INFANTE v. MANOLARAKIS (2026)

DECISION & ORDER

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Aaron D. Maslow, J.), dated November 7, 2025.  The order denied the plaintiff's motion pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) to dismiss the defendant's counterclaim.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with costs.

The plaintiff commenced this action to recover damages for personal injuries she alleged she sustained in November 2023 when she was a passenger in a vehicle operated by her husband Miguel A. Infante Garcia (hereinafter Garcia), which collided with a vehicle operated by the defendant on the Belt Parkway in Brooklyn.  The defendant interposed an amended answer in which he asserted a counterclaim to recover damages for fraud.  The counterclaim alleged, inter alia, that the plaintiff and Garcia staged the accident.  The plaintiff moved pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) to dismiss the counterclaim.  The defendant opposed the motion, submitting his own affirmation describing the incident and an affirmation of a biomechanical engineer who opined, among other things, that the plaintiff's alleged injuries were inconsistent with the circumstances of the accident.  By order dated November 7, 2025, the Supreme Court denied the plaintiff's motion.  The plaintiff appeals.

“On a motion to dismiss a counterclaim pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court must accept as true the facts as alleged in the [pleading] and submissions in opposition to the motion, accord [the pleading party] the benefit of every possible favorable inference and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory” (Maspeth Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn. v Elizer, 197 A.D.3d 1253, 1254, 153 N.Y.S.3d 580 [internal quotation marks omitted];  see Davydov v. Youssefi, 205 A.D.3d 879, 880, 166 N.Y.S.3d 557).

“The elements of a cause of action sounding in fraud are a material misrepresentation of an existing fact, made with knowledge of the falsity, an intent to induce reliance thereon, justifiable reliance upon the misrepresentation, and damages” (Davidoff v. Hershfield, 233 A.D.3d 926, 927, 224 N.Y.S.3d 468 [internal quotation marks omitted];  see Asamblea De Iglesias Christianas, Inc. v. DeVito, 210 A.D.3d 843, 845, 179 N.Y.S.3d 82).  CPLR 3016(b) provides that the circumstances constituting fraud “shall be stated in detail” (see Lanzi v. Brooks, 43 N.Y.2d 778, 780, 402 N.Y.S.2d 384, 373 N.E.2d 278;  RBE N. Funding, Inc. v. Stone Mtn. Holdings, LLC, 78 A.D.3d 807, 809, 911 N.Y.S.2d 115).  The pleading requirements of CPLR 3016(b) are satisfied “when the facts [pleaded] are sufficient to permit a reasonable inference of the alleged conduct” (Pludeman v. N. Leasing Sys., Inc., 10 N.Y.3d 486, 492, 860 N.Y.S.2d 422, 890 N.E.2d 184;  see Star Auto Sales of Queens, LLC v. Filardo, 203 A.D.3d 865, 868, 165 N.Y.S.3d 100).

Here, the counterclaim set forth a cognizable cause of action alleging fraud and stated in sufficient detail the facts constituting the wrong, as required by CPLR 3016(b) (see Gimenez v. Pepsi–Cola Bottling Co. of N.Y., Inc., 234 A.D.3d 943, 945, 225 N.Y.S.3d 691).

Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly denied the plaintiff's motion pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) to dismiss the defendant's counterclaim.

CONNOLLY, J.P., CHRISTOPHER, WARHIT and GOLIA, JJ., concur.