HERRERA v. Raymour & Flanigan Furniture, et al., appellants, et al., defendant. (2026)

DECISION & ORDER

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendants Raymour & Flanigan Furniture, Raymour & Flanigan Properties, LLC, and Raymours Furniture Co., Inc., appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Cassandra A. Johnson, J.), dated March 27, 2024.  The order denied those defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and all cross-claims insofar as asserted against them.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with one bill of costs.

On a particular day in June 2019, the plaintiffs were passengers in a vehicle driven by the defendant Anthony Almonte–Hernandez on an expressway in Queens when that vehicle allegedly was struck by a truck.  The plaintiffs commenced this action to recover damages for personal injuries against, among others, Raymour & Flanigan Furniture, Raymour & Flanigan Properties, LLC, and Raymours Furniture Company, Inc. (hereinafter collectively the Raymour defendants), and Almonte–Hernandez.  The plaintiffs alleged that the Raymour defendants controlled the truck that struck the vehicle driven by Almonte–Hernandez.  Almonte–Hernandez commenced a related personal injury action.  The Raymour defendants moved in this action for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and all cross-claims insofar as asserted against them.  In an order dated March 27, 2024, the Supreme Court denied the Raymour defendants' motion.  The Raymour defendants appeal.

“[D]efendants moving for summary judgment in a negligence action arising out of an automobile accident have the burden of establishing, prima facie, that they were not at fault in the happening of the accident or that the alleged negligence of another person was the sole proximate cause of the accident” (Harrington v. Tucker, 238 A.D.3d 724, 725, 232 N.Y.S.3d 617 [citations and internal quotation marks omitted];  see Elusma v. Jackson, 186 A.D.3d 1326, 1327–1328, 130 N.Y.S.3d 500).  “A motion for summary judgment should not be granted where the facts are in dispute, where conflicting inferences may be drawn from the evidence, or where there are issues of credibility” (Pokazanova v. Kellyman, 233 A.D.3d 952, 953, 225 N.Y.S.3d 284 [internal quotation marks omitted];  see Schmitz v. Pinto, 220 A.D.3d 681, 681–682, 197 N.Y.S.3d 326).

Here, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving parties, the Raymour defendants' submissions, which included a transcript of the deposition testimony of the plaintiffs, Almonte–Hernandez, and the alleged truck driver, provided conflicting evidence as to the material facts surrounding the incident and, thus, failed to establish the Raymour defendants' prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law (see Schmitz v. Pinto, 220 A.D.3d at 682, 197 N.Y.S.3d 326;  Elusma v. Jackson, 186 A.D.3d at 1328, 130 N.Y.S.3d 500).  Thus, the Raymour defendants failed to meet their initial burden demonstrating the absence of triable issues of fact regarding the cause of the incident, and the Supreme Court properly denied their motion, regardless of the sufficiency of the opposition papers (see Alvarez v. Prospect Hosp., 68 N.Y.2d 320, 324, 508 N.Y.S.2d 923, 501 N.E.2d 572).

The parties' remaining contentions either are without merit or need not be reached in light of our determination.

DILLON, J.P., BRATHWAITE NELSON, LOVE and MCCORMACK, JJ., concur.