PEOPLE v. FARQUHARSON (2026)

DECISION & ORDER

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Dineen Riviezzo, J.), rendered October 11, 2019, convicting him of rape in the third degree, forcible touching, attempted assault in the third degree, endangering the welfare of a child, and criminal mischief in the fourth degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.

ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.

The defendant's contention that he was deprived of a fair trial due to the Supreme Court's admission of certain testimony pursuant to People v Molineux (168 NY 264) is without merit.  The testimony at issue provided relevant background information and was relevant to the defendant's intent (see People v Hu Sin, 44 NY3d 455, 462;  People v Patierno, 240 AD3d 516, 517).  Moreover, the court providently exercised its discretion in determining that the probative value of that evidence outweighed the potential for prejudice to the defendant, and the court's limiting instruction to the jury served to alleviate any potential prejudice resulting from the admission of that evidence (see People v Patierno, 240 AD3d at 517;  People v Migranyan, 237 AD3d 1109, 1110).

Moreover, contrary to the defendant's contention, the Supreme Court's Sandoval ruling (see People v Sandoval, 34 NY2d 371) was a provident exercise of its discretion and did not deprive him of a fair trial (see People v McPherson, 228 AD3d 686, 686;  People v Blackman, 13 AD3d 640, 641–642;  cf.  People v Weinstein, 42 NY3d 439, 466).

Contrary to the defendant's contention, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in admitting expert testimony on the subjects of domestic violence, coercive control, and trauma, and the defendant was not deprived of a fair trial on this basis (see People v Carroll, 95 NY2d 375, 387;  People v Farmer, 203 AD3d 743, 744; People v Whitson, 166 AD3d 663, 664).  The court did not allow the expert to testify regarding the particular facts of this case or to offer an opinion as to whether the conduct at issue constituted domestic violence or coercive control.  Instead, the expert's testimony was limited to describing the general behavior patterns of domestic violence perpetrators and victims in order to explain behaviors that might be beyond the ken of the average juror (see People v Carroll, 95 NY2d at 387;  People v Whitson, 166 AD3d at 664;  People v Walters, 127 AD3d 889, 889).

“As a general rule, ‘evidence that a victim of sexual assault promptly complained about the incident is admissible to corroborate the allegation that an assault took place’ ” (People v Rosario, 17 NY3d 501, 511, quoting People v McDaniel, 81 NY2d 10, 16;  see People v Gross, 172 AD3d 741, 743).  A victim's outcry is prompt if it is made “ ‘at the first suitable opportunity’ ” (People v McDaniel, 81 NY2d at 17, quoting People v O'Sullivan, 104 NY 481, 486), which is “a relative concept dependent on the facts—what might qualify as prompt in one case might not in another” (id.;  see People v Rosario, 17 NY3d at 512–513;  People v Gross, 172 AD3d at 743;  People v Evangelista, 155 AD3d 972).

Here, although the testimony regarding the complainant's disclosure to a social worker, nine months after the events in question, cannot be considered “prompt outcry” under the circumstances of this case, and was, thus, inadmissible (see People v Rosario, 17 NY3d at 513;  People v Leon, 98 AD3d 1065, 1065), such error was harmless.  The evidence of the defendant's guilt was overwhelming, and there is no significant probability that, absent the error, the defendant would have been acquitted (see People v Crimmins, 36 NY2d 230, 241–242;  People v Hernandez, 185 AD3d 963, 963).  Further, the Supreme Court provided an appropriate limiting instruction, which is presumed to have been heeded (see People v Robertson, 240 AD3d 617, 619;  People v Caban, 126 AD3d 808, 809).

IANNACCI, J.P., VOUTSINAS, GOLIA and MCCORMACK, JJ., concur.