SAGALA v. ZIRS SERVICES INC (2026)

DECISION & ORDER

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, etc., the plaintiffs John D. Sagala and Sheri Sagala appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Rockland County (Thomas P. Zugibe, J.), dated June 16, 2025.  The order, insofar as appealed from, granted that branch of the defendants' motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted by the plaintiffs John D. Sagala and Sheri Sagala on the ground that the plaintiff John D. Sagala did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102(d) as a result of the subject accident.

ORDERED that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, with costs, and that branch of the defendants' motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted by the plaintiffs John D. Sagala and Sheri Sagala on the ground that the plaintiff John D. Sagala did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102(d) as a result of the subject accident is denied.

The plaintiff John D. Sagala (hereinafter the injured plaintiff), and his wife, Sheri Sagala (hereinafter together the plaintiffs), suing derivatively, among others, commenced this action against the defendants, inter alia, to recover damages for personal injuries that the injured plaintiff alleged he sustained while he was a passenger in a motor vehicle which collided with the defendants' vehicle.  The defendants moved, among other things, for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted by the plaintiffs on the ground that the injured plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102(d) as a result of the subject accident.  The plaintiffs opposed.  In an order dated June 16, 2025, the Supreme Court, inter alia, granted that branch of the motion.  The plaintiffs appeal.

The defendants failed to meet their prima facie burden of showing that the injured plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102(d) as a result of the accident (see Toure v. Avis Rent A Car Sys., 98 N.Y.2d 345;  Gaddy v. Eyler, 79 N.Y.2d 955, 956–957).  The defendants failed to submit competent medical evidence establishing, prima facie, that the injured plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury to his head and brain under the permanent consequential limitation of use and significant limitation of use categories (see Prado v. Town/Village of Harrison, 244 AD3d 884, 886;  Bryan v. City of Long Beach, 138 AD3d 774, 776).  The defendants also failed to establish, prima facie, that the injuries to the injured plaintiff's head and brain were not caused by the accident (see Prado v. Town/Village of Harrison, 244 AD3d at 886;  Petric v. Retsina Cab Corp., 235 AD3d 672, 673).

Accordingly, since the defendants failed to meet their prima facie burden, the Supreme Court should have denied that branch of the defendants' motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted by the plaintiffs, regardless of the sufficiency of the their opposition papers (see Winegrad v. New York Univ. Med. Ctr., 64 N.Y.2d 851, 853;  Prado v. Town/Village of Harrison, 244 AD3d at 886).

The parties' remaining contentions are academic in light of our determination.

DUFFY, J.P., WARHIT, VENTURA and OTTLEY, JJ., concur.