J.C-R., Plaintiff, v. R.A.R., Defendant. (2026)

Recitation as required by CPLR 2219(a) of the papers considered in the review of Motion Sequence Numbers 001 and 002

Document Numbered

Summons and Complaint 1

Order to Show Cause by Plaintiff (Mot. Seq. No. 006) 2

Affirmation in Opposition by Defendant 3

Affirmation in Reply by Plaintiff 4

Notice of Motion by Defendant (Seq. No. 007) 5

Affirmation in Opposition by Plaintiff 6

Affirmation in Reply by Defendant 7

Order to Show Cause by Plaintiff (Mot. Seq. No. 008) 8

Affirmation in Opposition by Defendant 9

Affirmation in Reply by Plaintiff 10

Transcript of Proceedings Dated June 27, 2025 11

Upon the foregoing cited papers, the Decision and Order is as follows:

Factual & Procedural History

Plaintiff Wife J. C.-R. and Defendant Husband R. A. R. were married on June 24, 1990, in Kings County, New York. The parties had three children who are all now emancipated. Wife commenced the present action for divorce by filing a Summons and Verified Complaint on February 16, 2021. Husband filed an Answer on April 28, 2021. After this divorce action was litigated for approximately four years before other Parts, it was assigned to the present Part for trial on or about February 13, 2025.

On June 27, 2026, the parties appeared for a pre-trial settlement conference in an attempt to resolve the matter or limit the issues for trial. Both parties spent several hours with the Court's attorney negotiating settlement terms. Counsel for both parties further stressed on the record that they had spent a considerable amount of time negotiating settlement terms out of court in preparation for the conference. In addition to the exchange of written proposals, the parties engaged in five or six settlement meetings before the court appearance (Tr. 6/27/25, pg. 9).

Based upon the terms negotiated by the parties out of court, and refined by their discussions in court, the parties' ultimately agreed upon settlement terms to resolve the action. Although this action was commenced as one seeking a Judgment of Divorce pursuant to Domestic Relations Law § 170(7), the parties' agreement converted the action to one seeking a Judgment of Separation pursuant to Domestic Relations Law § 200(6). Pursuant to CPLR § 3025(b) a party may amend their pleadings at any time via stipulation.

The parties, entered into an oral settlement agreement ("Stipulation") on this Court's record on June 27, 2025. Husband and Wife were fully allocuted by this Court as to the terms spread on the record which this Court referred to as being a "full and final settlement" (Tr. 6/27/25, pg. 7). The parties were allocuted in the presence of their lawyers and they indicated that they were satisfied with their representation. Each party further acknowledged on the record that they had an adequate opportunity to speak with their attorneys about the terms of the settlement. The parties also affirmed that they were not "forced, pressured or threatened" into agreeing. Finally, the parties affirmed that their attorneys would prepare a formal stipulation and Judgment of Separation based on the terms of their settlement, but that they were not permitted to change those terms as they were binding as stated.

Settlement agreements placed on the record in open court are binding. See Chernow v. Chernow, 51 AD3d 705 (2d Dept. 2008); see also Pretterhofer v. Pretterhofer, 37 AD3d 446 (2d Dept. 2007). Stipulations of settlement are favored by the courts and are not lightly cast aside, particularly where the parties are represented by attorneys. See Tavolacci v. Tavolacci, 114 AD3d 759 (2d Dept. 2014). Where a party voluntarily agrees to be bound by a stipulation placed on the record in open court, the agreement will not be set aside based on a party's subsequent refusal to execute a written stipulation. See Taormina v. Taormina, 85 AD3d 766 (2d Dept. 2011). If a comprehensive stipulation of settlement omits a specific issue, that issue is generally considered to be waived. See Ebel v. Ebel, 121 AD3d 934 (2d Dept. 2014). Moreover, the failure to include specific dollar amounts in a stipulation does not render it an unenforceable "agreement to agree." See Weitz. v. Weitz, 227 AD3d 1124 (2d Dept. 2024).

Present Motions

On March 19, 2026, Husband filed a Motion (Seq. No. 007) seeking to vacate the parties' Stipulation on several grounds. The primary ground relied upon by Husband is his subjective belief that the record was "incomplete." Husband further argues that he did not understand that the agreement was a "full and final settlement" and that he would be waving claims that were not addressed. Husband claims that he is entitled to a credit for alleged maintenance overpayments that was omitted from the agreement. Finally, Husband argues that the parties failed to fully resolve the issue of equitable distribution as several details regarding the sale of the marital home are missing, including the value of his separate property credits. Absent these credits Husband claims that the parties could not have had a meeting of the minds on the issue of equitable distribution. Husband seeks the ability to further negotiate a more "comprehensive" stipulation or, in the alternative, to refer those issues that he believes were omitted to trial. Wife filed opposition to this motion on April 3, 2026, and Husband filed a reply on April 6, 2026.

On March 19, 2026, Wife filed an Order to Show Cause (Seq. No. 008) seeking an Order granting her summary judgment pursuant to CPLR § 3212 and enforcing the settlement terms as set forth on the June 27th record. Wife argues that there is nothing vague, unenforceable or unconscionable about the Stipulation to justify this Court setting it aside. Wife seeks leave to file a Judgment of Separation incorporating the terms of the parties' Stipulation. Finally, Wife requests a counsel fee award in the sum of $50,000 pursuant to DRL § 237 and for the necessity of having to file a motion to enforce the Stipulation. Husband has filed opposition to the motion and Wife filed a reply. Motions 007 and 008 were submitted for decision upon receipt of the transcript.

Applicable Law

Pursuant to CPLR § 2104, an oral stipulation entered into on the record in open court constitutes a binding contract. See Matter of Abeido v. Abeido, 54 AD3d 330 (2d Dept. 2008); see also Blake v. Blake, 229 AD2d 509 (2d Dept. 1996). A party seeking to vacate such a stipulation must establish grounds sufficient to invalidate a contract, such as fraud, collusion, mistake, accident or unconscionability. See Young v. Young, 179 AD3d 1124 (2d Dept. 2019); see also Wilson v. Wilson, 35 AD3d 595 (2d Dept. 2006).

The proponent of a summary judgment motion has the initial burden of making a prima facie showing of entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by tendering sufficient evidence to eliminate any material issues of fact from the case. See Otty Cab Corp. v. Nazir, 72 N.Y.S.3d 517 (2d Dept. 2017). Once a prima facie showing of entitlement to summary judgment has been established, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to raise a material issue of fact sufficient to defeat the motion and warrant a trial. See Ubillus-Tambini v. Ischakov, 36 N.Y.S.3d 410 (2d Dept. 2016).

Decision

A review of June 27, 2026, record reveals that the parties knowingly and voluntarily entered into an agreement in open court that was identified as a "full and final settlement" of all material issues pertinent to this matrimonial action. The Stipulation was the product of hours of negotiation in and out of court, in which both parties personally participated with the assistance of their attorneys. Husband's own attorney stated the extent of negotiation that led to a meeting of the minds between the parties. See Mock v. Chamberlain, 224 AD2d 499 (2d Dept. 1996). While Husband now argues that he did not construe the record to be a complete and final understanding of the parties agreement, he unambiguously acknowledged that it was "full and final" on the record. The fact that Husband feels, in hindsight, that the Stipulation failed to address every issue is an insufficient ground for vacatur. See Hannigan v. Hannigan, 50 AD3d 957 (2d Dept. 2008). If an issue was omitted from the agreement, the court must assume that the parties intended for it to be omitted. See Bethea v. Thousand, 127 AD3d 798 (2d Dept. 2015); see also D.J. v. C.R., 2022 NYLJ LEXIS 547 (Supt. Ct. Nass. Cty. 2022).

Wife has established that the parties entered into a binding oral agreement resolving the issues material to the issuance of a Judgment of Separation. See Khitri v. Aaglane-Khitri, 247 AD3d 1168 (2d Dept. 2026). Thus, she has met her initial burden and established her entitlement to summary judgment as a matter of law. See Bohner v. Bohner, 186 AD3d 1481 (2d Dept. 2020); see also Burger v. Burger, 951 N.Y.S.2d 332 (Sup. Ct. Nass. Cty. 2012). This shifts the burden to Husband to raise a material issue of fact.

In opposition, Husband primarily contests the settlement terms concerning the marital home as "incomplete." Regarding the home, the parties agreed to the following:

"The martial residence, located on S. Street in Staten Island, will be sold subject to the appraisal they are waiting for from Neglia. The husband will get a separate property credit for the value of the land at the date of marriage, again, subject to the appraisal that we are waiting for from Neglia. Both parties must reasonably agree on the above numbers before we move forward with the transaction. Both Parties are to agree whether to do repairs on the house or the house to be sold as is."

While the Stipulation does not include precise values to be used in determining Husband's credits, this does not present a material issue of fact sufficient to deny summary judgment or to set aside the parties' Stipulation. See Matter of Marquez v. Rodriguez, 299 AD2d 551 (2d Dept. 2002); see also D'Angelo v. D'Angelo, 977 N.Y.S.2d 666 (Sup. Ct. Qns. Cty. 2013). As the Stipulation contains all the terms necessary to grant Judgment of Separation, it should simply be enforced as stated. See Wilson v. Wilson, 35 AD3d 595 (2d Dept. 2006). Notably, as the parties' Stipulation seeks a Judgment of Separation, as opposed to a Judgment of Divorce, the details of equitable distribution need not be delineated for a Judgment to be granted. See DRL § 200(6); see also Anglin v. Anglin, 80 NY2d 553 (1992). This Court finds that the parties' Stipulation sufficiently sets forth the procedure by which the marital home will be sold, including a mechanism for Husband to be afforded a separate property credit for the value of the land, a procedure for setting the listing price, and a procedure for the determination of whether repairs are needed (Tr. 6/27/25, pg. 56). To the extent that the parties cannot agree on terms, as required by their agreement, they are invited to return to this Court for a post-judgment ruling, and a hearing, if necessary.

Regarding Husband's alleged overpayment of maintenance, there is no basis for this Court to find that this issue was accidentally omitted from the Stipulation. Rather, the parties agreed to a specific maintenance award and failed to include a provision for overpayments. The Court is not permitted to insert an overpayment provision after the fact. See Hannigan v Hannigan, 50 AD3d 957 (2d Dept. 2008); see also Karmin v Karmin, 19 AD3d 458 (2d Dept. 2005). As the claim was not addressed, it must be deemed waived and subsumed into the Stipulation. See Gaisi v Gaisi, 48 AD3d 744 (2d Dept. 2008). In any event, there is a strong public policy against the recoupment of support payments and there is no evidence that Wife ever agreed to the same. See O'Donnell v O'Donnell, 153 AD3d 1357 (2d Dept. 2017); See also Rader v Rader, 54 AD3d 919 (2d Dept. 2008).

Finally, Husband argues that this Court should not grant summary judgment and should instead vacate the Stipulation in its entirety as it is unconscionable. "An unconscionable bargain is one which no person in his or her senses and not under delusion would make on one hand and no honest and fair person would accept on the other, the inequality being so strong and manifest as to shock the conscience and confound the judgment of any person of common sense." Ku v. Huey Min Lee, 151 AD3d 1040 (2d Dept. 2017). Here, the parties came to a mutually beneficial agreement with the assistance of their attorneys, and after a full allocution by the Court. Husband's conclusory allegations of unconscionability are insufficient to defeat summary judgment or warrant vacatur. See Rubin v Rubin, 33 AD3d 983 (2d Dept. 2006); see also Korngold v Korngold, 26 AD3d 358 (2d Dept. 2006); Morad v. Morad, 27 AD3d 626 (2d Dept. 2006). Accordingly, this Court finds that Husband failed to raise a material issue of fact in opposition to Wife's motion for summary judgment. See Nigro v Nigro, 44 AD3d 831 (2d Dept. 2007). This Court further finds that Husband failed to establish sufficient grounds to warrant vacatur of the Stipulation. See Cohen v. Cohen, 170 AD3d 948 (2d Dept. 2019); See also Silber v. Silber, 204 AD2d 527 (2d Dept. 1994); Ng. v. Chalasani, 36 N.Y.S.3d 408 (App. Term. 2d Dept. 2016).

Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above, Wife's Order to Show Cause (Seq. No. 008) for summary judgment to enforce the parties' Stipulation is granted. Husband's Notice of Motion (Seq. No. 007) seeking to vacate the parties' Stipulation is denied. The parties are hereby directed to file the necessary paperwork to obtain a Judgment of Separation within 30 days of this Decision and Order.

In addition to seeking enforcement of the parties' Settlement, Wife seeks an award of counsel fees. Wife's counsel fee application is addressed in two separate open motions, sequence numbers 006 and 008. By Order to Show Cause dated April 16, 2025 (Seq. No. 006) Wife sought an award of counsel fees in the amount of $50,000 pursuant to Domestic Relations Law § 237. However, as this motion predated the June 27th settlement, and as that settlement included a provision for the payment of $25,000 from Husband to Wife as a final resolution of the issue of counsel fees, motion 006 has been resolved.

Wife's Order to Show Cause (Seq. No. 008) seeks an award of counsel fees in the amount of $50,000 pursuant to DRL § 237 for the necessity of having to file a motion to enforce the parties' Stipulation. In support of her counsel fee application, Wife has submitted a single partially redacted invoice dated March 19, 2026. This invoice, which includes fees related to the preparation of the present summary judgment motion, totals $5,171. The invoice also includes a section indicating that Wife's total unpaid balance relating to this action was $103,231 as of March 19th. Husband opposes Wife's application for counsel fees arguing that he has already paid substantial counsel fee awards throughout this proceeding, including the $25,000 settlement, and that he cannot afford to pay any additional fees.

While financial need is the primary factor when determining a motion for counsel fees, the court may also consider the relative merits of the parties' positions and any actions taken by a party that result in unnecessary delay. See Marino v. Marino, 183 AD3d 813 (2d Dept. 2020); see also Franco v. Franco, 97 AD3d 785 (2d Dept. 2012). Moreover, when a party is compelled to file an enforcement motion to compel compliance, an award of counsel fees is generally appropriate. See D'Anna v. D'Anna, 17 AD3d 400 (2d Dept. 2005).

Here, the counsel fees incurred in relation to the present motion were only necessitated by Husband's refusal to acknowledge the parties' binding settlement and his unsuccessful attempts to vacate the same. Under these circumstances this Court will exercise its discretion and award counsel fees to Wife's attorney in the amount of $5,171 for the necessity of having to file a Summary Judgment motion to enforce the settlement. See Yakobowicz v. Yakobowicz, 217 AD3d 733 (2d Dept. 2023); Boukas v. Boukas, 163 AD3d 755 (2d Dept. 2018); see also Brown v. Keating, 182 AD2d 552 (1st Dept. 1992). This Court has reviewed the combined billing documentation set forth in Motions 006 and 008 and has determined that Wife's attorney has substantially complied with the billing requirements of 22 NYCRR § 1400.

This constitutes the Decision and Order of this Court in relation to motions 006, 007 and 008. Any issue raised in those motions and not specifically addressed herein is hereby denied. Plaintiff's attorney is hereby directed to serve and file a Judgment of Separation incorporating the terms of the June 27th Stipulation along with all necessary supporting documentation, within 30 days of this Decision.

Dated: 9/16/26

Hon. Catherine M. DiDomenico

Acting Justice Supreme Court

Catherine M. DiDomenico, J.