PARK NATIONAL CAPITAL FUNDING LLC v. 670 PARK PLACE LLC (2026)

DECISION & ORDER

In an action to foreclose two mortgages, the defendant 670 Park Place, LLC, appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Caroline Mazzu Genovesi, J.), dated July 16, 2025.  The order, insofar as appealed from, denied that branch of that defendant's motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3211(a) to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against it and granted that branch of that defendant's motion which was to stay all proceedings in the action pending the determination of a related action only to the extent of staying all proceedings in the action pending the determination of the related action on the condition that 670 Park Place, LLC, post a bond in the amount of $100,000.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.

The plaintiff commenced this action against the defendant 670 Park Place, LLC (hereinafter 670 Park), among others, to foreclose two mortgages on certain real property located in Brooklyn.  670 Park moved pursuant to CPLR 3211(a) to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against it or, in the alternative, to stay all proceedings in this action pending the determination of a related action entitled Matter of Fisher v 670 Park Place, LLC, et al., pending in the Supreme Court, Kings County, under Index No. 506341/18.  The plaintiff opposed.  In an order dated July 16, 2025, the Supreme Court, inter alia, denied that branch of 670 Park's motion which was to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against it and granted that branch of its motion which was to stay all proceedings in the action pending the determination of the related action only to the extent of staying all proceedings in the action pending the determination of the related action on the condition that 670 Park post a bond in the amount of $100,000.  670 Park appeals.

Pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(4), a court has broad discretion to dismiss an action based on another pending action where there is a substantial identity of the parties, the two actions are sufficiently similar, and the relief sought is substantially the same (see Mazzei v. Kyriacou, 139 AD3d 823, 824;  Montalvo v Air Dock Sys., 37 AD3d 567, 567).  While a complete identity of parties is not a necessity for dismissal under CPLR 3211(a)(4), there must at least be a “substantial” identity of parties, “which generally is present when at least one plaintiff and one defendant is common in each action” (Ashwood v. Uber USA, LLC, 219 AD3d 1289, 1290 [internal quotations marks omitted] ).

Here, 670 Park failed to demonstrate that the related action involved substantially identical parties (see Jaber v Elayyan, 168 AD3d 693, 694).  Moreover, the relief sought by the plaintiff in this action is not substantially the same as the relief sought by the plaintiff in the related action (see Mason ESC, LLC v Michael Anthony Contr.  Corp., 172 AD3d 1195, 1196).  Accordingly, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in denying that branch of 670 Park's motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(4) to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against it.

Contrary to 670 Park's further contention, under the circumstances of this case, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in directing 670 Park to post a bond in the amount of $100,000 as a condition of the stay that it requested (see id. § 2201;  Bank of N.Y. v Levy, 123 A.D.2d 589, 589;  Ziegler v Elliott Camp Corp., 62 NYS2d 74, 75).

The parties' remaining contentions are without merit.

BARROS, J.P., CHAMBERS, TAYLOR and GOLDBERG VELAZQUEZ, JJ., concur.