only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory. See Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]; See also Guggenheimer v Ginzburg, 43 NY2d 268, 275 [1977]. The inquiry is whether the pleader has a cause of action, not whether one has been artfully stated. See Leon, 84 NY2d at 88; See also EBC I, Inc. v Goldman, Sachs & Co., 5 NY3d 11, 19 [2005]. Bare legal conclusions are not entitled to that presumption of truth. See Simkin v Blank, 19 NY3d 46 [2012].

Where the pleading seeks declaratory relief, the standard differs in kind. On a motion addressed to the sufficiency of a cause of action for a declaratory judgment, the question is not whether the pleader is entitled to a favorable declaration, but only whether a proper case is presented for invoking the court's power to declare the rights and other legal relations of the parties to a justiciable controversy. See Civil Practice Law and Rules § 3001; See also North Oyster Bay Baymen's Assn. v Town of Oyster Bay, 130 AD3d 885, 890 [2d Dept 2015]; DiGiorgio v 1109- 1113 Manhattan Ave. Partners, LLC, 102 AD3d 725, 728 [2d Dept 2013]; Matter of Tilcon NY, Inc. v Town of Poughkeepsie, 87 AD3d 1148, 1150 [2d Dept 2011]. Where such a case is presented, the motion to dismiss must be denied.

D. Civil Practice Law and Rules § 3211 (a) (1)

Dismissal upon documentary evidence is warranted only where the evidence utterly refutes the pleading's factual allegations and conclusively establishes a defense as a matter of law. See Goshen v Mutual Life Ins. Co. of NY, 98 NY2d 314, 326 [2002]; See also Leon, 84 NY2d at 88). To qualify as documentary, the material must be unambiguous, authentic and undeniable — judicial records and instruments such as deeds, contracts and mortgages qualify; affidavits, affirmations, deposition testimony and letters do not. See Fontanetta v John Doe 1, 73 AD3d 78, 84-86 [2d Dept 2010]; See also Granada Condominium III Assn. v Palomino, 78 AD3d 996, 996-997 [2d Dept 2010].

DISCUSSION

A. The Branch of the Order to Show Cause seeking a Preliminary Injunction Pursuant to Civil Practice Law and Rules § 6301 Is Granted

Ramapo Field has demonstrated the likelihood of success on the merits on the causes of action and the balance of the equities based upon this Court's recent prior determination validating the existence of the easement. Without the grant of the injunction, the ZBA would be permitted to enforce a determination made after this Court already issued a decision allowing vehicular ingress and egress on the subject strip of land, thereby allowing the Village of Sloatsburg to alter the status quo. The denial of the preliminary injunction would also result in Ramapo Field having no access to their property causing irreparable harm to their business. It would render their property unusable and their business unable to access a major asset, both of which cannot be compensated with monetary relief. Granting this stay also does not prejudice the Respondents in the action, as many of them already access the property through vehicular traffic based upon their own easements granted by the prior landowner in interest. The branch of Ramapo Field's Order to Show Cause for a preliminary injunction preserving the status quo and preventing the Village of Sloatsburg from enforcing the ZBA's determination is granted.

B. The Branch of the Order to Show Cause seeking a Stay of Enforcement of the ZBA Determination Pursuant to Civil Practice Law and Rules § 7805 Pending Judicial Review

This Court, applying the same factors that were used for determination of Ramapo Field's application for a preliminary injunction, finds that Ramapo Field is also entitled to a stay of enforcement of the ZBA determination that prevents the Petitioner-Plaintiff's use of the fifty-foot strip of land for vehicular traffic for ingress and egress to their property. As already noted, allowing the Respondent's to enforce the ZBA determination would grant to the Respondents the ultimate relief sought while also irreparably harming Ramapo Field. Based upon the prior determination of Ramapo Field's rights to use of the strip of land, Ramapo Field has demonstrated a likelihood of success and that granting the requested stay would balance the equities between the parties, as status quo would be maintained.

C. The Branch of the Motion Pursuant to Civil Practice Law and Rules § 3211 (a) (1) Is Denied

Sterling submitted two items: the affirmation of its counsel and a copy of the Amended Complaint annexed as Exhibit A. Neither is documentary evidence.

An attorney's affirmation is not documentary evidence within the meaning of Civil Practice Law and Rules § 3211 (a) (1). See Attias v Costiera, 120 AD3d 1281, 1282 [2d Dept 2014]; See also Anderson v Armentano, 139 AD3d 769, 771 [2d Dept 2016]; County of Westchester v Unity Mech. Corp., 165 AD3d 883, 885 [2d Dept 2018]. Nor can the challenged pleading serve as documentary evidence of its own insufficiency; a complaint does not utterly refute itself.

Sterling's reply confirms the point: It argues that the only document the Court need review is the complaint, and that the motion turns on whether that pleading states a cause of action. That is a concession that the application presents a pleading question governed by Civil Practice Law and Rules § 3211 (a) (7), not an evidentiary one governed by Civil Practice Law and Rules § 3211 (a) (1). The alternative branch of the motion is denied.

D. Sterling Is a Necessary Party, and Joinder Does Not Depend Upon the Assertion of a Cause of Action Against It

Civil Practice Law and Rules § 1001 (a) provides that persons who ought to be parties if complete relief is to be accorded between the persons who are parties, or who might be inequitably affected by a judgment in the action, “shall be made plaintiffs or defendants.” The statute recognizes no third status. A person joined because the judgment will affect his interests must of necessity be aligned as a plaintiff or as a defendant, whether or not any party asserts a claim against him. It follows that the absence of a claim against a necessary party is not, standing alone, a ground for dismissing the pleading as against that party.

The principle has particular force where the declaration sought would define rights in real property. In Phillips v Town of Stony Point, (104 AD2d 1033 [2d Dept 1984]), the Second Department vacated a declaratory judgment concerning a fifty-foot-wide easement because owners of land subject to the easement had not been joined and had not been heard. In Matter of J-T Assoc. v Hudson Riv.-Black Riv. Regulating Dist., (175 AD2d 438, 440-441 [3d Dept 1991]), the Third Department held that a declaratory judgment serves a legitimate purpose only when all interested persons who might be affected are before the court, and that a court ordinarily must refuse to render such a judgment in the absence of necessary parties. The same rule governs the Article 78 component of a hybrid proceeding: a party whose interest may be adversely affected by a potential judgment must be made a party. See Matter of Karmel v White Plains Common Council, 284 AD2d 464, 465 [2d Dept 2001]; See also Matter of Feder v Town of Islip Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 114 AD3d 782, 784 [2d Dept 2014].

Measured against that standard, Sterling qualifies. Accepting the allegations of the Amended Complaint as true, Sterling holds an easement over the Road and uses it for commercial ingress and egress for trucks in its carting business. See NYSCEF Doc. No. 24, Am. Compl. ¶¶ 26-27, 61. The third cause of action asks this Court to declare whether vehicular ingress and egress over the Road is a permitted or a prohibited use of land under the Village Code. A declaration on that question cannot sensibly be confined to Ramapo Field's vehicles. If the ZBA's interpretation is sustained, the lawfulness of Sterling's own commercial traffic over the same fifty-foot strip is necessarily drawn into question; if the interpretation is annulled, Sterling's use is confirmed. Either way, Sterling “might be inequitably affected by a judgment in the action.” See Civil Practice Law and Rules § 1001 [a].

Sterling protests that nothing in the Amended Complaint seeks termination of its easement or adjudication of its property rights. That is true, but it is short sighted. Civil Practice Law and Rules § 1001(a) does not ask whether relief is demanded against the absentee; it asks whether the absentee's interests would be affected by the judgment. The declaration sought here fixes the permissible use of a roadway in which Sterling claims an interest by grant. Sterling's stake in that declaration is concrete, not hypothetical.

It bears emphasis that the procedural vehicle Sterling has chosen does not fit the objection it raises. A motion under Civil Practice Law and Rules § 3211(a) (7) tests the sufficiency of a pleading. A party that believes itself unnecessarily joined may apply to be dropped pursuant to Civil Practice Law and Rules § 1003, which permits the court to drop parties at any stage of the action and upon such terms as may be just. For the reasons stated, such an application would not succeed on this record.

Accordingly, so much of the motion which seeks dismissal of the First, Second and Third causes of action as against Sterling is denied. As to those causes of action Sterling is a necessary party, is properly joined as a Respondent-Defendant, and will be bound by the judgment rendered — with the understanding, stated in the decretal paragraphs below, that no affirmative relief is sought or may be awarded against Sterling upon them.

E. The Causes of Action Sounding in Constitutional Injury Are Dismissed as Against Sterling

A different conclusion obtains as to the Fourth, Fifth and Sixth causes of action, and as to the Seventh insofar as it seeks injunctive relief restraining Sterling.

Each of those claims — regulatory taking, substantive due process, and selective enforcement and equal protection — is by its nature a claim against government. The constitutional guarantees invoked restrain governmental, not private, conduct, and liability requires state action. See Sharrock v Dell Buick-Cadillac, 45 NY2d 152, 157 [1978]; See also Lugar v Edmondson Oil Co., 457 US 922, 936-937 [1982]. A selective enforcement claim in the land use context requires a showing that the claimant, compared with others similarly situated, was selectively treated, and that the selective treatment was based on impermissible considerations or was intended to inhibit or punish the exercise of constitutional rights. See Bower Assoc. v Town of Pleasant Val., 2 NY3d 617, 630-631 [2004]. The defendant on such a claim is the enforcing authority.

The Fourth, Fifth, Sixth and Seventh causes of action within the Amended Complaint employ “group pleading” and do not delineate which of the named defendants they pertain. In regard to the instant application, the aforementioned causes of action fail to allege any governmental act by Sterling. The Amended Complaint does not allege that Sterling issued the appearance ticket, participated in the ZBA's deliberations, voted, or exercised any municipal function whatsoever. See NYSCEF Doc. No. 24, Am. Complaint, ¶¶ 137-178. Sterling is only alleged to be a landowner, whose property fronts the Road and uses same for ingress and egress to its property located at 99 Sterling Mine Road via easements created by prior landowners. See NYSCEF Doc. No. 24, Am. Complaint, ¶¶ 26-27. Ramapo Field's own submission in opposition to Sterling's motion confirms as much: it represents that its constitutional claims do not depend upon wrongdoing by Sterling, and instead that Sterling's unlimited use of the Road, as Petitioner's similarly situated neighbor, will constitute evidence supporting their claims against the governmental defendants. See NYSCEF Doc. No. 61, Aff. in Opp., ¶ 3-4. A comparator is a source of proof, not a defendant. Sterling's alleged similarity to Ramapo Field is evidence bearing upon the Village's conduct; it is not a theory of liability against Sterling.

The necessary-party argument does not rescue these counts. Joinder secures Sterling's presence so that the Article 78 and declaratory relief may bind it and affect its rights; it does not convert Sterling into a proper defendant on claims for constitutional redress and damages that lie only against the municipal respondents. A pleading must give notice of the transactions intended to be proved and of the material elements of each cause of action (Civil Practice Law and Rules § 3013), and a pleading that refers to defendants collectively, group pleading, without identifying conduct attributable to a particular defendant, does not satisfy that requirement. See Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v Merchants Mut. Ins. Co., 84 AD2d 736, 736 [1st Dept 1981]; Principia Partners LLC v Swap Fin. Group, LLC, 194 AD3d 584, 585 [1st Dept 2021]). The authorities on group pleading appear for the first time in Sterling's reply, and the Court considers them only insofar as they amplify the contention advanced in the moving papers that the Amended Complaint pleads no conduct by Sterling. See USAA Fed. Sav. Bank v Calvin, 145 AD3d 704, 706 [2d Dept 2016].

The Fourth, Fifth and Sixth causes of action are therefore dismissed as against Sterling. Ramapo Field has not cross-moved for leave to replead and, on its own description of the pleading, contemplates no repleading as against Sterling; the dismissal is accordingly without leave to replead, but it is without prejudice to Ramapo Field's right to prove Sterling's use of the Road as evidence in support of its claims against the municipal respondents. The Seventh cause of action, which seeks injunctive relief and a stay ancillary to the first three, is dismissed as against Sterling only to the extent it would restrain Sterling; nothing in this determination limits the effect upon Sterling, as a party, of any stay or injunction directed to the municipal respondents.

To the extent Sterling asks that the Amended Complaint be dismissed against it in its entirety and with prejudice, that relief is denied. Sterling remains a party for the reasons set forth above.

F. The Baratta Defendants' Request for Dismissal Is Denied

The Baratta defendants took no position on Sterling's motion but asked that any dismissal in Sterling's favor be extended to them. They made no cross motion. A party seeking relief in connection with another party's motion is as a general rule required to proceed by cross motion, although the court retains discretion to entertain a request that does not satisfy Civil Practice Law and Rules § 2215. See Fried v Jacob Holding, Inc., 110 AD3d 56, 64-65 [2d Dept 2013].

The Court declines to exercise that discretion here. The Baratta defendants are not similarly situated to Sterling on the face of the pleading, which alleges that they were parties to prior litigation with Ramapo Field concerning ownership of and access over the Road, that they did not appeal the judgment rendered in that litigation, and that the enforcement effort now under review was prompted by complaints from neighboring owners involved in it. Whether those allegations state a claim is a question of substance that Ramapo Field has had no occasion to address, the request having been made in an affirmation responding to a different party's motion. The application is denied without prejudice to a properly noticed motion.

Accordingly, it is hereby

ORDERED that the Motion of Respondent-Defendant Sterling Carting, Inc. (Motion Seq. No. 2) for an order dismissing the Amended Verified Petition and Complaint as against it is granted in part and denied in part; and it is further

ORDERED that the branch of the motion (Motion Seq. No. 1) which is pursuant to Civil Practice Law and Rules § 3211 (a) (1) is denied; and it is further

ORDERED that the branch of the motion (Motion Seq. No. 1) which is pursuant to Civil Practice Law and Rules § 3211 (a) (7) is granted to the extent that the Fourth, Fifth and Sixth

causes of action are dismissed as against Sterling Carting, Inc., and the Seventh cause of action is dismissed as against Sterling Carting, Inc. insofar as it seeks injunctive relief restraining Sterling Carting, Inc.; and it is further

ORDERED that the branch of the motion (Motion Seq. No. 1) which is pursuant to Civil Practice Law and Rules § 3211 (a) (7) is otherwise denied, and Sterling Carting, Inc. shall remain a respondent-defendant in this hybrid proceeding as a necessary party pursuant to Civil Practice Law and Rules § 1001 (a) with respect to the first, second and third causes of action and shall be bound by the judgment rendered thereon; and it is further

ORDERED that no affirmative relief is sought by, or may be awarded to, Ramapo Field, LLC against Sterling Carting, Inc. upon the First, Second, Third or Seventh causes of action; and it is further

ORDERED that the application of Respondents-Defendants John J. Baratta and the Estate of James O'Brien d/b/a BB&D Properties for dismissal of the Amended Verified Petition and Complaint as against them is denied, without prejudice to a properly noticed motion; and it is further

ORDERED that Sterling Carting, Inc. shall serve and file its answer to the remaining causes of action within ten days after service of a copy of this Decision and Order with notice of entry (see Civil Practice Law and Rules § 3211 [f]); and it is further

ORDERED that Ramapo Field's Order to Show Cause (Motion Seq. No. 2) seeking a preliminary injunction and stay of enforcement of the ZBA determination is granted pending the outcome of this action or further order of this Court; and it is further

ORDERED that counsel for all parties shall appear for a conference on October 13, 2026, at 9:30 a.m.

The foregoing constitutes the Decision and Order of this Court as to Motion Seq. Nos. 1 and 2.

FOOTNOTES

1.   On July 9, 2026 the parties appeared before the undersigned on a related action, Village of Sloatsburg v Ramapo Field, LLC, Index No. 034420/2026, for oral argument on a pending Order to Show Cause in that action which sought a temporary restraining order against Ramapo Field, LLC. In a Decision and order dated July 23, 2026, the preliminary injunction was denied without prejudice. Index No. 034420/2026, NYSCEF Doc. No. 37.

John P. Collins, Jr., J.