PEOPLE v. RODRIGUEZ (2026)

DECISION & ORDER

Appeal by the defendant from a resentence of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Matthew J. D'Emic, J.), imposed May 4, 2021, upon his conviction of attempted murder in the second degree under Kings County Indictment No. 9174/11, upon his plea of guilty, after remittitur from this Court for resentencing (see People v Rodriguez, 172 AD3d 1240).

ORDERED that the resentence is modified, as a matter of discretion in the interest of justice, by providing that the sentence imposed under Kings County Indictment No. 9174/11 shall run concurrently with the concurrent sentences imposed under Kings County Indictment No. 9238/11;  as so modified, the resentence is affirmed.

CPL 720.20(1) requires “that there be a youthful offender determination in every case where the defendant is eligible, even where the defendant fails to request it, or agrees to forgo it as part of a plea bargain” (People v Rudolph, 21 NY3d 497, 501;  see People v Terrence L., 195 AD3d 1041, 1041).  As applicable here, “[s]uch determination shall be in accordance with the following criteria:  (a) If in the opinion of the court the interest of justice would be served by relieving the eligible youth from the onus of a criminal record and by not imposing an indeterminate term of imprisonment of more than four years, the court may, in its discretion, find the eligible youth is a youthful offender” (CPL 720.20[1][a] ).

“While the statute does not set forth any specific criteria to be considered upon an application for youthful offender status, a review of pertinent case law indicates that the factors to be considered include the gravity of the crime and manner in which it was committed, mitigating circumstances, defendant's prior criminal record, prior acts of violence, recommendations in the presentence reports, defendant's reputation, the level of cooperation with authorities, the defendant's attitude toward society and respect for the law, and the prospects for rehabilitation and hope for a future constructive life” (People v Cruickshank, 105 AD2d 325, 335, affd sub nom.  People v Dawn Maria C., 67 NY2d 625;  see People v Middlebrooks, 25 NY3d 516, 527;  People v Wills, 144 AD3d 952, 952–953).  “The determination of whether to grant or deny youthful offender status rests within the sound discretion of the court and depends upon all the attending facts and circumstances of the case” (People v Marcel G., 183 AD3d 667, 668 [internal quotation marks omitted] ).

Here, weighing the serious nature of the crime committed by the defendant and the fact that the defendant committed a similarly serious offense 14 months later in the same location, with the defendant's reputation, the level of cooperation with authorities, the defendant's attitude toward society and respect for the law, and his demonstrated prospects for rehabilitation and hope for a future constructive life, the Supreme Court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in declining to adjudicate the defendant a youthful offender (see People v Torres, 216 AD3d 675, 676;  People v Wills, 144 AD3d 952–953;  People v Raphael, 109 AD2d 899, 899).

However, under the circumstances presented, the sentence imposed was excessive to the extent indicated herein (see People v Jones, 166 AD3d 1479, 1480–1481;  People v Moore, 164 AD3d 1370, 1372).

LASALLE, P.J., FORD, WAN and QUIRK, JJ., concur.