IN RE: Danielle MONAHAN (2026)

DECISION & ORDER

In a family offense proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act article 8, Beverly Zindman appeals from an order of fact-finding and disposition of the Family Court, Nassau County (Ayesha K. Brantley, J.), dated August 27, 2025.  The order of fact-finding and disposition, after a hearing, found that Beverly Zindman committed the family offense of harassment in the second degree and directed the issuance of an order of protection in favor of the petitioner and against Beverly Zindman.

ORDERED that the order of fact-finding and disposition is reversed, on the law, without costs or disbursements, the petition is denied, and the proceeding is dismissed.

The petitioner commenced this proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act article 8 against the appellant, who is the mother of the petitioner's former boyfriend.  The petition alleged that the appellant committed, inter alia, acts constituting the family offense of harassment in the second degree, and sought an order of protection in the petitioner's favor.  After a hearing, the Family Court found that the appellant had committed the family offense of harassment in the second degree and directed that an order of protection be issued in favor of the petitioner and against the appellant.  This appeal ensued.

“The Family Court is a court of limited jurisdiction, and thus, it ‘cannot exercise powers beyond those granted to it by statute’ ” (Matter of Kane v. Tung, 194 AD3d 718, 719, quoting Matter of Johna M.S. v. Russell E.S., 10 NY3d 364, 366;  see Family Ct Act § 115).  Pursuant to Family Court Act § 812(1), the Family Court's jurisdiction in family offense proceedings is limited to certain prescribed acts that occur “between spouses or former spouses, or between parent and child or between members of the same family or household” (see Matter of Woldeselassie v. Colon, 227 AD3d 725, 726).  “[M]embers of the same family or household” include, among others, “persons who are not related by consanguinity or affinity and who are or have been in an intimate relationship regardless of whether such persons have lived together at any time” (Family Ct Act § 812[1][e];  see Matter of Woldeselassie v. Colon, 227 AD3d at 726).  Expressly excluded from the ambit of “intimate relationship” are “casual acquaintance[s]” and “ordinary fraternization between two individuals in business or social contexts” (Family Ct Act § 812[1][e] ).  Beyond those delineated exclusions, what qualifies as an intimate relationship within the meaning of Family Court Act § 812(1)(e) is determined on a case-by-case basis, and the factors a court may consider include “the nature or type of relationship, regardless of whether the relationship is sexual in nature;  the frequency of interaction between the persons;  and the duration of the relationship” (id.;  see Matter of Silverman v Leibowitz, 208 AD3d 1332, 1333).

Here, the parties have no direct relationship and are connected only through a third party, who is the petitioner's former boyfriend and the appellant's son (see Matter of Silverman v. Leibowitz, 208 AD3d at 1333;  Matter of Royster v. Murray, 157 AD3d 701, 702).  Additionally, the parties never resided together and their contact with one another was minimal and related only to a few visits between the appellant and the petitioner's daughter (see Matter of Johnson v. Carter, 122 AD3d 853, 854;  cf.  Matter of Winston v. Edwards–Clarke, 127 AD3d 771, 773).  Accordingly, the parties do not have an intimate relationship within the meaning of Family Court Act § 812(1)(e).

Since the parties do not have an intimate relationship within the meaning of Family Court Act § 812(1)(e), the Family Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to entertain the family offense petition (see Matter of Royster v. Murray, 157 AD3d at 703).

In light of our determination, we need not reach the appellant's remaining contention.

IANNACCI, J.P., VOUTSINAS, GOLIA and MCCORMACK, JJ., concur.